Eleven

The Undergraduate Journal of Sociology

VOLUME 11   2020

Eleven

The Undergraduate Journal of Sociology

Created By Undergraduates at the
University of California, Berkeley

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Eleven: The Undergraduate Journal of Sociology is the annual publication of *Eleven: The Undergraduate Journal of Sociology*, a non-profit unincorporated association at the University of California, Berkeley.

Grants and Financial Support: This journal was made possible by generous financial support from the Department of Sociology at the University of California, Berkeley.

Special Appreciation: We would also like to thank Rebecca Chavez, Holly Le, Belinda White, Tamar Young, and the Department of Sociology at the University of California, Berkeley.

Contributors: Contributions may be in the form of articles and review essays. Please see the Guide for Future Contributors at the end of this issue.

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"The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it."

–Karl Marx, "XI" from "Theses on Feuerbach"

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EDITOR'S NOTE

We are proud to present the eleventh volume of *Eleven: The Undergraduate Journal of Sociology*. This volume is possible because of the hard work of the featured authors and our dedicated editorial and public relations teams. Additionally, we are grateful to the staff and faculty in the UC Berkeley Department of Sociology, especially our Faculty Advisor, Michael Burawoy.

The year that has challenged our ideas, plans, and institutions has also provoked a search for *identity*: who we are as individuals, and who we are as a society. As *Eleven* contributors and UC Berkeley students explore their identities during and post-college, I believe sociological thought and analysis are inextricably tied to a healthy future. Volume 11 of this journal interrogates this concept of identity in four areas of the sociological imagination.

In "Private or Public," Jiayue Sun compares the different cultures of gay bars in Seoul and Taipei. Sun finds that while gay bars in Taipei were integrated into mainstream culture, gay bars in Seoul were pushed towards the margins. Olivia Zalecki employs her own experiences in "Wo Bu Hui Shuo Zhongwen" to investigate the motivations of adoptees to learn Mandarin Chinese once they are living in the United States. Using survey data, Zalecki finds a primary motivation is the desire for belonging and identity in the wider Chinese community. Next, Zoe Walker investigates links among media treatments, race, and political attitudes in "Racing the Messenger." In a survey experiment, Walker designs a media treatment directed to a Black audience in order to study its effects on political attitudes. Finally, Raquel Zitani-Rios investigates the motivations of residents' police calls in gentrifying neighborhoods. Using Oakland as a case site, Zitani-Rios employs participant observation, content analysis, and rich interview data to probe the correlations between gentrification and racially driven policing.

Clearly, the authors' scholarship incites sociological thought. Since our journal's mission calls for movement beyond analysis, to strategy, I hope you read this volume with an eye on the future, pointed towards action.

Harlow Sharp
Eleven Editor-in-Chief

Private or Public: A Comparative Study between Gay Bars in Seoul and Taipei

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Abstract
This paper explores the different cultures of gay bars in Seoul and Taipei. Gay bars are spaces for LGBT communities to entertain and socialize. Some gay bars exclude heterosexual visitors to protect the privacy of LGBT patrons, while others welcome the general public. In the current study, gay bars in Seoul are classified as "private" and those in Taipei as "public" according to their cultures. This distinction results from both internal and external factors of gay communities. As for the internal factors, gay people in the two cities have different self-identities. As a community, gay people in Seoul do not actively construct a collective identity to boost their visibility, while gay people in Taipei have almost reached a "post-gay" identity where the boundary between them and the mainstream culture has been increasingly blurred. In terms of the external constraints, a similar homonormative placemaking strategy has been applied to both gay spaces, to which the bars in Seoul are resistant while those in Taipei tend to conform more. Such internal and external factors contribute to the distinctive micropolitics of the two types of gay bars.

Keywords
gay bar, gay, sexuality and space, homonormativity

Gay bars serve as a centric space for the leisure and socialization of gay people. Meanwhile, they provide opportunities for patrons who identify as gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, or other sexual minorities (hereinafter LGBT) to form communities and intimacies (Achilles 1967; Brown and Knopp 2016; Chauncey 2008; Israelstam and Lambert 1984). Existing literature has portrayed two different images of gay bars. In some cases, gay bars function as a shelter from the heteronormative mainstream society, which protects the gay community from the hostile and homophobic public (Johnson 2005; Johnson and Samdahl 2005; McVeigh 1997; Moran et al. 2003). Such bars usually have strict gatekeeping and boundary marking policies, which systematically exclude heterosexuals (sometimes even all non-gay people) from the scenes. Therefore, they provide a sense of privacy or "ontological security" (Johnston and Valentine 1995) for patrons to openly express their gay identity, and meanwhile to escape the heterosexual gaze they suffer in their daily life (Myslik 1996).

However, many other gay bars publicly welcome straight people (Bell and Valentine 1995; Binnie and Skeggs 2004; Matejskova 2007; Mattson 2015). Though such bars are predominantly gay-patronized, people of other sexual orientations are also allowed to enjoy the space simultaneously. Therefore, these bars are often regarded as tourist attractions by heterosexual people and global LGBT travelers (Valentine 2002). Some scholars name this phenomenon as "post-gay" (Brown 2006; Ghaziani 2011) or "post-mo" (Nash 2013), indicating that preexisting boundaries between the gay world and the straight world have become blurred and gay subculture is re-assimilated to the mainstream society. Their notion is supported by the statistics showing an increasing public acceptance towards LGBT communities, for example in Taiwan (Hang et al. 2017) and Korea (Kohut et al. 2013). A second scholarly approach to explain this phenomenon borrows the concept of neoliberalism and cosmopolitanism by arguing that gay communities are domesticated and re-appropriated by the mainstream society, and further commodified and consumed (Binnie and Skeggs 2004; Duggan 2002). In other words, gay bars might have faced the dilemma of either partially conforming themselves to the heterosexual world and getting rewarded, or being punished and uprooted, and those bars that survived have chosen the former.

The contradiction between "private" and "public" echoes the classic notion of Achilles (1967:232) that gay bars are "both the center of the private activities of the community and its liaison with the larger society". Similarly, Davis (2013) articulates the identity struggle of gay bar patrons who long

for both a distance from the public and a manifestation of identity in front of the public. Based on these discussions, the first aim of the current study is to investigate what factors have led to either the rejection or the opening-up by gay bars towards the larger society.

Moreover, most existing research has focused on gay scenes in white, middle-class Western societies, while intersections between sexuality and race, class and other issues are under-theorized (Binnie and Skeggs 2004; Binnie and Valentine 1999). Though there is increasing academic awareness of this issue, still relatively few studies have been conducted in non-Western cultures (e.g., Elder 2004). Therefore, the second objective of this research is to fill this gap by providing knowledge of gay bars in East Asia. More importantly, as the following part of this paper will present, the gay communities in this region have taken unique paths of development, and their experience is not identical to the rest of the globe's gay communities.

The current study examines gay bar cultures in Seoul and Taipei. Hitherto no English literature has been produced precisely on this topic. Given the fact that Taipei and Seoul share similar economic, cultural and geopolitical backgrounds, this paper aims to discuss how internal and external factors, namely the patrons and the social environment, shape gay bars into either exclusive or inclusive atmospheres. It will start by discussing the internal problems of mapping gay communities in Seoul and Taipei, where their respective situations are defined as pre-identity and post-identity politics. Then, this paper will proceed to investigate how the two spaces are influenced by the external social environment from the perspective of "new homonormativity" (Duggan 2002). Finally, two models will be proposed to theorize the micropolitics in "private" and "public" gay bars.

DATA AND METHOD

Qualitative data collection methods were adopted in this study; namely, participant observation and semi-structured interviews. Participants included 30 patrons and bartenders from 9 gay bars in 2 areas in Taipei and Seoul where gay bars are concentrated. In this research, those bars in Seoul are defined as "private", while those in Taipei are "public". In Taipei, Ximen Red House Square (西門紅樓廣場, hereinafter, Ximen) was selected as the research venue. It is a gay community accommodating 7 bars on the square and many more indoors, as well as several clothes shops, beauty salons, and so forth. It is the largest and most famous gay space in Taipei, receiving not only locals but also tourists from all over the world. As the following part of this paper will present, a great diversity of patrons' sexual orientations is found there. This diversity exemplifies what Achilles (1967) considers as the connection between gay communities and the larger society, so I identify

this place as "public". The bars I visited include Mudan, THE Garden, G2 Paradise, Shibuya Taipei, and Café Dalida, where 20 patrons and bartenders were interviewed.

In Seoul, Jongno 3-ga (종로3가, hereinafter Jongno) was chosen for study. It is a historical gay assembly area in the city center, dotted with more than one hundred gay bars, pubs, saunas, and karaoke (Chris 2016). However, all bars are located in narrow lanes, basements or upper floors, and are therefore almost invisible to the public. None of the bars I entered was receiving more than 10 patrons at a time. This is why I classify them as "private". Bars where I conducted interviews include Bar Friends, owoo, BB, and Bar Code, where 10 patrons were interviewed. Afterward, 3 additional interviews were conducted in Itaewon (이태원). Itaewon is an international district in Seoul famous for its "Homo Hill", an alley with several gay bars and clubs. To better comprehend my interview results, I talked with English-speaking gay bartenders in this area. However, this area was not selected as a comparison spot in the current study because it was possible that gay bars there, as tourist attractions, did not share exactly the same culture with those in Jongno. In fact, I encountered no difficulties entering gay bars in Itaewon, and many patrons and even bartenders were foreigners, suggesting it did not have the same "private" atmosphere as bars in Jongno.

All observations and interviews were conducted during my one-month stay in the two cities in 2018. I visited the bars at night during both weekdays and weekends. Different strategies were adopted while approaching potential interviewees in the two areas. In Ximen, gay bars were usually crowded, and most patrons came in pairs or in groups. In some cases, they agreed to be interviewed in front of their friends (4 out of 20 interviewees), but in most cases, I had to catch someone who happened to be alone. Therefore, the selection of interviewees in Ximen was largely random, and it turned out that more than half of them were not gay. On the other hand, as I will show in the following part, gay bars in Jongno adopted strict gatekeeping policies. In fact, I visited around 15 bars that I could find, but only the four listed above allowed me in. Since few patrons were in the bar, conversations usually took place automatically when I sat down. All my interviewees in Jongno identified as gay.

Before starting the interviews, I overtly disclosed my identity as a straight foreign university student. Some rejected the interview immediately, and it was possible that some talked to me with reservations. Interviews in Ximen were conducted in Chinese (either Mandarin or Cantonese), while those in Jongno were in English (most with the help of Google Translate). Interview questions included their background information (including sexual orientation), how frequent and why did they visit the gay bar, how

did they perceive this place (e.g., functions, feelings), and how did/would they feel when/if straight people were present.

PROBLEMS OF MAPPING THE "GAY COMMUNITY"

So far, this paper has taken the phrase "gay community" for granted while describing homosexual geographies in Seoul and Taipei as if they have the same implications. However, differences are found in the respective social and cultural understandings of "gay" and "gay *community*".

Multiple Understandings of "Gay"

A primary divergence lies in the fact that the definition of "gay" is not unchanging, yet heavily dependent on the socio-cultural background of specific countries or cities. Based on historical research in New York, Chauncey (1994) argues that gay individuals were not self-defined. Rather, a chaotic identification was imposed upon them because the straight world was continuously drawing boundaries against them. In other words, it is based on the logic of opposition, or "phallogocentrism" (Irigaray, as cited in Butler 2002), instead of any essential or stable criteria that the "normal" world defined for both itself and the gay world.

This notion is also true in East Asia settings. One cultural element frequently mentioned by the interviewees was Confucianism. Confucianism constitutes the state ideology of both Korea and Taiwan to a large extent. In fact, traditional Confucianism in China held a tolerant attitude towards homosexuality, or at least same-sex romance (Zhang 2016). However, Korean society regards Confucianism as a powerful cultural element that combats homosexuality and, thus, has used it as grounds for discrimination (Seo 2001; Yi and Phillips 2015), while Taiwan society rarely claims so. It is true that in Taiwan some reports put traditional family values (a component of Confucian ideology) as one challenge against legalizing same-sex marriage, but there is also an increasing body of literature suggesting the "real" (i.e., inclusive) attitude of Confucianism (Adamczyk and Cheng 2015; Chou 2001). A different interpretation of Confucianism was also found in my interview results, where no Taiwanese participant regarded it as a major concern while coming out, but almost all Korean gay respondents mentioned their hardship of surviving in their Confucian society. Dong-Jin Seo (2001:77) explains this phenomenon as "a reproduced orientalism coming from the orient itself". To conclude, mainstream Korean society has drawn its boundary against the gay subculture by utilizing Confucianism,

while this case does not happen in Taiwan. Therefore, being gay is opposing different social expectations in the two cultures.

Moreover, as Weeks (1993:196) argues, "there are 'homosexualities', rather than one single 'homosexuality'". For instance, sexual taste, class, religion, political affiliation, etc., are not leveled among gay populations, and sometimes these internal variations are highly noticeable. For example, gay people in Taiwan sometimes specifically classify themselves as "bear" (large and strong), "monkey" (slim), "C" (sissy, but not always pejorative), etc. In fact, the first gay bar opened in Ximen was named "Bear Bar" (小熊村), which initially served this group of gay individuals exclusively, but later opened its door to other homosexualities (Lin 2011). It is not uncommon for gay bars to feature specific sexual tastes, e.g., Commander D on BDSM (i.e., erotic practices involving bondage, sadomasochism, etc.). In fact, many of my interviewees suggested I visit this specific bar to grasp "the whole picture" of the gay world in Taipei. Also, according to my informants, gay patrons have developed different uses of the bars. Some are for cruising (i.e., seeking potential partners), while some are for leisure, and others are only for drinking (e.g., Ximen). These refinements, however, are not found among gay bars in Seoul, whose only differences are the music played.

In conclusion, being gay can result in different cultural concerns in these two societies, while arbitrarily labeling a group of people as "gay" also runs the risk of downplaying internal diversity.

Myth of "Community"

Further developed from Weeks' (1993) argument above, a more radical view would argue that the expression "gay *community*" is even more problematic. On one hand, Rubenstein (1996) argues in his work "In Communities Begin Responsibilities: Obligations at the Gay Bar" that LGBT people must develop an intra-community moral obligation of coming out so as to facilitate social change. This idea stems from identity politics, namely, a totalized identity of *us* must be built up against *them*. This is often criticized as imposing a "denial of difference" or "unity over difference" (Young 2004:196; Valentine and Skelton 2003:861) upon community members. On the other hand, Judith Butler (2002) radically deconstructs the necessity of subjectivity in feminist movements, hence proposing a politics of difference. She calls for a new model of political participation based on the appreciation of differences and the rejection of a unified identity because any closed definition might result in further social exclusion. Similarly, Ghaziani (2011) points out the deficiency of the "add-another-letter" strategy (e.g., from

"LGBT" to "LGBTQQIAAP") and calls for a post-gay politics that blurs the boundaries between different, and even previously opponent social groups.

Given the literature above, what are the actual situations of Seoul and Taipei gay "communities"? In Seoul, most of my interview results are in line with Dong-Jin Seo's (2001) early findings. First, gay scenes are mostly invisible to the general public. As argued previously, bars in Jongno are geographically obscure. Gim, manager of *Bar Code*, claims that, though there are more than 120 gay bars in Jongno, most people (even local gay people) do not know their every existence because they hide in deep lanes, basements and upper floors amidst "normal" shops. In addition, many bars adopted membership to reject the entrance of strangers. In short, the gay world is geographically hidden from within the "normal" world. Yet, this does not mean that homosexual spaces are normalized and socially accepted; rather, they are marginalized to the extreme of being ignored. Radically speaking, mainstream society does not differentiate gay geographies because they are simply "not there". This invisibility might cause even more repression than prohibition or geographical segregation, which at least reminds the mainstream society of the existence of the gay world. In this case, however, not only individuals but the entire gay world is in the closet, and their subjectivity is radically denied.

Despite being physically invisible, the gay community is also socially non-existing. One shall bear in mind that only since the late 20th century has homosexuality been openly discussed in Korea. Before, as Seo (2001:66-67) articulates, homosexual people were simply not regarded as "members of the society who can exercise the power to effect social changes". Primarily, they have conformed to heteronormative ways of living for long (Yi, Jung, and Phillips 2017). Many of my interviewees said that they lived a "normal" life in the daytime. However, they were not necessarily concealing their gay identity intentionally, because unless they openly tell, people around them would seldom be aware of it. For instance, Rob, bartender of *Bar Friends*, said that he also frequented "normal" bars, but he simply would not "put on" his gay identity there. As is articulated by Chris (2016), "the Korean gay scene is not exactly hidden away, but most Koreans are completely oblivious to it". In other words, many straight people lack the knowledge and habitus to differentiate between homosexuals and heterosexuals. Another intriguing finding is that, in Jongno, even gay people can hardly tell whether someone else is gay through their dressing or manners. This obscurity of other patrons' sexual orientations in Jongno is contrasted to Taipei, where individuals' sexual orientations seem more identifiable within the community, as the following part of this paper will show. The long-term conformity to heteronormativity

and the obscurity of gay people's sexual orientation in public representation may have made it harder for them to form a socially recognized collective identity.

Finally and most importantly, gay people in Korea do not consciously regard themselves as a community, or, more radically speaking, "a cultural or political reality", as Seo (2001:74) argues. This is echoed by my interview results, especially respondents' indifference to politics and social injustice. To my surprise, none of the interviewees attended the Seoul Queer Parade held one week before my interviews. Gim said that the parade was "none of his business", and he criticized LGBT rights activists for simply utilizing gay movements to gain fame for themselves, which was why "real" gay people absolutely did not care about politics. Similarly, most interviewees claimed that they were disinterested in participating in political and social movements. This, as they explained, was because they did not believe that collective activism could make a difference to social exclusion, and they found it simply easier to remain invisible. As the latter part of this paper will show, this also resulted from the depoliticization of homosexual people by mainstream society. Nevertheless, such non-cooperative and indifferent attitudes prove Dong-Jin Seo's (2001) notion that gay people in Korea have not yet constructed a single collective subjectivity and political identity. To sum up, by assessing the visibilities of geographies, people, and political representations, I would like to highlight the articulation by Kay, manager of *EAT ME*, that there is no unified gay "community" in Korea, but just separate small-scale groups and networks. Furthermore, even if various political movements concerning gay rights have taken place, there is not yet a collective construction of any concrete and self-conscious socio-political identity among Korean gay bar patrons reflected in my research. That is to say, although gay people are involved in political movements, they, as is reflected here, have not entered the stage of identity politics, namely, collective movements based upon a shared identity and experience. Hence, they are at the stage of pre-identity politics.

The gay situation in Taipei has gone into reverse. Firstly, gay spaces are highly visible, and gay communities have been actively de-labeling themselves. Ximen Red House has already been a tourist attraction famous for creative markets, bringing in a large number of ordinary visitors. Bars in Ximen are opened on the ground floor, some even al fresco. Noticeable rainbow flags are hanging at the entrances, and no bars adapt membership. Even the government, with a history of oppressing gay people in this area, now propagates Ximen as the symbol of the LGBT-friendliness of Taipei (Lo 2010; Office for Gender Equality 2017). According to Mr. M, bartender

of *Mudan*, both LGBT and straight tourists come to his bar because it has gained a cross-regional reputation. Moreover, some bars are de-labeling themselves as gay spaces, shifting to universal inclusion. When I entered *THE Garden*, I asked the doorman if it was a gay bar, and he replied, "*It used to be, but now it welcomes everyone*". To elaborate, since these bars have boosted high visibility in society, they are currently not just out of the closet, but "beyond the closet" (Seidman 2013:6). That is to say, though heterosexuality is still institutionally privileged, homosexuality is increasingly normalized in conventional life. A bar whose patrons are predominantly gay no longer has to claim itself as a gay bar in order to survive because differences between gay bars and "normal" bars are muted.

In terms of the people, gay, straight, and other LGBT people are all found within these bars. An umbrella term *tongzhi* (同志, literally "comrade") is preferred there while addressing gay individuals, but this term can also refer to all non-heterosexual people. This term, argues Chou Wah-Shan (2001), has the potential to go beyond the *us/them* binarism. Furthermore, many straight people are calling themselves *zhi tongzhi* (直同志, literally "straight *tongzhi*"), often translated as "straight ally". However, *zhi tongzhi*, in Chinese grammar, is *tongzhi*, but "straight ally" is not within the word "LGBT". This again reflects the deficiency of the "add-another-letter" strategy (Ghaziani 2011), whereas calling others *tongzhi* or *zhi tongzhi* has the potential to produce a more fluid and inclusive social attitude towards diverse sexual orientations. When I asked one interviewee whether he was gay, he asked back: "*Have you heard of the term 'zhi tongzhi'?*" He was implicitly explaining that, though not gay in terms of sexual orientation, he was socially on the same side with them. Apart from the straight people present, gay patrons also expressed an inclusive attitude. Most gay patrons I interviewed said that they would not care about the sexual orientation of other patrons unless if they were cruising. This, however, does not mean that people (especially gay patrons) were unaware of others' sexual orientation. It might be true that in Jongno, many gay patrons' sexual orientation was obscure, but patrons in Ximen deliberately avoided labelling and excluding others by their sexual orientations. Therefore, even though there are concrete stereotypes of how gay people dress, talk, behave, etc., patrons in the Ximen bars chose not to label others accordingly, contributing to the fact that sexual orientation was deliberately unmarked in this place. Also, being asked "*What do you think of people with other sexual orientations?*", most gay interviewees replied that all people, regardless of sexual orientation, were much the same. Geog, a 28-year-old gay man, explained that no matter the gender of one's lover, he was just loving another human, and love was essentially the same. To sum

up, in Ximen gay bars, gay and straight patrons are easily identified by each other, but both parties deliberately blur the boundary.

Finally, in terms of political participation, though Lo (2010) criticizes Ximen gay bars for not facilitating more profound social change, my counterargument is that this place is *freed* from the obligatory political participation. Taiwan ranks the first among East Asia countries in Gay Travel Index (2018), owing a debt to active LGBT rights movements hitherto. Lee (2017) concludes that queer activism has pushed Taiwan to a stage of cosmopolitanism, transcending the assimilation/liberation dichotomy. Back in 2001, Chou Wah-Shan already argued that queer movements in Taiwan had broken the *us/them* and gay/straight binarism. In other words, gay people neither had to assimilate themselves to, nor make a clean break from, the heterosexual world. Rather, sexual orientation is unmarked. In this context, identity-based LGBT activism has come to an end, and not all social fields have to remain as battlefields (Altman 2013). From micro perspectives, in gay bars, there is no need for gay patrons to either keep a distance from straight individuals or actively involve them in the scene to enhance mutual understanding. Rather, patrons can behave as if sexuality-blind. Micro-level resistance is no longer a must, as gay bars have gained autonomy of depoliticization and de-labeling.

In conclusion, I would like to reexamine the fact that the most frequent answer to "*What do you think of the mixed presence of gay and straight patrons here?*" by the Taiwanese interviewees was that "*I don't care*". This "*don't care*" is distinct from the indifferent attitude towards collective gay identity expressed by those individuals I interviewed in Seoul, yet sheds light on a social reality of "post-gay" mindset (Ghaziani 2011). The common ground of solidarity has evolved from the former "*us-vs-them*" logic to a more inclusive "*us-and-them*". Butler (as cited in Martin 2000:81) criticizes collective activism by arguing that "before, you did not know whether I 'am', but now you do not know what that means". However, the situation in Ximen goes beyond politics on "*whether you are*" or "*what you are*", towards a post-identity politics of "*whatever you are*".

NEW HOMONORMATIVITY AND COSMOPOLITANISM

Having discussed the internal complexity of gay communities presented in gay bars in Seoul and Taipei, this paper will proceed to analyze the external factors. In specific, a similar homonormative placemaking strategy has been applied by larger societies to the two venues but produces different outcomes.

Duggan (2002) first defines homonormativity as the re-appropriation of gay subculture by the heterosexual world, featuring forceful privatization and depoliticization. Later, scholars including Smith (1994, 1997), Brown-Saracino (2010), Mattson (2015), and others contributed to this theory by suggesting society's selective governmentality against gay scenes. Smith (1994) raises the idea of "good homosexual" versus "dangerous queer" to theorize how the homophobic mainstream society governs the homosexual population. She suggests that in order to demonstrate a tolerant and liberalist attitude, modern societies seldom directly combat the homosexual population, but imagine, define and squeeze them in reality into the "good homosexual" image. Yet, this concept is defined exactly in opposition to the "dangerous queer" whom the mainstream society is actually afraid of. Hence, gay people should be disciplined and normalized into "good homosexuals" so that the mainstream society would conditionally include them. Smith (1994:64) describes the "good homosexuals" as being "self-limiting, closeted, desexualized, and invisible", which was contextualized in the "don't ask, don't tell" policy. However, as "good homosexuals" is not a social existence but subjective to the definition of the dominant group, its implication changes constantly. In contrast, the "dangerous queers" are demonized as perverts who undermine social morality, against whom the new homonormativity attacks. However, like the "good homosexuals", this concept is also a label without ontological reality.

In the same vein, Mattson (2015:3145) analyzes how bars and nightclubs are disciplined. Those that conform to, or can adapt to mainstream heterosexual values, are preserved and rewarded, termed as "gentrification from within". Such bars are usually desexualized, depoliticized, boutique, and friendly to heterosexuals. On the other hand, non-conformist bars, often described as erotic and threatening, are ejected, restricted or forced to be invisible, termed as "gentrification from without" (Mattson 2015:3145). For example, Brown and Knopp (2016) studied how the government used licensing to force gay scenes into self-disciplining, which was apparently based on heteronormative standards. New homonormativity frames itself by neoliberalism, namely to "seek solutions for social problems in the engine of economic growth" (Dictionary of the Social Sciences 2002). In late capitalist societies, multi-cultures are objectified, marketed and consumed, where a "fetishization of difference" (Binnie and Skeggs 2004:57) is found. This might stem from the "stranger fetishism" identified by Ahmed (2000), namely the anxiety of modern society to find concrete others to operate so as to boost social homogeneity. Therefore, encounters are prerequisite. People long for safe and controllable encounters with *others*. Hence, conformist gay spaces are transformed into cosmopolitan spectacles and generate economic

profits, while non-conformists are marginalized. This proves Žižek's notion that "late capitalism offers opportunities for the incorporation of previously marginalized groups, whilst simultaneously dividing them" (Binnie and Skeggs 2004:1).

Gay bars in Seoul have undergone a typical process of "gentrification from without" (Mattson 2015:3145). Chris (2016) argues that since gay people started secretly gathering in Jongno in the 1970s, gay spaces have always remained invisible. Gay bars are neither concentrated into a community nor forced to shut, but simply neglected of existence. In 2015, the Korean government took down the largest online gay map website and all gay networking apps (Morgan 2015). These are evidences of mainstream society privatizing gay-concentrated spaces. An effort of depoliticization is also found. The indifference of Korean gay people to politics mentioned before and as reflected in my interviews might actually be the aftermath of prolonged self-appropriation to external oppression. Bong (2008:98) points out that, when gay individuals first collectively came out in the late 1980s, mainstream society made a conditional tolerance that, "As long as homosexuals do not cross the boundary of ghettos set by invisible rules in the society, their access to 'normal life' is guaranteed". Since then, though improvements in political representation have been made, gay rights movements have now reached a plateau where gay people find it easier to stay within ghettos. As is mentioned, most Korean gay interviewees explained that because they failed to see any slight hope of social change in the near future, they could not help but lose interest in politics.

Gay bars in Ximen have experienced another form of homonormative placemaking, i.e., "gentrification from within" (Mattson 2015:3145). They also experienced a history of social oppression and disregard. Before 2008, all government records mentioning Ximen selectively ignored its gay assembly (Lo 2010). In fact, gay people in Ximen gained their acceptance from the public only after they built this place as a space for consumption and proved it profitable, instead of from social movements. Therefore, though Ximen seems to be freed from political obligations, it remains a question if they have had a choice not to become so. Also, the inclusive attitudes of gay people there might result from homonormative domestication, with those non-conformist gay individuals expelled to other places. Many interviewees suggested I visit bars like *G*star*, which are "more gay" than Ximen because those are more gay-dominated and straight-exclusive.

In short, Ximen is favored by homonormativity, but Jongno is not, which forced them into either publicized or privatized states. Bars in Ximen are gentrified from within and adjusting themselves to the ideology of "good

homosexual" (Smith 1994), while those in Jongno are "gentrified from without" (Mattson 2015). One reason for this distinction might be that the latter remains erotic while the former is desexualized. When asked *"what does 'gay bar' mean to you?"*, Korean interviewees regarded it as a cruising space for finding partners. Chris (2016) connotatively mentions that these places are for seeking sex. However, all Taiwanese interviewees regarded Ximen as just a place for drinking and relaxation. Actually, very few intimate bodily contacts were observed. However, both are highly depoliticized, which is in line with the theoretical analyses before. Finally, as for visibility, in contrast to Smith's (1994) notion, being as hyper-visible as Ximen is also favored by the "good homosexual" ideology, perhaps because of its material benefit.

CONCLUSION: MICROPOLITICS IN GAY BARS

Jongno and Ximen accommodate typical private and public gay bars respectively, resulting from a synergistic function of both internal complexities of gay communities and homonormative placemaking of the external society. As Jackson (2006) argues, heterosexuality governs not only the minority (i.e., gay and other LGBT people) but also the majority (i.e., straight people) because any boundary restricts both sides. Inspired by this notion, this part of the paper will conclude and integrate previous arguments into a diamond model of micropolitics in these two types of gay bars.



Figure 1. "Private" Gay Bars

The internal complexity of the gay population in Seoul unfolds a lack of self-conscious collective socio-political identity. There is no bona fide community, but just "separate and passive enclaves" (Yi and Phillips 2015:124), stuck at a stage of pre-identity politics. Gay individuals are becoming increasingly numb to social movements and their unequal status. The inner complexity also makes gay scenes and people almost invisible from

the heterosexual world as most gay people are in the closet and conform to heteronormative lifestyles.

On the other hand, external factors also contribute to the depoliticization of gay people by privatizing them into narrow lanes and basements. The heterosexual world conditionally tolerates gay subculture, as long as they keep themselves secret. This tolerance also habituates "normal" citizens to be oblivious to those already-obscure gay scenes.

In conclusion, privacy arises in Seoul from the fact that gay individuals are keeping their own territory secret while conforming to the heterosexual world in other social fields. Straight people, on the other hand, privatize the gay world and keep themselves indifferent, where an *"us-vs-them"* binarism stands at the core.



Figure 2. "Public" Gay Bars

In comparison, the internal complexity of the gay population in Taipei first highlights the inner heterogeneity. There are plural homosexualities, and this diversity is treasured. Gay people actively depoliticize themselves in leisure spaces, where micro-resistance is not a must. Even in politics, they are moving beyond identity politics, namely political representation based on a shared identity (e.g., gay). Rather, collectivity is built upon a shared appreciation of diversity. This inclusive stance also spreads to the heterosexual world. Straight people recognize these bars as gay scenes, but they still feel welcomed within, and their presence helps to make the boundary increasingly blurred. Some straight individuals even identify themselves as *zhi tongzhi,* which further reflects their inclusiveness of diverse sexual orientations.

However, homonormativity is much more potent in Taipei than in Seoul. On the one hand, gay patrons in these bars are desexualized, depoliticized, and generally sanitized. Under neoliberalism, "good homosexuals" are rewarded with political and economic benefits, while

"dangerous queers" are muted. Also, a fetishism of difference is encouraged among the general public, leading them to celebrate their selective friendliness to the gay subculture.

To conclude, gay bars are publicly visited and favored in Taipei, resulting from both deliberate and forced opening-up to the heteronormative world. Nevertheless, this suggests a future of a "post-gay" era (Ghaziani 2011), where the boundary between gay and straight people will ultimately be canceled. The current core value of *"us-and-them"* serves as its prerequisite.

Finally, limitations of this study might first arise from the fact that gay scenes are extremely diverse, just like gay identities. For instance, there are some hyper-eroticized gay bars in Taipei (e.g., *Commander D*), as well as popular gay tourist destinations in Seoul (e.g., *Itaewon*). Therefore, to what extent my findings and interpretations can be generalized is questionable, as these two gay spaces certainly cannot represent the diverse gay identities and expressions in these two regions. Also, it remains to be discussed which of the internal or external factors may have played a decisive role in shaping gay bar cultures, and whether there is a third path to transcend the "private/public" dichotomy, which has long been criticized by feminist scholars as verbally stereotypical (Gavison 1992). In addition, my identity as a foreign researcher and a straight man may have led to biased sampling and interview results, especially among the "private" ones. As is mentioned, some patrons and bars in Jongno turned down my interview in the first place, and it was also possible that some interviewees replied with reservations. Finally, due to limited samples, this paper cannot escape criticisms of over-simplification, thus calling for more comparative studies on gay geographies in East Asia.

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APPENDIX A. INTERVIEWEES

Nickname	Age	Gender	Sexual Orientation	Interview Place	Role	Nationality
Sophia Kim	33	Male	Gay	Bar Friend (Jongno)	Bartender	Korean
Bo-Seong	34	Male	Gay	Bar Friend (Jongno)	Bartender	Korean
Rob	30	Male	Gay	Bar Friend (Jongno)	Bartender	Korean
Jung-Nam	x	Male	Gay	Bar Friend (Jongno)	Bartender	Korean
Jerry Kim	28	Male	Gay	BB (Jongno)	Manager	Korean
Ho-Ye	22	Male	Gay	owoo (Jongno)	Manager	Korean
Gim	50	Male	Gay	Bar Code (Jongno)	Manager	Korean
Alan	22	Male	Gay	Bar Code (Jongno)	Patron	American
George	27	Male	Gay	Bar Code (Jongno)	Patron	Taiwanese
Kay	35	Male	Gay	Bar Code (Jongno)	Patron	Greek
Jay	22	Male	Gay	EAT ME (Itaewon)	Manager	Korean
Josh	30	Male	Gay	Oz (Itaewon)	Bartender	Korean
Robin	26	Male	Gay	Oz (Itaewon)	Bartender	Korean
Mr. M	x	Male	Straight	Ximen	Bartender	Filipino
Lee	x	Male	Gay	Ximen	Bartender	Taiwanese
Tom	36	Male	Gay	Ximen	Patron	Taiwanese
Bruce	x	Male	Gay	Ximen	Patron	Taiwanese
Joe	18	Male	Straight	Ximen	Patron	Taiwanese
Katherine	18	Female	Straight	Ximen	Patron	Taiwanese
Chloe	18	Female	Straight	Ximen	Patron	Taiwanese
Vick	27	Male	Gay	Ximen	Patron	Taiwanese
Chris	18	Male	Straight	Ximen	Patron	Taiwanese
Mike	18	Male	Straight	Ximen	Patron	Hong Kong
Mr. Tang	21	Female	Straight	Ximen	Patron	Taiwanese

Nickname	Age	Gender	Sexual Orientation	Interview Place	Role	Nationality
Ms. Fang	21	Female	Straight	Ximen	Patron	Taiwanese
Will	25	Male	Gay	Ximen	Patron	Taiwanese
Ms. T	22	Male	Lesbian	Ximen	Patron	Taiwanese
Sam	28	Male	Gay	Ximen	Patron	Taiwanese
B	32	Male	Gay	Ximen	Patron	Taiwanese
Geog	28	Male	Gay	Ximen	Patron	Taiwanese
Kelvin	24	Male	Straight	Ximen	Patron	Taiwanese
John	24	Male	Straight	Ximen	Patron	Hong Kong
Whales	21	Male	Straight	Ximen	Patron	Taiwanese

Note:

1. Interviewees' genders are all judged from appearance, thus they are only for reference. Some of them might self-identify as transgender, queer, or others.
2. "x" means I did not ask, or interviewees were not willing to tell.

APPENDIX B. VENUES



Figure 3. Gay bars in Jongno District. Photocopied from *2018 19th Seoul Queer Culture Festival* (p. 40), by Queeround, 2018, unpublished booklet.

Note: All purple dots are gay bars, of which the four bars I conducted interviews are marked out in red.

Figure 4. Gay bars in Ximen. Retrieved from *Living Dreams On Ximen Red House Square: Toward a Civic Space of Gay Community in Taipei* (p. 4), by Lo, Yuchia, 2010, Taipei: National Taiwan University.

Note: All gay bars in this district (including the four I visited) are concentrated within the bar area marked on the figure.

Wo Bu Hui Shuo Zhongwen: Identity as Motivation in Birth Language Reclamation for Chinese Adoptees

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North Carolina State University

Abstract
The rise in the predominance in Chinese language classes, as well as initiatives by the U.S. government, has led to increased opportunities for American students to study Mandarin. While there have been many studies on Chinese Heritage Language Learners (ethnic Chinese who have grown up in the U.S. with Chinese parents) and non-Chinese second language learners' motivations for studying Mandarin, little research currently exists on Chinese adoptees' motivations. This paper considers sixty-two survey answers from Chinese adoptees across the U.S. who are motivated to learn Mandarin Chinese. Results suggest that the main sources of motivation to learn Mandarin results from adoptees' sense of marginality and a yearning for belonging in the greater Chinese community. These results are significant by locating Chinese adoptees' motivations as closely resembling that of Chinese Heritage Language Learners, despite being raised in households and environments similar to non-Chinese second language learners.

Keywords
Chinese language learning, Chinese adoptees, heritage, culture

INTRODUCTION

I was supposedly born in the city of Xiangtan, Hunan, China with records saying I was found as a baby left on a police station door. I say "supposedly" because as many Chinese adoptees know, birth certificates and dates are viewed with suspicion. Between handwritten records, bribed officials, and the devastating risk birth families take on if they are discovered to have abandoned a child, little is known about many Chinese adoptees' true origins. I spent roughly the first year of my life in China before I was adopted by a White American family and moved to the United States. As a child, my exposure to Chinese culture was minimal, in part due to my visceral fear of anything perceived to be Asian. It wasn't until I was fifteen, when my mom appointed me a Mandarin tutor in an earnest attempt for me to connect with Chinese culture, that something clicked. I began studying Mandarin with a fervency; never before had I been so enthralled by a subject that was as deeply personal as it was terrifyingly foreign to me. In retrospect, I believe it was the first time I perceived myself as being Chinese. What started as an interest in learning Mandarin began a journey of self discovery nearly ten years in the making and with no foreseeable end in sight.

The purpose of this paper aims to explore the motivations of Chinese language learning, and perhaps help myself realize my own motivations in my personal journey as Chinese adoptee. There are three primary groups of study: non-native Chinese language learners (NCLL), Chinese Heritage Language Learners (CHLL), and Chinese adoptees. While extensive research has been conducted on the motivations for non-native Chinese language learners and Chinese Heritage Language Learners, there has been little research on Chinese adoptees' own motivations. Much of the existing literature surrounding Chinese adoptees learning Chinese has focused on motivations for adoptees' families. The working hypothesis is the following: The primary motivations for transracially adopted Chinese to learn Mandarin Chinese most closely resemble the identity component CHLLs seek versus non-native second language learners, despite adoptees being brought up in Western, non-Asian households. I will attempt to prove this hypothesis by providing a background on relevant literature, conducting a survey of Chinese adoptees, and finally analyzing the results in a discussion.

History of Adoption

1.1 As a Concept in Ancient China

China has a vast history of domestic adoption dating back to imperial China (Ryznar 2017). The continuation of bloodlines was, and in some cases

continues to be, a cornerstone of Chinese thought. Traditionally, the passage of one's bloodline was restricted to males, as females were married into other families (Ryznar 2017). Adoption thus became one of the main mechanisms through which a family could acquire males. Intra-family adoptions were most common at first, with families often adopting nephews (Ryznar 2017). According to scholars, as adoption by strangers increased, the children also began breaking all communication from their birth family and become completely absorbed into their adoptive family (Ryzner 2017).

1.2 Why China gives children up for adoption

In 1979 China underwent an extremely controversial control measure dubbed the One- Child Policy (Zeng and Hesketh 2016). The sweeping policy was enforced for thirty-five years and is estimated to have prevented nearly 200 million births (Zeng and Hesketh 2016). With few exceptions, couples throughout China were restricted to having one child. There has been a noticeable gendered component to the One-Child Policy's effect on international adoption to predominantly Caucasian, Western nations. A 2006 study from Children's Hope International stated that at that time about 95 percent of adoptees from China to the U.S. were girls (Hurwitz, 2003). These statistics are not surprising once one considers Chinese society's general preference for sons. In a 1995 study, conducted in a time period when there was a surge of Chinese girls being adopted internationally, researchers noted the importance of sons for Chinese families being fourfold: family labor, elderly support, women's status, and family line (Gu and Li 1995). In terms of family labor, such roles were usually delegated to men as they often required strenuous physical labor. In traditional Chinese families, girls were expected to marry out, shifting their duties from their immediate families to their new in-laws. As for the role of women in society, many especially in rural areas still relied on a son or husband as a means for social and economic upward mobility. Lastly, hailing back to imperial Chinese history, family lines were still considered to be carried only through male heirs. Having a lone daughter could entail the end of a family lineage, which itself was cause for deep cultural shame (Gu and Li 1995).

Additionally, the impact of the One Child Policy has fundamentally changed Chinese society, as well as international family law (Ryznar 2017). Besides the nearly 200 million prevented births, China now faces a massive gender skew with the 2000 Census reporting that there were 19 million more boys than girls between the ages of 0-15 (Jordan 2007). This gender disparity has, in turn, negatively affected children born under the One Child

Policy. As China lacks an effective social security program for its elderly, the burden of care often falls on a single child (Jordan 2007).

The high number of qualified adoption candidates, as well as government policies, served as the main justification for international adoption from Chinese families (Ryznar 2017). A report by the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2016) revealed that 90 percent of all intercountry adoptees came from Asia. From 2006-2007, China was the country sending the most children over (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2016). The US Department of State's statistics indicate that from 1999 to 2017 alone, there were 80,162 adoptions from the People's Republic of China to the U.S. (US Department of State). These international adoptions were made possible in part by changing laws on behalf of the Chinese government. The 1991 Adoption Law of the People's Republic of China was one of the most salient pieces of legislation in terms of opening up restrictions on foreigners who wanted to adopt from China (Ryzner 2017). Additionally, it must be noted that the Chinese government played an active role in creating an international adoption program that was both attractive to foreigners and a funding source for orphanages (Ryzner 2017). The diaspora of Chinese adoptees in western nations serves as the demographic of interest for this paper due to its proliferation.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND / LITERATURE REVIEW

On Non-Native Speakers

Non-native Chinese language learners serve as a basis for motivational comparison to Chinese adoptees. In this study, a non-native Chinese language learner is defined as an individual who has not grown up with any prior experience with the Chinese language and is not ethnically Chinese. Currently, there are approximately 20 million people who study Chinese as a second language (Li and Tucker 2013). There have been various proposed theories of motivation concerning non-native speakers' desire to learn a foreign language. However, for many non- native speakers, it has been determined that identification with the native speakers of the language learned is not a major motive for their language learning (Noels, Pelletier, et al. 2003).

I posit that the primary motivations for non-native speakers to study Mandarin Chinese specifically is influenced by a variety of external factors before a cultural interest. The appeal for many Non-Native speakers to study Chinese exists at an institutional level in the United States in both the business and security sectors. One external motivation would be the

economic benefits associated with speaking any foreign language. One study indicated that acquisition of a foreign language is consistent with about a 2.8 percent wage premium for the average individual (Saiz and Zoido 2005). One European study noted how nearly 38 percent of human resource and financial directors sampled expected that Chinese would become the most valuable business language (Ding and Saunders 2006). Due to China's tremendous rise in the business world, studying Chinese has become attractive to many non-native speakers to enter the international business sphere. In general, the growing economic, military and diplomatic power of China has influenced the number of non-native speakers to study Chinese. The Chinese government has noticed this trend and taken considerable action to maximize opportunities for Chinese language engagement with American non-native speakers. For western nations more broadly, the Chinese government sponsors the development of the Confucius Institute (CI) network, which promotes Chinese language and culture learning at schools worldwide (Lu and Trucker, 34). There are currently 110 Confucius Institutes in the USA, 173 in Europe, and 14 in Australia (Confucius Institute).

One study noted how learning Chinese amongst western business people could strengthen ties known as guanxi in Chinese (Selmer 2006). Guanxi is loosely translated to mean a personal connection while implying a deep level of trust and obligation between parties (Wenderoth). For many Chinese firms, establishing guanxi is a necessary step to ensure a mutually beneficial and stable partnership (Wenderoth). Having guanxi between two parties has been considered to increase business success (Selmer 2006). While learning Chinese does not necessitate guanxi, it can be valuable and thus serve as a motivation for non-native speakers interested in undertaking business in China.

Motivations for studying Chinese as an opportunity to enter the national security sectors have also arisen. Researchers Saiz and Zoido note how recent national security concerns have highlighted the importance of American foreign language acquisition (523). The aftermath of 9/11 serves as one of the greatest examples for US mobilization of foreign language learners (523). Attractive employment options for Chinese speakers include working in diplomacy, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other foreign affairs departments (523). The demand for Americans to start learning Chinese has been so great that in 2010, former President Barack Obama announced the 100,000 Strong in China Campaign, which sought to grow the number of American students studying Mandarin Chinese to 100,000 people by the year 2020 (Yang and Wang 2018).

The motivations for non-native speakers to learn Mandarin are not merely restricted to external business or security purposes. Deng Xiaoping's "Open-Door" policy in the late 20th century largely enabled Chinese culture to spread somewhat prolifically to the west in the form of food, media, and literature (Ding and Saunders 2006). The spread of Chinese language was no exception, and for some non-native speakers it served as a point of accessibility to enter the Chinese culture (Ding and Saunders 2006). While previous studies indicate that culture might not be the first and foremost reason for many non-native speakers to take up learning the language, it would be incorrect to assume interest in culture had no place in their language learning motivations. Researchers found that among non-native speakers studied, there seemed to be four primary motivations to study a foreign language, which in order of prominence were: travel, friendship, knowledge and instrumental orientations (Noels, Pelletier, et al. 2003). While the mentioned statistics proved true for languages such as French, Wen (1997) in contrast reported that the main motivation for Chinese language learning was "instrumental" (Noels, Pelletier et al. 2003). According to the authors, instrumental orientation was defined as the desire to learn the language for practical purposes such as "job advancement or course credit" (Noels, Pelletier et al. 2003).

On Heritage Learners

Heritage Learners of Chinese serve as the second group for comparison to Chinese adoptees' motivations for language learning. A heritage learner is an individual who is ethnically Chinese and has been raised in a household where any sort of Chinese dialect has been prevalent. Chinese is considered a Heritage Language, also referred to as an HL, which is a language that is associated with one's cultural background but is not the predominant societal language (Mu 2016). Speakers of a heritage language, therefore, vary in levels of fluency (Mu 2016). Here, I identify the primary extrinsic motivators and intrinsic motivators for heritage learners to study Chinese.

Diasporic heritage learners of Chinese have cited many different extrinsic motivators for studying their heritage language. One Australian study found that the most frequently received response to a question about motivations for learning Chinese amongst heritage speakers in Australia was "job prospects" (Xu and Moloney, 375). Another one of the strongest extrinsic factors in learning Chinese for heritage learners was familial pressure. Chinese HL learners often felt pressured to learn the language to communicate with extended family, who may not be fluent in anything but

the heritage language (Xu and Moloney, 2014). The importance mandated by some overseas Chinese families to have bilingual children does not apply to non-native speakers. The presence of this finding at all is significant due to the environment in which Chinese Heritage Language learners and speakers grew up. Many recognized English as their first language and cited growing up in western cultures, but identified Mandarin Chinese as representing them ethnically and culturally (Xu and Moloney 2014).

In terms of intrinsic motivation, Chinese learners' heritage language proficiency was found to be positively related to their sense of identity and belonging to the Chinese ethnic group. This feeling of acceptance coincided with their experiences with discovering about Chinese history and culture (Mu 2016). Another study found that many Chinese-Americans studied their heritage language to establish interpersonal connections with members of their ethnicity, as well as establishing themselves as different from mainstream American culture (Mu 2016). A study on Chinese Australian Heritage Learners indicated similar sentiments. The study compiled answers from Chinese Heritage Language Learners on their motivations for studying Chinese, with the final results being scored from being the highest motivating factor to the lowest (Xu and Moloney 2014). The response "cultural heritage" was the second most motivating factor out of 14 given, with "cultural identity" following in third place (Xu and Moloney, 375).

On Adoptees

The demographic of Chinese adoptees in this study focuses on those adopted from affluent western nations. This is due to the enormous extent to which Chinese children are adopted into those families (Hyltenstam et al. 2009). Multiple bilingual researchers have noted that it is a "fact that majority of children [adopted internationally] come from countries where the language spoken differs from the one spoken by the adoptive families" (Hyltenstam et al., 121). Although some Chinese children are adopted at ages where they initially can still speak Chinese, studies have shown that their bilingualism gradually disappears (Yip and Matthews 2010). Due to this loss of language, there exists both external and internal motivations for Chinese adoptees to study Chinese.

1.1 Language Acquisition and Retention in Young Adoptees

Naturally, before the children are adopted to western countries they are exposed extensively to Chinese. As such, a reasonable question is whether having a history with Chinese influences an adoptees' motivations or

predisposition to learning the language. Researchers have studied language acquisition extensively. According to Hutauruk (2015:54), there are six stages of language acquisition in children. The stages are as follows: the pre-talking stage, babbling stage, holophrastic stage, the two-word stage, telegraphic stage, and finally the later multiword stage (Hutauruk 2015:54-55). In the pre-talking stage (0-6 months) infants respond to human sounds and make some noises (Hutauruk 2015:54). In the babbling stage (6-8 months) infants produce consonant-vowel combinations, and in the holophrastic stage (9-18 months) children begin forming one-word sentences to convey their meaning (Hutauruk 2015:54). The two-word stage (18-24 months), telegraphic stage (24-30 months) and later multiword stages (30+ months) are when children begin to form multiple word sentences and finally convey more complex meanings (Hutauruk 2015:55). In the case of Chinese adoptees, knowing the age at which one is adopted is important because it can affect one's ability and motivations to study Mandarin. A child adopted in the pre-talking stage to the holophrastic stage would have little if any remembrance of the Chinese language, while one adopted at the two-word stage and forward might have a better memory. However, as Yip and Matthews (2010) note, even those who do have some memory of Chinese lose their bilingualism if it is not frequently utilized.

Many studies have also been suggested to answer the question of whether adoptees have an advantage when learning Mandarin later in life, despite the loss of their birth language. The literature surrounding this question has been varied. Zhou and Broersma's (2014) research focused on the perception of birth language tone contrasts by adopted Chinese children. They looked at adoptees from both Cantonese and Mandarin speaking regions of China, and non-adopted Dutch control participants (Zhou and Broersma 2014:63). The study had participants identify differences in Chinese tones that did not exist in the Dutch language (Zhou and Broersma 2014). The study found that, save for the few Chinese adoptees who had visited China recently, there was no discernible difference between the non-adopted Dutch and Chinese adoptees in their ability to detect tones (Zhou and Broersma 2014:65). A different notable study to mention was on Korean adoptees and their abstract language knowledge by Broersma, Choi, and Cutler (2018). While the subject group was Korean, not Chinese, the study was still focused on language identification in transnational East Asian adoptees (Broersma et al.). Given the structural similarities between Korean and Chinese, it is plausible to assume there would be similarities in the adoptees' experiences learning these languages. In this study, Korean adoptees (with no prior knowledge of Korean after their adoption) and non-

adopted Dutch children were given brief phonetic identification training for Korean consonant contrasts, then subsequently tested on their ability to increase their identification performance (Broersma et al. 2018:3). The results of their test showed that while both non-adopted Dutch and Korean adoptees improved their perceptual identification over time, adoptees did so at a rapidly faster speed (Broersma et al. Year:11). A brief analysis of these two studies may suggest that Broersma et al.'s (2018) longitudinal study is more revealing than Zhou and Broersma's (2014) one- time study that did not account for growth over time. The implications of the results of these tests on adoptees studying Mandarin have yet to be studied.

1.2 Feelings of Marginality amongst Adoptees/ Internal Motivations

Much of the literature surrounding adoptees and language acquisition and identity has been from adoptive parent's perspectives (Shin 2014; Baden et al. 2012; Xing et al. 2004). Unlike heritage speakers, external pressures from family do not often come from a necessity to learn the birth language but a desire. Some parents exert pressure on their children to start language lessons to give them access to a culture they otherwise would have no exposure to (Volkman 2005). In terms of external pressures, adoptees are not completely characterized as being "passive recipients" of their parent's decisions to learn languages (Shin 2014:198). The study argued that adoptees played a large role in making decisions about language acquisition that could sometimes even go against parental wishes (Shin 2014). Internal motivations that were briefly touched upon included how knowledge of an adoptee's birth language was found important to their feelings of belonging in their ethnic communities (Shin 2014).

Similarly, to the experiences of CHLLs, adoptees also experienced feelings of identity in reference to learning Chinese. What makes this particularly unique is that given the Chinese adoptees who have been raised largely in western Caucasian households, societal pressure existed which made many feel obligated to learn the language despite it having no practical use in their daily lives. Previous studies on international adoption, with respect to Asian adoptees, made note of how adoptive parents made evident the physical difference their adopted children had in comparison with them (Shin 2014). The parent's mention of such differences staunchly asserts adoptees' racial "otherness" in comparison to their White families. This study postulates that many Chinese adoptees' internal motivations for learning the Chinese language seemed to be more like heritage language learners' motivations, namely to establish feelings of identity and belonging within their ethnic groups. For the most comprehensive view of language

acquisition and motivation regarding Chinese adoptees, studies must take into consideration motivations from adoptees themselves.

METHODOLOGY

To test the hypothesis that motivations for transracially adopted Chinese to learn Mandarin Chinese most closely resembles that of heritage speakers versus Second Language learners, a survey was sent out to four Facebook groups that had significant populations of Chinese adoptees in them. The groups were as follows: Adoptees from Asia (1,189 members), Subtle Asian Adoptee Traits (769 members), Adoptee Only CCI Group (1,198 members), Chinese adoptees (293 members). There were 62 responses recorded which were then evaluated in this study. Note: The group membership number mentioned was updated as of April 3, 2019. Participants were asked initial screening questions to account for potential confounding variables such as gender, age, and location. The questions are as follows:

- *What is your gender identity?*
- *What age were you adopted?*
- *What state in the U.S. were you raised? If not raised in the U.S. where were you raised?*
- *What race are your adoptive parents/ guardians?*

Participants were asked to respond to the questions on gender and age in a poll for conciseness. However, the question regarding the location was a free response answer to account for those adopted into countries besides the United States. Those results were compiled into a pie chart.

After the screening questions, participants were asked to respond to three statements by rating their level of agreement with the statements about their motivations for learning Chinese. The three statements are as follows:

- *I felt pressured to learn Chinese by an outside source (family, friends, school, society).*
- *I personally wanted to learn Chinese to get in touch with my roots/culture.*
- *I primarily wanted to learn Chinese for career purposes (CIA, FBI, Business etc).*

Each question is coded to mean either an external or internal motivation for language learning. Both "pressured to learn Chinese by an outside source" and "I primarily wanted to learn Chinese for career purposes" are examples of extrinsic motivations. The answer "I personally wanted to

learn Chinese to get in touch with my roots/culture" is interpreted to be an internal motivation.

A Likert scale was implemented to track the results of the participants. The purpose of using a Likert scale was to measure the degree to which respondents agreed or disagreed with the statements. The scale ran from a score of 0 to 100, with 0 being the lowest level of agreement and 100 being the highest level of agreement. Due to the large range of answer options, answers were additionally coded into four categories: 0-24 low motivation, 25-50 moderately low motivation, 51-75 moderately high motivation, 75-100 high motivation. Additionally, a free-response question titled "If not listed, what is your main motivation for learning Chinese?" was also included to account for motivations that were beyond the scope of the survey.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Figure 1 accounts for any confounding variables that may have occurred due to gender. As anticipated, the gender ratio in this study was 95.1 percent female-identifying. The statistic of 4.84 percent non-binary individuals was interesting.



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
male	0.00%	0
female	95.16%	59
non-binary	4.84%	3
prefer not to answer	0.00%	0
TOTAL		62

Figure 1

Figure 2 asks, "What age were you adopted?" and is significant because it accounts for the literature discussed earlier concerning language acquisition put forth by researcher Bertaria Sohnata Hutauruk (2015). It is revealed that most of the adoptees interviewed were adopted between the ages of 9-18 months, what Hutauruk (2015) calls the holophrastic stage. In this stage, it is unlikely that many, if any, children retained conscious knowledge of their birth language.



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
0-8 months	20.97%	13
9-18 months	69.35%	43
18 months- 2 years	8.06%	5
2 years +	1.61%	1
unknown/ prefer not to say	0.00%	0
TOTAL		62

Figure 2

Figure 3 displays the geographic location of the adoptees surveyed. The participants seem to be fairly distributed throughout the U.S., with a few located in other western nations. Of the areas represented, Chinese is not widely spoken. Additionally, there is not an unusual number of adoptees concentrated in one area.



Figure 3

Figure 4 of this study is particularly interesting as it shows the racial makeup of adoptive families. All the Chinese adoptees studied came from White households. Such statistics are not unusual. According to a study by the Institute for Family Studies (2017), 77 percent of adoptive mothers of kindergarteners were White, 9 percent were Hispanic, 6 percent Black, 4 percent Multiracial, 2 percent American Indian Alaska Native, 2 percent Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander and Asian (Zill 2017). It is assumed that none of the White households speak Mandarin or Cantonese natively to fully immerse their child in their birth language. This lack of cultural knowledge serves as a main impetus for many Chinese adoptees to study their birth language.

What race are your adoptive parents/ guardians?

Answered: 62 Skipped: 0



ANSWER CHOICES	RESPONSES	
Black or African American	0.00%	0
White or Caucasian	100.00%	62
Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander	0.00%	0
Asian or Asian American	0.00%	0
Hispanic or Latino	0.00%	0
Another race/ multiracial	0.00%	0
TOTAL		62

Figure 4

Figures 5a-7b ask adoptees their motivations for studying Chinese. Out of the five bar charts, the results of Figure 5a had the lowest average number for adoptee motivations concerning learning Chinese. The total average of 32 out of 100 lends one to think that job motivations are not primary extrinsic motivators for adoptees. In chart 5b, answers varied widely across the polls with the highest number of individuals, 54.1 percent putting their job motivations for Chinese between 0-24, which is coded for low motivations. The next two highest statistics were 23 percent of participants at the moderately low motivation level, 14.8 percent with moderately high motivations, and the smallest amount 8.2 percent with high motivations for learning Chinese in terms of business and job security. It is noted that one participant skipped this question.



Figure 5a



Figure 5b

The results of Figure 6a show that, on a scale of 1 to 100, the Chinese adoptees surveyed scored an average of 36 on the question of "I felt pressured to learn Chinese by an outside source." While some existing literature emphasized the role of parents in motivating their children to learn Chinese, this data suggests that many adoptees do not interpret such pressure as a main motivation in their endeavors. Figure 6b displays that 44 percent of

those polled felt very low pressure from outside sources, and scored their motivations between 0-14. The moderately low and moderately high motivation groups had similar results with 23 percent of participants scoring moderately low and slightly more at 26.2 percent scoring moderately high. The smallest percentage of participants, 6.6 percent, responded that they felt high pressure from outside sources to learn Chinese. In sum, both external motivators did not seem to have a profound effect on adoptees' desire to learn Chinese. Concerning previous literature on non-native speakers and heritage speakers, adoptees' external motivations seem to diverge from them.



Figure 6a



Figure 6b

Figure 7a, which attempts to measure identity as a main motivation for adoptees learning Chinese, has by far the highest overall average score at 79 out of 100. Out of all figures from 5a to 7b, Figure 7b has the highest percentage of participants at 64.1 percent report that they had high motivation to learn Chinese in order to get in touch with their roots, heritage, and/or culture. The findings broaden the earlier sentiment made by Shin that adoptees associate language with identity (2014: 109). The extent to which identity is entwined with language for Chinese adoptees is deeper than some researchers may have previously thought.

I wanted to learn Chinese to get in touch with my roots/ heritage/culture

Answered: 62 Skipped: 0



ANSWER CHOICES	AVERAGE NUMBER	TOTAL NUMBER	RESPONSES
Responses	79	4,918	62
Total Respondents: 62			

Figure 7a

Roots/Heritage



Figure 7b

More telling, however, are answers to the free response question "If not listed, what is your main motivation for learning Chinese?". As shown in Figure 8, there were thirty total responses, which include responses of "N/A" and "already answered." The adoptees' responses were grouped into two categories for motivation: learning Chinese as a form of identity or learning Chinese due to outside pressures. Although the free response questions were intended to expand the scope of the study to incorporate viewpoints

not accounted for, fourteen of the twenty-one featured responses could be categorized as falling into an "identity" motivation for learning.

The response, "I wanted to get in touch with my heritage but also felt obligated to learn it since I'm a Chinese that 'doesn't know her own language.' I don't think I felt pressured by anymore but more of my own self-consciousness" reinforced similarities with CHLLs' motivations to speak Chinese. In both groups, the appearance of being Chinese has an intangible but a noticeable presence on their psyche. The results of all the figures indicated above suggest that the working hypothesis is a plausible explanation for Chinese adoptee motivations in learning Chinese. According to the polls and free response data collected from the given sample size, the following assumptions were made: Chinese adoptees' motivations for learning Chinese most closely resemble that of CHLL's motivation concerning identity, while Chinese adoptees' motivations differ the most from non-native speaker's desire to learn for utilitarian purposes such as future jobs.

Identity/Culture	**Other**
• So I can communicate with people when I'm searching for my birth parents, as well as know a third language that is one of the most spoken languages in the world • So I can learn my own language and culture • To get in touch with my Chinese culture, but also because I'm just beginning to search for my biological parents and I'd like to be able to at least communicate with them a little • Guilt • To be able to travel to China without worrying and to blend in more • To get in touch with my roots • I think its interesting to know multiple languages and it would be cool to have that cultural aspect of China • To reclaim the culture and heritage that I lost as a result of my adoption • Cultural interest (already listed)	• Because I want to become fluent and I think it will really benefit me in the future • I think it would be cool to be bilingual, and it would look good on resume and job applications • I grew up with it, my parents enrolled me in a Chinese- immersion school • To just learn a fun language • Interesting • Understand what the Chinese is trying to tell me while I am in China. It's one of the coolest languages I know • Educational purposes

• To learn about my roots, because parents wanted me to, and for future job opportunities • I wanted to get in touch with my heritage but also felt obligated to learn it since I'm a Chinese that "doesn't know her own language." I don't think I felt pressured by anymore but more of my own self consciousness • Connecting with my roots • I feel pressured to live up to the expectation that I speak Chinese. But I also genuinely enjoy learning a new language and understanding people from different countries	

Figure 8

LIMITATIONS

The scope of this study is limited in terms of the type of study conducted as well as the demographic pooled. The study was a volunteer sample, so it can be inferred that only those with strong feelings concerning the matter were likely to participate. Additionally, the sample was confined to Chinese adoptees who had access to Facebook, and were specifically part of the adoptee community through their explicit membership in the Facebook group. Challenges in overcoming this limitation include the select amount of venues and sources that target the Chinese adoptee population. Furthermore, within that demographic it is difficult to ensure that the targets are also interested in, or currently studying Mandarin Chinese. In the future, it is recommended that a more comprehensive survey be given to a larger demographic of Chinese adoptees through different mediums in addition to Facebook. An area of interest would be to compare adoptee motivations based on gender identity for learning Chinese.

IMPLICATIONS

These snippets of sometimes disparate thoughts concerning Chinese language learning for adoptees are all part of a broader narrative of over 80,000 Chinese adoptees in the United States alone. While I cannot, and would never attempt to, speak for all Chinese adoptees, there is something to be said generally about the tremendous power that reclamation of language

has for some. Reflecting back on my own personal experiences learning Chinese as an adoptee, I am struck by one particular participant's response to my survey on why they study Chinese: "to reclaim the culture and heritage that I lost as a result of my adoption." My journey in learning Chinese has irrefutably been composed of so many of the emotions and feelings shared by others in this study: guilt, outside pressure, internal pressure and an unquenchable thirst to belong. While a small sample size, the findings of this study, indicating that identity is one of the strongest motivators for adoptees learning Chinese preliminarily, affirms my postulation that the primary motivations for transracially adopted Chinese to learn Mandarin Chinese most closely parallels the identity component CHLLs learning Chinese.

There is an additional sense of urgency I attribute to studying language reclamation of Chinese adoptees, and this is in part due to the falling international adoption rate of Chinese children worldwide. Researcher Jean-Francois Mignot (2015) notes how between 2004 and 2013 the two countries with the highest sending levels of children overseas, China and Russia, fell by three-quarters. In China, the numbers showed that adoptions fell from 13,415 to 3,400 (Mignot 2015). This drop in adoption rates, as explained by Mignot, is not due to a decrease in demand from mostly western nations, but is indicative of policy changes and the rising standards of living in many developing nations from which children are often adopted from (3). Logically, this suggests that in the future there will be significantly less transnationally adopted Chinese left, and even less who will attempt to study Chinese. On a personal level I have an, admittedly selfish, abject fear at the prospect of there being a dearth of Chinese adoptees. This study is my attempt to record and preserve the plight of a specific set of Chinese adoptees searching for meaning and belonging through language in our complex identities.

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Racing the Messenger: The Effect of Racial Cues on Blacks' Political Attitudes*

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Abstract
Research has shown that political messages filtered through race have powerful effects on viewers—specifically, white viewers. But what kind of effect does a racial cue have when it is created for and consumed by a *Black* audience? To answer this question, a survey experiment was designed, including a media treatment tailored for a Black viewership, and distributed exclusively to African American respondents. One third of respondents were exposed to no treatment, another third were exposed to a media treatment with visual racial cues, and the final third were exposed to a media treatment with only auditory racial cues. The results of this experiment show that racial cues have a significant influence on Black viewers' reception of political messages and can significantly alter their political attitudes. More specifically, beliefs about political group consciousness can be shaped by racial cuing.

Keywords
group consciousness, linked fate, racial cues, media treatment, political attitudes

*Special thanks to the Center for Undergraduate Scholarly Engagement, the Institute for Scholarship in the Liberal Arts, and the Department of Political Science for providing funding towards this project.

INTRODUCTION

In December of 2018, the United States' Senate Select Committee on Intelligence commissioned a report[1] outlining the "tactics and tropes of" the Internet Research Agency (IRA), a Russian firm that spent billions of dollars studying and influencing U.S. voters during the 2016 Presidential election. According to the report, the IRA disseminated tens of thousands of posts on Facebook, images on Instagram and videos on YouTube to spread disinformation and sow public division nationwide. But the agency's "most prolific" efforts honed in one particular group: Black Americans (New Knowledge 2018:8).

The extent of the IRA's operations within Black online communities was unparalleled. While the IRA produced media targeting the Right-Wing, the Left-Wing, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump supporters, none of those efforts came close to reaching the quantity of content it designed specifically for consumption by *Black* audiences. With YouTube channel names like "Black Matters" "Don't Shoot" and "Cop Block US" the IRA attracted Black audiences with appeals to racially potent issues like police brutality (New Knowledge 2018:11). After locking viewers in with buzzwords, the IRA pursued its central goal of discouraging Black voters (a core component of the Democratic Party's base) from supporting the Democratic Presidential candidate, Hillary Clinton. This involved everything from encouraging support for third party candidates like Jill Stein to urging potential Black voters to stay home altogether (New Knowledge 2018:8). Though we cannot know for sure to what extent these campaigns actually changed voting behavior for Blacks in America, the potential influence of digital and social media should not be ignored.

After all, Black voter turnout dipped to an 8-year low of 59% in 2016. This initially might not seem alarming given that nearly 2/3 of Blacks still turned out to vote. But when we break down this statistic by age, the results are more striking. Black Millennials were the *only* racial subgroup of Millennials who turned out to vote at lower rates in 2016 than they did in 2012 (Krogstad and Lopez 2017). While there is certainly more than one factor influencing this change in voter turnout, the use of social media, which is often politicized, cannot be overlooked as a potential explanatory variable. According to a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center, 76% of voting-age Blacks used YouTube, 67% used Facebook and 24% used

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[1]The report was completed by New Knowledge, a private company based in Austin, TX that investigates disinformation campaigns and has advised the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence as well as the National Security Agency.

Twitter in 2018 (Smith and Anderson 2018). Across each of these categories, Blacks' usage of social media surpassed whites' usage.

While Black voters often play a consequential role in both local and national elections, the nuances of their political engagement are often oversimplified. Paul Frymer describes the position of Black voters in a two-party system that overvalues the white swing vote as one in which "Black voters remain captured" (1999:48). The consequence of this political "capture" is reflected in the way that research on racial cues in the media tends to both privilege the attitudes of white voters and ignore the attitudes of Black voters. Previous research has emphasized the power of implicit racial messages like that of George H.W. Bush's infamous 1988 Willie Horton advertisement which sought to smear Michael Dukakis by exploiting crude anti-Black stereotypes (Valentino, Hutchings and White 2002). But the idea that political media designed to trigger racial thinking can only affect white audiences ignores the reality that Blacks consume just as much media as whites.

My thesis explores how Black Americans navigate a complex media environment that filters politics and political participation through the lenses of race and racial identity. In doing so, I hope to highlight the ways in which Black group consciousness can be manipulated for political gain. There is a reason why the IRA devoted more resources to Black identity politics than it did to any other singular political identity group. The instability of American race relations is a critical fault line, along which foreign adversaries can intervene to exacerbate political divisions. Understanding how Black Americans are targeted through the media is not only an underexplored subject in Political Science that deserves more attention, it also has important implications for national security and the preservation of free and fair democratic elections.

LITERATURE REVIEW

In order to understand the influence of racialized media on African Americans' political behavior, this thesis will focus on the political attitude that drives Blacks' participation in the American political system—group consciousness. If Blacks' attitudes towards this core belief can be changed, then attitudes about corollary beliefs and even specific policy preferences might also be susceptible to change. Present scholarship acknowledges that feelings about group consciousness can fluctuate, but it lacks an exploration of the role that media can play in this fluctuation. To begin to fill this gap, I will unpack the idea of group consciousness, examine the factors that have

already been shown to alter it and finally discuss how prior research on the power of media to influence political attitudes has largely been limited to studies of white audiences.

Group Consciousness and Its Limits

Group consciousness is the mechanism that drives political participation and decision-making for Black Americans (Verba and Nie 1972; Miller et al. 1980; Dawson 1994; McClain et al. 2009; McClain and Stewart 2010). Group consciousness includes two constituent parts: *attachment to a social group* and the *politicization of that attachment* by a belief that collective political action is the best way to advance the group's interest and improve its status (Dawson 1994; McClain et al. 2014). For Blacks, group attachment develops from shared historical experiences with anti-Black racism and political consciousness manifests through group-based partisan identification and voting (Dawson 1994). In the 21st century, this phenomenon is illustrated by strong support for the Democratic Party among Black Americans. Throwing the entire group's support behind one party rather than dividing group influence between multiple parties is considered to be politically advantageous.

To measure the intensity of this phenomenon, scholars have used different metrics ranging from counting the number of times Black respondents spontaneously mentioned race in conversation, to using an index of questions about racial identity and attitudes; but, the most common tool used to measure group consciousness has been the question of linked fate (Matthews and Prothro 1966; Miller et al. 1981). That is, to what extent does a Black person believe her fate is tethered to the lives of other Blacks, whether she knows them personally or not (McClain et al. 2014). Studies have shown the power of the linked fate measure to predict certain forms of political participation amongst Blacks across class, age, education and gender. For example, Michael Dawson's (1997) seminal work, *Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African American Politics*, illustrated the linked fate question's ability to predict Black electoral turnout based on data from the 1984 National Black Election Survey. The linked fate question has since served as the standard for evaluating Blacks' beliefs about group-based political behavior.

But relying on the linked fate question alone to make inferences about Black Americans' political behavior makes a strong assumption. It assumes that belief in a common fate with other Blacks acts as a proxy for the co-occurring beliefs of shared historical experiences with racism and an understanding that collective action is the best solution for advancing group

interests. While Dawson (1997) provides ample evidence of the historical experiences shared by Black Americans, his work does not provide an explanation for *why* Black people would, en masse, see voting as a viable option for group uplift to begin with. The linked fate question overlooks this possibility and dilutes the complexity of Blacks' political decision-making process. More simply, it is problematic that a measure designed to capture Blacks' political attitudes does not mention politics at all.

Before the linked fate measure became standard however, early research on group consciousness did not use any form of the linked fate question to predict voter participation amongst marginalized groups. Gurin's (1980) work on Black group consciousness finds that the "most important predictor of collectivist orientations" amongst Blacks is the "rejection of the legitimacy of…race disparities" (p.46). In other words, Blacks are driven to collective action as a means of racial uplift because they attribute their unequal status to systemic, institutional racism. Similarly, Miller et al. (1981) labels this sentiment "system blame" and identifies it as one of the psychological components underpinning group consciousness. According to Miller et al. (1981), a measure of group consciousness that *combines* in-group identification (e.g. identifying as Black) and polar power (e.g. feeling dissatisfied with Blacks' level of power in government) powerfully predicts both electoral and non-electoral political participation. Despite these findings, work on Black group consciousness continues to favor a singular linked fate measure to gauge political attitudes.

In addition to being a potentially weak measure of political activism, the linked fate measure assumes that feelings of closeness between Black people are both static and salient. But linked fate is not guaranteed to be at the forefront of every Black person's political considerations. In fact, some studies suggest that the effects of linked fate on political decision-making may be reduced or eliminated under certain conditions. In the shadow of the Civil Rights era, scholars have shown that group consciousness has its limits, particularly in two areas. First, the unifying power of a shared historical experience has changed as Black group interests have splintered. Cohen's (1999) *Boundaries of Blackness: Aids and the Breakdown of Black Politics*, critically evaluates the limits of group consciousness when marginalization occurs *within* the marginalized group. Using the HIV/AIDS epidemic as a lens, Cohen (1999) complicates the notion that Blacks share a common experience and even a common opponent in the American political system. She argues that while the upper echelon of respectable Blacks have become more incorporated into the dominant (white) political system through voter enfranchisement, office holding and increased access to influential social

groups, *other* Blacks have been left behind. These "others" include Blacks who are queer, especially those living with HIV/AIDS, as well as Blacks living in severe poverty (Cohen 1999). Those who exist on the margins of respectable Black society are often isolated from the "universal" Black experience that drives Black group consciousness and therefore may rely on a different calculus when making political decisions. Despite the reality of these social and class divisions, the margins of Black politics have scarcely been explored.

The second limitation of the linked fate measure concerns the fact that perceptions of closeness to other Blacks vary along some of the same variables as perceptions of shared historical experience mentioned above. Gay (2004) examined how a person's environment can alter beliefs about the salience of race in one's life. She found that the quality of the neighborhood in which Blacks live influences their beliefs about racial discrimination and the extent to which they feel their personal outcomes are tied to the status of Blacks as a whole in society (Gay 2004). Further, Laird (2017) finds that class, gender identity and education can predict how close Blacks feel to other Blacks. Identifying a demographic subgroup of so-called "moveable Blacks," Laird (2017) finds that Blacks in this subgroup report the most volatile changes in perceptions of group consciousness. These "moveable Blacks" are especially sensitive to political issues being framed to address their more narrowed interests rather than the broader interests of Blacks generally (Laird 2017:4). Ismail White (2014) and colleagues further find that beliefs about group solidarity amongst Blacks are compromised when Blacks' individual interests are at odds with group interests. Their experiment shows that, when in the purview of other group members, Blacks' expressions of group solidarity are stronger relative to when they are alone (White et al. 2014).

The linked fate measure is limited in two ways. First, even though it does not directly measure political attitudes, it is used to make broad assumptions about Black Americans' political behavior. Second, linked fate assumes that racial group attachment is constant. The research presented here illustrates some of the ways in which linked fate can vary. But even this research does not consider the role that media plays in shaping perceptions of group attachment. It also does not consider that a Black person who defects from group consciousness might be doing so because she disagrees with system blame (the attribution of racial disparities to institutional racism and the belief that political participation is the key to racial group uplift), but still identifies strongly as a member of her racial group. Disaggregating the group attachment and group-based political thinking components of the group consciousness model will provide a fuller picture of how Blacks think

about their relationship to other members of their racial group and their group's relationship to politics.

Group Consciousness and Political Discontent

Group consciousness is the driving force being Blacks' active participation in American politics through voting or seeking elected office, among other things. However, high levels of consciousness often coincide with anti-government sentiment. Shingles (1981) finds that a distrust of government actually *motivates* Blacks' political participation and even, paradoxically, their sense of political efficacy. For most Blacks, participating in politics is tied to the foundational belief that illegitimate racial disparities are at work in the political system and need to be corrected. Where many Blacks differ is on the best way to go about this correction.

For Black conservatives, government skepticism manifests as a broad rejection of government solutions to any racial group problem. Dawson (2001) described Black conservative ideologues as the "most visible" and most "influential set of ideological elites'' in American politics at the time of his writing *Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary Black Political Ideologies* (p.281). Since then, the visibility of Black conservatives has only increased with the expansion of right-wing media outlets (Henry 2013; Lewis 2018). According to Dawson (2001), the Black conservative complicates the group consciousness paradigm in two ways. First, though a Black conservative might acknowledge the legacy of white supremacy in government institutions, they would reject political participation as a solution to racial inequality and focus squarely on economic development as a tool for racial uplift (Dawson 2001:286). Second, a Black conservative sees "system blame" as a weak explanation for current racial inequality and dilutes the influence of systemic racism on the contemporary status of Blacks in America (Dawson 2001:288).

Despite the dearth of support amongst Blacks for the Republican Party (White and Laird 2020), evidence suggests that many share the party's conservative ideological sentiments. Pluralities of Black Americans in national surveys hold right of center opinions on issues like public school prayer, abortion rights, same-sex marriage and even the principle of self-help as a primary solution to poverty (Sigelman and Todd 1992:241; Philpot 2017:165-182). One study even finds that Blacks living in poverty were less likely to see race as the determinant of their economic status than were middle and upper-class Blacks (Durant and Sparrow 1997). Another study finds that Blacks who supported the conservative Black Supreme Court

Justice, Clarence Thomas, concurred with his beliefs about self-reliance as the key to racial uplift (Clawson, Kegler, and Waltenberg 2003). These studies suggest that despite near-uniform *partisan* identity across Black communities, meaningful cleavages in Black public opinion do exist along some of the same measures that shape Blacks' beliefs about group attachment. This research also supports the argument presented here that Blacks differ on their opinions about how best to combat systemic racial disparities.

The literature points to the strength of group consciousness, as measured by linked fate alone, as an explanation for why even Blacks with conservative political opinions overwhelmingly support liberal policies and vote for liberal politicians. Yet, some research suggests that this explanation is insufficient; surveys of Black voters have shown a negative correlation between linked fate and ideology. As perceptions of linked fate decrease, identification with conservative ideology increases, even amongst Blacks who self-identify as Democrats (Philpot 2017:161). Other research shows lower levels of linked fate correlate with more satisfaction with existing political institutions and less desire to pursue political change (Clawson, Kegler, and Waltenberg 2003). These studies indicate the potential for a small-government argument to be attractive to some Blacks (given the right framing) and the potential for group consciousness to shift in response to changing beliefs about the role of government.

Racial Cues in Political Media

While group consciousness has rarely been studied as a dependent variable responding to media exposure, the influence of media exposure on American public opinion and political attitudes more generally is well-documented. Kinder and Iyengar (2010) find that television news for example, plays an important role in establishing a frame for evaluating political ideas and political leaders. While television now plays a slightly less critical prominent in the distribution of political information, many of their findings for TV apply well to the more ubiquitous forms of digital and social media popular today such as video clips shared on YouTube, Facebook and Twitter. One of these findings is the "priming effect" which argues that "calling attention to some matters while ignoring others" affects "the standards by which governments, presidents, policies and candidates for public office are judged" (Kinder and Iyengar 2010:63). Using experiments, Kinder and Iyengar (2010) show strong support for the power of priming in television news coverage to shape how viewers evaluate politicians. However, this study does not examine the role that race plays in interpretations of the

media, nor does it examine how viewers respond to racial issues evaluated through the medium of television.

Other scholarship has shown how media infused with intentionally racial cues can affect whites' political beliefs (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Mendelberg 2001; Valentino, Hutchings, and White 2002). Mendelberg (2001) describes a theory of *racial* priming, "an increase in the effect of racial stereotypes, fears and resentments leading to increased opposition to racial policies" (p.12). It is argued that racial priming is most effective when it appeals to race implicitly, without language that directly invokes race (e.g. the word "Black")(Mendelberg 2001). Valentino, Hutchings and White (2002) applied the racial priming effect to racially coded political advertisements. They found that viewing such ads influenced both white viewers' racial attitudes and policy preferences on issues like welfare which are not inherently racial in nature but have strong racial implications (Valentino et al. 2002).

All of this research on the power of priming lacks an examination of how *Black* viewers respond to race cues in media. Little research has explored the relationship between race and media frames as it pertains to a Black viewership, in part because Black support for liberal policies is a forgone assumption. The work that has explored media influence on the contours of Black public opinion suggest that the story might be a bit more complicated. White (2014) finds that Blacks respond to racial cuing in a fundamentally different way than whites (2007). While both Mendelberg (2001) and Kinder and Sanders (1996) conclude that whites are most responsive to implicit cues, White (2014) shows that Blacks are more responsive to *explicit* cues.

In addition to focusing exclusively on white audiences, the early research on racial priming is a bit dated. American politics has transformed substantially since the mid-aughts with the election of an African American man to the presidency (twice) and the subsequent successful presidential campaign of Donald Trump, an individual who initiated his political career by explicitly exploiting racial stereotypes. New research from Valentino, Neuner and Vandenbroek suggests that explicit racial appeals are "now a powerful force regardless of the way we talk about politics" (Valentino, Neuner and Vandenbroek 2018:769). Because Blacks have a fundamentally different relationship to racial cues in political media and the fluidity of Black group consciousness warrants further exploration, this thesis seeks to address both areas by identifying exposure to racialized media as a potential determinant of Black group consciousness.

THEORY AND ARGUMENT

Present research has failed to consider the ways in which Blacks respond to racial cues in media. This is largely due to an underlying assumption that racial cues are predominately "dog-whistles" designed for, and therefore only audible to, white listeners. Such research is shortsighted and overlooks the dynamic, and, at times, conflicting cognitive processes that underscore political decision-making for Blacks. In the 21st-century with the ubiquity of the internet, social media and a plethora of online news outlets, it is reasonable to expect that Blacks explore, develop and even question their racial and political identities in response to the kinds of political communications to which they are exposed.

Through a survey experiment, I examine how Blacks respond to racial messages in a complicated media environment. I argue that respondents exposed to treatment media that questions the legitimacy of group consciousness, a central component of Black politics, will report significantly lower levels of group consciousness compared with respondents in a control group who are not exposed to the treatment. My dependent variable, group consciousness, is operationalized using two different questions to measure respondents' closeness and attachment to other Black people as well as their satisfaction with the level of power Blacks have in politics.

Prediction for the Control Group

Research in Black politics finds that Black voters feel a sense of attachment to members of their racial group due to shared historical experiences with discrimination and political exclusion. This attachment manifests politically as group consciousness, that is, "attachment to a social group and the politicization of that attachment by a belief that collective political action is the best way to advance the group's interest and improve its status" (McClain et al. 2009:476). So, absent experimental interference, respondents should report high levels of group consciousness. Therefore, respondents in the control group should report both strong group attachment and dissatisfaction with Blacks' influence in politics.

Prediction for the Treatment Groups

As discussed in the literature review, group consciousness is not static. Socioeconomic status, environment, ideology and partisan identification have all been shown to shape Blacks' perceptions of group consciousness. I propose another dimension along which group consciousness might vary: exposure to media. By exposing respondents in the treatment groups to

media that challenges the assumptions underpinning group consciousness, I predict that those exposed will report diminished levels of group consciousness. That is, weak group attachment and contentment with Black political representation.

The media treatment used for this survey comes from a YouTube video entitled "Blacks in Power Don't Empower Blacks." This video includes a Black host explaining why he believes that the rise of Black leadership in government has worsened conditions for Black communities and suggests that Black political leaders are motivated primarily by self-interest rather than concern for uplifting other members of their racial group. The host, Jason Riley, a journalist and researcher at the ideologically conservative Manhattan Institute, makes several arguments to this effect. Broadly, he contends that the pursuit of political inclusion has inhibited Black communities.

I chose this video because it makes a clear and unambiguous case *against* both the "system blame" component of racial group consciousness and the group attachment component. Both system blame and group attachment are robust indicators of strong racial group consciousness for Blacks (Gurin et al. 1980; Miller et al. 1981; Dawson 1994). In the media treatment, Riley argues that Black politicians have "achieved considerable personal success" at the expense of "their constituents", a direct attack on the notion that what happens to other Blacks (e.g. political leaders) will have a direct impact on what happens to individual Blacks. He further cites research that Black political leaders in majority-Black counties and cities have failed to secure economic gains for the Black communities they represent. He says the idea "that politics is the pathway to progress" is "an incorrect assumption" ("Blacks in Power Don't Empower Blacks" 2018). So, if the argument in the media treatment is successful, it will *deactivate* beliefs about group solidarity and group attachment and this deactivation should be reflected in responses to the operational questions.

My hypotheses are based on the creation of two separate treatment groups: an audio-visual group that will view the video in its entirety and an audio-only group that will only listen to the audio of the video. I chose to vary the physical presence of Riley, who is an ostensibly African American man, in order to test whether the race of the messenger or the message alone have a stronger influence on group consciousness. The audio-only treatment group should, on average, report *lower levels of group consciousness* compared with the control group. Further, the audio-visual treatment group should, on average, report the *lowest levels of group consciousness* amongst all three experiment groups.

My hypotheses for the treatment groups are grounded in literature regarding the role of media in shaping individual responses to politics generally and race specifically. I predict that the visibility of the Black speaker will trigger respondents in the audio-visual treatment group to specifically consider race when they evaluate the claims made by Riley in the treatment. Exploration of Black viewers' responses to racial cues in political media is a small but growing field; however, the most substantial research on racial cues in politics focuses on white viewers. This research finds that when individuals are triggered to consider race while consuming political media, this trigger can subsequently alter their political beliefs relative to individuals who are not exposed to racial cues (Kinder and Sanders 1999; Mendelberg 2001; Valentino et al. 2002). Thus, exposure to the treatment should have some influence on respondents' decision-making.

While my prediction is based largely on this work, I also look to the newer body of literature that has measured *Black* viewers' responses to racial cues specifically. This research finds that Blacks do respond to racial cues in media, but in ways that often differ from whites (Hutchings and Valentino 2010; Sullivan 2010; Laird 2014; Lyle 2014). White (2007) finds that, for Blacks, explicit cues that directly frame an issue as one concerning their racial group tend to be more effective at changing thoughts and behaviors than implicit cues that "talk around" race. The very title of the treatment video, "Blacks in Power Don't Empower Blacks" is an explicit appeal to racialized thinking.

Further, experimental work on Black respondents conducted by Lyle (2014) and Laird (2014) inform my predictions about the unique power of the treatment media. Though it only uses a small sample of less than 100 Black respondents, Lyle's study finds that when exposed to a racial cue from a political elite that called on Blacks to "take responsibility" for systemic racial disparities, respondents were more likely to report that racial inequality is not the result of systemic racism (2014:360). Lyle (2014) did not identify the race or gender of the unnamed "prominent political figure" in her study, but her results show strong evidence that political leaders have the power to disproportionately shape Black public opinion even when the speaker's identity is unknown. Further Laird's (2014) experimental work showed that Blacks respond differently to the question of linked fate based on how well a newspaper article treatment framed Black issues according to their specific interests. Both of these studies demonstrate that racial cues have the potential to shape Black respondents' answers to questions about group attachment and group political participation.

A third area of research pertinent to my hypotheses is the study of race-of-interviewer effects on responses to survey questions. This research indicates that Blacks' responses to explicitly racial questions in national surveys are significantly influenced by whether their interviewer is Black or white (Schuman and Converse 1971; Schuman and Hatchett 1974; Anderson, Silver and Abramson 1988; Davis 1997). While my survey will be conducted online with no direct interference from a physical interviewer, I suspect that the treatment media will have an effect similar to that of a Black interviewer. Black interviewers have been shown to elicit more "frank" or authentic responses from Black interviewees compared to the responses elicited by white interviewers when it comes to specifically racial questions (Schuman and Converse 1971; Davis 1997). Davis (1997) further finds that "African Americans invariably take more accommodating and powerless positions in response to white interviewers" when asked questions regarding race in an effort to guard against the white gaze (p.319). Because my operational questions are explicitly racial in nature, I expect the audio-visual treatment group, the only group that will physically see the speaker in the treatment, to have significantly weaker responses to the group consciousness questions than the control and audio groups.

I do not apply race-of-interviewer effects to the audio group mainly because the race of the speaker is not immediately evident from his voice alone. Riley avoids use of regional slang or Ebonics[2] in the video and has no discernible regional accent. Riley also uses strictly third-person pronouns (e.g. he never uses words like "I" or "We" in reference to Black communities) throughout his video so there is no indication that he is actually a member of the group he describes. Further, race-of-interviewer has shown to have negligible influence on Black respondents when surveys are conducted by telephone (Cotter, Cohen, and Coulter 1982). To further control for the possible but unlikely instance of a respondent identifying the speaker as Black, respondents in the audio-only group will be asked to identify the race of the speaker at the very end of the survey. So, any changes in reported levels of group consciousness between the control group and the audio group should result purely from the content of the message itself rather than from any identity characteristics of the speaker. Thus, my treatment hypotheses combine theories of racial cuing as well as research on how the race of the interviewer can influence responses to questions about racial attitudes for Blacks.

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[2]Ebonics is a "dialect of American English spoken by a large portion of African Americans" which is "most distinctive in its intonation and some stress patterns" (See Mufwene 2019 for more).

Prediction for the Treatment Groups

But how can media that triggers racial in-group identification simultaneously push viewers to reject group consciousness? After all, it seems logical that identifying strongly as a member of a group should encourage feelings of group solidarity. Does my proposed treatment video really have the power to divorce an identity from its political implications?

Careful consideration of the mechanisms underlying group consciousness suggests that it is possible. Since the impetus of the study of Blacks in American politics, researchers have measured the feelings of attachment and "closeness" that bind Black individuals to Black communities and subsequently shape their political participation (Matthews and Prothro 1966; Verba and Nie 1972; Dawson 1994). As Figure 1.1. demonstrates, relatively high numbers of Blacks have identified with this feeling of closeness for decades in large part because what is good for the group as a whole is believed to serve as a proxy for what is good for the individual (McClain et al. 2014). Conversely, things that are bad for Blacks as a group are believed to be bad for individuals as well.

Table 1: Proportion of Black Americans Perceiving that They Share a Common Fate with Other Black Americans

	1984* %	**1988*** %	**1993*** %	**1996*** %	**2005*** %	**2007*** %	**2008*** %	**2012*** %	**2016**** %
Yes	73.5 (796)	77.4 (339)	77.9 (904)	83 (954)	65 (601)	59.7 (261)	66.7 (661)	65.3 (667)	67.3 (268)
No	26.5 (287)	22.6 (99)	22.1 (256)	17 (196)	35 (318)	40.3 (176)	33.3 (330)	34.7 (360)	32.7 (130)
Total	100 (1083)	100 (438)	100 (1160)	100 (1150)	100 (919)	100 (437)	100 (991)	100 (1037)	100 (398)

*Source: McClain, P.D. and Carew, J.D. (2016). *Can we all get along?: Racial and ethnic minorities in American politics.* New York, NY: Westview Press. pp. 79.

**Source: 2016 American National Elections Study

While small government conservatives have long made the case against political incorporation as a means of social advancement for marginalized groups in America, this messaging fails amongst Black voters in part because of the strength of group attachment. Specifically, small government rhetoric is rooted in individualism, but political participation for Blacks tends to be centered on community and collectivism (Lewis 1991). However, if, alternatively, the small government message could be advertised as a collectivist solution, the argument could carry more weight with Blacks.

Though the thinking behind group consciousness calls for political action as a means of advancing group interest, group consciousness also shares cognitive space with belief that government is the problem. Recall from the literature review that racial group consciousness hinges on the notion that racial disparities are caused by institutional racism and must be corrected by those same institutions. In the treatment video, Riley proposes an alternative means of achieving group uplift: rejecting political institutions altogether rather than trying to reform them.

While as a staunch conservative Riley himself appears to be outside the mainstream of Black political thought, his argument in the treatment video is not[3]. According to Dawson, nearly all versions of Black political ideologies agree that the government has hindered Black progress, but they disagree about the extent to which the same system can be trusted to correct for those problems. For Black liberals, the government should play a prominent role, while for conservatives like Riley, the government role should be minimal if it interferes at all. The common thread of government resentment between both Black conservatives and liberals is why Dawson (2001) categorizes Black conservative ideology as a potential, though decidedly unpopular, remedy for those Blacks who feel "disillusioned" with American liberalism (p.280). Riley's argument in the media treatment plays upon this sense of political disillusionment that is, in some ways, inherent to the Black political experience, regardless of ideological leanings and despite relatively invariant support for the Democratic Party.

The treatment video is unique in that it offers the small government message from a non-partisan, Black messenger who explicitly frames limited political participation as a tool for racial group uplift. Riley refocuses the group consciousness paradigm, calling unambiguously for racial in-group identification while also funneling that identity away from politics. By simultaneously activating a strong sense of group identity and political cynicism, the treatment video should weaken respondents' perceptions of group consciousness. This experiment will thus explore the role that media plays in influencing beliefs about group solidarity.

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND METHODS

To test my hypotheses, I designed a survey experiment that includes a media treatment. I divided a sample of paid respondents acquired from

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[3]I note here that the treatment video is strictly non-partisan and makes no references to political parties. The distinction I draw between Black conservatives and liberals holds party identification constant because there has been so little variation in the partisan-identification of Blacks in the last 60 years (See White & Laird 2020 for more).

a Qualtrics market research survey database into two treatment groups and a control group. All three groups answered a series of pre-treatment demographic questions and post-treatment operational questions. By varying the presence and type of media exposure in each experiment group, I show that exposure to political media that includes racial cues can alter perceptions of group consciousness amongst Blacks.

The Treatment Media

My media treatment is a 6-minute video essay publicly available on the social media platform YouTube. The video was published by the YouTube channel affiliated with "Prager University" or "PragerU," a right-wing 501(c) nonprofit organization that produces free, "educational" multimedia content through its website, prageru.com, and its channel on YouTube ("About Us"). While PragerU has published multiple videos addressing "race relations" and racial issues in American politics, I chose the particular video "Blacks in Power Don't Empower Blacks," because it makes an unambiguous case against the utility and the logic of Black group consciousness. Appendix A contains a full script of the video essay.

I choose to rely on the content produced by PragerU rather than producing a media treatment myself for three reasons. First, I lack the resources and knowledge to create a media treatment of the same production quality as the video I have chosen. The audio is clear and sharp, the editing is clean and contains simple animations to keep the audience engaged and the overall professionalism of the video conveys a sense of authenticity and authority that I simply could not reproduce.

The second reason concerns external validity. It is important for my experiment to present respondents with a media treatment that mimics the kinds of media that they would actually see outside a closed experimental environment. This video was designed to be attractive, engaging and compelling to a general audience so respondents' reactions to the video will provide a good simulation of the real online environment in which Blacks are interacting with political media.

In addition to being well-produced and potentially persuasive, the video contains both of my independent variables of interest: an argument against group consciousness and a Black messenger. Because Riley is an ostensibly African American man and his unambiguous goal is to suppress perceptions of group consciousness, the video is an ideal fit for analyzing my dependent variables in the post-treatment questionnaire.

Sample Size and Group Assignment

I randomly assigned a sample of n = 458 respondents into three groups: a **control group** which was not exposed to any media treatment, an **audio-visual group** which was exposed to a treatment video and an **audio-only group** which was exposed only to the audio from the same treatment video used for the audio-visual group. All respondents for this survey self-identified as African American. Figure 1 summarizes the assignments of the experimental treatment groups.

Figure 1: Experiment Group Assignments



Pre and Post-Treatment Questionnaires

Each respondent answered 8 pre-treatment questions and 6 post-treatment questions, with the exception of respondents in the audio-only group who answered 7 post-treatment questions. In the pre-treatment, all respondents were asked demographic questions including their race, age, household income, level of education, political ideology, partisan identification and gender.

In the post-treatment, all respondents were asked two operational questions as well as three "filler" questions to desensitize their responses to questions about race. The filler questions included a question about respondents' opinions of international trade agreements and how often they read newspapers. In addition to the filler, the audio-only group was asked to identify the race of the speaker post-treatment. The two operational post-treatment questions measure consciousness as follows:

The linked fate/closeness question: *"how much do you think that what happens generally to Black people in this country will affect what happens*

in your life? [A lot, some, not very much, or not at all?]" is a standard measure of group attachment amongst Black Americans (McClain et al. 2014; Sanchez and Vargas 2016). Responses to this question have been shown to correlate with increased political participation and political efficacy (Dawson 1994).

The second question, **group influence:** *"would you say Blacks have too much, too little, or just about the right amount of influence in American politics?"* stems from Gurin, Miller and Gurin's (1980) original model of group "political consciousness." According to Gurin et al. (1980), group consciousness arises from both a feeling of "power discontent" and a "rejection of [the] legitimacy" of intergroup disparities. The former is addressed by the group influence question. Together, the linked fate and group influence questions should measure how respondents, post-treatment, perceive their relationship to their racial group and the role that their group plays in politics. A full list of the pre and post-treatment questions can be found in Appendix B.

Analysis

To analyze the significance of the changes I found in perceptions of group consciousness across my experimental groups, I used a Chi-Square test for independence. I chose the Chi-Square test because I rely on questions with categorical responses to measure my dependent variable. Both the group influence and linked fate questions have categorical answers: a lot, some, too much, etc. The Chi-Square results show whether the actual responses to the group influence and linked fate questions differ significantly from the responses we would expect to see if group assignment had no influence on responses to those questions.

RESULTS

Summary Statistics: Comparing the Experimental Groups

The survey was distributed online through Qualtrics, a research survey platform, to a total of 458 respondents who identified as Black or African American. Each respondent was randomly assigned to either the control group (n = 154) with no media treatment, the audio-only group (n = 153) that listened to an audio clip of the media treatment or the audio-visual group (n = 151) that was exposed to the full media treatment. Before exposure to the treatment, all three groups were asked the same series of demographic questions available in Appendix B. A summary of responses to these questions is described below.

Figure 2: Gender by Group Assignment



Each group shared roughly similar demographic traits in terms of gender, ideology, partisan identification, income and level of education. As Figure 2 illustrates, in all three groups, more than 2/3 of the respondents identified as female. Figure 3 further shows that similar numbers of respondents in all three groups identified as Democrats, Independents and Republicans, with the vast majority of respondents identifying as Democrats. The control group did include slightly more Republicans than the other two groups and slightly less Democrats.

Figure 3: Party ID by Group Assignment



The slight difference in the number of Republicans is reflected in the ideological distribution between the three groups. Figure 4 shows that the control group was relatively more moderate while the Audio-Visual group leaned more conservative and the Audio group leaned more liberal. The median ideology however was constant between all three groups at around 4.

Figure 4: Ideology by Group Assignment



Respondents were also asked to identify their age-range. As Figure 5 shows, most respondents across the three groups were between age 25 and 44. The audio-only group had slightly older respondents (over 55) and the control group had relatively more young respondents (18-24). The audio-visual group had the highest number of middle-aged respondents (35-44).

Figure 5: Age by Group Assignment



Finally, respondents were asked to identify the range of their annual household income and the highest level of education they obtained. Figures 6 and 7, respectively, display the responses to these questions across experimental

groups. In Figure 6 we see that, across all three groups, most respondents reported an annual household income of less than $25,000. And, the second most frequently reported income category was $50,000-$74,999. All groups had relatively small numbers of respondents earning six-figure incomes. This is not surprising given that respondents received a paid incentive to complete this survey and this incentive likely attracted many low-wage workers.

Figure 6: Income by Group Assignment



Figure 7 displays the highest level of education respondents obtained according to their experimental group. Once again, the distribution of incomes across groups is roughly equivalent.

Figure 7: Education by Group Assignment



The audio-only group appears to have slightly more post-secondary education than either the control or audio-visual treatment groups while the audio-visual group has more respondents that have earned an Associate's degree. This appears to be consistent with the slightly higher incomes of respondents in the audio-visual group.

Overall, the three experimental groups, while not completely identical, do share enough similarities across demographic characteristics to make meaningful comparisons amongst the groups. Aside from all identifying as African Americans, respondents in all three groups were overwhelmingly female, Democrats, ideologically left of center, earned an income of less than $25,000 and earned less than a college diploma. The control group was slightly more moderate than the audio-only and audio-visual groups. The audio-visual group was slightly more educated and had a slightly higher average household income compared with the other two groups.

CHI-SQUARE TEST RESULTS

Group Influence

Respondents answered two operational questions to measure my dependent variable, group consciousness. The first was group influence. If

my predictions hold true, we should see the number of respondents who feel that Blacks have "too little" influence *decreasing* as we move from the control group, which was not exposed to any racial cues, towards the audio-visual group, which was exposed to the strongest racial cues in the media treatment. We should expect to see the opposite trend for the number of respondents who report that Blacks have enough or even too much influence in politics. Figure 8 summarizes responses to the group influence question. Consistent with my predictions, the control group had the lowest number of respondents to report that Blacks have "just about the right amount" of influence in American politics, while the audio-visual group had the most respondents report that Blacks have enough influence in American politics. The audio-only group reported higher numbers than the control group, but lower numbers than the audio-visual group. Conversely, the audio-visual group had the lowest number of respondents reporting that Blacks have "too little" influence in American politics, while the control group had the highest number reporting "too little" influence. The audio-only group fell in the middle.

Figure 8: Group Influence by Group Assignment



So overall, respondents who were not exposed to any racial cues were less satisfied with the level of influence Blacks have in politics than were respondents exposed to racial cues via the media treatment.

These results confirm my hypothesis that exposure to the media treatment would weaken respondents' perceptions of group consciousness. I performed a Chi-Square test for independence to determine the significance of the differences in responses between the treatment groups. As Table 2

indicates, the results of this test were significant at the .05 level. So, media exposure and responses to the group influence question are *not* independent of one another.

Table 2: Group Influence by Group Assignment

	# Too little	# Just about the right amount	# Too much
Control	119	30	5
Audio-Only	98	46	9
Audio-Visual	89	55	7
X^2	13.09	df = 4	p < .05

Linked Fate

The second operational question was linked fate. Figure 9 summarizes responses to the linked fate question organized by group assignment. The audio-visual group reported the highest levels of linked fate, with slightly more respondents identifying themselves as feeling that what happens to other Blacks impacts their lives "a lot," in the audio-visual group than in the other two experimental groups.

Figure 9: Linked Fate by Group Assignment



As we move from the Control group which received no racial cues to the audio-visual which received the strongest racial cues, we see the proportion of respondents reporting "not at all" or "not very much" linked fate decreasing. These results therefore indicate the opposite of my hypotheses: the audio-

visual group actually reported *the highest levels* of this measure of group consciousness.

I performed another Chi-Square test of independence to evaluate the significance of these differences in reported levels of group consciousness. Table 3 indicates the results of this test. The Chi-Square result has a p-value of .14, which is not statistically significant. So, while the general direction of the responses goes against my hypotheses, these results were not significant.

Table 3: Linked Fate by Group Assignment and Chi-Square Results

	# A lot	**# Some**	**# Not very much**	**# Not at all**
Control	75	52	17	10
Audio-Only	76	57	15	5
Audio-Visual	82	57	11	11
X^2	9.58		df = 6	p = .14

Taking a Closer Look at the Audio Group

Of particular interest for this experiment was the audio-only treatment group and how its respondents identified the race of the speaker in the media treatment. The audio-only group received no visual indication of what the speaker looked like so any guesses made were based on the speakers' voice alone. Figure 10 shows the distribution of how respondents in the audio-only group identified the race of the speaker in the audio treatment when asked, post-treatment. This was the very last question that each respondent answered. Most guessed that the speaker was white, and about 1/3 identified the speaker (correctly) as Black. Only 16% were unsure of the speaker's race and an insignificant number identified the speaker as Asian/Pacific Islander or Latino.

Figure 10: Identified Race of Speaker



I did not anticipate that such a large proportion of respondents in the audio-only group would correctly identify the speaker's race. This suggests that the audio version of the media treatment conveyed racial cues to most respondents in this group. If my assumptions about the influence of race cues on political behavior hold true, respondents who believed that the speaker was a member of their in-group (Black), should report statistically significant differences in their perceptions of group consciousness from respondents who identified the speaker as an out-group member (non-Black).

Figure 11 summarizes how respondents answered the group influence question based on how they raced the speaker. We can see that most of the respondents who felt Blacks had "too little" influence in American politics also identified the speaker as white. In contrast, most respondents who felt that Blacks have "just about the right amount" of influence in politics identified the speaker as Black. None of the respondents who felt that Blacks have too much influence in politics believed the speaker was white.

Figure 11: Group Influence by Race of Speaker



Figure 12 breaks down the number of respondents in each category of the speaker's identified race. The small number of respondents who said Blacks had "too much influence" were also predominantly those respondents who identified the speaker's race as Black. We can also see that most of the respondents who felt Blacks have "too little" influence believed the speaker was white. This result is especially interesting when considered alongside Davis' theory that Blacks "don" a more submissive position when presented with a white interviewer in order to avoid appearing threatening to that interviewer (Davis 1997). These results instead suggest that when the speaker was believed to be white, respondents directly challenged the attitudes expressed in the audio clip.

Figure 12: Race of Speaker by Group Influence



Table 4 shows the results of the Chi-Square test evaluating the significance of these results. We can see that the differences in responses to the group influence question based on the identified race of the speaker are highly significant with a p-value of <.001. This is consistent with the findings across all three groups. We can compare respondents in the audio-only group who *believed* the speaker was Black to respondents in the audio-visual group, who saw the speaker's race. Both were more likely to think that Blacks had "just about the right amount" of influence than were respondents in the control group or respondents who believed the speaker to be non-Black.

Table 4: Group Influence by Race of Speaker and Chi-Square Results

	% Too little (n=98)	**% Just about the right amount (n=46)**	**% Too much (n=9)**
Asian/Pacific Islander	1	2	11
Black or African American	22	57	55
Hispanic or Latino	1	0	11
Not Sure	22	4	23
White or Caucasian	54	37	0
Total	100	100	100
X^2	df = 8	35.45	p < .001

Figure 12 shows that respondents answered the linked fate question based their identification of the speaker's race. Most respondents perceived either "a lot" or "some" linked fate with other Blacks. Respondents who identified the speaker as Black reported stronger linked fate than respondents who identified the speaker as non-Black. As was the case when we examined linked fate across all three groups, this result runs counter to the predictions made in my hypotheses. A Chi-Square test was also used to verify the significance of these responses. Table 5 shows the results of this test which failed to reach a meaningful level of significance. However, with a p-value of .063, this test was close to being significant at the .05 level.

Figure 13: Linked Fate by Race of Speaker



Table 5: Linked Fate by Race of Speaker and Chi-Square Results

	% A lot (n=76)	% Some (n=57)	% Not very much (n=15)	% Not at all (n=5)
Asian/Pacific Islander	3	0	0	20
Black or African American	34	39	20	40
Hispanic or Latino	0	4	0	0
Not Sure	16	16	13	40
White or Caucasian	47	42	67	0
Total	100	100	100	100
X^2	20.24		df = 12	p = .063

On Gender

Given that an overwhelming majority of respondents were Black women, it is useful to disaggregate the responses by gender in order to better understand if and how gender played a role in shaping responses. Figure 13 organizes answers to the group influence question across all three groups by gender. Respondents had three options for response to the gender question: male, female, or other. None of the respondents in the survey identified with a non-binary gender label. We can further see that females were slightly more likely than males to believe that Blacks have too little influence on politics, regardless of their group assignment. Similarly, males were more likely to feel that Blacks have just about the right amount of influence. Table 6 further shows that the differences in response to the group influence question based on gender were significant at the .01 level. There does appear to be some gender difference in responses to the group influence question.

Figure 14: Group Influence by Gender



Table 6: Group Influence by Gender and Chi-Square Results

	% Female		% Male
Too little	73 (n=228)		55 (n=78)
Just about the right amount	24 (77)		38 (54)
Too much	3 (11)		7 (10)
Total	100		100
X^2	13.4	df = 2	$p < .01$

Table 7 summarizes responses to the linked fate question based on gender. A Fisher's Exact test was used for this data because the expected value for some of the response categories was less than five. As was the case with my other analyses of the linked fate question, the differences in response are not significant. Still, the percentage of male and female respondents in each category of responses was nearly identical. Gender appears to have no influence on responses to the linked fate question.

Table 7: Linked Fate by Gender and Fisher's Exact Test Results

	% Female	% Male
A lot	50 (n=159)	53 (n=74)
Some	36 (113)	37 (53)
Not very much	9 (29)	10 (14)
Not very much	5 (5)	0 (1)
Total	100	100
Fisher's Exact Test	p = .16	

DISCUSSION

The results of this survey experiment showed mixed support for my hypotheses. First, a discussion of the results that were statistically significant. Responses to the group influence question across all three groups *confirmed* my hypotheses that respondents exposed to the strongest racial cue in the audio-visual group, would report the lowest levels of dissatisfaction with Blacks' representation in politics. My results were also significant when analyzed within just the audio-only group amongst those respondents who believed the speaker to be Black. We can compare these groups because, as Figure 10 shows, *both* perceived racial cues from the media treatment. For the audio-visual group, the cue was obvious: Jason Riley, the host of the video, is an ostensibly African American man and respondents' answers to the group influence question were influenced by his presence. Significantly more respondents in the audio-visual group reported satisfaction with the current level of influence Blacks have in politics than did respondents in the other groups.

We can also see the power of the racial cue through the audio-only group, which was presented with an audio clip of the same media treatment that the audio-visual group received, without the visual image of a Black host. A much greater percentage of audio-only group respondents who raced Riley as Black also reported satisfaction with how Blacks are currently represented in politics than those who raced Riley as white. Those who believed Riley was white reported more skepticism about Black group influence. These findings suggest that Riley's tactic was effective, at least marginally. The core message of the treatment, that political incorporation has failed Black Americans individually and Black communities broadly, was significantly

more palatable to a Black audience when that message was conveyed by a *Black* messenger. In contrast, when we look specifically at the audio-only group's responses, the message was met with much more resistance when the speaker was raced as a white male. More than half of the respondents who believed the speaker was white reported that Blacks have too little influence on American politics. The literature on race-of-interviewer effects explains and supports the divergence in responses between these two groups. Blacks tend to offer more authentic answers when they believe they are in the purview of another Black person compared with when they believe they are in the purview of a white person (Schuman and Converse 1971).

We also saw that gender played some role in responses to the group influence question. Though there were twice as many women as men in the sample, a greater percentage of women, across all three groups, felt that Blacks had too little influence in politics than did men. And, in parallel, a greater percentage of men in all three groups reported that Blacks have enough influence in politics. These results indicate that gender might mitigate beliefs about group consciousness as well. It is not immediately clear why men reported significantly more satisfaction than women with Blacks' level of influence in politics; but, given the relatively small number of male respondents, less than 1/3 of the number of female respondents, I am not sure that these gender differences would have been as significant if more men were in the sample.

These results demonstrate the power of media to impact political thinking, at least in the short-term. Previous research has relied on the assumption that Black political beliefs are static. However, my results show that Blacks have dynamic political beliefs and their opinions can be significantly influenced by media, particularly when that media explicitly appeals to their racial identity. When Riley argues that Black representation in politics has failed to improve conditions for Black citizens, he pushes against the system blame component of group consciousness. The result is that viewers who felt convinced by his argument were less likely to report that Black political representation is lacking. And, viewers were more likely to be convinced when they believed Riley to be Black. Thus, this prong of group consciousness, the politicization of group attachment, is malleable to the media environment.

However, answers to the group attachment measure of group consciousness (the linked fate question) did not show any statistically significant changes in response to the media treatment. Though insignificant, the direction of responses to the linked fate question went against the grain of my original hypotheses. Respondents exposed to treatment media, that is,

those in the audio-only and audio-visual groups, on average reported higher levels of linked fate than respondents in the control group. This suggests that feelings of group attachment are relatively sticky compared to beliefs about the group's political influence. Further, perceiving a racial cue from the speaker in the media treatment appeared to trigger stronger feelings of group attachment than when no racial cues were perceived at all, as was the case with respondents in the control group. While these results were not significant, the fact that the responses to the two group consciousness questions were so divergent suggests that the political dimension of Black identity (as measured by group influence) can be separated from feelings of attachment to the identity itself.

CONCLUSION

Media plays an important role in the development of our political beliefs and attitudes, the same beliefs and attitudes that ultimately shape our political behavior. When media with an unambiguous political agenda is infused with race, it strikes at the core of one's identity and thus has the potential to dramatically shape future actions. While previous research has focused on the ways in which white Americans negotiate their racial identity in political media environments, this thesis has explored how Black Americans navigate this space.

The results of my experiment demonstrate that African Americans *do* respond to racial cues in political media and these responses are mitigated by the type of cue they perceive. I predicted that when exposed to media that criticizes the cognition of group consciousness, respondents would report weaker perceptions of group consciousness if they identified the speaker as Black. Measuring group consciousness with two questions, one about group attachment and the other about group political influence, I found significant evidence that exposure to the treatment media influenced responses to the latter question, but not the former. These results revealed two important conclusions about the power of racialized media and the ideas it conveys. The first we already knew to be true for white audiences: mere exposure to racialized political media can significantly alter political attitudes and beliefs, at least in the short-run. Consistent with the small amount of previous research on this topic, I found this to be the case for the Black audiences as well. The second, more subtle finding, is unique to this research: a Black speaker is a more effective messenger when addressing a Black audience, even when his message runs counter to existing group norms.

The fact that respondents answered a question about their own group's influence in politics differently based on the way they raced the speaker in the media treatment importantly indicates that the speaker's message is not race-neutral. It is in fact mitigated by the identity of messenger such that what feels threatening when a speaker is raced as white feels instead like an innocent suggestion when the speaker is raced as Black. Specifically, the stark difference in answers within the audio-only group (which received no visual cues about the speakers' race) between those who raced the speaker as Black and those who raced him as white best illustrates my overall argument. Media, in as little as just five to six minutes, can shift Blacks' political attitudes, even when that media presents a counterintuitive message. When believed to be Black, the speaker's racial identity conveyed a sense of familiarity and trustworthiness that follows from racial group attachment. The fact that group assignment had almost no significant bearing on linked fate, the question used to measure group attachment, further indicates the strength of this phenomenon.

At the outset of this research, I put stock in the treatment media's ability to discourage viewers' feelings of linked fate because the speaker argues that the successes of elite Black politicians have not had (and will never have) trickle down effects on their Black constituents; in other words, *their* fates are not linked to the fate of the average Black person's. But it appears that the treatment had the opposite effect: by highlighting the disparities between the Black political elite and the Black "everyman", the treatment appeared to strengthen group attachment. Though responses to the group attachment question were not statistically significant, the relative uniformity of these responses across groups and even between men and women suggests that media does not influence this belief in particular.

As Dawson (2001) notes, "the fact that two African Americans can believe that their fate is linked to that of the race does *not* mean that they agree on how best to advance their own racial interests" (p.11). In fact, the results of my survey show that the power of linked fate can actually be used to funnel energy away from political participation as a form of group uplift, such was Riley's stated goal in the media treatment. This finding is important because it demonstrates how a playbook for political manipulation could potentially be effective. The introduction to this thesis discussed the Russian IRA (Internet Research Agency)'s targeted campaigns to influence African American voters through online social networking with the goal of discouraging Blacks from voting in 2016. Contemporary Russian agents' fixation with the role of Blacks in American politics is not purely a function of the 2016 election. In their extensive study of depression-era

Black politics, *The Political Status of the Negro in the Age of FDR*, Bunche and Grantham (1973) recorded the Soviet Communist Party's extensive efforts to radicalize Black communities in the North and the South decades ago. In an era characterized by severe economic depression and racial discontent in the United States, the Soviets "considered the time ripe to appeal to American negroes" (Bunche and Grantham 1973:578). While the state of American and Russian politics has changed significantly since the early 20th-century, the fault line of American race relations has yet to fully heal and is, thus, still ripe for exploitation.

IRA agents used carefully chosen language to trigger feelings of group attachment amongst Blacks. The IRA's tactic runs parallel to the tactic employed in the treatment media used for this survey: lure in viewers with their feelings of group attachment to gain credibility and subsequently, subtly, introduce political directives. While we may never know for sure to what extent, if any, the IRA's trolling actually changed voting behavior, this research has shown that it *is* possible in the short-term for media to significantly alter Blacks' political attitudes when that media makes its appeals to race unambiguous.

This thesis presents strong evidence for the persuasive political power of identity-based appeals in media and can be improved upon in future work. Future research can strengthen these findings by incorporating more sophisticated analyses that account for more variables than my Chi-Square tests can. I do not know, for example, if men in the lowest income category responded differently than men in the highest income category. Using more of respondent's characteristics in the analysis should reduce the possibility that another confounding variable outside of group assignment had a stronger influence on responses.

Though I cannot say whether the effects of media exposure in the short-term will continue in the future, it is important to note that the use of social media involves repeated interactions with thematically similar content. YouTube's algorithm for example constructs a digital feedback loop wherein, after watching one video, viewers are immediately presented with a recommendation for another, analogous video (Madrigal 2018). Future work should examine how these short-term changes in attitudes can be solidified over time with repeated exposure.

Finally, experiments can be useful for identifying causal mechanisms, but qualitative interviews might shed more light on just how these messages are perceived. Interviews or focus groups where respondents have the opportunity to discuss the role that social media plays in shaping their

political identity will reveal patterns and ideas that the data alone cannot show.

Experimental research on the role that media plays in manipulating political attitudes has implications beyond academia. As the *New Knowledge* (2018) report on the IRA's propaganda campaign presented to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence demonstrates, racial cues can and have been used to manipulate Blacks' political behavior towards nefarious ends. Going forward, it will be important as a matter of national security for both individuals and social networking corporations to be aware of the ubiquity and effectiveness of media that seeks not to inform, but to manipulate voters and prey upon their vulnerabilities to do so.

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APPENDIX A: TRANSCRIPT OF MEDIA TREATMENT

"Since 1965, the number of Black elected officials has exploded. Between 1970 and 2012, it grew from fewer than 1,500 to more than 10,000. And, oh, yes—a Black man was elected president. Twice.

Conventional wisdom would suggest that all these political gains would lead to economic gains. But that has not proven to be the case. In fact, during an era of growing Black political influence, Blacks as a group progressed at a slower rate than whites, and the Black poor actually lost ground.

Why was the conventional wisdom wrong?

Because it was based on the incorrect assumption that politics was the pathway to Black progress. Only Black politicians, so the thinking went, could properly understand and address the challenges facing Black Americans.

It wasn't stable families, hard work, or education that would lift Blacks into the middle class; it was more Black city councilmen, congressmen and senators.

But the evidence, even according to liberal social scientists like Gary Orfield, 'indicates that there may be little relationship between the success of . . . Black leaders and the opportunities of typical Black families.'

So, while Black politicians, from Tom Bradley and Marion Barry to Maxine Waters and John Conyers, achieved considerable personal success, their constituents did not.

Yet this calculus—political success is a pre-requisite to a better life—remains progressive orthodoxy today.

When Michael Brown was shot dead after assaulting a police officer in Ferguson, Missouri, in 2014, much was made over the racial composition of the police department and city leaders.

But if Black representation among law enforcement and city officials is so critically important, how do you explain the rioting in Baltimore the following year after a Black suspect there died in police custody? At the time, 40 percent of Baltimore's police officers were Black. The Baltimore police commissioner was also Black, along with the mayor and a majority of the city council.

What can be said of Baltimore is also true of Cleveland, Detroit, Philadelphia, Atlanta, New Orleans and Washington, D.C., where Black mayors and police chiefs and city councilmen and school superintendents have been in office for decades.

But to what end?

As I document in my book, False Black Power, when Blacks had little political power, they nevertheless made significant economic progress. In the 1940s and '50s, Black labor-participation rates exceeded those of whites, Black incomes grew much faster than white incomes, and the Black poverty rate fell by 40 percentage points. Between 1940 and 1970—that is, during the Jim Crow era, with its racist laws— and before any affirmative action, the number of Blacks in middle-class professions quadrupled. In other words, racial gaps were steadily narrowing without any special treatment for Blacks.

And then came the War on Poverty in the mid-sixties.

This was supposed to close the gap once and for all. Yet, despite billions of dollars of government assistance in the form of welfare payments, housing projects and enforced hiring programs like affirmative action, Black poverty rates remained unchanged relative to white poverty rates.

In fact, a strong case can be made that to the extent that a social program, however well-meaning, interferes with a group's self-development, it does more harm than good. Government policies that discourage marriage and undermine the work ethic—open-ended welfare benefits, for example—help keep poor people poor.

No wonder, then, that more Black politicians bringing home more government aid has done so little to improve rates of Black employment, homeownership, and academic achievement.

As economist Thomas Sowell explains, 'The relationship between political success and economic success has been more nearly inverse than direct.'

The history of Germans, Jews, and Italians in America support Sowell's observation. Each of these groups made significant economic gains before ever attaining significant political power. Asians are the most recent example. How many prominent Asian politicians can you name?

On the other hand, the Irish—whose rise from poverty in the 19th century was especially slow—were very politically successful. Irish-run political organizations in places like Boston and Philadelphia dominated local government. In the US, the Irish had more political success than any other ethnic minority group. 'Yet the Irish were,' according to Sowell, 'the slowest rising of all European immigrants to America.'

The Black experience in America is of course different from the experience of the Irish—or any other ethnic minority—but that doesn't undermine the obvious conclusion: Human capital is far more important than political capital.

And the formula for prosperity is the same across the human spectrum: Traditional values such as marriage, stable families, education and hard work are immeasurably more important than the color of your congressman—or senator, or police chief, or president.

I'm Jason Riley of The Manhattan Institute for Prager University" (Prager University).

APPENDIX B: PRE AND POST-TREATMENT QUESTIONNAIRES

Pre-Treatment

1. What is your age?

    a. 18-24 years old
    b. 25-34 years old
    c. 35-44 years old
    d. 45-54 years old
    e. 55-64 years old
    f. 65-74 years old
    g. Over 75 years old

2. We hear a lot of talk these days about "liberals" and "conservatives." On a scale of 1 to 10 with 10 being extremely conservative, 4 being exactly in the middle, and 1 being extremely liberal, where would you place yourself?

    a. 1
    b. 2
    c. 3
    d. 4
    e. 5
    f. 6
    g. 7
    h. 8
    i. 9
    j. 10

3. Please specify your gender

    a. Female
    b. Male
    c. Other

4. Please specify your ethnicity

    a. White/Caucasian (not Hispanic or Latino)
    b. White Hispanic or Latino
    c. Black/African American (not Hispanic or Latino)
    d. Black Hispanic or Latino
    e. Native American or American Indian
    f. Asian/ Pacific Islander

5. Generally speaking, do you see yourself as a Democrat, a Republican or an Independent?

a. Democrat
b. Republican
c. Independent

6. What is the highest level of education you've attained? If currently enrolled in school, select the highest degree you've earned.

a. No schooling completed
b. Grade School (Kindergarten through 8th Grade) Completed
c. Some High School, No Diploma
d. High School Diploma or Equivalent (e.g. GED)
e. Some College, No Degree
f. Trade/Technical or Vocational Training
g. Associate's Degree
h. College Degree
i. Master's Degree
j. Doctorate Degree

7. In the last 12 months, what was your total household income before taxes?

a. Less than 25,000
b. 25,000 to 34,999
c. 35,000 to 49,999
d. 50,000 to 74,999
e. 75,000 to 99,999
f. 100,000 to 149,999
g. 150,000 to 199,999
h. 200,000 or more

8. Would you say that whites have **too much influence** in American politics, **just about the right amount** of influence in American politics, or **too little influence** in American politics?

a. Too much influence
b. Just about the right amount of influence
c. Too little influence

Post-Treatment

1. What do you feel is the most important issue facing the U.S. today?

a. Climate change/ global warming
b. Illegal Immigration
c. Income Inequality
d. Healthcare
e. Economic growth
f. Something else

2. How much do you think that what happens generally to Black people in this country will affect what happens in your life?

a. A lot
b. Some
c. Not very much
d. Not at all

3. To what extent do you agree with the following statement?:

"Trade deals that allow the U.S. to import more goods from countries like China are good for the U.S. economy."

a. Strongly agree
b. Agree
c. Somewhat agree
d. Neither agree nor disagree
e. Somewhat disagree
f. Disagree
g. Strongly disagree

4. How often do you read national newspapers like, **The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post or U.S.A. Today**?

a. Very Often
b. Often
c. Sometimes
d. Not very often
e. Never

5. Would you say that Blacks have **too much influence** in American politics, **just about the right amount** of influence in American politics, or **too little influence** in American politics?

a. Too much
b. Just about the right amount
c. Too little

6. How would you identify the race of the speaker in the audio clip?*

a. White or Caucasian
b. Hispanic or Latino
c. Asian or Pacific Islander
d. Black or African American
e. Not sure

7. Please select the answer that applies to you

a. I watched a video as part of this survey.
b. I listened to an audio clip as part of this survey.
c. I DID NOT listen to an audio clip or watch a video as part of this survey.

*This question was *only* asked to the audio-only group

Calling the Cops in Oakland: Norm Enforcement, Social Exclusion, and Criminalization in Gentrifying Neighborhoods

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Abstract
Recent news headlines have brought a curious, but troubling phenomenon to our attention: white residents of gentrifying neighborhoods calling the police on racial minorities for engaging in rather innocuous activities, such as barbecuing in the park or chatting with friends at a café. These headlines, and the implications of such reports are important for understanding dynamics of race, class, and space in a changing metropolis. Prior research has examined top-down mechanisms for policing in gentrifying cities, as well as how gentrification fuels debate among new and longtime residents. However, research has not yet addressed who is calling the police in neighborhoods undergoing gentrification, why they are doing so, and how citizen police calls might incite demand for policing within these neighborhoods. Through participant observation at two Oakland-based organizations, content analysis of Nextdoor posts and comments, and semi-structured in-depth interviews with Oakland residents, this research seeks to better understand resident police calls in gentrifying Oakland neighborhoods. Findings suggest that residence police calls are largely influenced by length of residency, socioeconomic status, and homeownership. Additionally, the concerns that prompt resident police calls center around the protection of property, quality of life in neighborhoods, and definitions about acceptable neighborhood activities and/or community members.

Keywords
Oakland, gentrification, policing, community policing, social class, homeownership, social exclusion

INTRODUCTION

In April 2018, two Black men, Kenzie Smith and Onsayo "Deacon" Abram, were having an unobtrusive barbeque on a beautiful day by Lake Merritt—a popular community staple for residents in Oakland, CA. However, their relaxing Sunday was cut short when a white woman, Jennifer Schulte—later dubbed "BBQ Becky" by social media users—began harassing Smith and Deacon, arguing that the park was not designated for charcoal grilling. When Schulte realized that Smith and Deacon were not going to pack up their barbecue at her request, she took out her phone to call the police. As police officers arrived on the scene, Schulte cried hysterically and argued that Smith and Deacon's barbeque was breaking the law and putting others in "danger" (Elan 2018; Farzan 2018; Snider 2018). However, the "danger" that Schulte reported was simply two Oakland residents partaking in a safe, peaceful barbeque at their local neighborhood park. Recent incidents similar to "BBQ Becky" have reached national news headlines illustrating white residents calling the police on racial minorities for innocuous, everyday activities. Further, many of these cases are occurring in rapidly gentrifying areas—viewed as part of a larger pattern of apparent racial profiling by newcomers calling the police on longtime residents of color. Undeniably, gentrification changes the racial, economic, and cultural composition of American cities, but it may also change residents' engagement with police.

Concerns regarding the policing of poor, racial minority communities around the country amplify as neighborhoods gentrify. In fact, recent data shows that gentrification is correlated with higher levels of 3-1-1 calls and "quality of life" complaints; often perceived as complaints in which longtime residents are being targeted by newcomers (Fayyad 2017; Vo 2018). Additionally, gentrifying cities have a positive association with increases in order-maintenance policing (Sharp 2013). These changes are important to understand because in a disproportionate number of cases, Black people are profiled as "suspects," are targeted by false police reports, and are victims of police violence—putting them at risk of arrest, employment loss, damage to reputation, or death (Lockhart 2018; Lopez 2018; Ishisaka 2019).

Despite scholarly explanations for gentrification and increases in policing—which take different views—we know little about how and why changes in complaint reporting take place. Some literature emphasizes top-down models of gentrification and policing, asserting that political and business interests fuel changes in who and what police officers prioritize (Parenti 2000; Sharp 2013; Walker 2018). Scholars who take this approach see policing—including prioritization of quality-of-life offenses—as a

method that transforms previously divested cities into profitable, gentrified cities. However, others examine the interpersonal dynamics between residents and their interactions with the police at the neighborhood level (Betancur 2002; Chesluk 2004; Bryant 2005; Freeman 2006; Martin 2008; Rai 2011; Sullivan and Bachmeier 2012; Chaskin and Joseph 2013; Hyra 2017). For example, notions about "disorder" shift as affluent populations move into inner cities, and activities considered normal by longtime residents are intolerable to newer residents. Likewise, newer residents, with differing norms compared to longtime residents, often utilize the police in order to serve their interests.

Although these studies highlight how policing transforms as cities gentrify, there is not a clear understanding of how residents interact with each other to express perceptions of disorder, the use of space, and the utilization of police calls. Police calls are a crucial point that previous scholarship misses, but which are often a key mechanism in attracting vigilant police activity and patrols in neighborhoods. The research presented here seeks to interrogate this second set of concerns: *who* is calling the police in neighborhoods undergoing gentrification and *why*, with the hopes of examining how citizen police calls might fuel the demand for policing within these neighborhoods.

This paper will first cover changes in policing as cities gentrify and explanations for resident conflict that occurs within gentrifying neighborhoods. Prior studies will inform the basis of my research; however, there is an evident gap in sociological literature that explains how the policing of gentrifying neighborhoods may be demand-driven by residents who call the police, as well as the reasons why they call. The remainder of this paper will attempt to fill this gap by using gentrifying neighborhoods in Oakland, California as a field site—a city that is currently undergoing large demographic and socioeconomic shifts as a result of gentrification, triggering recent conflict around police calls (e.g. "BBQ Becky) (Walker 2018; Urban Displacement Project 2018). This research will highlight residents' understandings of crime and disorder in their neighborhoods, and how these understandings are primarily influenced by factors such as socioeconomic status (SES), homeownership, length of residency, and police cynicism. Moreover, these factors influence who is more or less likely to call the police, as well as residents' explanations for when/why police calls should be utilized.

POLICING GENTRIFIED CITIES

Gentrification is defined in numerous ways but is commonly viewed as a phenomenon that occurs when waves of high socioeconomic status (SES) individuals move into low-SES neighborhoods. Gentrification does not happen randomly—it is caused by capital investment, rent gaps where buildings can be purchased for cheap and made more expensive over time, housing supply, larger shifts in lifestyle preferences, and the political influence of newer residents (Smith 1996; Bryant 2005; Hyra 2017; Moskowitz 2017). Generally, low-income, racial minority neighborhoods have exceptionally low property values, making them prime areas for developers and historical preservationists to invest in real estate (Smith 1996; Bryant 2005; Moskowitz 2017). When newer residents purchase and "revitalize" homes in low-income neighborhoods, they often work alongside city government officials to establish and maintain local ordinances (Bryant 2005). For example, newer residents and local governments utilize historical preservation designations requiring residents to obtain permits for any aesthetic changes to houses, enforcing housing code violations for homeowners who do not comply (Byrant 2005). Low-income residents usually cannot afford the costs of these changes; consequently, gentrification drives housing displacement of low-income residents, reorganizes local level funding and political interests, and changes the demographic composition of neighborhoods (Smith 1996; Bryant 2005; Moskowitz 2017).

Additionally, community politics are transformed as neighborhoods gentrify; middle and upper-class *gentrifiers* begin to participate in committees and community boards, developers begin to assert their interests in the neighborhood, and policing increases (Hyra 2017; Moskowitz 2017). Not only do *gentrifiers* and longtime residents favor conflicting amenities—such as "revitalizing" local parks, funding exclusive art galleries, or implementing entertainment centers that cater to the wealthy—*gentrifiers* also seek to get rid of existing resources that accommodate poor, working-class, minority residents (Parenti 2000; Hyra 2017). For example, local hip hop music venues that are frequented by Black longtime residents (which serve to support creative expression and identity building for Black communities), are targeted by *gentrifiers* for being "bad businesses" that attract an undesirable clientele (Hyra 2017:136-137). As newcomers acquire more political power, these types of businesses are often pressured to shut down and are supplanted by trendy upscale bars and restaurants (Hyra 2017).

These dynamics undoubtedly influence policing, necessitating the enforcement of quality of life policing as a mechanism to bolster and protect

city business interests and newer, affluent residents (Parenti 2000; Bryant 2005; Hyra 2017). As historically divested cities change and gentrify, policing strategies change as well—such as the shift from prioritizing cases of violent crime to prioritizing quality of life offenses. This shift is explained as a political state-sanctioned strategy supported by newer residents, government officials, and business leaders (Parenti 2000; Bryant 2005; Moskowitz 2017; Walker 2018). In the effort to "revitalize" underfunded inner cities and create profitable, commoditized, gentrified cities, politicians and business officials have produced "modernized central business districts" that cater to those who will bring the most economic growth (i.e. tourists, the young, wealthy, and the elite) (Parenti 2000:92; Florida 2006; Sharp 2013). With state support of profitable gentrification tactics (e.g. changes to building/housing code violations, anti-loitering ordinances, etc.), longtime residents—who are often low-income racial minorities—become targets for further criminalization.

Adopting Kelling and Wilson's (1982) "Broken Windows" theory—which asserts that visible neighborhood disorder will create an increase in crime—local policymakers have prioritized managing hazardous, aesthetically offensive, and/or disorderly populations (i.e. Black and racial minority populations, homeless populations, low-SES populations, etc.) by executing zero-tolerance policing (Parenti 2000). Ultimately, the expected role of police officers—with increasing gentrification—marks a turning point in recent history. Policing cities is now less focused on responding to violent crime, and increasingly focused on administering citations and arrests for low-level transgressions (e.g. loitering, public intoxication, trespassing, and other misdemeanor offenses) (Parenti 2000; Sharp 2013).

Despite the significance of the literature on policing in gentrifying cities, these institutional level analyses fail to explain interactive accounts of policing within gentrifying neighborhoods. Parenti's (2000) historical analysis does not examine how residents perceive these changes on an individual level. Likewise, Sharp (2013) largely focuses on quantitative changes in policing patterns as cities gentrify. These approaches assume that policing procedures within gentrifying cities spawn from the state level, overlooking a critical explanation of how residents within gentrifying cities—of differing socioeconomic, racial, and neighborhood temporal backgrounds—interact and influence police priorities in gentrifying neighborhoods.

RESIDENT CONFLICT IN GENTRIFYING NEIGHBORHOODS

It has been suggested that increases in wealth, homeownership, and resources in divested neighborhoods can improve the collective efficacy among residents (i.e. encourage attentiveness toward neighborhood aesthetics, safety, and order) and assist in reducing crime (McDonald 1986; Sampson 1997, Raudenbush and Earls 1997). However, along with driving housing displacement, gentrification can impair collective efficacy by producing social instability (Martin 2008; Hyra 2017). Although gentrification may improve neighborhoods in the long-term, the immediate effects make for a hostile and difficult environment for both longtime and new residents.

Disparities among residents generate disputes concerning neighborhood crime, disorder, norm expectations, appropriation of public space, access to community resources, and *legitimate* rights to the neighborhood (Freeman 2006; Martin 2008; Sullivan and Bachmeier 2012; Moskowitz 2017). Newcomers and longtime residents tend to have conflicting goals and interpretations of neighborhood experiences (Martin 2008; Rai 2011; Chaskin and Joseph 2013; Hyra 2017). For example, new residents and homeowners express more fear about crime and disorder within their neighborhoods, often viewing longtime residents as apathetic regarding these issues (Martin 2008; Sullivan and Bachmeier 2012). These types of norm and behavioral differences can further solidify divisions between new and old residents, and obscure inequalities based on class and race. This has the potential to impact the distribution of social resources among less privileged residents. In some cases, affluent new residents attract or implement new businesses within gentrifying neighborhoods (e.g. coffee shops, grocery stores, restaurants, etc.), which are often the types of establishments that longtime residents cannot afford (Freeman 2006; Hyra 2017; Moskowitz 2017). New residents also tend to push out businesses that do not align with their cultural and class preferences (e.g. liquor stores, Black-owned businesses, etc.), which are typically accessible public staples for longtime residents (Hyra 2017).

As inner cities transform and gentrify, so do the types of neighborhood concerns residents see as high-priority. Prosperous residents who move into low-income, racial minority neighborhoods bring particular norms and expectations. Additionally, newer high-SES residents are more likely than longtime low-SES residents to enforce their expectations, often working with police authorities and/or building authorities to patrol and deter behaviors deemed "disorderly" (Chesluk 2004; Freeman 2006; Martin 2008; Rai

2011; Moskowitz 2017). For example, as newer affluent residents begin to participate in community-police meetings, typically held by neighborhood groups, residents' complaints increasingly prioritize nuisance infractions (Chesluk 2004). Subsequently, police officers—who generally prioritize cases of violent crime—are pressured to respond to growing reports related to loitering, public intoxication, and vandalism (Chesluk 2004).

In addition to directly addressing their concerns to police—and having SES, racial, and/or cultural advantages at getting the police to respond and enforce order—newer residents utilize community-policing strategies (e.g. forming neighborhood watch groups, increasing resident surveillance and/or patrols, etc.) (Betancur 2011; Rai 2011; Hyra 2017). Community-policing methods, in this case, are first informed by community-police meetings and are then employed by residents to eradicate "disorderly" neighborhood behavior (e.g. "positive loitering," aiming to rid neighborhood sidewalks of "disorderly" individuals) (Rai 2011). Methods used by newer residents not only establish cultural and norm boundaries but establish physical boundaries around the appropriate use of public space. These strategies eventually lead to the *political* and *cultural displacement* of longtime residents, fuel mistrust between new and old residents, and exacerbate alienation among underprivileged residents (Hyra 2017).

Evidently, gentrification incites clashing norm expectations, unequal power dynamics, and debates over rights to space and the neighborhood. While research shows the resulting consequences of conflicts over disorder and space, it is unclear how different actors are defining what is deemed acceptable within neighborhoods, how that differs among residents, and how these dynamics impact *who* calls the police in gentrifying neighborhoods and *why* they choose to call. Differing views of crime and disorder among Oakland residents living in gentrifying neighborhoods may have a similar influence on views regarding police calls. This is especially important as Oakland has always been a battleground between working-class Black residents and the police—from the birth of the Black Panther Party in the 1960s to the Movement for Black Lives in the 2010s (McClintock 2008; Harris 2011; Armaline, Vera Sanchez, and Correia 2014; Walker 2018).

CASE SELECTION: OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA

The city lost its soul and gained a lot of hipsters
But does that really make it better or a little weirder?
And will the idea of America come to fruition?
Or is to push the poor away really the real agenda?
No jobs, poor education, some things ain't really changing

It's time we learn for self and do for self, fuck being patient
Inflation rises, people moving but the rich are staying
Sometimes it seems the future plans include a Third World nation.
—Gift of Gab, "The Gentrification Song"

Oakland is the eighth-largest city in California with a population of approximately 425,000, and although it is located across the bay from San Francisco and Silicon Valley, it is not immune to the impact of the rapid growth among the "tech capital of the world" (Data USA 2017; Walker 2018). As a result of the overflow of tech workers and soaring housing costs in San Francisco, the city of Oakland—with property values a third cheaper than in Berkeley, San Francisco, and the Tri-Valley areas—has become a prime target for gentrification (Haber 2014; Maharwal 2017; Walker 2018).[1] Oakland's ongoing shift in racial and socioeconomic demographics is not surprising considering the ways in which business and political interests influence gentrification; further, how these interests impact policing. Thus, a brief discussion of Oakland and its sociopolitical history will assist in setting the stage for this study site.

Throughout the decades since the 1960s, the majority of Oakland's population has been made up of poor, working-class Black residents.[2] Black Oakland residents also have a deep-rooted history of enduring waves of harsh, federally mandated hyper-policing due to endemic city-wide poverty (Kelley 1996; Rios 2011).[3] Moreover, federal campaigns such as the "War on Crime" and the "War on Drugs" created severe police strategies that targeted Oakland's Black residents, particularly in response to high levels of inner-city crime and poverty, and the development of the Black Power movement (Rios 2011; Hinton 2016).[4] Furthering this tradition, Oakland has continued to increase its law enforcement spending and has a police department that is rife with internal corruption (Rios 2011). The use of brutal and violent tactics, falsifying reports, planting evidence, failure to conduct investigations on its officers, and racial profiling are just a few of the OPD's contemporary unethical practices (Harris 2011; Armaline, Vera Sanchez, and Correia 2014).

In part due to its large population of low-income Black residents, as well as its reputation and overrepresentation of crime in national statistics, Oakland was not considered a viable financial investment for real estate (Johnson 1993; Walker 2018). However, Silicon Valley's colossal tech industry has prompted a surplus of tech workers from around the world to move to the Bay Area (Schwarzer 2015; Dineen 2016; Walker 2018). Now, Oakland has become the model city for an overflow of high-rise luxury condominiums, trendy gastropubs, and art galleries—physical symbols of

"hip" cultural commodities that cater to the city's newer, affluent residents (Haber 2014; Schwarzer 2015; Dineen 2016; Werth and Marienthal 2016; Walker 2018). This has fueled a huge shift in Oakland's demographics, with a new emerging population of professional workers and white families moving back into a city that was once deemed—as termed by Derek Hyra—the *dark ghetto*, and is now seen as the *gilded ghetto* (2017:8).

Recent data shows that Oakland is now shifting in favor of affluent, white, professional workers—even termed "Brooklyn by the Bay" (Haber 2014). There has been an increase in white residents, from 31.3% in 2000 to 34.5% in 2012 (U.S. Census Bureau 2000). Conversely, Black residents comprised 35% of the population in 2000 and dropped to 28% in 2010 (U.S. Census Bureau).[5] Further, median household income has grown rapidly from $40,055 in 2000 to $76,496 as recently as 2018 (U.S. Census Bureau 2010). This pattern indicates a loss of low-income households within Oakland, which currently holds the fastest rate of displacement and gentrification in the Bay Area since 2013 (Urban Displacement Project 2018). Oakland is a location where the intersections of racism, poverty, and police violence meet the housing displacement and resident conflict that gentrification produces.[6] Finally, Oakland is the origin of "BBQ Becky," a signifier of the previously stated issues bubbling to the surface in ways that have yet to be addressed. This makes Oakland an important site to understand in regard to gentrification and resident police calls.

METHODOLOGY

To gain insight into *who* is calling the police in gentrifying neighborhoods and *why* they are choosing to (or not to) do so, I utilized participant observation, content analysis, and semi-structured interviews. I then analyzed this data to compare those who call the police to those who do not to examine what factors may provoke or hinder residents' reliance on the police, and how they may relate to race, SES, homeownership, length of residency, and police cynicism.

Using UC Berkeley's Urban Displacement Project (UDP) map, which shows census tracts in the Bay Area are currently undergoing gentrification, I located multiple Oakland neighborhoods for data collection (2019). The neighborhoods I identified for my analysis are the following: the Lorin District, Harmon Tract, Golden Gate District, Mosswood District, West Oakland District, Hoover Foster District, Fruitvale District, Longfellow District, and Temescal District. These are all residential neighborhoods

within Oakland that either have ongoing gentrification/displacement or advanced gentrification.

First, I conducted participant observation at several meetings held by two separate Oakland groups: Neighborhood Crime Prevention Council (NCPC) and Anti Police-Terror Project (APTP). The two organizations were strategically chosen based on their contrasting goals and views: the framework of NCPCs view community-police engagement as having a positive impact on Oakland's communities, while APTP sees police as harmful and works to eliminate the need for police by creating alternative resources for Oakland residents (e.g. community-run mental health first response teams). Oakland's first NCPCs were established in 1996 in order to facilitate "public safety" and strengthen ties between Oakland's residents and police officers (Bass 2000; Oakland Wiki n.d.). Meetings are held at different times of the month depending on the neighborhood district and allow residents and local beat officers to address any concerns they have. In fact, NCPC meeting attendees frequently report worries about neighborhood crime and/or disorder, and actively work with OPD officers to come up with effective community policing strategies (e.g. neighborhood watch groups, nuisance abatement tactics, effective surveillance tactics, etc.) (Oakland Wiki n.d.). APTP, on the other hand, was founded recently in the wake of the Movement for Black Lives. APTP is a non-profit Black-led activist organization that seeks new ways to handle community issues *without* police involvement. APTP provides Oakland and Bay Area residents a space to meet and organize strategies that address concerns around local, statewide, and nationwide police violence. In sum, APTP is working towards building "a replicable and sustainable model to eradicate police terror in communities of color" (Anti Police-Terror Project n.d.).

Observations at each of these meetings were important, not only for considering concerns Oakland residents have within their communities, but in terms of each organizations' relationship to the police and trust in police authorities. This revealed an understanding of divergent types of Oakland residents' concerns, as well as the types of residents who are more likely to support calling the police. However, there are limitations to observing two groups that are so dissimilar—observing two extremes did not build a comprehensive insight of Oakland residents who fall within the spectrum of civic engagement and trust in police.

I selected NCPC meetings using the City of Oakland's "Find a Police Beat" webpage, and attended meetings that were held in any of the Oakland districts that correlated with the UDP's census tract map. Likewise, APTP's meetings are listed on their website's "Events" webpage, held once-per-

month in Oakland. I attended five NCPC meetings and two APTP meetings between February and March 2019, during which I observed and took notes on the discussions attendees engaged in. My field notes were coded to form an idea about what issues were most commonly addressed at each meeting, and how this helps to explain resident police calls within gentrifying Oakland neighborhoods. Participant observation at meetings also helped me recruit individuals for semi-structured interviews.

Second, I carried out content analysis of posts and comments within the "Crime and Safety" subsection on Nextdoor. Nextdoor is unique because it is a fairly new social media platform that has grown quickly in popularity, now including over 200,000 defined neighborhoods in 11 different countries and 27 million active users (Roof 2019). Further, it is a virtual community where residents are actively reporting and openly discussing neighborhood incidents, such as cases of crime and disorder. Although Nextdoor allows users to read through reported incidents, I was not able to access precise demographic information (e.g. race, SES, length of residency, etc.) from users—and how this may influence their views. It is also important to note that Nextdoor only allows individuals who have a home address and access to a computer and/or smartphone to register; thus, the data does not capture perspectives from those who do not have access to the aforementioned requirements. Nonetheless, conversations on Nextdoor provide valuable insight into how residents perceive incidents in their neighborhoods, as well as reliance on police calls.

Neighborhoods on Nextdoorwere filtered to align with the Urban Displacement Project's (UDP) 2018 census tract map. Using the UDP map assisted in locating census tracts that are geographically similar and are currently undergoing gentrification; all tracts have experienced increases in median rent, displacement of lower-income residents, decreases in Black residents, increases in white residents, and increased in higher-income residents (Urban Displacement Project 2018). Neighborhoods included are located within North, West, and Downtown Oakland.[7] By examining Nextdoor posts I aimed to understand how residents are using an online platform to report and talk about their grievances, as well as what types of occurrences residents believe warrant calling the police. I selected specific posts where residents were reporting crimes, nuisance complaints, suspicious activities, and so on.[8] Additionally, due to the time constraints of my research, I only collected posts between a two-month period, from the beginning of December 2018 to the end of January 2019, in which a total of 51 posts were submitted. I analyzed all data from Nextdoor at the beginning of February 2019.

The culmination of posts and comments from Nextdoor were coded for several patterns. First, I coded posts based on the types of incidents reported (e.g. property crime, suspected crime, nuisance complaint, etc.). Incident codes were guided by Oakland's existing Crime Incident Data Reports (2019). I also coded for the specificity of a reported incident. By sorting posts based on key phrases (e.g. a user stating they experienced a "robbery", a "burglary", etc.) and/or utilizing descriptions of the incident, I was able to categorize each post. I also coded for the specificity of a reported incident (e.g. within reports of property crime there were varying types, such as package theft, robbery, etc.). Additionally, I coded whether or not users explicitly stated that they called the police, as well as comments that suggested that an incident should be reported to the police. All data was quantitatively analyzed—I calculated percentages based on the frequency of types of reports, the number of posters who stated they called the police, the types of incidents users called the police for, and the types of incidents other commenters think necessitate a police call. This revealed an understanding of the types of incidents users reported, as well as the types of incidents that were more likely to motivate a police call. I also did a qualitative exploration of how residents replied to posts—for example, did users on Nextdoor typically agree with their neighbors' concerns?; did users call-out others for posting racist or discriminatory information?; etc. Moreover, accessing Nextdoor allowed me to create posts that reached users who live in identified gentrifying neighborhoods, which also helped in recruiting individuals for interviews.

Finally, I conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews with 14 adults who are currently living in gentrifying Oakland neighborhoods. I recruited respondents who live specifically in any of the gentrifying neighborhoods I identified via the UDP map. The majority of respondents were recruited from Nextdoor (n=10), and the remaining respondents were recruited from NCPC meetings (n=4). Interviews were held either in public spaces, such as coffee shops, or at participants' homes. Interviews helped in attaining nuanced and descriptive accounts of how residents interact with their neighborhoods and/or the police in their neighborhoods.

Interviews asked a series of questions about respondents' demographic information, length of residence within their neighborhood, feelings they have about their neighborhood, neighbors, neighborhood crime and disorder, and any witnessed conflict or criminal incidents within their neighborhood. Most importantly, questions asked respondents about personal experiences calling the police and/or interacting with the police. The data collected from semi-structured interviews were transcribed and coded. The specific

patterns of importance to this research were, first and foremost, whether or not residents have called the police in their neighborhood, the reasons they did or did not call, and how their responses may connect to prior research on gentrification and policing.

Reliance on the police (for both content analysis of Nextdoor posts and interview data) was analyzed by looking at whether or not residents have called the police—either via 9-1-1 (often used to report emergencies, crime, etc.) and/or 3-1-1 (often used to report non-emergencies, nuisance violations, etc.). Interviewees' race, gender, age, SES, employment status, and current occupancy were all recorded. I also recorded whether participants are homeowners or renters within their neighborhood. Additionally, I recorded the length of residency of each respondent, which helped me to differentiate between newer versus longtime residents. Longtime residents are defined as those who have lived in their neighborhood for at least ten years. Lastly, police cynicism was examined by seeing how participants feel about police authorities, and if they trust the police to act within the participants' best interests. In sum, these methods assisted in answering my overarching research question.

COMMUNITY CONCERNS, COLLECTIVE SOLUTIONS

Neighborhood Crime Prevention Council

Attendee demographics at NCPC meetings reveal that the majority of NCPC members are either white or Black. Little to no non-white or non-Black individuals were present at meetings. Further, most of the attendees tend to be older, are retired, and/or are homeowners. The only exception was at a meeting that took place near West Oakland BART—where newer condominium developments have been built—prompting a younger demographic of condominium-owning residents to attend. Based on these observations, homeownership appears to play a large role in the types of people who attend NCPC meetings, since very few to no renters attended meetings. This may be due to homeowners having "more" of a stake in their neighborhood, as well as retirees having more free time to attend meetings.

NCPC meetings also show a racial division between who vocalizes concerns and/or the types of concerns vocalized. White NCPC meeting attendees are mainly concerned about homeless encampments, housing blight, abandoned vehicles, and neighbors who are "suspects" in relation to recent neighborhood crimes. White residents also tend to be more aggressive in their proposed solutions (e.g. utilizing nuisance abatement, reporting all incidents to the police, confronting "problematic" neighbors with threats

of city involvement, etc.). For example, at one meeting, a group of middle-aged white attendees discussed a neighbor's deteriorating and aesthetically offensive car that had been parked on the street for a long time. One white attendee questioned why none of the surrounding residents had reported the car and stated, "Some neighbors seem to be indifferent about it, but we should move forward with nuisance reports. The [car owner] may be looking at serious fines."

Conversely, Black residents are mostly worried about violent crime (e.g. recent fatal shootings, armed robberies, drug dealing, and gang-related violence), and typically ask their assigned Crime Resource Officer (CRO) about community-level strategies for handling these concerns. At a separate meeting, several older Black women asked their CRO for details about a recent shooting and a series of armed robberies that had occurred in their district. The CRO confirmed that the shooter had been apprehended, and that the OPD is working on ramping up "plainclothes" operations—which is an undercover police tactic where officers patrol neighborhoods out of uniform to catch crimes in action (Scott 2003). However, drawing from recent crime data in Oakland, CROs across all meetings asserted that cases of violent crime (murder, assault, burglaries, etc.) have declined compared to previous years.

Although there are differences in expressed neighborhood concerns, some fears remain constant across all NCPC meetings, among both Black and white attendees: property crime, illegal dumping, and gunfire. However, at West Oakland's NCPC meetings, attendees are most distressed about local homeless encampments. At one meeting it was reported that there are 3,000 to 4,000 homeless people living in Oakland, with 70% residing in West Oakland's Dogtown District.[9] At the same meeting, a group of younger, mostly white men discussed their qualms about disorder and crime, which they believe the homeless encampments bring into the neighborhood. They exhibited full support of an encampment clear-out that was scheduled to happen in late February and expressed the most desire about getting more police patrols out in their neighborhood.

Concerning how NCPC meeting attendees feel about the OPD's effectiveness, most attendees express that the OPD does not respond quickly enough or at all when they call emergency and/or non-emergency lines, report incidents online, or contact their district's CRO directly. For example, at an NCPC meeting in North Oakland, meeting attendees stated that they contacted their CRO to deal with multiple incidents of blight, dumping, and suspicious activity in their neighborhood, but have not heard back. This prompted attendees to lay out their priorities for the following month,

particularly in reference to cracking down on a household of residents who are suspected of being tied to criminal activities in the neighborhood. They proposed beginning an investigation to collect information and utilize a series of nuisance reports to deal with their "problematic" neighbors.[10]

Overall, these observations suggest that NCPC attendees who are white might call the police more often than Black attendees. For one, white attendees express witnessing far more nuisance infractions than Black attendees and show more frustration about how frequently these offenses occur and how little the OPD is doing to manage them. Moreover, because Black attendees express more worry about violent crime, and because violent crime is decreasing within Oakland, Black attendees may not be calling the police as often as their white counterparts. Despite frustrations about unresponsive OPD officers, it is clear that NCPC meeting attendees have predominantly positive views of the OPD, and do not hesitate to call the police for their aforementioned concerns. NCPC meetings act as a space where residents feel safe and comfortable speaking with police officers and express a desire for the OPD to be more involved in their neighborhoods.[11] However, I found that this was not the case with the APTP.

Anti Police-Terror Project

Observations from APTP meetings showed far more demographic diversity among attendees. Although numerous older individuals attend, there are just as many younger individuals as well. Moreover, there is more racial diversity among APTP's members (i.e. more non-white and non-Black attendees than NCPC meetings). In addition, the concerns discussed during APTP meetings contrast greatly to the concerns spoken about at NCPC meetings. APTP meeting organizers and attendees primarily address recent local incidents of police violence and police corruption. For example, at one meeting organizers informed attendees about an incident that occurred in February 2019—a 20-year-old Black man, Willie McCoy, was brutally murdered by Vallejo, California police officers while sleeping in his car. McCoy, who was unconscious and unresponsive, was shot at least 25 times by the police (Fortin 2019; Takei 2019). Discussing occurrences such as this are important concerns for APTP organizers and members, especially in terms of bringing justice to victims (and families) of police violence.[12]

APTP members also have little to no trust in the OPD and display explicit cynicism about police authorities in general. Unlike NCPC meeting attendees, APTP members discuss that they want police as far away from their communities and neighborhoods as possible. At one APTP meeting,

an attendee expressed her feelings about the police: "Defund the police… Training never works. People of color don't want better experiences with cops, they want fewer experiences with cops. Beat cops don't work." Other APTP members convey similar sentiments, believing that the American legal system is complicit in failing to indict police officers who shoot and kill members of their community, who are predominantly Black and Brown people.

In Conversation

Discussions at NCPC and APTP meetings, centered around community concerns and police interactions, show there are clear distinctions between each group. NCPC members see the OPD as generally trustworthy and are working towards fostering better relationships with OPD officers. APTP members, on the other hand, have been directly and/or indirectly harmed by the OPD's violent and discriminatory practices, have no trust in police authorities, and are working on solutions that keep the police out of their communities altogether. NCPC members, who have mainly positive interactions with the police, tend to feel that calling the police in their neighborhood is not only a reasonable decision but also a helpful thing to do. However, for APTP members who have experienced police violence first- or second-hand, they see any type of interaction with the police as a major dilemma.

These findings help show *who* may be more likely to call the police in gentrifying Oakland neighborhoods (e.g. those observed at NCPC meetings who are older in age, white, and/or homeowners who are more concerned with nuisance infractions), as well as those who are less likely (e.g. those observed at APTP meetings who have been victims of police violence and/or do not trust the police, as well as Black NCPC meeting attendees who are more concerned with violent crime). Additionally, observations from NCPC meetings show some of the reasons for *why* people call—property crime, violent crime, housing blight, illegal dumping, homeless encampments, and problematic neighbors—and how these reasons for calling differ based on race. Lastly, residents who attend NCPC meetings express a desire for increased policing within their neighborhoods, in order to address their concerns. Putting pressure on the OPD to increase patrols may inevitably increase the amount of policing within gentrifying Oakland neighborhoods. Conversely, APTP views policing as a major issue that will not solve Oakland's larger issues, and are seeking to build larger solutions that reduce policing overall.

Although participant observation was helpful for understanding how NCPC and APTP Zwork in opposition to one another, I was limited in my ability to obtain detailed demographic information of all meeting attendees (except when attendees self-identified information). Nor could I distinguish how many attendees were longtime versus newer residents of Oakland. Hence, findings from content analysis of Nextdoor posts and semi-structured interviews offer a more comprehensive understanding of *who* calls the police and *why* they call, and how these mechanisms are influenced by demographics, length of residency, and homeownership.

CRIME, SUSPICION, AND LEGITIMACY IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD

Quantitative Content Analysis of Nextdoor Posts

By far, posts reporting property crime were the most frequent, with 53% of users stating that they had recently been the target of property crime. The category of property crime was coded by examining posts where users reported that they experienced armed robbery, robbery, attempted car-jacking, a car break-in, burglary, in addition to any type of non-violent theft in their neighborhood. Among property crime, general theft (i.e. nonviolent theft of packages or property from residents' porches or yards) was the most reported (48%).



Figure 1. Percentage of Types of Incidents Reported by Nextdoor Users (n=51)



Figure 2. Percentage of Types of Property Crimes Reported by Nextdoor Users (n=27)

Suspected attempted crime was also commonly reported, with 26% of users' posts containing information warning other residents to look out for specific individuals within their neighborhood, who had not yet committed a crime, but who "looked" out of place or were acting in an alarming way. For example, users reported suspected attempted property crime when they observed individuals who appeared to be scoping out cars or houses. In total, suspected attempted property crime (i.e. package theft, car break-in, and burglary) made up 62% of suspected crime reports, with suspected gunfire holding the second most reported suspected crime (19%). Moreover, most posts for suspected crimes used vague descriptions of suspects, typically omitting race.[13] Users mainly described the incident they witnessed, suspects' clothing, estimated age, and/or presumed gender; men were the most frequently reported suspects.



Figure 3. Percentage of Types of Suspected Crimes Reported by Nextdoor Users (n=13)

Nuisance complaints were nearly as frequent as suspected crime, making up 21% of the total posts within the two-month period. Nuisance complaints were categorized by examining posts where users reported occurrences that were impacting the perceived aesthetic attractiveness, safety, and/or quality of life in their neighborhood. Illegal dumping was the most frequent type of nuisance report (46%), followed by noise complaints, homeless encampments, neighbor conflict, liquor stores, and disorderly youth. Users predominantly reported these incidents to see if anyone else in their neighborhood had additional information about how to deal with illegal dumping, as well as noisy and/or "disorderly" neighbors. In cases where users reported illegal dumping, commenters frequently suggested calling a local city resource, *SeeClickFix*—a city agency number, similar to the nonemergency 3-1-1 line, which sends workers out to pick up deserted debris in Oakland neighborhoods. Moreover, most users' who reported nuisance complaints stated that these occurrences harmed neighborhood order, and are types of incidents that city officials are not adequately addressing.



Figure 4. Percentage of Types of Nuisance Complaints Reported by Nextdoor Users (n=11)

Nextdoor posts were also coded for whether or not a user explicitly stated that they called the police. Within all posts collected, 39% of users explicitly stated that they called the police to report the incident related to their post. Among those who did call the police, most called the police for property crime (45%), with nearly an equal proportion calling to report suspected attempted crime (30%) and nuisance infractions (25%). Those who called the police for suspected attempted crime mainly called to report suspected property crime, suspected gunfire, and suspected trespassing. The remaining police calls for nuisance complaints (25%) were made for illegal dumping, noise infractions, and homeless encampments. However, it is possible that among the 61% of users who did not explicitly say that they called the police, some may have called but did not mention it within their post.



Figure 5. Percentage of Nextdoor Users Who Called the Police to Report an Incident (n=51)



Figure 6. Percentage of Types of Incidents Nextdoor Users Called the Police For (n=20)

Additionally, 24% of posts included comments where one or more users suggested that the original poster should call the police. Commenters typically did not suggest that the original poster should call the police if the original poster clarified that they had already called. However, in posts where the original poster *did* state that they called the police, commenters would often debate with the original poster or other users about whether or not they approved of calling the police for certain types of incidents.



Figure 7. Percentage of Posts Where ≥1 Nextdoor Commenter Suggested that Original Poster Should Call the Police to Report an Incident (n=51 posts)



Figure 8. Percentage of Types of Incidents Commenter(s) Suggested Original Poster Should Call the Police for (n=12)

Quantitative analysis suggests that Nextdoor users who live in gentrifying Oakland neighborhoods are most concerned with property crime, which most frequently motivates police calls; however, users are also concerned about suspected attempted crime and nuisance infractions, prompting additional police calls. Moreover, Nextdoor users not only explicitly state that they have called the police for property crime, suspected crime, and/or nuisance infractions, but other users comment and encourage posters to call the police for these incidents as well. In most cases, commenters advised to call the police when a poster did not explicitly state that a call was made. Observations suggest that some types of suspected crime may leave posters with hesitation about calling the police, or with questions about whether or not it is justified. Thus, Nextdoor appears to work as a forum that generates consent and subjectivity—other commenters encourage and reinforce that calling to report suspicious incidents to the police is not only justified but is in the best interests of the surrounding neighborhood.

Qualitative Analysis of Nextdoor Posts

Taking a qualitative approach, I assessed Nextdoor posts with more ambiguous reports of crime and/or nuisance infractions, focusing on how other users responded to these posts.[14] For example, I coded posts to see if commenters offered alternative solutions to calling the police (e.g. community involvement, increasing surveillance around their home and/or neighborhood, directly confronting an offender, etc.) and found several posts where debates were quite prevalent. This exploration is essential for understanding how residents respond to activities that are largely noncriminal but may perhaps burden residents' quality of life, and how debates among Nextdoor users inform residents' views about calling the police. Although some users utilize Nextdoor as a buffer for police calls, the conflicting comments within these posts display how Nextdoor—as a new reporting technology—also works as a catalyst for police calls.

Below, I discuss two posts that incited the most dispute among Nextdoor users. The chosen posts also provoked numerous responses from users who asserted that particular types of complaints are more often displayed by those who are newer residents to the city of Oakland, and not complaints that longtime residents see as important. Findings from selected posts and comments reveal patterns around the *legitimacy* of particular types of Oakland residents, the *quality of life* in Oakland neighborhoods, the *protection* of property, and the *security* of neighborhoods. Moreover, these patterns help to explain how Oakland residents who use Nextdoor *do* or *do*

not view calling the police as justified. The two posts chosen for this analysis involved a report about a youth "bicycle gang" (with 92 total replies) and a report about homeless individuals living next to someone's residence (with 87 total replies).

A user on Nextdoor posted about a local "gang" of young boys who were witnessed riding around their neighborhood on bicycles and tapping on car doors and windows.[15] The poster asked if anyone else knew more about who the bicycle riders were. This post prompted a long argument between commenters about how "disorderly" Oakland youth should be addressed by residents and/or the city. Some users responded angrily and called out the original poster for promoting derogatory language through their use of the term "gang." Commenters highlighted the harmful implications that can result from "labeling" certain groups of people—such as increased policing and criminalization. Two users posted the following comments in response:

> When BBQ Becky types use 911 as a customer complaint line & use coded language like "gang" is how unjustified police shootings aka murders occur, so there's no overreaction, the words matter. Stop using harmful descriptions like this for our youth.[16]

> …[the OPD] spend a lot of time dealing with locals and have a pretty good idea what the real social standards are (not to mention that some of them are genuine locals coming from our neighborhoods). But there have been exceptions, like when they busted the Black churches for "noise nuisance", which showed incredible cultural insensitivity…But for the most part, newbies who hammer the police with "quality of life" complaints, will get ignored at some point.[17]

These replies, as well as numerous other comments within this post, show how some Oakland residents are angry about these types of reports. Several commenters stated that they believe the very motivation to create posts such as this spawn from issues around racism and gentrification within Oakland. Thus, many commenters asserted that the only people complaining and calling the police for such inconsequential and *illegitimate* incidents are newer white residents.

However, other users addressed that the types of behaviors displayed by "disorderly" Oakland youth are clearly mischievous, dangerous, and unacceptable:

> These kids behaved like a gang because there were many of them and they are harassing drivers. That is a very basic use of the word gang…Stop saying things like BBQ Becky …We can't not use words which correctly describe an action that is gang-like…These kids acted like a pack of wild animals and are harassing people while they are driving!… I don't think the word is exploited or exaggerates the behavior. I don't think these kids are being labeled.[18]

> Wait are we going to pretend that there are not a lot of young unsupervised people doing things that they should not be doing in Oakland? Is it a taboo to recognize this place has a lot of problems? What else do you call a bunch of people on bikes acting like jerks other than a gang? Teen crime is really bad here…don't y'all know someone or have been a victim of crime? One of the worst parts about living here is the crime, not the racism.[19]

> …people here are so put off by the G-word that they miss the whole point. Seems that the Oakland police don't want to get involved in anything less than a felony, so unruly folks are emboldened to pull crap because they know they'll get away with it.[20]

Although commenters did not directly suggest that the original poster should call the police on the young bicycle riders, numerous comments involved coded language with racialized insinuations—such as the comments above referring to the youths as "a pack of wild animals," "jerks," and "unruly." While no one outright referred to the bicycle riders as "criminals," these comments imply that Oakland youths are a "disorderly," negative, and *illegitimate* presence in their neighborhoods. These types of labels perpetuate stereotypes about urban youth and are rooted in larger fears about Black and Brown populations. Previous studies note that Black youth, in particular, are frequently the targets of criminalizing labels and racial profiling based on historical and media portrayals of Black bodies, behavior, and culture as "dangerous" (Chapple et al. 2017; Weissinger, Mack, and Watson 2017; Tucker 2018).

Another Nextdoor user posted about a group of homeless individuals who were living next to their house. Their post asked for advice on how to handle the situation, particularly because the unhoused individuals had

used their electricity by plugging into their outdoor power outlets, and had trespassed onto their property to take gardening tools from their backyard.[21] In this case, the user specified that they called the police to handle the situation but the homeless group had not yet moved. Some users recommended that the original poster should increase their reliance on police authorities and use different surveillance tactics around their property, as displayed in the following comments:

> Keep making reports. As many as you can. Set up video equipment. Identify them in your reports. Encourage others to do the same. Write your mayor and Congresspeople. Many people see the "unhoused residents" as victims of the system. The reality is that many (not all) are drug users or just plain users who will continue to take from others as long as they are allowed. Do what you can to protect yourself and your property.[22]

> Do what you need to do to make your property secure. Keep reporting incidents to the police. Post No Trespassing signs. I do not think you need to feel "compassion" for thieves. What they are doing is wrong. I would not talk to them other than to tell them to get the hell out of your yard. Change the location of your security lights so they can't reach them.[23]

> Honestly, if they are trespassing and you and your family are feeling threatened, AND you've warned then AND the police are doing nothing, you need to consider arming yourself and be prepared to use force. I mean, what else can you do?? Does anybody on this forum really believe these "trespassers" won't break into his home if given the chance?[24]

These responses illustrate that some Oakland residents view homeless individuals as a highly concerning nuisance. Furthermore, commenters use generalizations about homelessness by asserting that if the individuals living next to the original poster's residence are not already engaging in "criminal" activities, they eventually will. Thus, commenters emphasize that in order to address the protection of property and the issue of homelessness in Oakland, the police should be called frequently and reports should be filed to the city.

Disdain for the larger issue of homelessness within Oakland—along with suggestions for more police involvement, heavy use of surveillance, and

proposals about carrying a weapon— prompted other users to respond by providing alternative suggestions and perspectives:

> …People have issues but they are still people and yes, the first thing you should do is talk to the people and explain how it is impacting you. They might appreciate it and move on. Or you might be able to figure out an easy way to be neighborly and help them.[25]

> You have neighbors, housed and houseless. Get to know your neighbors; be personal, get to know them as you would any new neighbor.[26]

> City authorities will ignore any complaints unless those complaints happen to fit into their agenda…But they won't be responding because they care about your problem or are trying to fulfill their formal purpose. Old-timers know this but new people are still living in TV land. Many fresh new people have come here to "clean-up Oakland". But over time, they are slowly ground down by their inability to significantly change the general situation here. Oakland's roots run deep and are fairly mysterious to most people. In spite of this (or maybe in some weird way because of it), many of us have a deep love for Oakland and wouldn't want to live any other place.[27]

The debate ensued within this post shows how some Oakland residents have contentious views centered around *legitimate* rights to the protection of property, versus the protection of vulnerable populations living in Oakland—who should be viewed as *legitimate* residents. Additionally, numerous responses to this post, made by self-identified longtime residents, argued that newer residents need to stop complaining and calling the cops on homeless people in Oakland. On the other hand, self-identified property owners responded to this post with a clear message: protect your property, keep calling the police, and amplify surveillance at all costs.

Interactions among Nextdoor users in these two posts suggest that residents in gentrifying Oakland neighborhoods have conflicting beliefs about how particular types of activities should be handled. The most significant divergence is exhibited in how new residents view crime and police interaction versus that of longtime residents. Nextdoor users have difficulty finding common ground about what is a genuine neighborhood

concern that may lead to potential crime or disorder, versus what is simply a non-issue complaint that has racist and/or classist allegations—particularly when posts fuel debates that attempt to define whether some groups should be humanized and accepted as *legitimate* members of the neighborhoods they reside in or if they should be criminalized. Likewise, within both posts, commenters assert that the OPD will not take noncriminal community concerns seriously. So rather than calling the police and demanding for more vigilant policing within Oakland's neighborhoods, users suggest that neighbors work together to find alternative solutions for dealing with their concerns.

Although Nextdoor offers valuable insight, I was not able to access precise demographic information (i.e. race, SES, length of residency, etc.) from Nextdoor users—and how this may influence *who* is calling the police. Additionally, it is difficult to say whether or not race impacts the types of individuals who are more likely to have the police called on them by Nextdoor users since the majority of posts omit "offenders'" race. The remaining component of my data—qualitative interviews—will help provide a more detailed account of *who* is calling the police and *why*. Moreover, how reliance on the police may indeed provoke increases in policing within Oakland neighborhoods undergoing gentrification.

URBAN LIFE, PROTECTION OF PROPERTY, AND TRUST IN THE POLICE

In-Depth Interviews with Residents Living in Gentrifying Oakland Neighborhoods

Interviews with Oakland residents were coded for several main patterns that help to illuminate *who* is calling the police in gentrifying Oakland neighborhoods and *why* they are choosing to do so—as well as who is *not* calling and why. Demographic information of each respondent was recorded (e.g. race, gender, SES, homeownership status, etc.), as well as the length of time respondents have been living in their neighborhood. Respondents who have been living in Oakland for ten or more years were coded as longtime residents, and those who have been living in Oakland for less than ten years were coded as newer residents. I kept track of any types of neighborhood concerns respondents reported (e.g. quality of life, crime, etc.), and whether or not respondents reported that they *would* call the police given a hypothetical situation. Most crucially, I coded for whether or not respondents *have* called the police in their neighborhood (predominantly coding for recent police calls, but also accounting for past calls during their

time living in Oakland), and the reasons for why they called. Additionally, I coded for how respondents feel about the OPD and police authorities, in general, to see how police trust/mistrust may influence decision making about calling the police.

Interviews reveal several patterns in regards to *who* is calling the police and *why*.[28] The first key finding is that all respondents, across all demographics, report that they have or would call the police if they experienced or witnessed a violent crime (i.e. assault, sexual assault, domestic violence, shootings, armed robbery, etc.). Respondents show agreement that any incident in their neighborhood that puts them or someone else in harm's way necessitates a police call. Moreover, respondents express that managing violent crime is not something that should be left up to individuals to deal with on their own. Thus, most residents believe that the police are generally best suited for handling dangerous types of situations.

Apart from calling the police to report violent crime, calling for other types of incidents—as well as perceptions of what types of situations residents deem as unsafe or concerning—show diverging patterns. These differences are based on varying combinations of SES, length of residency, and homeownership status, which influence views on neighborhood *legitimacy*. Unexpectedly, race fell out as a variable that explains *who* is calling the police. Black respondents are just as likely to call and/or not call the police as white respondents. Additionally, white respondents are just as likely to express police cynicism as Black respondents, based on views about racialized police violence and police corruption. Although race does not help to explain *who* is or is not calling the police within my study, it does assist in explaining *why* some people may call the police, which will be discussed later.

The central patterns that help to explain *who* is calling/not calling the police, and reasons *why*, are seen among three categories of Oakland residents: newer high-SES homeowners; longtime low-SES homeowners; and renters (across SES demographics) who have been living in Oakland and/or the larger Bay Area for at least several years. What follows is a discussion of each category of respondents, the central concerns addressed by each category, and the reasons why they have or have not called the police in certain situations.

Newer Homeowning Residents

"…if they're going onto my property, that's a whole different ballgame. I feel it's a personal violation. I personally won't hesitate to call the police on someone doing that."—Anthony (35-year-old Black man)

Respondents who are new to Oakland, high-SES, and homeowners are the most likely to report having called the police for multiple types of incidents in their neighborhood, including nonviolent, noncriminal nuisance infractions. This set of respondents are also younger (between 30 and 40 years old), have a professional or tech-related occupation, and the majority moved to the Bay Area from out-of-state. In cases where respondents from this category have never called the police since moving to Oakland, they are also the most likely to say that they *would* call the police given a hypothetical situation, and generally trust the police to handle situations in their neighborhoods.[29]

Concerns among newer high-SES homeowners are centered around neighborhood aesthetics (e.g. housing blight, dumping, litter, etc.), the presence of homeless encampments, "disorderly" neighbors, and nuisance offenses. For example, most respondents in this category report that they had recently called the police for noise violations in their neighborhood.[30] Moreover, newer homeowning residents in this category are more likely to see a division between themselves and renters—often blaming renters within their building and/or neighborhood for numerous disturbances. Jessica, an Asian woman in her early 30s has owned her condominium in Oakland for four years. She highlights some of the concerns she had when she first moved into her neighborhood, and how her concerns have changed:

> Jessica: There's a couple of times where I had to call the police because there'd be like riffraff down the street hanging out or being really loud or something…But now, [in my building] …we have a neighbor that we really dislike…He's a sub-tenant, he's not even like a real tenant. And like, he's really noisy, and he'll bang his bike around. So we've had to deal with him and contact the landlord…we've been trying to get him out.
>
> I: What kind of strategies are you using to try to get him out?
>
> Jessica: Well, we've complained to his landlord to get him out, so it's kind of like a nuisance abatement thing. And I've also written to the city about him, about like abating this issue, because it's pretty ridiculous.

Jessica's illustration shows not only clear disapproval of loud parties and gatherings that go on in the neighborhood but a ready-made distinction

between *legitimate* homeowners and *illegitimate* renters. Respondents in this category not only view calling the police for noise infractions as necessary but believe that *illegitimate* residents in the neighborhood—most often renters—should move out if they do not act in accordance with their norms and expectations. Furthermore, because renters do not own the house or unit they live in, they are viewed by newer, high-SES respondents as not having a stake in improving and maintaining neighborhood aesthetics, property values, or quality of life. Anthony, a high-SES Black man in his mid-30s who has lived and owned his home in Oakland for three years describes a similar frustration about a renter in his neighborhood:

> There's one house that is two blocks from ours that is kind of a mess on the front. It has a very old car that's never been moved… [there are] mattresses on the side of the house. The people there are also not friendly. Everyone's royally upset. They also have two [dogs] that they never walk and just stay gated in their front yard, and occasionally inside the house. They bark at everyone, it doesn't matter what time of day, and everyone is just livid. There's been emails to the city, reports on SeeClickFix, reports of nuisance abatement, like the whole nine…It may not do much, but we're doing everything short of a joint lawsuit against the neighbors.

These statements display how distinctions are made about *illegitimate* individuals and behaviors within their neighborhoods which negatively impact their quality of life—most often blamed on *illegitimate* residents who do not appear to "care" about the neighborhood. Moreover, respondents in this category display direct support for utilizing the police and other city agencies in order to enforce their norm expectations within their neighborhoods.

In addition to having called the police one or more times for noise complaints and/or housing blight in their neighborhoods, all respondents in this category report that they would, without question, call the police if they experienced non-violent property crime. Moreover, respondents in this category also express that they would call the police if homeless individuals started living next to their residence—largely associating the presence of homeless individuals with the risk of having their property damaged and/or stolen.[31] Sarah and Kyle are a white married couple in their late 30s who recently moved to the Bay Area from the East Coast, and bought a condominium in Oakland. Sarah describes in detail how she would respond

to a hypothetical situation regarding homeless people living next to their building:

> …if it [happened here] I'd be making it the most unfriendly place ever. I don't feel that because you're unhoused you get to steal from your neighbors. That's just like establishing a boundary. "This is the line, and you cannot cross this line." So, that's how I would handle that. And if they keep on destroying stuff then that's another crime, and that's when you have to start getting the police involved. I feel like a lot of people that say, "Oh, you should be helping [the homeless]," aren't having the problem. Because like, no, it doesn't work that way.

Anthony shares a similar reaction to this situation in the following statement:

> I mean, in that kind of situation it's super complicated…a lot of people that are homeless do have mental or psychological or drug use issues and could be unstable for any of those reasons. And someone's that's a sane, tax-paying individual trying to reason with someone like that, it's not the best solution. You could get yourself hurt...[Calling] 3-1-1 would certainly be my first course of action…I'd call them and have them deal with it. If it's a matter of people stealing things from the yard or something like that, like if I didn't catch them in the act and it was after the fact, I would certainly get 3-1-1 involved. And if that doesn't work then definitely OPD proper. Like if it involved damage to property, like if they bust my car window or jumped my fence…Or if they're going onto my property, that's a whole different ball game. I feel it's a personal violation. I personally won't hesitate to call the police on someone doing that.

These types of statements articulate anxiety about the proliferation of homelessness within Oakland. Further, these statements indicate how this category of respondents view private property as spaces that need to be respected and protected; thus, property violations are unacceptable. Similar to their views on renters and sub-tenants, respondents in this category also view homeless individuals as *illegitimate* members of the community who negatively impact their quality of life. Moreover, many respondents in this

category assert that they do not understand why the city of Oakland and the OPD allow for the issue of homelessness to continue.

Although respondents in this category express overall trust in police authorities, they feel that the OPD should be more effective at dealing with crime and disorder in their neighborhoods. Respondents largely believe that the OPD should be increasing the number of officers who patrol their neighborhoods, and should improve police call response times. However, respondents, such as Sarah's statement below, show how living in Oakland makes residents more aware of the current limitations that the OPD is facing:

> I never had to worry about my safety around a police officer and I know that I've recognized that. It's just sad, it makes me sad. It shouldn't be like this. Cops are supposed to be the kinds of people you hang out with…But I don't trust [the OPD] to show up. I don't feel like they would ever be mean to me or anything. But I think that they're overwhelmed. They're limited because of the federal oversight.

There are also feelings of disappointment attached to newer, high-SES homeowners' perceptions about the OPD's ineffectiveness. However, frustration and disappointment among this category of respondents is predominantly centered around how the OPD's troubled history is impacting their ability to efficiently deal with community concerns.[32]

Despite having complex feelings about the OPD's current federal oversight, as well as wanting more vigilant policing in their neighborhoods, respondents in this category generally feel that policing in Oakland has been improving. Jessica explains how she thinks policing has changed in her neighborhood since she first moved in:

> Jessica: I hear stories, like talking about police brutality and all that stuff, which I don't know if that's something that happened in Oakland very often. Like I don't know if I have enough information to decide for myself what was going on. I mean it might have changed. In my perspective, it totally has changed because you're dealing with a population that has less crime. So when you're dealing with that kind of population you're not going to have the same kind of interactions as opposed to dudes selling drugs on the corner or prostitution going on and that type of interaction. So you're dealing with different people which results in different interactions.

> I: And by different people, can you expand a little bit on what you mean by that?
>
> Jessica: Like for example, people who are just going to work, maybe going to the bar or whatever, and coming home. Versus people who maybe are down on their luck or for whatever reason they're selling drugs for money, or they're just hanging out, or they've gone to jail and are on parole, or that kind of idea of what Oakland was before. Just kind of like this blighted area, and I think with that idea comes a lot of crime. And that's like what I have seen in the area.

Even though Jessica's statement does not mention how the demographic changes within her neighborhood, and thus, changes in policing, may be impacted by gentrification, the implied correlation is understood. As more high-SES professional workers are moving into Oakland, housing and rental prices are increasing, and those who are "down on their luck" are moving out. Despite Oakland's growing reduction of Black residents, low-income residents, deeply embedded community activities, and culture, respondents in this category do not express worry or guilt for these losses. Jessica articulates this, asserting her feelings about the legitimacy of nuisance complaints in relation to the case of "BBQ Becky":

> …people got away with it for a long time but now they can't…Especially like, part of the way I feel is if I lived across the street, and people were doing all this stuff, or playing all this loud music when I'm trying to chill out on a Sunday, I would be hell of annoyed…Like people are trying to chill in their homes and the reason why you can't do x, y, z is probably because people in the neighborhood do not want that. The same reason why I wouldn't want unhoused people living next door taking my stuff. And so, for me it's just like, enjoy it while it lasted, but understand that there is a law that is now being enforced, that was always there, but just wasn't enforced previously.

Seemingly, newer high-SES homeowners feel justified in enforcing their norm expectations within their neighborhoods, even if it means calling the police for small offenses. This illustrates a divide between how respondents in this category see their neighborhoods compared to how those from other categories perceive similar, if not the same, neighborhoods.

It is also important to note that race is not a variable that influences *who* calls the police among interview respondents in this sample—across racial demographics, all newer high-SES homeowners state that they largely trust the police, and have/would call the police for numerous types of incidents. However, the coded language utilized by Jessica may help to explain how race may be a mechanism for *who* police calls target, which will be discussed after my analysis of findings from the remaining two categories of Oakland residents. What follows is an examination of longtime homeowning residents, how they understand their neighborhoods, and how this influences their perceptions and use of police calls.

Longtime Homeowning Residents

"…don't come into the community with these preconceived ideas."—Evelyn (64-year-old Black woman)

Longtime low-SES homeowning respondents are far less likely to call the police than newer high-SES homeowners. While newer affluent homeowners see the quality of life in their neighborhoods as a concerning issue that needs to be addressed, longtime residents see their neighborhoods as safe and largely amiable places to live. They also do not express observing many offenses that require calling the police. Furthermore, all respondents who are longtime homeowning residents are 50 years or older, and the vast majority are low-SES. These demographic differences are important to note, as newer homeowners are all high-SES, younger, and professional workers. Conversely, the majority of longtime homeowners are retired, most of whom purchased their homes prior to the 1990s, long before Bay Area housing prices skyrocketed (Bay Area Market Reports 2018).

Regarding neighborhood crime, longtime homeowning respondents express that incidents of violent crime have decreased significantly, and assert that shootings and gang-related violence used to be far more common occurrences. Georgina is a white woman in her late 60s who has owned her house for over 30 years, and illustrates an incident she witnessed when she first moved into her house in the 1980s:

> When we first moved in it was kind of the Wild West…there was a house behind ours and it was a crack house. The police were chasing somebody in that house and they ran over our roof. Once I got home from work at 12 or 1 in the morning and there was a gun battle out on my street. Once, after I had

> returned home, bullets flew…You would hear gunshots… crime was definitely much worse.

Additionally, respondents in this category view decrease in violent crime as an outcome of some of the mechanisms of gentrification, which is not a pattern that newer homeowning residents explicitly recognize. As a result of gentrification, newer affluent residents and the city are putting pressure on the OPD to crack down on not only violent crime but quality of life infractions. Evelyn, a Black woman in her mid-60s who owns a condominium, explains how she is experiencing this phenomenon:

> Evelyn: I think police calls have probably been on an increase. By just looking at the makeup of the community I think that they're probably calling the police more. Especially at this last [NCPC] meeting, a lady was complaining about the people standing on the corner, congregating, you know. And she was almost wanting to say that there should be a curfew, that people shouldn't stand out. Well, why'd she move right next to a liquor store? And she's kind of a newbie to the neighborhood. So, with her talking it makes me feel like she wants to call the police all the time to clean up the neighborhood. "Get these people off the streets so I can defend my place and feel comfortable and not hear any noises from the outside."
>
> I: Do you think these changes in complaints are at all related to gentrification?
>
> Evelyn: Oh absolutely. It's a little bit disgusting. I think that people should have done their homework before they moved into the neighborhood.

Moreover, while respondents in this category affirm that they have seen a reduction in violent crime in their neighborhoods, most also note that property crime has increased. Several respondents express that property crime is more rampant, primarily based on the frequency of property crime they see reported on Nextdoor.[33]

Likewise, the majority of longtime residents also believe that the influx of wealth into low-income neighborhoods is not only fueling "crimes of opportunity," but that property crime is possibly a form of anger-fueled resistance—at the hands of impoverished Oakland residents who are being

pushed out of the city—targeted at newer, more affluent residents. Evelyn expresses her thoughts about recent increases in property crimes, such as package theft and car break-ins:

> I think it is an issue but I don't think it is an issue of massive proportion. I think that people are looking for opportunities. You're looking at the have-nots looking and what the haves have, and the haves are careless about what they have. So then yeah, "I'll just take it and hopefully, I can get away with it." So you're looking at petty crimes.

Despite increases in property crime, longtime residents insist that they have not and generally would not call the police to report property crime, unless they were in immediate danger of being physically harmed. Stephanie is a white woman in her mid-50s who has owned her house since the 1980s, and illustrates her views about calling the police for property crime:

> Well, I think it would depend on if I felt like they were going to take something from the outside of the house or if they were going to break in. If they were going to break in and I was home then I'll probably call the police because I just don't feel safe. But if they're just coming and taking a tool from the side of the house then I'm probably not going to call the police, because, really…It's stuff. There's no reason to get so upset about stuff.

Stephanie's assertion shows a clear division in regard to calling the police for property crime compared to assertions made by newer high-SES homeowners. Newer homeowners show more concern about defending their property and would call the police in instances where their property is violated. Longtime homeowners, conversely, feel that stolen property does not necessitate calling the police, except in circumstances when their safety is in proximate, tangible danger. Although longtime residents express that they generally believe the police should be called for reporting violent crime, there are still instances in which they would be cautious about doing so. Stephanie asserts that she does not always trust the police to handle vulnerable populations, and illustrates her fears about the police in the following passage:

> …the police need to be trained to be able to tell if someone's dangerous or [mentally ill] or anything else. Or, has a cultural difference and that's why they're not meeting your eyes. Or

> that they're not automatically on drugs or that they don't automatically have guns…Our police are trained to shoot. They're trained to kill people. They're not trained to stop people.

Stephanie went on to discuss a situation that occurred in her neighborhood, when she made the decision to call the police—an aggressive fight that occurred in which one offender was mentally unstable. She described the police as being unnecessarily forceful and unhelpful during the incident and explained her reaction towards the police officers: "I was like, 'You guys are supposed to have a mental health unit. You're supposed to know who to call.' And they were like, 'Well, we've never been trained in any of that.' And so I've never called them again." Negative reactions about how police handle mentally unstable populations and racial minorities (primarily Black people) are not uncommon among longtime Oakland residents. Evelyn illuminates a similar feeling about deciding whether or not to call the police on a drug dealer that hangs out in her son's neighborhood in Oakland, where her young grandchildren also reside:

> Evelyn:…there's this drug dealer on my son's block and I just really wanna turn him. He seems to be a pretty nice guy. He's become a fixture in the neighborhood. But the drug dealing, that shit has just got to go…So I've got information on this, but I just haven't made the phone call yet.
>
> I: Why haven't you made the phone call yet?
>
> Evelyn: I guess I'm trying to just justify the fact that when I do make that phone call there's going to be yet one more Black man going to jail. So I'm having to wrestle in my mind: is it worth me making that phone call to clear up my son's block, so that way when my grandkids come outside they don't see what he's doing? Or is it to save a guy from going to jail?

This shows how respondents who are longtime residents of Oakland display an understanding of the OPD's corrupt and violent history, as well as larger patterns of racialized police violence and mass incarceration occurring within the United States. Thus, longtime residents assert that calling the police is never an easy thing to do, due to the potential injury—to body, reputation, financial stability, and/or life chances—that it can incite for

vulnerable individuals. This diverges from the assertions of newer high-SES homeowners, who have positive views of the police and would not hesitate to call the police in most situations, even if vulnerable populations are at risk.

Though longtime homeowners exhibit hesitance about calling the police, they generally have some trust of the OPD. However, many respondents in this category wish that OPD officers were better trained to deal with sensitive situations and vulnerable populations—such as Stephanie's previous assertion. Likewise, all respondents in this category express wanting more police officers "walking the beat" in their neighborhoods and getting to know the community, rather than patrolling around in police cars. Fred, a Black man in his late 50s who owns a condominium, shares some of the changes he would like to see in policing:

> I would like to see more on-foot policing, and police making an effort to get to know people in the community. And not just communities that have real estate. Because there's this perception that if you live in a certain neighborhood then you're a criminal, and so then, therefore, you're not a person who is to be trusted. So basically, people are dehumanized and made to be an object or a threat, as opposed to a person… So having police be a part of the community as opposed to policing the community I think would go a long way to start bridging those gaps between the community and the police.

This displays that a large part of the frustration that longtime residents have with the OPD, and the police in general, is the lack of community engagement on the part of police officers. Thus, if police officers got to know Oakland's residents and were from their neighborhoods, then it would help build more trust among residents of Oakland and the OPD.

In addition, longtime residents also feel frustrated about newer residents who frequently complain about crime and call the police for minor quality of life offenses. Where newer homeowners see a division between themselves and *illegitimate* renters, sub-tenants, and homeless people, longtime homeowners see a division between themselves and *illegitimate*, *misinformed* new residents. Many respondents in this category refer to newer residents as being naïve about Oakland's history, culture, and crime statistics. Moreover, longtime homeowners assert that they do not view calling the police for nuisance infractions as an acceptable thing to do. Evelyn demonstrates her frustration about newer residents who have been complaining and calling the police in her neighborhood:

> I think if a person is going to come into the community they should, number one, do some research about it. Look at the historical facts and the things that have happened and understand why the community is the way that it is. Be intentional. If you're gonna come into the community.
> and be a part of it, then let's be a part of it and look for solutions to make it better. But don't come into the community with these preconceived ideas. Like, for instance…people moved in next door to a Baptist church and complained about the music and how long the service goes on Sunday. How stupid is that? And then they wanna stop the church from doing business.

Statements such as this exhibit how longtime homeowning residents of Oakland have a deep appreciation and understanding of their neighborhood, community, and the city of Oakland. In addition, they often participate in the very neighborhood activities that are deemed as "disorderly" by newer residents.

Even with respect to the issue of homelessness, longtime homeowners feel more compassion towards those who are struggling with housing insecurity in Oakland than newer homeowners do. When posed the hypothetical situation of unhoused individuals moving next to their homes, longtime homeowners express that they would not call the police—largely because they do not feel that the police are equipped to deal with homeless populations. More, respondents in this category see policing of homelessness as cruel and unnecessary. Instead, longtime homeowners express that they would rather talk to homeless people directly or find alternative resources and that assist homeless populations. Fred shares his views on homelessness in Oakland, and how some residents seem to lack a sense of compassion for those who are enduring housing insecurity:

> There's this blame for the victims who are [homeless] and how homelessness is ruining the neighborhood, or, "Oh, I can't walk down that street anymore because I have to walk by that." So there's a lack of compassion…I do have empathy for those circumstances. And most of the expressions is a lack of empathy, and, "The city should do something about that trash," and ignoring the human component of it…[Some] of the residents in my building said, "We need to call [the police] and tell them to do something about those people out there." I'm just like, "Really? That's your concern? Have

> any of these people bothered you?" "No, but they just make me uncomfortable." "So it's your discomfort, but you're not concerned about their discomfort on the hard ground, in the cold?"…They're not bothering me. It's unfortunate that they're there, but I'm not trying to criminalize it.

The views of longtime homeowners are in direct contrast with newer homeowners, who are far more likely to state that they would call the police on homeless individuals who are living next door to their residence or are trespassing onto their property. Longtime homeowners, on the other hand, have a more thorough understanding of the housing crisis within Oakland and the larger Bay Area. Thus, they are more likely to view homeless people as *legitimate* community members and do not feel that turning to the police is an effective way to alleviate the issue of homelessness.

It is important to note that although most longtime residents report that they do not support calling the police for property crime, homelessness, or nuisance infractions, many do support filing police reports online. For instance, those who have been targets of certain types of property crime (i.e. car break-ins and burglary) state that they have filed police reports, but filed using an online reporting platform in order to make insurance claims. Moreover, most longtime homeowners call *SeeClickFix* and/or open a case on *SeeClickFix*'s online website to report illegal dumping in their neighborhood. They assert that these city resources are helpful alternatives for reporting property crime or illegal dumping that do not involve directly calling the police. This is in opposition to newer high-SES homeowners, who have or would rely on directly calling 9-1-1 or 3-1-1 for incidents in their neighborhoods. But these forms of reporting are certainly not exhibited by all categories of respondents; least likely to be seen by renters, whose reliance on police calls diverges the most compared to all homeowners.

Renters

"I feel like there are a lot of white people in Oakland who are more likely to see reportable disturbances, like people with the barbecues at Lake Merritt…I don't think it's a good idea to trust the police and treat a group of non-white people fairly for disturbing the peace."—Blake (40-year-old white man)

Respondents who are renters, across SES and racial demographics, are the least likely to have called the police in their neighborhood and are the least likely to assert that they would call given a hypothetical situation. Although none of the renters interviewed for this study fit the category of

"longtime" Oakland residents, most have a familiarity with the Bay Area, exhibit a tolerance for living in an urban city, and are well-informed about the OPD's corrupt policing practices. Based on these dynamics, renters also display far more cynicism about the OPD and police authorities compared to newer homeowners. This is a surprising finding, as low and high-SES renters have comparable cynicism about the police and do not call the police. Thus, the majority of renters' reliance on police calls is in far contrast to newer high-SES homeowners, and somewhat different compared to longtime low-SES homeowners.

Renters in this study are also younger than both newer homeowners and longtime homeowners—most are in their mid to late 20s or early 30s, with only one respondent who is in their early 40s. It is worth noting that because younger populations tend to be renters rather than homeowners, it is possible that generational differences also influence views of the police and reliance on police calls. Nevertheless, respondents who are renters display interpretations of policing and police calls that align more with longtime homeowners—who are older—than with newer homeowners—who are younger. However, there is one respondent who did not fit this pattern—a young renter who recently moved to the Bay Area from out-of-state and has/would call the police for numerous types of offenses. The case of this respondent will be discussed later in relation to other renters.

Among renters who have not called the police to report incidents in their neighborhood, nearly every respondent details that they have never experienced or witnessed any type of occurrence that required calling the police. In the rare cases where renters did call the police, they only called for violent crime-related incidents. In instances where renters experienced property crime, the majority did not call the police or file a police report online—a departure from longtime homeowners, who often do report certain property crimes online. Possibly, renters do not file police reports for property theft and/or damage because they do not have insurance (in contrast to homeowners); however, most respondents in this category convey that property crime is simply not a concern that the police should be notified about. Blake is a high-SES white man in his early 40s who grew up in the South Bay Area and has been a renter in Oakland intermittently throughout his life. Blake maintains that although his wife and close friend both experienced property crime at his residence, stolen or damaged property are not alarming incidents:

> [Once] somebody broke into the garage in the building and stole my wife's bike. And we had a friend visiting and

> somebody broke into the window of their car…I think that's the extent of our experience with crime. But that has never made me feel unsafe and has never made me feel like, for example, I didn't write to my council member and say, "We need more cops on the streets." It didn't make me feel like we need more of a government level response for a bike getting stolen…[And] the car window, I don't think she [reported it]. If I had to guess she didn't. She's a student so she's very, very busy. And we didn't report the bike. If we did we wouldn't expect anything to come of it.

Similarly, Tyler, a high-SES white man in his early 30s who is originally from the East Bay Area and a current renter in Oakland, details his views of crime within the city:

> Crime is probably an issue anywhere. Oakland very obviously has more crime than if you compare it to other surrounding cities…There's a lot of property crime, but violent crime is at a very low level historically. But I do have a couple of friends who were walking in Oakland and got robbed at gunpoint. That was like traumatic, right? Totally understandable, that was really shitty. But, I have lots of friends out here. The vast majority of us have not been violently threatened at all. Some of us have had cars broken into, burglaries, that's kind of common. But, maybe I've just been desensitized to it, but I feel more strongly about the ways in which the OPD is corrupt and isn't responsive in a thoughtful way to its community.

These statements show how even among high-SES renters who have experienced property crime, or who know someone who has, there are larger issues that need to be addressed within Oakland. Although property crime may be concerning for renters to some degree, making the time and effort to call the police or file a report is not viewed as an effective way to tackle these problems.

Besides, renters perceive increases in property crime in Oakland as a consequence of larger social issues happening within the Bay Area, similar to longtime homeowners. Andrew is a renter who is a low-SES white man in his late 20s, who grew up in Southern California, moved to San Francisco after college, and only recently moved to Oakland. He describes some of the

dynamics that he sees occurring in his neighborhood that may explain the frequency of property crime:

> There's definitely tension between the old guard and the newcomers in our neighborhood. Older neighbors talk about that and I've had interactions with people where they're like, "Well, I don't know you and you're white so you're probably rich and you probably just moved here and work for Google." Which is all fair, but I definitely feel like there's an escalation in property crime in neighborhoods that have radical wealth disparity. And here there's tons of it and it's constant. I mean one house will be here with a bunch of people who are making $100,000 a year and the next house will be a bunch of people who are making $20,000 a year. And then you've got somebody outside who's making $200 a year. I mean, we're all guilty of envy. And if you see them as the enemy and are like, "Man, they can afford another iPhone," or, "Man, they can afford another car window." I mean, they're not wrong.

Andrew's assertions show that there are clear socioeconomic and racial inequities occurring within gentrifying Oakland neighborhoods that are likely prompting increases in property crime. Moreover, property crime is perceived as being targeted at newer affluent white residents (i.e. *gentrifiers*). However, similar to longtime homeowners, renters feel that they cannot fault those who are struggling economically for stealing from more well-off Oakland residents. It is expressed as being an inconvenient reality of living in an urban city with stark inequalities.

Renters also emphasize that they embrace the realities that come with living in an urban city, and do not view calling the police for nuisance infractions as ever justified. For one, most renters assert that they don't see nuisance infractions (i.e. noise, litter, homeless encampments, loitering, etc.) as a threat to the quality of life in their neighborhoods. If anything, renters detail that it is the exceedingly unaffordable rental prices that take a toll on their wellbeing. Second, most renters do not distinguish between *legitimate* and *illegitimate* community members—which is a type of boundary that both new and longtime homeowners make in respect to protecting and reinforcing their neighborhood standards. Lastly, renters believe that living in Oakland comes with certain activities and experiences that are normal parts of living in an urban city. Blake illustrates some of his views on people

who call the police for nuisance complaints, and what it means to live in a city such as Oakland:

> I'm very cognizant of public disturbance…I feel like there are a lot of white people in Oakland who are more likely to see reportable disturbances, like people with the barbecues at Lake Merritt…I don't think it's a good idea to trust the police and treat a group of non-white people fairly for disturbing the peace, or loud music, or that kind of thing…if someone in the driveway, or my neighbor, or someone was playing loud music, I would put earplugs in. And we live in an area with a lot of activity. We live right next to a bar, so on Friday and Saturday nights there are people laughing and there's music playing, and to me, that's just part of living in a city.

This is surprising, showing that even among high-SES renters, nuisances such as noise, dumping, and homelessness are not viewed as police-call-worthy events. These observations contrast immensely from newer high-SES homeowners, who identify far more police-call-worthy occurrences in their neighborhoods. Thus, experience living in an urban city seems to build a tolerance for types of activities that newer residents deem as bad for the quality of life in Oakland.

Conversely, as mentioned previously, not all renters agree that property crime and nuisance infractions should be ignored. William, a high-SES white man in his late 20s, recently moved to the Bay Area from the Midwest for a job in the tech industry. He lives in a newly built development and says that he quickly befriended his neighbors after moving in—all high-SES homeowners who are also tech workers. The bond he formed with his neighbors resulted from their similar fears about crime and the quality of life in their neighborhood, as well as the "culture shock" they all experienced when they first moved into their Oakland neighborhood:

> A lot of people that live in the [development] are in the tech industry and I get the sense the place is a little bit more expensive than the surrounding neighborhood. It is more of an open development, like no gates or nothing like that. And I think that has kind of factored into some of the things that have gone on in the neighborhood…I think because of certain issues with crime, that's how I met a lot of the neighbors…And then we've talked about taking up approaches like talking to the police, talking to a resource

> officer, and starting a neighborhood watch…[But] I think that a lot of people weren't mentally ready for some of the crimes that have happened in the area. I think it was just kind of a culture shock to everyone…Other issues that build upon that are the homeless encampments, suspected gang activity, drug dealing. Another one is just trash in the area, like litter and illegal dumping. It all feeds into the feeling that there's not a good quality of life in the neighborhood.

William's assertions, as a renter, correlate more with many statements made by newer high-SES homeowners—that Oakland neighborhoods are rampant with disorders that need to be addressed by the police and city authorities. This shows how high-SES residents who are new to both Oakland and the overall Bay Area perceive Oakland as a dangerous and unsanitary place to live.

In calling the police, William's experiences also align with that of newer high-SES homeowners, which further illustrates how newer affluent Oakland residents see crime and disorder as frequent occurrences in their neighborhoods. William discusses some of the instances when he called the police in his neighborhood:

> William: [I called] when my car was broken into…I've also called the non-emergency line a couple of times. Mostly for gunshots, or if like, I see something suspicious happening. One time I saw a car idling for a while and it wasn't one I recognized from the neighborhood so I was worried they were canvassing. I've talked to neighbors a couple of times and they told me they've seen things like people with stolen merchandise…And I was explaining to them, "Call 9-1-1 if you see this because it is a crime in progress."
>
> I: Can you clarify what you mean by stolen merchandise?
>
> William: Someone said it looked like stolen packages from a shop, and they were trying to take off the security tags. But the reason I came to the sense to call 9-1-1 is because there was one time a homeless guy stole my boots off the driveway, and I called the non-emergency line, and the police explained, "Call 9-1-1 if it's a crime in progress because that's what the line is for." I was so shocked that this guy had the audacity to just take my boots off of my driveway. And I gave

> a description to the police, and I think we both knew that it wasn't going to go anywhere.

Although William is the only renter in this study whose self-reported experiences and views follow with newer high-SES homeowners, another renter discussed how his housemates perceive Oakland. Andrew—who has never called the police—explains that his neighbors, who are newer high-SES renters, call the police frequently for incidents in their neighborhood:

> Our downstairs neighbors are a little bit more straight-laced and are tech workers, and they definitely call the cops more regularly. They are vigilant and paranoid. They've lived there longer than [me] but they're also both newer to the Bay Area in general. I get the impression that they'd like to live somewhere else but they just don't. It's like a convenient commute for them but they don't love the neighborhood, and I don't see them going out. They don't go out to neighborhood spots or hangout at local restaurants and stuff. They get in an Uber and go somewhere else…They called the cops when someone parked their minivan outside and were selling drugs out of it for like two weeks…Anytime a car window gets broken, they call the cops, which doesn't even occur to me to do usually. You know, like what are they going to do? They want to be creating a paper trail so that the city can see what's going on in the neighborhood, I guess.

These two narratives show how "culture shock" and fear work as mechanisms for calling the police among newer high-SES renters. Newer affluent respondents not only show a lack of experience with urban life, they also feel an entitlement to enforce their norm expectations by calling the police and increasing police surveillance within their neighborhoods. Moreover, newer high-SES residents recognize that they have more resources than many of their neighbors in Oakland, thus, they tend to feel as if they are the primary targets for property crime. William describes some of the precautions he takes because of his fear of being robbed, asserting, "If I'm in public I don't tell people I work in tech. I usually say that I'm an EMT."

Except for William and Andrew's downstairs neighbors, renters generally speak positively about the quality of life in their neighborhoods and do not see calling the police as a necessary action. Moreover, all other respondents who are renters display cynicism and mistrust of the OPD. Chloe is a high-SES mixed-race woman in her early 30s who grew up in the

North Bay Area. Chloe offers her thoughts on the OPD in the following passage:

> …there's things I'd like to see changed about the overall police…They could be less racist, less misogynistic. They could be held accountable for their crimes. They could be less condescending, and less condescending in encounters with women.

Cynical views of the police and the OPD—either based on previous negative exchanges with the police or anger about larger patterns of police violence—influence renters' decision making about calling the police. Blake also presents his feelings about the OPD, centered on recent scandals that have come out in the media:

> The stories that [I] read about in the newspaper about the underage sex worker scandal, it's hard to read that and see [the OPD] as an organization that is trustworthy. And I think it comes down to trust. There are these people who we trust to be on city payroll and to be trained…we give them a lot of power and the hope is that they will use that training, resources, and power to make us all safer. But then there are those few stories that come out, and trust is easy to lose and hard to earn. So with the stories that come out and the turnover, and all the scandals and things that happen, yeah, it's hard to feel like it's a trustworthy organization.

This shows how renters set a boundary of *illegitimacy* about police authorities rather than in reference to their neighbors—a divergence from both longtime and newer homeowners. Thus, based on renters' experience living within the Bay Area, their tolerance for urban life, and their overall negative feelings about policing, makes them the least likely to engage with—or to want to engage with—police calls and police authorities.

Racial Profiling in Perceptions of Illegitimate Residents

"I don't think the people that are gentrifying came in with a full knowledge of where they're moving to. So every black person or person-of-color is suspect."—Evelyn

Although interviews do not reveal a racialized mechanism that explains *who* is calling the police within Oakland's gentrifying neighborhoods,

interviews do reveal how the targets of police calls may indeed be racially informed. Some respondents, during interviews, used ambiguous coded language to refer to "suspicious" and "problematic" characters in their neighborhood, establishing both race and class-based insinuations. Further, the coded language used by respondents has similar connotations to the language used by Nextdoor users, which are influenced by racial stereotypes that automatically criminalize Black bodies and behaviors (Chapple et al. 2017; Weissinger, Mack, and Watson 2017; Tucker 2018). For example, Jessica uses the word "riffraff" when referring to the residents who once occupied her neighborhood—residents who she states she previously called the police on for noise infractions. Jessica also states that the previous residents in her neighborhood were the "down-on-their-luck" type that engage in "criminal" activities, and how her neighborhood now consists of "just people who are going to work." William also uses coded language when discussing the types of incidents and/or individuals he would be more likely to call the police for:

> William: If I saw someone with a personal stash of psychedelics or cocaine, I probably wouldn't call the cops. But if I thought it was some gangbanger carrying a gun, I would definitely call the police.
>
> I: And what would make you assume someone is a gangbanger who has a gun?
>
> William: Just the number of people around. It's hard for me to really say because I don't really know. So short answer is I would call the police, unless I thought it was two college students messing around.

These statements show how some respondents—in most cases, newer high-SES respondents—use racial and class stereotypes to make assumptions about individuals within their neighborhoods. The "riffraff" and the "gangbangers" are labeled as *illegitimate* community members, and newer high-SES residents are more likely to support calling the police on them.

Furthermore, interviews with longtime residents reveal how Black respondents in this category feel that gentrification and increases in new white residents in the neighborhood are changing their day-to-day life experiences. Evelyn's following statement exhibits her thoughts about how

newer gentrifying residents perceive her, other Black residents, and residents of color, as “suspects” and “outsiders” just for just existing in Oakland:

> I don’t think the people that are gentrifying came in with a full knowledge of where they’re moving to. So every black person or person of color is suspect…Like I’ll be walking to the mailbox and people are like studying [me] as a suspect like, “Okay, so how did you get in here? And who are you?” And watching to see if [I] actually have a key and things like that…people on my [development’s] Facebook page, early on, would get on and bash people of color. “These black guys came in here and they were wandering around and they were touching stuff.” And so then I was like, “Well did you see them?” “Oh, no, they all had hoodies on.” So then why are you saying for a fact that you know that it was these guys that did it?…Don’t just judge and say they’re all shady, checking doors and all that…Anybody that had a hoodie on, they were suspect. But there’s still people on [the Facebook page]—instead of saying “Black” they call them “bozos,” “crazies,” and [I] know what the hell they’re talking about.

This illustration shows how newer residents’ behavior towards Black Oakland residents makes Black residents feel as if they are being labelled as “suspicious” or *illegitimate* characters. Also, Evelyn’s statement shows how newer Oakland residents are using racial stereotypes and coded language, not only on websites such as Nextdoor, but on other online resident-community forums. Similar to Evelyn, Fred describes how his day-to-day life has changed since his Oakland neighborhood has gentrified:

> I’m a 6’4” Black guy, so I’m the person that everyone profiles…I have problems with people who just assume that if I’m walking down the street and I don’t look like them, I’m a criminal…I think there are people who just walk down the street in their neighborhood like they always do and now people think, “Oh, there’s a suspicious person. Let’s call the police on them.” Well, what are they doing that’s suspicious? “Walking down the street.” And? “They just looked like they didn’t belong here.” Why? And people are just hanging around outside, being loud, which is just a part of Black culture or Latino culture.

Fred's assertion, again, highlights how racial bias and racial profiling may be influencing which residents are more likely to be labeled as "suspicious" by newer residents, and thus, more likely to be targeted by police calls. Moreover, the experiences of Oakland's longtime Black residents show how Black residents do not feel as if they are seen as part of the "new" communities that are forming within their neighborhoods. Rather, longtime Black residents are hesitant to engage with newer residents and feel that newer residents view them as *illegitimate* members of the neighborhoods they have lived in most of their life.

DISCUSSION

Findings from participant observation at NCPC and APTP meetings, Nextdoor content analysis, and interviews with Oakland residents reveal a plethora of complex patterns. However, there are several findings from all three sets of data that not only help to answer *who* is calling the police in gentrifying Oakland neighborhoods but *why* they are doing so. As mentioned previously, I expected to see an obvious racial pattern that explains who is calling the police (i.e. white residents calling the police more than Black residents and/or residents of color), but the data did not reveal this. However, the data did reveal other patterns around race, gentrification, and policing, which will be considered following a discussion of the primary findings.

Patterns in the data reveal that generally, homeownership is a key factor that explains *who* is calling the police in gentrifying Oakland neighborhoods. Protection of property and the quality of life within neighborhoods—presented in findings from NCPC meetings, Nextdoor posts, and interviews—is a big concern for homeowners. This finding aligns with Sullivan and Bachmeier's (2012) study on perceptions of disorder among residents in gentrifying neighborhoods—that homeowners may call the police more. Additionally, the reasons *why* homeowners call the police are not only for incidents of property crime but also center around views about which individuals or activities are *illegitimate*. This finding supports Martin's (2008) study on the boundary maintenance used by residents in gentrifying neighborhoods, influenced by an intolerance for particular aspects of urban life. Thus, homeowners in this study are more likely to call the police for nuisance violations within their neighborhoods than non-homeowners to secure and maintain their quality of life expectations.

However, as informed by data from interviews, homeowners who are both new to Oakland and high-SES tend to call the police far more than longtime low-SES homeowners. Longtime homeowners express that

Oakland neighborhoods are far safer than they previously were and that violent crime is now an infrequent occurrence. They also do not identify nuisance infractions as defensible reasons to call the police. Newer high-SES homeowners, on the other hand, call the police habitually in order to enforce the security and aesthetic stability in their neighborhoods. Thus, forms of nonviolent property crime, suspicious activities, noise infractions, homeless people, and "disorderly" residents prompt newer homeowners to call and/or say that they would call the police. Likewise, high-SES renters who are not from the Bay Area call the police frequently to report numerous types of incidents, often fueled by *fear* and *culture shock*. Although newer residents have inexperience living in Oakland, some also exhibit an awareness of the stark wealth inequalities in their neighborhoods; thus, this category of residents generally perceive that they are "targets" for property crime, feel the most insecure in their neighborhoods, and call the police more often in order to defend their safety. These findings speak to how low social cohesion, suspicion, and fear among residents living in gentrifying neighborhoods may impact police calls—all do, exclusively among newer high-SES residents (Martin 2008; Rai 2011; Chaskin and Joseph 2013; Hyra 2017).

Residents who do *not* call the police are explained by their length of residency (either in Oakland or the larger Bay Area). Self-identified longtime Bay Area residents (from Nextdoor and interviews) have a clear understanding of Oakland's history, and are more likely to tolerate numerous types of activities within their neighborhoods. Accordingly, longtime residents express that calling the police for nuisance infractions is *illegitimate*—with most longtime residents asserting that it is newer *misinformed* residents who are calling the police to report noncriminal activities. Moreover, renters are the least likely to call the police compared to homeowners. Part of this is explained by renters' minimal concern about the protection of property, large mistrust in police authorities, and a high tolerance for urban city living. It is possible these views may also be influenced by age, since most renters in this study are younger. However, as previously mentioned, renters who are young in age share similar views about policing and police calls to that of longtime homeowners who are older—although longtime homeowners largely support reporting property crimes online.

Additionally, police cynicism—driven by previous negative interactions with the police and/or negative feelings about police violence within the United States—influences whether or not longtime homeowning residents and renters decide to call the police. Informed by findings from Nextdoor posts, APTP meetings, and interviews, Oakland residents who question the OPD's *legitimacy* state that they have not and/or would not call the police

in most cases (except regarding violent crime). Moreover, residents in these categories do not trust the police to safely handle vulnerable populations—a finding that aligns with Armaline, Sanchez, and Correia's (2014) study on Oakland residents' perceptions of the OPD's validity. Rather than call the police directly, longtime homeowners tend to report property crime or illegal dumping online, as it allows for them to manage incidents without direct police interaction. Conversely, renters do not call the police or file online reports, as they typically do not have time to make reports, do not view property crime or dumping as pressing issues, and have the most cynicism about interacting with police authorities.

Lastly, it was initially expected that white residents would be more likely to call the police than Black residents. Surprisingly, interviews with Oakland residents reveal that both are equally likely, as well as not likely, to call the police. Although there are no clear-cut racial patterns that explain *who* is calling the police, findings across Nextdoor, participant observation, and interviews highlight how race impacts residents' concerns. For instance, observations at NCPC meetings show that white and Black residents have conflicting reasons for *why* they rely on police authorities to address neighborhood anxieties. White NCPC members are far more likely to complain about nuisance infractions and take more aggressive police-centered approaches to tackle these problems. Black NCPC members, on the other hand, have more fear about violent crime and want to use community-centered approaches to solving neighborhood issues. Furthermore, findings from Nextdoor and interviews reveal how police calls directed at "disorderly" or "suspicious" activities may be racially biased, which relates to larger patterns of racial stereotyping and racial profiling of Black people (and people of color) within the United States (Chapple et al. 2017; Weissinger, Mack, and Watson 2017; Tucker 2018). Coded language used in Nextdoor posts, and descriptions made by respondents during interviews, suggest that the types of individuals who may be more likely to be targeted by police calls are Black residents living in Oakland. Finally, findings from interviews show that longtime Black residents feel as if they are being directly labeled as "suspects" by gentrifying residents just for being Black in their neighborhood. More, Black respondents report that they feel exiled and unsafe within their neighborhoods, and do not want to get to know their newer neighbors. This finding aligns with the alienation, withdrawal, *political displacement*, and *cultural displacement* that longtime Black residents often endure as their neighborhoods gentrify (Hyra 2017).

CONCLUSION

This research underlines some of the mechanisms that produce resident police calls, as well as feelings of anxiety, in gentrifying Oakland neighborhoods. Nevertheless, future research should address more thoroughly how race may influence these dynamics. It is highly likely that race plays a big role in who is calling the police, as well as which populations are targeted more frequently by police calls. However, respondents within this study did not divulge about race-related police calls, likely due to desirability bias. Also, dynamics such as political affiliation and/or political activism—which were not considered for this study—should be included in future studies, as these may impact individuals' relationship to the police and police calls. The sample size and scope of respondents that were recruited for interviews is also quite narrow (n=14). Future research would be better informed by recruiting a larger, more diverse set of residents in order to attain saturation (i.e. non-white, non-Black residents, more renters, younger low-SES homeowners, residents between the ages of 18 and 25-years-old, etc.).

Additionally, the time, resources, and accessibility limitations of this research only allowed for a snapshot of a few select neighborhoods within North, West, and Downtown Oakland. Future research should address how resident police calls are operating within other areas of Oakland—particularly East Oakland, which is currently at risk of gentrification (Urban Displacement Project 2018). Examining at-risk neighborhoods and any demographic changes that may be occurring within these neighborhoods will help to further explain how the dynamics of gentrification may be impacting resident police calls. It might also be advantageous to examine resident police calls within non-gentrifying Oakland neighborhoods to see if there are similar patterns compared to gentrifying neighborhoods. Future research would also be better informed with access to neighborhoods on Nextdoor that are not limited to North, West, and Downtown Oakland. This would provide a more extensive analysis of how residents in other Oakland neighborhoods perceive police calls, crime, and the quality of life. Lastly, a long-term approach to participant observation at NCPC and APTP meetings—as well as a more comprehensive recording of members' demographic information and/or recruitment of members for interviews—would provide a deeper understanding of how each group interprets the OPD and calling the police for different types of incidents.

Despite the limitations of this research, addressing resident police calls in gentrifying Oakland neighborhoods is an important phenomenon to examine. This research assisted with building an understanding of how

gentrification is impacting residents' perceptions of culture, community, and police calls within Oakland. Increasingly, high-SES people are moving into low income, predominantly Black Oakland neighborhoods, and have very little experience living within the Bay Area. Further, many of these affluent *gentrifiers* are buying houses and asserting their rights to Oakland neighborhoods by calling the police. These findings align with previous studies, which explain not only how gentrifiers have conflicting norms to that of longtime, low-SES, minority residents, but how gentrifiers also have the resources and power to enforce the changes they want to see (Betancur 2002; Chesluk 2004; Freeman 2006; Martin 2008; Rai 2011; Chaskin and Joseph 2012; Sullivan and Bachmeier 2012; Hyra 2017). As shown in the data, it is evident that newer, high-SES homeowning residents not only want to rid their neighborhoods of disorder and *illegitimate* characters, but they also expect the police to show up and intensify surveillance within their neighborhoods. This indicates how policing within gentrifying cities may very well be initiated and heavily driven from the neighborhood level, with residents pressuring the police and city agencies to "clean up" their neighborhoods. Moreover, aligning with previous studies, the call for increased policing directly targets and further criminalizes Oakland populations who are in the most precarious positions: the poor, the homeless, racial minorities, and anyone deemed as "disorderly" or not having rights to neighborhood *legitimacy* (Parenti 2000; Bass 2001; Hinton 2016).

Due to the tangible threat of over-policing and criminalization of Oakland neighborhoods, longtime residents in this study feel as if their neighborhoods are under attack by newer residents. Many interviewees express beliefs that newcomers aren't responding appropriately to their perceived neighborhood concerns, are frequently calling the police for small nuisance complaints, and as a result, are attracting a larger police presence within Oakland's gentrifying neighborhoods. Most crucially, longtime residents express fear about how newcomers' responses are intensifying gentrification, displacement, over-policing, and the potential risk of police brutality against Black and Brown people within Oakland. In a city already known for police corruption and police violence, the use of police calls for minor infractions makes longtime Oakland respondents (particularly Black respondents) feel harassed and misunderstood. This is not a surprising finding, as Armeline, Sanchez, and Correia's (2014) study found that Oakland residents see the OPD as illegitimate authorities and a threat to both public and personal safety. This study reveals that newer affluent residents are adding to this threat through their use of police calls.

Despite the obvious conflicting views on neighborhood disorder, policing, and police calls, longtime residents in this study are not claiming that they want newer residents to leave. Rather, there is an interest among many interviewees who are longtime residents to build an inclusive and open community. Many respondents express that if newcomers knew proper ways to protect their property, and had an understanding of Oakland's history and deeply rooted culture, then many issues could be mitigated without the use of police intervention. However, as is clear from findings, there are very few spaces that bring these groups (i.e. longtime residents, newer residents, renters, homeowners, homeless people, activists, etc.) together that do not involve police officers or fuel heated debates based on personal beliefs and fears. This raises the issue of how residents of gentrifying Oakland neighborhoods perceive their community and relationships with the police. What is needed are ways to educate and inform residents about alternative approaches that address community concerns. The presence of diverse perspectives in community spaces is lacking among Oakland's established organizations (e.g. NCPC and APTP). Further, there is an obvious division among residents who view the police as the main solution to neighborhood issues versus those who want the police out of their neighborhoods. Thus, educating Oakland's residents may need to be directed via mutual aid platforms, such as providing accessible meetings that do not involve police and include a larger variation of voices across age, racial, gender, and SES demographics.

Along with fostering more productive and inclusive conversations that educate Oakland's residents, issues around gentrification and policing need to be addressed at the policy level. For the safety of vulnerable populations, legislation should be put in place that will avert people from calling the police for small offenses. Although we have yet to see concrete ratified laws, ideas about how to alleviate this topic are currently being deliberated. One proposal is to stop letting the police be "weaponized" by racially prejudiced police callers, beginning with how dispatchers address police calls (Takei 2018). Rather than having police respond to every reported incident, dispatchers should collect adequate evidence that a police call legitimizes a police response—and when a response is necessary, police officers should be trained to de-escalate and "resist enforcing other people's biases" (Takei 2018). Further, policies attempting to tackle this topic are already being proposed in some American cities. For example, former New York Senator Jesse Hamilton introduced a "911 Anti-Discrimination Bill" that would consider falsified racially motivated police reports a hate crime under New York State Law (Hamilton 2018). Similarly, Grand Rapids, Michigan is

proposing a "Human Rights" ordinance that would make it a "criminal misdemeanor" to racially profile people of color for participating in their lives" (City of Grand Rapids 2019; Thebault and Brice-Saddler 2019).

Reactions such as these come in the wake of campaigns such as Living While Black and Black Lives Matter. These movements are bringing attention to the disproportionate number of incidents where Black people are profiled as "suspects," are targeted by false police reports, and are victims of police violence—which puts them at risk of arrest, employment loss, damage to reputation, or death (Lockhart 2018; Lopez 2018). Although racial profiling is not a new trend, these movements highlight historical patterns around racialized police brutality, racially-biased police calls, and the frequency of Black people who are shot and killed by the police (Lopez 2018). For example, in 2018 in Sacramento, California, a police call reported a suspect who was breaking windows in a local neighborhood. This report ended in the death of a 22-year-old unarmed Black man, Stephon Clark, who was shot in the back seven times by police officers in his grandmother's backyard (Hauser 2018). This is just one of the countless cases in the United States where unarmed Black people are reported as "suspects" and die at the hands of the police.

Additionally, cases surrounding the profiling and criminalization of homeless individuals, which often go unreported, are now coming to light. One such incident happened in 2016 in San Francisco—Luis Góngora, a homeless Latino immigrant, was reported to the police by a homeless outreach team who suspected that he had a knife. Just seconds after the police arrived, they shot and killed Góngora (Williams and Ho 2016; Wong 2016). As a result of these types of incidents—which often begin with a police call—activists and policymakers are trying to implement larger changes within police training and protocol. California's ACLU is currently working with organizations across the state, such as APTP, to pass legislation that will limit police officers' use of deadly force when other de-escalation options are available—and will hold officers accountable if they do not follow legal procedures (Buchen 2019). These types of policies are necessary first steps towards opening up a widespread dialogue about racialized policing and police violence within the United States, how gentrification worsens these dynamics, and how we can work to secure the safety of those who are persistently the direct targets of police calls and police violence.

Unfortunately, spaces that provide productive conversations among Oakland's diverse residents are missing, and within Oakland's gentrifying neighborhoods, miscommunication and disagreement are rampant. Fear of crime, fear of disorder, fear of the police, fear about the protection of property,

fear about the protection of culture, and intolerance are keeping residents from addressing very palpable issues within their communities. Although there are no clear-cut solutions, this emphasizes the importance for residents of Oakland to collectively work towards solutions, rather than immediately turning to police authorities to quell their fears. Most crucially, these should be discussions and solutions that include the voices of marginalized groups within Oakland. Marginalized communities of Oakland should be empowered, heard, respected, and *legitimized*—regardless of whether or not they own property, have an economic advantage, have a racial or cultural advantage, or have a roof over their head.

NOTES

[1]The Tri-Valley is east of San Francisco and refers to the areas in-between the Armador, Livermore, and San Ramon Valleys. The cities within the Tri-Valley area include Dublin, Livermore, Pleasanton, San Ramon, Danville, Alamo, Blackhawk, and Diablo.

[2]During WWII, tens of thousands of Black people moved to Oakland to join the promising wartime manufacturing labor force (McClintock 2008; Walker 2018). Once a booming industrial city, Oakland eventually saw its prosperity decline as a result of the post-war deindustrialization (Johnson 1993; McClintock 2008; Walker 2018). Add to that the "white flight" (the mass exodus of white residents from inner cities) of both young white workers and massive corporations, Oakland became a city in distress (McClintock 2008; Walker 2018). Further, the first population affected during deindustrialization were Black Oakland residents—they were the first to be laid off and suffered the highest unemployment rates (Johnson 1993; McClintock 2008; Walker 2018).

[3]During the 1960s, the Civil Rights movement, "race riots," high levels of inner city crime and poverty, and the development of the Black Power movement, sparked federal level law-and-order campaigns (Parenti 2000; Rios 2011; Hinton 2016).

[4]The Black Panther Party (BPP)—an organization made up of Black Oakland youth—acted as a response to the oppressive policing of Black people within Oakland (Douzet 2012; Bloom and Martin 2013; Maharwal 2017; Walker 2018). Oakland's BPP fought for self-determinism within their neighborhoods, bringing attention to police brutality against Black bodies, as well as the American government's repression of Black inner-city communities (Douzet 2012; Bloom and Martin 2013; Walker 2018). The

BPP and their objectives were viewed as a national threat; thus, Oakland became a prime target for state and local police suppression (Rios 2011:32; Bloom and Martin 2013).

[5]The most significant changes in racial demographics is seen among whites and Black or African Americans. Total population among those who identify as American Indian and Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander, Hispanic or Latino, other race, or two or more races have remained relatively consistent (Bay Area Census).

[6]Despite the rampant displacement occurring within Oakland, marginalized residents, much like the BPP in the 1960s, continue to be at the forefront of fighting against police brutality, racism, poverty, and the neoliberal government's defunding and oppression of inner-city communities. Oakland residents are currently bringing attention to continued state sanctioned racialized police violence, which coincides with the Bay Area's political economy "defined by gentrification, a speculative real estate boom, a housing affordability crisis, and the consequent 'eviction epidemic' precipitated by the massive impacts of the region's tech industry" (Maharwal 2017:340; Walker 2018). Oakland residents are heavily involved in the recent Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement, which has become a national response to the fatal police shootings of two Black men, Michael Brown and Eric Garner (Marhawal 2017). However, Oakland is a specific case with regards to the fatal shooting of Oscar Grant, a young Black man who was shot by a BART police officer in 2009 (Maharwal 2017). Furthermore, BLM protesters in Oakland and across the Bay area are concurrently responding to a larger issue "about the tech-led regional transformation of cities across the region and the particular kind of security state being produced to protect this political economy" (Maharwal 2017:349).

[7]As listed by the Nextdoor website, correlating with UDP's census tract map: Longfellow, Dogtown, Pill Hill & Telegraph Ave., Bushrod, Santa Fe, Golden Gate District, Ralph Bunch, West Oakland, Acorn, Foster Hoover, Prescott, South Prescott, Uptown Oakland, Northgate-Waverly, Oak Center, and Old Oakland districts.

[8]The majority of posts from the "Crime and Safety" subsection were considered; however, I omitted posts that were not created by residents or were not relevant for my data collection. For example, local beat officers often post crime statistics and weather emergency information. Likewise, some users create posts with city resources or contact numbers that residents can call for different inquiries.

[9]Bradford, Akiba. 2019. Beat 2X 5X Neighborhood Crime Prevention Council Meeting.

[10]This is a tactic known as Nuisance Abatement, which uses "code violations," the threat of police intervention, and possible eviction as a way to force "problematic" residents to conform to the norms and expectations of "the neighborhood" (Reiss 1985).

[11]Higher ranking officials who oversee all of Oakland's NCPC meetings are calling for an expansion of "community-policing." A representative who attended two different NCPC meetings discussed some of the priorities for all NCPCs. The primary focus is to receive more funding for NCPCs, to hold a police summit where residents can be trained in "community-policing tactics," and to spread the word about NCPC meetings. The goal, according to the representative, is to strengthen community-police partnerships and utilize community policing as a form of problem-solving that takes pressure off of the OPD.

[12]To address the issue of police violence, APTP organizers are focusing on passing local legislation to stop OPD officers from using excessive force during routine stops. Additionally, APTP has created numerous sub-committees, one of which responds to the scene after incidents of police violence. This specific team works to interview witnesses, gather evidence, and offer legal services and resources for victims' families—all in an effort to combat the overabundance of falsified police reports. From meeting observations, the concerns and efforts of APTP is to fight police violence through local and state legislation, as well as through organized community efforts.

[13]Omission of "suspicious" individuals' race could be in part due to Nextdoor's community guidelines— prohibiting "discrimination and hate speech"—which might make users more cautious when reporting unsubstantiated incidents. According to Nextdoor's guidelines: "Do not make posts or comments that discriminate against, threaten, or insult groups, based on race, color, national origin, religion, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, political affiliation, age, veteran status or disability… Also, when describing people who are homeless or who have committed crimes, avoid inflammatory language (e.g. 'scum' or 'animals'). Keep in mind that everyone is someone's son or daughter or sister or brother." <https://help.nextdoor.com/s/article/behelpfulnothurtful?language=enUS#discrimination?language=en_U S>.

[14]Nextdoor users' names have been omitted from this study in order to protect their identity.

[15]Nextdoor Poster 1. 2018. "bicycle gang?" *Nextdoor*. <https://nextdoor.com/news_feed/?post=99637201&comment=225048724>.

[16]Nextdoor Commenter 1a. 2018. "bicycle gang?" *Nextdoor*. <https://nextdoor.com/news_feed/?post=99637201&comment=225048724>.

[17]Nextdoor Commenter 1b. 2018. "bicycle gang?" *Nextdoor*. <https://nextdoor.com/news_feed/?post=99637201&comment=225048724>.

[18]Nextdoor Commenter 1c. 2018. "bicycle gang?" *Nextdoor*. <https://nextdoor.com/news_feed/?post=99637201&comment=225048724>.

[19]Nextdoor Commenter 1d. 2018. "bicycle gang?" *Nextdoor*. <https://nextdoor.com/news_feed/?post=99637201&comment=225048724>.

[20]Nextdoor Commenter 1e. 2018. "bicycle gang?" *Nextdoor*. <https://nextdoor.com/news_feed/?post=99637201&comment=225048724>.

[21]Nextdoor Poster 2. 2019. "Could use some advice." *Nextdoor*. <https://nextdoor.com/news_feed/?post=100376634&comment=227228786>.

[22]Nextdoor Commenter 2a. 2019. "Could use some advice." *Nextdoor*. <https://nextdoor.com/news_feed/?post=100376634&comment=227228786>.

[23]Nextdoor Commenter 2b. "Could use some advice." *Nextdoor*. <https://nextdoor.com/news_feed/?post=100376634&comment=227228786>.

[24]Nextdoor Commenter 2c. 2019. "Could use some advice." *Nextdoor*. <https://nextdoor.com/news_feed/?post=100376634&comment=227228786>.

[25]Nextdoor Commenter 2d. 2019. "Could use some advice." *Nextdoor*. <https://nextdoor.com/news_feed/?post=100376634&comment=227228786>.

[26]Nextdoor Commenter 2e. 2019. "Could use some advice." *Nextdoor*. <https://nextdoor.com/news_feed/?post=100376634&comment=227228786>.

[27]Nextdoor Commenter 2f. 2019. "Could use some advice." *Nextdoor*. <https://nextdoor.com/news_feed/?post=100376634&comment=227228786>.

[28]Respondents' names were omitted from this analysis. Pseudonyms were created in place of their legal name, in addition to names of certain locations (i.e. original hometown and/or current neighborhood) in order to protect respondents' identity.

[29]Hypothetical questions were pulled from examples found within Nextdoor posts and comments, and touched on situations such as loitering and suspected crime outside of local liquor stores, and homeless individuals living next to private residences.

[30]Some respondents in this category live in condominium units, and reported calling the police on other residents in their building for making too much noise.

[31]This is a hypothetical question that was posed to all respondents that was inspired by my qualitative content analysis of Nextdoor posts. See qualitative content analysis of Nextdoor posts for further context.

[32]As of March 2019, the OPD is still under federal oversight and has ongoing investigations related to cases of police brutality, police shootings, and in-custody deaths (Cassidy 2019).

[33]Respondents in this category who I recruited from Nextdoor typically brought up their use of the online platform, as well as the types of posts they observe as being most common.

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Zoe C. Walker is a precandidate doctoral student at the University of Michigan-Ann Arbor. She graduated cum laude from the University of Notre Dame in 2019 with a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and English. Her piece for the Eleven journal earned awards for the best undergraduate thesis in both Political Science and Africana Studies at Notre Dame. She is a University of Michigan Rackham Merit Fellow and an American Political Science Association Minority Fellow. She has presented her work at several conferences including the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association and the National Conference of Black Political Scientists. Her research centers around minority and identity politics, political behavior and political psychology.

Raquel Xitlali Zitani-Rios is a re-entry transfer student who graduated summa cum laude from UC Berkeley with a degree in Sociology. Additionally, her achievements as an undergraduate awarded her Departmental Citation

as the top graduating Sociology Major for the Class of 2020. During her time at Berkeley she served as Senior Editor for Eleven: The Undergraduate Journal of Sociology, assisted fellow students as a tutor for Classical Social Theory, and worked as a reader for courses in Political Sociology, Sociology of Policing, and Sociology of Social Movements and Political Action. Additionally, she co-authored a paper with Professor and former Chair of the Sociology Department, Dr. Sandra S. Smith, assessing how social capital access and mobilization impacts individuals' experiences during the pretrial detention period. This research was presented at the Pacific Sociological Association (PSA), the Law and Society Association, and the American Sociological Association (ASA) annual conferences in 2019. Independently, she conducted two research projects—one for her senior honors thesis, and another as a fellow in the McNair Scholars Program. Her senior honors thesis was presented at PSA's conference in Oakland, California, and won acceptance into the ASA Honors Program where it was presented at ASA's conference in New York City. Currently, Raquel is continuing her work as a reader for several upper division sociology courses at UC Berkeley, and intends to pursue a PhD in Sociology to further examine her research interests. She hopes to explore how the oppressive forces of state violence and policing impact interpersonal conflict among communities in the United States. But above all, she hopes to be a source of support and guidance for traditionally underrepresented students in higher education.

GUIDE FOR FUTURE CONTRIBUTORS

General

Eleven: The Undergraduate Journal of Sociology accepts submissions from current undergraduate students and students who have graduated in the last 36 months, given that their papers were originally written as undergraduates. *Eleven* seeks sociological articles written for sociology courses as well as courses outside the discipline. Papers submitted by authors in different academic disciplines should foreground a rich sociological engagement to make their work appropriate for *Eleven*.

We welcome both electronic and paper submissions. We accept papers with a length of 10-65 pages, including references. An electronic submission must be in Microsoft Word 6.0/95 or later, and may be submitted as an e-mail attachment to submissions.eleven@gmail.com. Paper submissions should include: a completed cover sheet/submission form; a copy of the paper with no identifying information; an abstract or short summary of the paper (maximum of 250 words); and an academic biography (maximum of

250 words). Since manuscripts are reviewed anonymously, the author should be identified only on the submission sheet and not in the manuscript itself. Potential contributors should e-mail *Eleven* at eleven.ucb@gmail.com for a copy of the journal's submission form. For more information please visit our website at www.eleven.berkeley.edu.

Format

All manuscripts must be typed and double-spaced with 1-inch margins on all sides. The submission must include numbered pages. All text (including titles, headings, and footnotes) should be in Times New Roman, 12-point font.

In general, we recommend submissions not have too complex a hierarchy of sections and subsections. In the case of a heading, the title should be separated from the preceding paragraph by two (2) lines and one (1) line from the following paragraph. The heading should appear in 10-point boldface type, left justified. In the case of a sub-heading, the title should be separated from both preceding and proceeding paragraphs by a single (1) line. The sub-heading should appear in 12-point italicized type.

Citation and Reference Format

Submissions should follow the American Sociological Association (ASA) *Style Guide* (Third Edition). All citations in the text should be identified by the author's last name, year of publication, and pagination (if necessary). Identify later citations in the same way as the first. If there are more than three authors of a single work, use "et al." Citations should follow the following format: (Author Year:Pagenumber). If there are multiple citations, separate each citation with a semicolon (";") and a space: (Author Year:Pagenumber; Author Year:Pagenumber).

References should come at the end of the paper and should be prefaced with the heading "References" in 12-point boldface type, left justified. The reference entries themselves should be formatted according to the American Sociological Association (ASA) *Style Guide*.

"The cost of liberty is less than the price of repression."

- W.E.B. Du Bois, John Brown

"The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways;
the point, however, is to change it."

- Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach"