Eleven

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Created By Undergraduates at the
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"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it."
–Karl Marx, "XI" from "Theses on Feuerbach"

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EDITOR'S NOTE

Welcome to this special edition of *Eleven: The Undergraduate Journal of Sociology*. *Eleven* has always been a home for provocative ideas, innovative perspectives, and ambitious argument. We are proud to continue this tradition of thoughtful journalism through new means with a special release focusing specifically on the modern university.

Inspired by the course "Our University" taught by Professor Michael Burawoy and Kara Young, our journal wanted to reflect on the very universities that nurture our contributors' and readers' minds. The forces that shape the modern university are ubiquitous and dynamic, powerful yet quiet. They have resulted in such transformations as the privatization, corporatization, and financialization of these educational institutions. The societal influences at work can be approached, of course, through a variety of theoretical lenses. There is the Durkheimian perspective of equality of opportunity, the Foucaldian view of discipline, and the Fanonian approach of racial order. A Marxist perspective can offer insights into the capitalistic influence that has made the university adopt corporate practices, while a Weberian approach can point to the university's bureaucratization as part of its modernization.

In this volume, we bring to you the work of four current students and critics of our very own university, the University of California, Berkeley. These individuals, all students of Professor Burawoy's Fall 2016 class, explore the university's recent transformations from various theoretical perspectives. We begin the volume with John Towey's piece on executive compensation. His research on tuition, student debt, and faculty employment trends expertly brings Marxist class analysis into the university setting. Next, Thea Matthews examines campus sexual violence, resulting student activism, and the university's response. She utilizes the Weberian model of bureaucratization to explain these causes and effects at play in students' activist efforts. In our third paper, Natalie Ruiz too draws on Weber, this time to understand student parents' experiences navigating the financial aid system. Her look into the shortcomings of the bureaucratic financial aid system exposes multiple levels of dysfunction while simultaneously highlighting the benefits of such a system. Our final paper has Aaron Palmer tying Weber's theory of bureaucratization to the Campus Shared Services. His analysis of university efforts to improve efficiency illustrates the hidden costs of such measures, as well as the root issues causing them.

It is our hope that this special edition of *Eleven* not only unearths problems within the modern university system, but also inspires solutions. As changes occur in the world around us, we must meet them with a renewed mind, a critical brain, and an active spirit.

Nancy Liao,
Eleven Editor-in-Chief

PROFESSOR'S NOTE

I am delighted to see *Eleven* publishing several of the papers from the sociology seminar I taught with Kara Young in the Fall of 2016. The seminar was a continuation of the two-semester sequence in the history of sociological theory, required of all sociology majors at Berkeley. Some 30 addicts of social theory (ASTs) decided to take this third semester and the topic was "our university". Students chose an issue, connected to the Berkeley campus, and researched it through the lens of one of the theorists that we had studied the previous year: Marx, Gramsci, Fanon, Durkheim, Weber, Foucault, Beauvoir and Collins.

In the space of 15 weeks students came up with amazing papers, showing the relevance of social theory to major issues at the university. They pursued such topics as the student experience: undocumented students, food insecurity among student-parents, women in STEM fields, gendered interaction in co-op life, ideologies of student in different disciplines, experience of foreign Chinese students, LGBTQ students struggling for space on campus, the alienation of transfer students, exploitation of student-workers in the dining halls, and student-worker alliance against outsourcing. They studied the aspirations of graduate students in different departments, the exploitation of research assistants and the experience of lecturers. They discovered how sociology faculty responded to the "ranking of their department" and how recruitment of faculty did or did not take diversity into account. They studied institutions on campus such as the Disabled Student Program, the Title IX office, the changing conduct of campus police in quelling protest, and the Underground Scholars Initiative. They investigated the corporatization of the university as manifested in athletics, in the financing of new buildings and in Operation Excellence.

Out of the class emerged a sociological vision of "our university" - a dynamic arena of inequality and domination, of collaboration and struggle, of alienation and discovery - a tribute to the talents of Berkeley undergraduates and the power of sociological theory.

Michael Burawoy,
Professor of Sociology
University of California, Berkeley

Classes in Classes: Executive Compensation, Student Debt, and Faculty Composition in the Public University

John M. Towey
University of California, Berkeley

Abstract
In this paper, I argue that research into executive compensation in higher education has neglected to thoroughly examine the extent to which public university executives' salaries rise through mechanisms of exploitation in which university executives enrich themselves by increasing student tuition and prioritizing employment of adjunct and contingent faculty over tenured and tenure-track faculty. This paper presents exploratory research designed to ascertain whether there is sufficient evidence to reject this exploitation hypothesis. I develop a Marxist class analysis of the University of California, Berkeley using data from The Institute for College Access and Success, The Sacramento Bee's State Worker Salary Database, and the Institutional Data Archive on American Higher Education. I show that tuition increases, student debt increases, and non-tenured and non-tenure-track faculty employment increases occur temporally prior to or simultaneously with average executive compensation increases at the University of California, Berkeley. I conclude with a discussion of a preliminary research agenda and the possible significance my project may have for social theory and social policy.

Keywords
Marx, class conflict, exploitation, executive compensation

INTRODUCTION

In their report on executive salaries at state universities, Erwin and Wood (2014) not only demonstrate that there is a correlation between administrative compensation on the one hand and student debt and low-wage faculty labor on the other, but imply this relation is causal. However, though Erwin and Wood (2014) should be commended for bringing attention to the possibility of a relationship between executive compensation at public universities and faculty composition or student debt, their work lacks the theoretical foundation necessary for establishing this as a causal relationship.

Existing research in the area of executive compensation has established that both boards of directors and executives have influence over the compensation contract. Neoclassical economic theory implies that higher pay for executives should be associated with larger numbers of open executive positions and fewer candidates available to fill them (Rubinstein 1982). However, many empirical investigations have problematized this straightforward hypothesis, finding that firm size, as well as weaker boards of directors, and the existence of benchmarks, industry pay guidelines, or reference peer-groups that executives can cite in negotiations also correspond to higher executive compensation (Bebuchuk and Fried 2003, Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen 2008; Ezzamel and Watson 1998; Faulkender and Yang 2010; Gregoric, Polanec, and Slapnicar 2010; Hart and Moore 2006; Hyndman 2011; Porac, Wade, and Pollock 1999; Ruiz-Verdú 2008). Erwin and Wood (2014) acknowledge the importance of boards of trustees in presidents' salaries but make a valuable move toward examining the relations between groups within the structure of the university proper.

In addition to general examinations of executive compensation, scholarship investigating the relationship between executive performance and pay in educational institutions has found almost no link between executive compensation and the performance of these institutions (Bachan 2008; Bartlett and Sorokina 2005; Cheng 2014; Ehrenberg, Cheslock, and Epifantseva 2001; Monks and McGoldrick 2004; Pfeffer and Ross 1988; Tang, Tang, and Tang 2000; Tarbert, Tee, and Watson 2007). Researchers have concluded most executives, including public university presidents, are actually compensated as if they are bureaucrats, with salaries and raises dependent on firm size and attached to offices or positions while being independent of the performance of the individual who occupies the office (Cheng 2014; Jensen and Murphy 1990; Tosi et al 2000). However, Erwin and Wood's (2014) approach forces us to consider not just why executive compensation increases over time—i.e. because it is built into the

bureaucratic structures of the organization—but rather how this happens consistently.

Existing research into executive compensation, therefore, generally seems to treat it as either the outcome of a rational negotiation between executives and boards or as an institutional process completely removed from the power of executive influence. In both cases, this literature tends to ignore the possibility that the group relations within the public university could be the source of compensatory increases. Erwin and Wood's (2014) approach, on the other hand, shifts the focus from institutionalized mechanisms or relationships between groups inside and outside the organization to the relations between groups within the organization. This shift is valuable in that it allows a different sort of question to be asked. Rather than simply investigating why executive compensation increases, Erwin and Wood (2014) demonstrate that we should be asking: what is the source of the funds that university executives need to increase their compensation packages? However, with no theoretical basis for clearly formulating such a question, Erwin and Wood (2014) cannot ultimately state the causal claim they imply.

What is needed is a theoretical framework that treats university management as a class of individuals with the motive and the agency to affect the budgetary allotments for both their own compensation packages on one hand and student aid, faculty hiring, and tenure appointments on the other - in other words, a Marxist class analysis of the public university. Marx's focus on the effects of class conflict in society (e.g. Marx and Engels 1978:473-83) allows for an analogous examination of the social relationships in the public university as relations of class conflict. I intend to argue that a broad notion of class, as individuals within an organization who either control or are subjected to the "means of administration"—which is implied by Weberian theory (e.g. Giddens 1971; Weber 1946, 1978a, 1978b)—allows us to examine the extent to which the relationship between executives, students, and contingent and adjunct faculty are, thus, relations of exploitation in which the dominant class profits at the expense of subordinate classes. This is analogous to the approach Marx used in examining relationships in society at large (e.g. Marx 1978a:429-31). And I will make use of the University of California, Berkeley as a case study of large public universities with a large number of executives, students, and faculty[1].

Within U.C. Berkeley, then, executives represent a dominant class with

[1]One may ask why this study is not rooted in a Weberian organizational analysis. I contend that Marxist theory is the appropriate theoretical perspective herein because the central concept under investigation is not class or organizational hierarchy, but exploitation. And with exploitation as the focus it is better to start with Marxist theory and retrieve the broader notion of class from Weber.

power over the means of administration, while students and faculty represent subordinate classes subject to them. This Marxist perspective implies that executive compensation should increase not simply as a result of a bureaucratic mechanism, or executive-board negotiations, but at the expense of the economic situation of students and faculty. Therefore, executive compensation should increase as student tuition increases, insofar as student fees provide a source of revenue on which executives can draw to increase their salaries. Furthermore, executive compensation should increase the more the university employs contingent and adjunct faculty over time, given the lower salaries and benefits paid to these precariously employed instructors relative to tenured and tenure-track faculty. In what follows, I first briefly describe my data sources and variables. I then present Marxist theoretical perspectives on classes and exploitation in the public university. After, I detail the results of my exploratory data analysis, showing that executive compensation at U.C. Berkeley increases over time, along with student tuition fees and student debt, even as student aid remains relatively stagnant. I then show how the number of unclassified faculty at U.C. Berkeley increases over time, while the number of tenure and tenure-track faculty remains relatively stagnant. I argue that these findings are consistent with Erwin and Wood's (2014) results, and that therefore the exploitation hypothesis cannot be rejected. However, despite this, I ultimately conclude that I have insufficient evidence to reveal a causal relationship among these variables. Finally, I discuss the possible implications of my findings, as well as the limitations of my data and areas for future research.

DATA SOURCES AND VARIABLES

Building on Erwin and Wood's (2014) work, I obtained data from The Institute for College Access and Success (College-Insight 2016) on student tuition and fees and student debt. These data include both student

[1]For Marxist perspectives on organizations see Braverman (1974) and Burawoy (1979, 1983). Though Burawoy focuses on the ideological frames of organizations, his research supports the treatment of an organization as more than merely an expression of society-level class conflict between Marx's bourgeoisie and proletariat—particularly to the extent that management in the context Burawoy explores strategically shape workers' compensation and employment conditions. Braverman's treatment of organizations is more conventionally Marxist, with management functioning as a suppressive and extractive body in the service of capital. However, Braverman still devotes significant time to the development, implementation, and effects of "scientific management," as well as the organization of the modern corporation. Moreover, Braverman points out that "operating control is vested increasingly in a specialized management staff for each enterprise. Since both capital and professional management—at its top levels—are drawn, by and large, from the same class, it may be said that the two sides of the capitalist, owner and manager, formerly united in one person, become aspects of the class" (1974:258).

tuition, institutional aid, and the average debt of graduates at U.C.Berkeley. I also located and extracted the salaries of senior managers at U.C. Berkeley from the State Worker Salary Database at The Sacramento Bee. I extracted data on the number of individuals employed and the average salary for each of the following positions: Chancellor, Provost, Vice Chancellors and Provosts, Assistant and Associate Vice Chancellors, Assistant Provosts, Directors and Associate Directors, Deans, and acting, associate, and assistant deans. This covers the entire "Senior Management Group" (SMG) plus senior academic administrators, but excludes university librarians, athletic managers, and coaches.

I extracted data on faculty employment from the Institutional Data Archive on American Higher Education (Brint 2013). These data include the total number of faculty, the number of tenured faculty, the number of tenure-track faculty, and the number of non-tenured, non-tenure-track faculty. Furthermore, I use exploratory data analysis to examine my hypotheses. I first calculated the average annual salary for the SMG over the first part of the 21st century. I then calculated the "Other Faculty" variable as discussed above. Finally, I produced graphical representations of the trends in these variables over the early 2000's to examine whether there is evidence of exploitation at U.C. Berkeley.

CLASSES AND EXPLOITATION IN PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES

Marxist political theory begins with the premise that states have a functional relationship to social classes; that is, that "the state is the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their common interests… [and] that the state mediates in the formation of all common institutions and that these institutions receive a political form" (Marx 1978d:187; see also Engels 1972 for a discussion of the functional relationship between states and classes). Moreover, Marx argues the organization of schools is determined by social conditions, and state educational systems support the dominant class (Marx 1978b:539-40; Marx and Engels 1978:487).

This is how Christopher Newfield (2008) approaches an examination of public universities. Newfield (2008) stresses the importance of the state's withdrawal of public support from universities and related increases in tuition through the 1980s and 90s. Newfield (2008) argues that in the 1980s the "shareholder's revolt" changed the administration of public universities even as it altered the administration of public corporations. Executives' shift to "knowledge management" techniques and the penetration of financial accounting into university administration made tuition increases unavoidable

(Newfield 2008). In this "market-smart" environment, Newfield (2008) maintains, education is seen as a product purchased with tuition money and private philanthropy is offered as a replacement for public funding.

However, though Newfield (2008) makes a powerful argument, he neglects to point out that these tuition increases may become "unavoidable" specifically because of the dominant economic position of the group in charge of setting tuition relative to those who must pay it, and not because capitalists outside the university control this group. If it is true that dominant classes in society "possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think… and determine the extent and compass of an epoch" (Marx 1978d:173), then university executives, a dominant class relative to students and faculty in the structure of the organization, must also have the agency to determine the direction of the university. That is, executive control over budgetary allocations creates the possibility for affecting the financial arrangement of the university relative to students and faculty regardless of the fact that all of these groups have equivalent structural positions in society at large vis-à-vis traditional Marxist theory. Newfield only tangentially acknowledges the role of university executives in implementing and utilizing "responsibility-center management", the delegation of control over the allocation of revenue and payment of expenses from agents of the state to university managers themselves (2008:165). Newfield thus presents the condition under which public university presidents positioned themselves to substantially influence the distribution of salaries, fees, aid, and employment within their universities, even as he summarily dismisses this as less important than changes to affirmative action admissions rules and need-based financial aid allotments at the level of the state.

If Newfield (2008) lacks a perspective on class conflict within the university, Erwin and Wood (2014), for the most part, lack any theoretical explanation for their observed patterns at all. This hampers their methodological approach in addition to limiting their ability to draw causal conclusions.[2] Like many modern social scientists, Erwin and Wood (2014) focus on rates of change in their variables of interest. They show how executive compensation increases over time from its starting value, but rather than doing the same for student debt and aid, they instead show only the acceleration of the changes in these variables. This is problematic insofar as it does not compare directly to the primary variable they hope to explain, i.e. executive compensation, and because it only captures differences in the

[2]To recapitulate, Erwin and Wood (2014) do not explicitly claim the relationships they observe are causal, but rather imply this.

rates of change without referencing differences in the values per se—which may inhibit the ability to draw any substantive conclusions. Furthermore, the choice of student debt and aid are insufficient without also incorporating student fees into the analysis—if debt is increasing and aid is not, that does not necessarily imply that fees are increasing or budgetary restraints to increasing executive salaries have been relaxed. Instead housing prices could be increasing, for example, or other costs of living. Erwin and Wood (2014) additionally compare total permanent faculty to total adjunct and contingent faculty at the top 25 public research universities by executive compensation. This is an odd choice, given that the average would be a more informative measure of faculty employment relationships at these 25 schools.

Marxist theory provides the analytic leverage necessary to conduct the examination that Erwin and Wood (2014) attempt, and Newfield (2008) informs the details of educational systems that Marx and Engels lack. That is, theory reveals what the mechanism at work in the causal relationship Erwin and Wood (2014) attempt to explore could be, using Newfield's (2008) conception of financial accounting in the marketized university as a weapon of class conflict. Executives enrich themselves by increasing student tuition over time, while not increasing student aid from the institution. At the same time, executives limit tenure and tenure-track faculty positions while expanding contingent and adjunct positions over time. These actions by those with the capacity to act ease constraints on budgets, releasing funds that executives can then use to increase their salaries.

EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AT UC BERKELEY

The first premise that must be established is that executive compensation at U.C. Berkeley increases over time. Figure 1 displays the average annual salary of senior managers—as defined in section III—from 2007 to 2015, which is every year for which data was available. Average executive salary was approximately $160,000 in 2007, and increased to approximately $275,000 in 2015. This is an approximately 72% increase over eight years. Furthermore, the rate of increase in managers' salaries increased following the 2008 financial crisis, indicated by the steepening of the slope of the line. These findings are consistent in pattern, though not in scope, with Erwin and Wood's (2014) findings that executive compensation at public research universities nationwide increased between 2005 and 2012, and increased more rapidly following the 2008 financial crisis.

Furthermore, this is consistent with the Marxist hypothesis that executive salaries increase over time, though this is not, in itself, sufficient

to draw any conclusions. This does, however, establish the preliminary necessary condition of the argument. That is, if we observed that executive compensation at U.C. Berkeley did not increase over time, then we would be forced to reevaluate our hypothesis at this point.

STUDENT FEES, AID, AND DEBT AT UC BERKELEY

With the preliminary necessary condition satisfied, it is now possible to proceed to the comparative portion of this argument, in which the relationship is established between executive compensation on the one hand and student fees, aid, and debt on the other. Figure 2 indicates that student fees were nearly zero in 2001, increasing to nearly $7,500 by 2008. Following the financial crisis, fees spiked to some $13,000 in 2012, where they remained through at least 2014. Institutional aid in 2004, the earliest available year, was approximately $2,000, remaining relatively flat until 2008 when it reached about $2,500. Institutional aid increased to about



Figure 1. Average annual salary of senior managers at U.C. Berkeley, 2007-2015.
Source: The Sacramento Bee State Worker Salary Database

$4,000 by 2011, $5,000 in 2012, and then declined to approximately $4,500 by 2014. At the same time, the average debt of graduates increased between 2004 to 2014. From 2004 to 2005, debt remained at approximately $13,000, increasing to almost $15,000 in 2006, where it remained for the most part until 2009. Debt then increased steadily to approximately $18,000 in 2012,

declining thereafter to about $17,500 from 2013 to 2014. Comparing these results to executive compensation, from 2007 to 2014 the average manager's salary increased about 72%, while student fees more than doubled over the same time period—from approximately $6,000 to approximately $13,000, or more than 116%. During this same period, institutional aid increased from about $2,500 to approximately $4,500, or about 80%, while the average debt of graduates increased more than 20%.



Figure 2. Annual student fees, per capita institutional aid, and average debt of graduates at U.C. Berkeley, 2001-2014 (2004-2014 for aid and debt).
Source: Institute for College Access and Success

These findings are consistent with the Marxist hypothesis that over time executives increase their salaries by increasing student fees more than institutional aid. Moreover, the inclusion of student fees makes this case more forcefully than Erwin and Wood (2014), to the extent that my analysis reveals that the increase in executive compensation is concomitant with both a greater increase in student fees than institutional aid, and an increase in student debt. The implication is that a portion of the increase in executive compensation may be accounted for by increasing student fees more than student aid over time, which in turn is associated with increasing student debt. This adds to Erwin and Wood's (2014) analysis, therefore, by not only relating student debt to executive compensation, but also by providing empirical evidence of the source of increasing debt that Erwin and Wood implicate.

FACULTY COMPOSITION AT UC BERKELEY

Figure 3 shows that from 1990 to 2010, the number of tenured faculty remains nearly unchanged at approximately 1,100 employees. Likewise, tenure-track faculty remained mostly stable at approximately 250 employees. Non-tenured-non-tenure-track faculty increased slightly from 1990 to 2010, from about 200 to approximately 275 employees. Figure 3 also establishes that from 1990 to 2000 the total number of faculty was equal to the sum of the categories of tenured, tenure-track, and non-tenured-non-tenure-track faculty. Beginning in 2000, though, the total number of faculty increases without a like increase in the sum of the faculty in these three categories, which reveals an apparent difference between total faculty and classified faculty. It is not clear why this occurred; it could simply be a reclassification of existing employees' job titles from non-faculty to faculty, or it could be a result of the university hiring more adjunct faculty. Alternatively, it could be a combination of both. I derived a variable I call "Other Faculty," representing these unclassified faculty. Figure 3 indicates that unclassified faculty increases from zero in 2000 to about 750 from 2005 to 2010.



Figure 3. Non-tenured-non-tenure-track faculty, tenure-track faculty, tenured faculty, total faculty, and other faculty at U.C. Berkeley, 1990-2010.
Source: Institutional Data Archive on American Higher Education

These data exhibit a trend in which the number of the most precariously employed faculty increases prior to the indicated increases in executive compensation from 2007 to 2015. The increase in unclassified faculty is also concomitant with the increase in student fees and debt. These findings are consistent with the Marxist hypothesis, that executives increase their salaries through holding steady the number of tenure and tenure-track faculty positions and expanding the number of contingent faculty, assuming they are represented by the "non-tenured-non-tenure-track" and "Other" attributes. These results, however, are not entirely consistent with Erwin and Wood's (2014) finding that total adjunct and contingent faculty increase at a faster rate than total permanent faculty at the top 25 public research universities. In fact, their data show the average permanent faculty employment for these top 25 universities was approximately 1,400 from 2005 to 2011, while contingent and adjunct faculty range from about 1,200 in 2005 to approximately 1,500 in 2011. These aggregate data reveal a shift in the majority employment status from full-time to part-time. On the other hand, my data indicate that while adjunct and contingent faculty did increase it does not appear that they become the majority of employed faculty. This might suggest that the top 25 universities on which Erwin and Wood (2014) focus may be unique. On the other hand, my findings could imply that what Erwin and Wood (2014) see happening in these top 25 universities is a precursor to what could eventually happen at places like U.C. Berkeley. At the least, we should take their findings as a warning of a possible future for faculty employment at public universities.

In sum, my data show that executive compensation at U.C. Berkeley increased through the early part of the 21st century, that this increase occurred just as Berkeley students' fees increased more than student aid increased, producing the conditions under which expanding student debt also occurred. Similarly, over this same time period the number of precariously employed faculty increased while the number of faculty with more stable employment relationships with U.C. Berkeley remained essentially unchanged. These findings are, furthermore, consistent with the exploitation hypothesis outlined above. However, there are limitations to this study that prevent concluding that university executives are in fact exploiting students and faculty to enrich themselves. I conclude with a discussion of these limitations and recommendations for future research, as well as the potential theoretical and policy implications of such research.

CONCLUSION

I have argued that existing research into executive compensation in the public university has not sufficiently explored the class-based determinants of executive salaries. I argued that most accounts of salaries of senior managers give too much weight to the force of negotiations between managers and boards, while others remove almost all agency from managers and ascribe it to bureaucracy. I claimed that we can best understand increasing executive compensation by drawing on Marxist theories of exploitation, and Newfield's (2008) contention that accounting practices in public universities benefit executives at the expense of students. I took the University of California, Berkeley as a case of public universities and analyzed time-series data on executive salaries, student fees, aid, and debt, and faculty employment numbers. I found evidence consistent with, but which by no means proves, the Marxist hypothesis of exploitation.

This analysis was limited, first, by taking Erwin and Wood (2014) as a starting point. Because my intention was to explore evidence of a possible explanation for the trends they observed, i.e. exploitation of students and faculty by senior managers, I focused on data that were similar enough to facilitate comparison. However, as Newfield (2008) points out, consistent with Marx and Marxist theory (Engels 1972; Marx 1978b:539-40; Marx 1978d:172-73; Marx and Engels 1978:487), the social relations within the public university are themselves dependent on, or at least heavily influenced by, the state. In particular, public universities are dependent in large part on both state funding and state approval of their budgets. Future research must account for the actions of the state in the construction of the university budget. Without access to the budget, the source of the funds used to raise the salaries of senior managers cannot be determined with any level of certainty, which would be necessary for drawing the conclusion that exploitation is the cause of the increasing salaries.

Additionally, there are other groups in the university that may represent an oppressed class -- specifically, non-faculty employees. UC Berkeley staff and other workers report suffering extremely poor working conditions, including low pay, few benefits, and precarious employment (Purser, Schalet, and Sharone 2004). Some of the increase in managers' salaries over time could be a result of exploiting workers, in addition to or rather than students and faculty. Future research should incorporate non-faculty employment into analyses of executive compensation.

Finally, my analysis is limited without controls for changes in the consumer price index (i.e. inflation adjustment). Erwin and Wood (2014)

report their findings adjusted to 2012 dollars. Future research into the relationship between executive compensation, student fees, aid, and debt, and faculty composition must adjust dollar amounts for inflation. Ultimately, this project is incomplete, but presents evidence of the possibility that executive compensation at U.C. Berkeley increases over time as a result of increasing student fees, decreasing student aid, increasing student debt, and increasing use of contingent and adjunct faculty. My main contribution is in providing theoretical grounding for and incorporating student fees into the analysis begun by Erwin and Wood (2014). However, more research is needed to determine whether the observed relationship is indeed causal.

Assuming future research is successful in demonstrating a causal relationship between the aforementioned variables, however, it seems likely that this has broader implications for social theory. First, by showing that relationships between groups within universities can be understood as relations of exploitation, this research could build on and support Marxist studies of organizations (e.g. Burawoy 1983). Furthermore, it may underscore the importance of drawing on another of Marx's concepts: alienation. Though exploitation and alienation are two distinct processes, if it is useful to explore organizations as sites of class conflict per se, rather than an expression of the struggle Marx sees in broader society, then it also may be useful to examine the extent to which students and faculty — but in particular adjunct and contingent faculty — are alienated from the product of their intellectual labor, from each other, from their potential, or from the natural world (for Marx's account of alienation see: Marx 1978c).

The policy implications of this research could be significant as well. If the causal relation can be established, and assuming there was sufficient moral impetus to end exploitative relationships, then several possible policy solutions exist. On the one hand, the source of the increases to public university executive compensation could be restricted to sources other than tuition and fees or faculty compensation. The managerial independence of university executives (Newfield 2008) could be restricted through greater oversight at the level of the state, which would also allow for the enforcement of additional regulation that may be required to prevent executives from redirecting subsidies away from students and faculty. A second possibility would be to remove compensation increases from public university executive compensation contracts or from the normative understandings of how boards of trustees think these executives should be paid. Finally, as distasteful as it may seem to make it easier for executives to acquire raises, more funding from the state over time would preclude the necessity of executives resorting to raising student fees and shifting faculty

composition. Some combination of these three approaches would likely be most effective at eliminating exploitation in public universities, should its presence be conclusively demonstrated, but these broad policy prescriptions should be further detailed and evaluated in future research.

APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS

My methodological approach of exploratory data analysis was appropriate for his study insofar as it allowed me to evaluate whether evidence could be obtained in support of Erwin and Wood's (2014) implication of a causal relationship between the variables of interest. Given more time, I would like to have incorporated more schools into the analysis. A greater length of time over which I could calculate average salaries of senior managers would also have been helpful.

The data on employment numbers proved to be the most challenging to collect. Employment data that may have been available at one time from U.C. Berkeley proved difficult to locate. It is not clear if these formerly available sources of data are still on the web somewhere, in some form, or if they have been suppressed. More research may uncover their location, or establish that university administrators have indeed ceased making the data publicly available. The Institutional Data Archive on American Higher Education that I used is not an ideal data source for this type of exploratory analysis. It does not break down faculty by rank and does not include full-time-equivalencies for each faculty rank. Its great strength is in the fact that it brings together a huge amount of data on every higher education institution in the United States, allowing for comparisons across universities. My future work on this project will focus more on these large-scale datasets and use methods comparing, for example, public and private universities across the United States.

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Cal Survivors Speak Out!: Examining the Emergence of Student Activism Addressing Sexual Violence at UC Berkeley in Response to the Weberian Model of Bureaucratization

Thea Matthews
University of California, Berkeley

Abstract
According to Weber, bureaucracy is the most efficient system of rationalization in that institutions are held by fixed duties, qualifications, rules from a top-down hierarchical power structure of offices by official rules in a series of regulated documented procedures. In this paper, I will examine how the Weberian model of bureaucratization at UC Berkeley has spawned student activism addressing campus sexual violence; and in what ways the bureaucracy responds. Through in-depth interviews and secondary resources, data revealed that bureaucracy's red tape, time length to address reported cases, an austere impartial nature, and dishonorable acts violating federal bureaucratic interventions impels student-survivors to politically organize, publicly disclose their story to media outlets, hold political, survivor-solidarity demonstrations; and utilize the Dear Colleague Letter to become Title IX complainants. In response, bureaucracy responds with concessions and more bureaucracy. Years between waves of student activism potentially result in a combination of concession pacifiers and activists graduating.

Keywords
Weber, bureaucracy, sexual violence, student activism

INTRODUCTION

We undeniably live in a rape culture where we are subjected to not only various forms of sexual violence in our communities and within multiple institutions, but we are also subjected to dehumanization by systematic bureaucratic measures used to address our disclosures and theoretically provide formal justice for all people. UC Berkeley is no exception to this global phenomenon. In addressing campus sexual violence[1], UC Berkeley has a Title IX office, the Office for the Prevention of Harassment & Discrimination (OPHD), in which all reports, including student-on-student and faculty/staff-on-student violations, are channeled through before any further action can take place. The length of time investigations OPHD has held when cases are processed, and the dearth of Kadi-justice -- ethical justice in which everyone is equal before the law (Weber 1958) --continues to propel students to take further legal and non-legal action to combat sexual violence on campus (Abbott, Wen, and Yoon-Hendricks 2017).

Currently, students learn at an institution where professors, such as Sujit Choudhry, Geoff Marcy, Blake Wentworth, and most recently, Nezar AlSayyad, found guilty of sexual violence, still hold their positions and pensions, or they resign rather than having their position terminated. Students guilty of sexual assault and/or harassment are able to graduate on time with accolades. The offender is not equal to the victim. Student-survivors as the mass democracy have continuously enforced their weight on the bureaucratic process for addressing the pervasiveness of sexual violence at UC Berkeley. Hence, I hope to answer in this paper how has the Weberian model of bureaucratization at UC Berkeley continued to spawn student activism that redefines justice while addressing campus sexual violence; and in what ways does the bureaucracy respond.

Weber considered bureaucracy the most efficient and disciplined organization whose crucial elements not only develop from passive democracy, but counteract its principles in order to maintain its permanence. Institutions are bureaucratized through fixed duties, qualifications, and rules from a top-down hierarchical structure of offices bound together by official rules for only qualified personnel who implement their duties in a series of regulated, documented procedures (Weber 1958). Consequently, bureaucracies hold a documental, procedural rigidity producing delayed-actions or avoidance of constituents' complaints. Weber knew these attributes of bureaucracy when he stated:

[1]For the purpose of this paper, campus sexual violence will be used to encompass all variations of sexual harassment *and* assault.

> When fully developed, …the more bureaucracy is "dehumanized," the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational and emotional elements which escape calculation. This is the specific nature of bureaucracy and it is appraised as its special virtue (Weber 1958:196, 215-216).

Regulations lead bureaucrats to parochialism, routinization, and impersonalization of the client and of themselves. Because bureaucratic work depends upon rules, officials utilize rules to obstruct unwanted actions from clients and/or bureaucracies; and its impartial nature of formal equality before the law continues to objectify and dehumanize the victim, and in some cases, also the offender. Regardless, there is an imbalance to all constituents involved.

The methodology for this paper consists of a grounded theory approach, which is utilized in order to "uncover relevant conditions but also to determine how the actors under investigation actively respond to those conditions, and to the consequences of their actions," (Corbin and Strauss 1990:5). I interviewed two female-identified survivors/student-activists—Meghan Warner, sexually assaulted by a fraternity brother, and Aryle Butler, assaulted by a faculty member. I also interviewed Marandah Field-Elliot, who believes in consent and got involved with the "Title IX crew" during her freshman year. These women were between the ages of 18 and 20 when they first became activists on campus. I kept their use of language to convey their subtext and interpretation of the experience they reflected upon when I facilitated the interview. I supplemented the data with secondary resources, such as periodicals, reports, and emails, encapsulating other survivor-students' accounts and reports made alleging the university's mishandling of cases.

Data revealed that bureaucracy's adherence to rules and formalities (red tape), time length to address reported cases of campus sexual violence, austere impartial nature, and dishonesty around compliance to the federal bureaucracy used to confront campus sexual violence have impelled survivor-students to politically organize themselves and fight for reformation. Since the 1970's case against sociology professor Elbaki Hermassi for sexually harassing cisgendered female graduate students, survivor-student activists have conducted a series of public campaigns bringing to light the fact that UC Berkeley has violated federal bureaucratic interventions by not adhering to its regulations: first, with Title IV, part of the Education Amendment Act prohibiting all forms of sex discrimination in educational institutions (1972);

and recently, the Dear Colleague Letter (DCL) issued by the Department of Education's office of Civil Rights as part of a 2011 guidance holding universities accountable to promptly address campus sexual misconduct (Lochner 2015). Thus, students have incited federal investigations, organized protests, and advocated for consent education (Schubert and Vidu 2016).

RED TAPE & ELAPSED TIME LENGTH

Red tape or excessive regulation and abidance to bureaucratic formalities stalls time, impedes decision-making, but essentially calls victims to take action. At UC Berkeley, fixed jurisdictions within a hierarchical power structure of offices, and a centrality of documentation, have resulted in complaints not promptly addressed (Weber 1958:196-198). Student activism confronting campus sexual violence began in November 1978 when Women Organized Against Sexual Harassment (WOASH) acted on behalf of thirteen student complainants against sociology professor Elbaki Hermassi, (Schubert and Vidu 2016). Three months later, they filed suit with the HEW (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare). As time elapsed, the more disgruntled students became. In one of the WOASH WEEKLY leaflet series, the header reads: "312 days have passed since the filing of the HEW complaint on February 28, 1979. WE WANT ACTION NOW!" (Women Organized Against Sexual Harassment Weekly, Issue 2) Within the same year, materials for the first press conference divulging to the media the university's faults state: "Since July 1976, the administration has been talking about having a Title IX compliance officer, which has been required by law for these nearly 3 years. Yet there is still no compliance officer and no procedures for implementing Title IX of any kind at this time." The wait for implementing laws, formulating procedures, and handling cases of campus sexual violence has been considered unacceptable by most survivor-students then and now. 40 years later, in 2016 when student advocate and activist Marandah discussed her experience assisting a friend to make a report of campus sexual assault to OPHD, she disclosed:

> She went through the reporting process and the biggest problem that she had is that it's supposed to, there's all these like time allotments that they're giving for each step, and they're all like 30 days but they're able to give themselves unlimited extensions. So, it was supposed to be like a 2-month process. Lasted like 7 or 8 months, because at every stage of the reporting process, the investigators are able to give themselves unlimited extensions. So it'll say 30 days but they can push it to whenever if they need

it…

Therefore, the time elapsed for each step of the process can be very taxing on the victim/survivor and as Marandah Field-Elliot goes on to state, the process is "misleading" in that when the victim makes the report they are told and learn of a particular time frame the case should be processed, but then unexpectedly the time has the potential to be repeatedly delayed. There are many interpretations for this type of bureaucratic attribute. Weber would see this phenomenon as a manifestation of how methodical and precise bureaucracy must be in handling each report (Weber 1958:214). Meghan Warner, one of the students under the 2012 Title IX complaint alleging UC Berkeley with "deliberate indifference" for mishandling reported cases, contended with Weber's notion:

> Title IX has to fairly investigate, and they have to do a fair and complete investigation, which can take time. It shouldn't take as long as it has been taking them, but it's not gonna happen in 2 days. It's gonna take some time… So some students are like, so they're taking a 100 days, which sometimes, or even longer than that, which is way way way too long, but it's gonna take some time to get all the information… so Title IX has to investigate and they have to do so fairly, they have to be an impartial body first and foremost."

Warner also attributes underfunding to reasons why the Title IX office may be understaffed and not promptly processing each case. Her sympathizing words for Title IX can be problematic when hearing the case of Marandah's friend. The time to be precise sometimes compromises the time to be efficient; and most survivor-students have expressed much discontent when bureaucratic processes are said to take a certain amount of time, but take much longer.

OBJECTIVE IMPARTIALITY

In addition to reports not promptly addressed, bureaucracy's impartial nature has connected to survivors becoming activists demanding an ethical, informal justice; however, according to Weber, bureaucracies are calculable and objective, providing solely a formal 'equality before the law' (Weber 1958:220-221). Sofie Karasek, sexually assaulted by a senior who was also a leader of a student organization when she was a freshman in 2012, recalls in an article byAl Jazeera America (2014) that after she reported the attack with three other women on the same perpetrator to OPHD, she was "unsuccessful" in removing the perpetrator from the student group. She

said that "the university's Gender Equity Resource Center advised her that the group should 'keep him close in case he does it again' so that he would 'have a community of friends to support him in processing it.' Karasek's response to the reporter discussing the aftermath was: "Why should his healing process take precedent over the possibility that he could assault me again, or assault another person?" (Taylor 2014). Survivors such as Karasek complained that they were not treated with respect or integrity after they told their trauma, yet bureaucracies' main task is to be calculable and objective as they treat everyone fairly (Weber 1958:220-221). The constant strive for impartiality leads to a grave imbalance impacting the definition of justice. Weber concedes that formal equality before the law only honors the propertied class; informal/ Kadi-/ ethical justice honors the property-less, but is seen as irrational (Weber 1958:220-221); because objectivity does not buttress the justice for which student-activists strive. In the case of Nicoletta Commins, a graduate student who was sexually assaulted by a male student in January 2012, the university only temporarily suspended her assailant from some time in 2013 until fall 2015 (Lochner 2015). Survivor-students, such as Commins and Karasek may not want to completely take away their assailants' rights; however, committing any acts of sexual violence, from their perceptions, should have graver consequences than suspension and leaving student organizations.

DISHONESTY

A keen overarching attribute of bureaucracy is dishonesty, which indicates that exhibited behavioral patterns by bureaucratic officials have negatively impacted constituents, proving themselves and the process itself untrustworthy. There has been dishonesty with whether or not cases got actually reported; and whether or not the university has abided by federal bureaucratic processes for confronting campus sexual violence. In regards to the case of Aryle Butler, she believes that the university never investigated or even took disciplinary action on her assailant. She first told her supervisor of the trauma, no action was taken, and when she later told OPHD, she was reprimanded for being accused by her assailant for falsely reporting sexual assault (Lochner 2015). Her case is different from many cases in that her assailant was a guest lecturer. When talking with Aryle Butler, she considered her experience with OPHD fall 2012 as a turning point with her becoming a public survivor, student-activist, joining others in the Title IX complaint and disclosing testimonies to the media:

> After I was assaulted, I went to the school…to kind of

> get them to do something about [the offender], and I was told constantly by the Title IX coordinator, you know, 'oh we can't do that because of FERPA,' (Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 1974) or 'We can't do this because um I would have to reveal your identity,' or 'We can't do this because of our school's policy.'…all I heard her say was that, 'oh [there's] nothing we could do,' and at the very end, she goes, 'If there's anything we can do, please feel free to contact me.' …And so, um, I thought to myself, 'well if it's true they can't do any of these things because of these different laws, what do these laws say?' And I just started reading…and I realized I have been lied to…

She was lied to and excuses were made to hinder movement of processing her case. Survivor-students, such as Butler, alleged the university for "deliberate indifference" for how the institution handled reported cases; because there was no existing accountability process and transparency for all constituents involved. Yet, the paradoxical nature of Weberian bureaucracy is that it assumes power through the leveling of economic and social differences by the mass democracy to supposedly prevent economic/social exploitation; and mass democracy, in this case survivors/students/ activists (and their families) prevent a supreme authority in bureaucracy based on their fight for "equality before the law" and the "principled rejection of doing business 'from case to case'" (Weber 1958). In other words, bureaucracy naturally is not meant to be accountable to the mass democracy. Only through struggle and protest does this mass garner enough momentum to generate reformation. After the Dear Colleague Letter was issued in 2011 requiring universities to have established prompt disciplinary procedures for allegations of campus sexual violence, students learned how to file Title IX complaints and get the university under federal investigation.

SURVIVORS/STUDENTS RESPOND

Red tape, austere objective impartiality, and the degree of dishonesty UC Berkeley's bureaucracy has exhibited strongly motivated survivors/ students (now Cal alumni) Warner, Butler and Karasek, to becoming public activists. Similar to the 1970s, survivors politically organized and strengthened survivorship visibility by disclosing their stories not only to each other but publicly through various mainstream and underground media outlets. Also, to assert the epidemic found on campus, students conducted researched on their own fellow collegiate body. For instance, in a 1979 zine circulating on

campus, Donna Benson, a student in the Sociology department, conducted a survey revealing that 1 out of 5 UC Berkeley senior women have been sexually harassed. (Women Organized Against Sexual Harassment Weekly, Issue 2) A crucial element in responding to perceived injustices of campus sexual violence was and remains raising awareness of trauma itself. Another similarity between the 1970s and present time after 2011 was an emphasis on policy for UC Berkeley's reformation. Students educated themselves and others on their rights and existing policies used to confront campus sexual violence. They publicly disclosed their stories, their names, and in turn created spaces for other survivor-students to do the same, they took their story to news media outlets, and not only did many become Title IX complainants charging the university with "deliberate indifference," but they also organized campus demonstrations and healing circles in solidarity with other survivors at different universities and in light of raising awareness of their own cases (Karasek 2014). Also, a fully staffed survivor-support office, the PATH to Care center, now exists as a direct result of 2013 students continuously advocating for confidential care for victims on campus. Marandah pointed that although groups of survivors/students/ activists have helped bring resources into existence and reformation, countless students are still unaware of what is available to them on campus. Demonstrations and rallies are great for not only gaining media attention, but also for reminders to the student body of the issue this university has with campus sexual violence and the resources that are available to them.

Photo by: Sophia Kasa in "Students Bring Out Mattresses In Huge 'Carry That Weight' Protest Against Sexual Assault" by Alexandra Svokos (Huffington Post 2014).

"Carrying the Weight Together" solidarity action done in 2014 for Columbia student Emma Sulkowicz carrying her mattress to raise awareness of campus rape culture, sexual assault, and the university's negligence in handling reported cases.

Furthermore, the vision of these activists lives as long as they are students at this institution. What happens when activists graduate? Warner expressed that current enrolled advocates/activists are not focusing on policy and mandatory sexual consent education as she and other Title IX activists were when enrolled at UC Berkeley while organizing demonstrations.

Photo by: Nathaniel Solley in "Auditor's report on sexual harassment gives UC and CSU a passing grade (improvement needed) while "affirmative consent" bill moves forward in State Senate" by Paul G. Mattiuzzi (CSU Independent Observer 2014).

Sofie Karasek (Centered; right to Congress woman Barbara Lee); Meghan Warner (behind next to U.S. Rep. Jackie Speier); and Aryle Butler (Directly behind Karasek)

Photo by: Laura A. Oda in "San Jose State, UC Berkeley grapple with fallout from sexual harassment cases" by Katy Murphy (The Mercury News 2016)

Political action done Sept. 7, 2016 in response to Sujit Choudhry's return to campus after found guilty of sexual misconduct.

Photo by: Anda Chu in "UC Berkeley students furious over new sexual harassment case" by Katy Murphy (Mercury News 2016).

Political demonstration outside Wurster Hall on November 15, 2016 in an immediate response to campus sexual violence and in light of architecture professor, Nezar AlSayyad, being found guilty of sexually harrasing a graduate student.

BUREAUCRACY RESPONDS

A shift in the bureaucratic regulation of sexual violence precedes a shift in a university for confronting campus sexual violence. When WOASH filed the Title IX complaint at UC Berkeley, the university had no efficient Title IX procedure. In turn, the Chancellor created the Campus Title IX Advisory Committee in the 1980s. Over 35 years later, survivor-students were again leading the wave of activism demanding justice and an end to campus sexual violence. First, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) in the Department of Education "promulgated a Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance in 2001 reaffirming the compliance standards of the 1997 Guidance, stating that schools must 'end the harassment, prevent its recurrence, and, as appropriate, remedy its effects.' Then in 2011, OCR issued the Dear Colleague Letter (DCL), extending the 2001 Guidance, focusing on the definition of campus sexual violence and the university's responsibility to addressing and preventing it (Gersen and Suk 2016). The current Title IX complaint and federal investigation UC Berkeley is under exists because of DCL.

Frankly, UC president Janet Napolitano and UC Berkeley's administration have responded with concessions, and more "lip-service" as Field-Elliot described it (Gordon and Watanabe 2014). They sent a host of emails assuring students that they are determined to have an efficient organization of panels, task forces, and new policies addressing the issue of sexual violence. One such email was sent on November 3, 2016 by

Chancellor Nicholas Dirks, notifying students that a new task force, the Campus Sexual Violence & Sexual Harassment Peer Review Panel has been finalized. According to Dirks, this panel responds to UC President Janet Napolitano's proposal in March 2016 for a "UC System-wide peer review panel that would review cases of sexual harassment and sexual violence policy violations involving senior university leaders including chancellors, associate and assistant chancellors, provosts, vice provosts, deans, coaches, and athletic directors." Despite the "good news" that there is a newly designed task force, no jurisdiction or official bureaucratic process exists to effectively handle such cases of campus sexual violence. New task forces continue to sprout, such as the panel peer-review board for analyzing faculty-on-student cases. Allocated funds have been directed to provide jobs for a full-staffed survivor support center on campus, the PATH to Care Center. Also, mandatory consent education now exists for students, faculty, and staff (Gordon and Watanabe 2014); and in regards to student-on-student campus sexual assault, if found guilty, offenders are suspended for two years. The length of time and lack of bureaucratic procedure for each conceived, possible known sexual violation exhausts but galvanizes student victim-survivors.

CONCLUSION

Task forces are often seen as PR stunts that do "basically nothing" as Warner stated. However, she did acknowledge that survivor-led student-activism has influenced today's bureaucracy at the university. Concessions have been made and what was not in existence five or ten years ago, now is. A flowchart and functioning website for victims now exist, as well as mandatory preventative sexual violence education training. Survivor-activists, such as Karasek, Warner, and Butler continue to advocate consent sexual education; and they assist others with filing Title IX complaints to universities botching reported cases. When considering the current state of OPHD, she asserted that "students complain about [the office], it's because it's not perfect and I get wanting to push for more, but it's just a lot more than we had, way more than we had before, and way more than most schools in the country." Settling with concessions and the little changes under reformation only strengthens the interdependency between society and bureaucracy, survivors/students and OPHD and administration. As Weber (1958: 96) noted, "more and more the material fate of the masses depends upon the steady and correct functioning of the increasingly bureaucratic organizations of private capitalism," the more utopian it is to eliminate

such organizations. Bureaucracy breeds more bureaucracy with the same reoccurring attributes of red tape, time length to handle cases, impartiality, and a severe lack of accountability and transparency. Thus, the never-ending struggle for reformation remains.

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

For the basis of this project, I conducted three interviews and then supplemented the data with secondary resources. I interviewed Marandah Field-Elliot, Meghan Warner, and Aryle Butler. From these facilitated interviews, I had the opportunity to meet survivors who became activists fighting against sexual violence since their late teens. I was quickly amazed and inspired by the fact that they took initiative to reforming UC Berkeley's bureaucratic processes for handling campus sexual violence. Not everyone who experiences trauma is initially a go-getter, fight-back-the-system-type of person. The idiosyncrasies these women exhibited, such has having the motivation to learn policies (i.e. Title IX and Dear Colleague Letter) and taking initiative to organize in accordance with other existing cases throughout the nation in a move for survivorship visibility, aided their own abilities to publicly bring their stories to the forefront and organize demonstrations on campus.

In regards to the research question—how does the Weberian model of bureaucracy spawn student activism, in this case, survivors/students combating campus sexual violence— I asked participants questions of their experience interacting with OPHD, inspirations for getting active on campus, and how their visions changed over time with concessions. From their responses and the conversations we had, this is where implicit biases crept in. I am also an activist, also a survivor of sexual violence, and I believe the basic functioning of bureaucracy is inherently flawed. However, the data could still be considered credible because I did not impose my beliefs on any of the participants nor was my analysis impacted by my preconceived beliefs. I primarily listened and in our conversations, I was reminded that reformation does not equate to transformation. When activists protest for reformation, concessions are eventually delivered. Similar to a cycle of violence, there will eventually be another wave of bureaucracy that will incite student activist to fight for more reformation to the same bureaucratic system once again.

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Access Without Excellence: The Shortcomings of Financial Aid and Its Impact on Students with Children

Natalie Ruiz
University of California, Berkeley

Abstract
This essay seeks to understand the experiences of UC Berkeley student parents navigating bureaucratic organization. Though Weber theorized that this form of organization was not only superior to other forms of organization, but also the only secure and stable option because it protected against the whims of public opinion and populist fervor, bureaucracy is not without its shortcomings. These shortcomings are brought to life through the experiences of eight student-parent interviewees that share their stories of debt, stress, food insecurity, and academic strain at the hands of Financial Aid—a bureaucratic system that exists to promote the University's mission to provide Access and Excellence to all students. These interviews highlight not only the ways in which bureaucracy is dysfunctional on multiple levels, but also the ways in which it can still be advantageous.

Keywords
Weber, bureaucracy, financial aid, student parents

INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH QUESTION

My research seeks to understand how student parent experiences are shaped by bureaucratic organizations at the University of California, Berkeley. In the 2016-2017 academic year, UC Berkeley enrolled fewer than 200 undergraduate students with dependent children (2015). More than two-thirds of this group was considered eligible for the Educational Opportunity Program, meaning that they fit at least one of these three criteria: first generation student, historically underrepresented racial minority, or recipient of a Pell Grant. To fit the eligibility criteria for a Federal Pell grant, a student needs to provide documentation stipulating that they expect to live off of a financial amount that is roughly equivalent to the federal poverty line, or less (2017). I hypothesized that financial aid, a bureaucratically organized system, cannot effectively meet the unique needs of UC Berkeley student parents because of their small population size, low levels or representation and advocacy, as well as the implications set from existing literature regarding individuals like these and their success rates in accessing supportive, bureaucratically administered support services.

LITERATURE REVIEW

According to Max Weber, bureaucratic organization holds "technical superiority" over any and all other forms of organization within modern western bourgeois rational capitalism (1968: 214). This particular form of Capitalism is the precondition for which bureaucracy is able to succeed. It is characterized by a large, complex population whose governing comes from a rational, legal order disbursed throughout bureaucratic officials, unlike its precursor that concentrated power at the top and disbursed authoritative power based on hereditary privilege. According to Weber, Bureaucratic officials enjoy a tenured, salaried position and many other forms of job security (1968:196-198). For Weber, these characteristics should presumably create a system that works with "precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity…" and more traits that prove functionally superior (1968:214), especially in comparison to the Patrimonial, kinship-based organization that preceded it. Additionally, Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy operates under "formal equality," or the leveling of social and economic differences that serves to ensure that bureaucratic jobs and services are accessible to everyone, regardless of hereditary privilege.

I therefore imagine that Weber would defend the system of financial aid and its efficacy in many facets. The system of Financial Aid at UC Berkeley closely resembles Weber's model of bureaucracy which is characterized

by fixed jurisdiction, a hierarchy of offices, written documents, expert training, separation of work and home, and management through rules. The combination of these characteristics is intended to guarantee access to not only government jobs, but government services as well. The notion of access is notably relevant to this research, given that the UC Berkeley maintains a mantra of its dedication to "Access and Excellence" and regards in its mission statement that "This comprehensive educational excellence is accessible and affordable to large numbers of students of exceptional talent from all socioeconomic backgrounds" according to the official website of UC Berkeley. Weber might argue that the bureaucratically organized system of financial aid is the vehicle through which "all" students, under formal equality, are granted their "access and excellence" from this University.

The office of Financial Aid at UC Berkeley manages award packages that are funded at the federal, state, and university levels. Each financial aid bureaucrat is required to answer to managers higher than them in all of these areas when distributing their funds. This level of accountability is achieved through heavy documentation and paperwork for all of their student cases, their needs, and what kind of aid is given to them. Weber's discussion on bureaucracy provides this research with the theoretical framework of "formal equality," which is the leveling of social and economic differences that protects the bureaucratic system from the "irrational" sentiments of public opinion (1968:226). Under this model, to challenge formal equality is to challenge the fiber of bureaucracy, and open up opportunities for dictatorship built upon populism without any rational structure or accountability.

Michel Crozier's (1964) The Bureaucratic Phenomenon acts as a critique of Weber's ideal model of bureaucracy. Crozier is largely interested in internal power struggles between both individuals and groups inside of the context of a bureaucratic organization. He argues that such power struggles create "vicious circles" which ultimately make the rationalized model of bureaucratic organization dysfunctional (1964:149). This idea will act as a second theoretical framework in this essay. Each "vicious circle" occurs internally and then contributes to the overall external bureaucratic dysfunction. These circles are characterized first by the "impersonal rules" which guarantee that a set of abstract rules cover all possible events. For example, the 1960's French Clerical Agency, in which he observes bureaucracy at work, administers a standardized bureaucratic exam given to all officials. If passed, it guarantees seniority and upward mobility for lifetime state careers. Crozier contests that this practice diminishes the actual value of upward mobility as well as the authoritative power of the higher positions

to effectively govern the lower positions (1964:19). A second tenet of Crozier's "vicious circles" is the impersonal nature of jobs that characterizes bureaucratic decision making. It seeks impartiality and thus calls upon those with insufficient knowledge on the problems they are meant to solve. In an effort to protect the bureaucratic official against what Weber calls the whims of "irrational public opinion," (1964:229) Crozier argues that bureaucracies employ uninformed decision makers for the sake of preserving impartiality, though it ultimately produces dysfunction. Lastly, Crozier argues that power within a bureaucracy is disproportionately wielded by those who control the "zones of uncertainty" – or the areas in which events occur outside of the impersonal and predefined rules (1964:163). The end results stray far from the intended bureaucratic goals of impartiality and equal access for all clients.

A review of Michael Lipsky's (1980) Street Level Bureaucracy explores the ways in which the interactions between bureaucratic officials at the front lines of public service and public clients largely shape the bureaucratic experience as a whole. Lipsky references social workers, legal aides, police officers, and teachers to argue that these relatively low-level public officials' day-to-day interactions with clients embody a gap between governmental policy theory versus governmental policy in practice. Lipsky coined these officials and those similar as "street level bureaucrats" who "represent government to the people" (PAGE). Street level bureaucrats face a dilemma in which they are expected to make decisions for individual cases while carrying out strict, broad, and often oversimplified governmental policies that make their tasks counterintuitive. As a result of high caseloads, inadequate resources, and ambiguous governmental goals that do not fit neatly into the individual cases they are expected to manage, street level bureaucrats must adopt a level of "discretionary power" demanded by the nature of their work. This concept provides a third theoretical framework in which the experiences of student parents at UC Berkeley can be analyzed. Discretionary power, or discretionary decision-making authority stems from the notion that governmental goals or policies do not provide enough specific guidelines to manage the highly specific details of individual cases. Therefore, although bureaucracy employs a hierarchical system of authority, the "street level bureaucrats" are consequently given a higher, unwritten degree of discretion over the actions they make take in the case of a client. This may work favorably at times, but Lipsky acknowledges that discretionary power among street level bureaucrats cumulatively reroutes the intended governmental policy or service to a less favorable outcome for the client.

METHODOLOGY

This essay will attempt to highlight the experiences of student parents as they navigate through bureaucracies of UC Berkeley, with a particular emphasis on the office of Financial Aid. Methods for data collection consisted of conducting eight in-person, in-depth, ethnographic interviews with student parent participants. I solicited participation for these interviews by advertising on the Berkeley Student Parent Facebook group. These interviews were held in public, neutral locations, such as coffee shops on or near campus, as well as private locations including the homes of respondents. The questions were geared toward learning about student parents' levels of "Access and Excellence," consistent with the UC Berkeley Mission Statement. For the purposes of this research, I define "access" as the degree of ease with which students in need can obtain a broad range of resources needed to achieve excellence at UC Berkeley. I define "excellence" in the areas of academics, job preparedness, and socioeconomic wellness, and mental, physical, and psychological health. Over the course of my interviews, I found it challenging to maintain the focus of my research question with my overwhelming findings in different areas relevant to the existing literature. I entered this research intending to focus on food insecurity as a consequence of a flawed system of Financial Aid at UC Berkeley. I based this hypothesis on the theoretical frameworks brought forth by Lipsky and Crozier coupled with the recent data that reveals an alarmingly high level of students who report skipping meals at UC Berkeley released by the UC Berkeley Food Pantry. However, as I learned different commonalities in the responses, I began to readjust my questions to learn more about consequences other than food insecurity including falling academic performance and mental health struggles.

Nonetheless, my qualitative and quantitative findings have brought forth meaningful data to prove the following arguments. While I hypothesized that Weber's "superior" form of bureaucracy would be proved ineffective and dysfunctional through a student parent experience analysis, I am finding that it offers both dysfunction and opportunities for loopholes—and therefore advantages. These findings simultaneously affirm and refute Weber's argument of bureaucratic superiority.

FINDINGS

Financial Aid does not adequately meet basic financial needs of student parents.

Candy is a 34-year old Ethnic and Chicano studies major and mother of five. When asked if FAFSA (Free Application for Federal Student Aid) accurately assessed what kind of financial need her family was in, she answered "nope, otherwise I wouldn't need to fill out a budget appeal." A Cost of Attendance Adjustment Report, also known as a budget appeal, is a documented request for an expanded student budget. The form gives students written guidelines where they may list any expenses that the standard financial aid package is not expected to cover. If approved, students receive extra funds in the form of loans. Approval is not guaranteed, and financial aid advisors have the discretion and authority to approve only parts of it.

Each of the eight student parents I interviewed reported needing to submit a budget appeal every single semester during their time at Cal. Each participant is a financially "independent" student (meaning that their parents income would not be considered) with one or more financial "dependents", or children, whose needs were also to be considered. All reported having an "Expected Family Contribution" (EFC) of zero dollars, meaning usually that they did not expect to work while attending school. This qualified all eight student parents for the maximum amount of financial aid grants and loans, which still was not enough money without a supplemental budget appeal, according to all eight. When asked what kind of expenses were still remaining after the standard budget covered the cost of tuition, fees, and some rent, common answers included the remainder of rent, the cost of groceries, clothes, regular medicine, household items, and the cost of traveling to their hometowns for holidays.

From this data, I argue that the bureaucratic system of financial aid is dysfunctional as a means of granting "access and excellence" to student parents at UC Berkeley for two possible reasons. First, perhaps the standard budget currently awarded to student parents with an EFC of zero dollars could have met the basic needs of a student parent, but no longer does. This would reflect the bureaucracy's failure to adjust with the rising cost of living, housing, and tuition—which then negatively impacts the student parents who must now compensate for the failures of the system. Secondly, it is possible that perhaps this standard budget was never actually intended to be enough money to meet the basic needs of student parents. Instead, it is possible that the University's intention was always that student parents would rely on multiple external systems in order to compensate for the areas in which standard financial aid packages did not suffice. Regardless, this limits both access and opportunities for excellence of student parents because the required time and paperwork necessary to advocate on behalf of one's own needs to multiple bureaucracies cuts into time that is already

scarcely divided amongst two extremely demanding responsibilities from both parenting and higher education.

Delays in processing time and disorganization of paperwork make "free money" very costly.

Though every student interviewed expressed their gratitude for the opportunity to even fill out a budget appeal with the possibility of expanding their budget (even though it meant taking on more debt), a majority reported that the budget appeal in some cases hardly helps their financial situation because it is not even available until halfway through the semester. At the time of interviews, Amy shared that she had been driving for Uber and selling items like her bike on the UC Berkeley "Free and For Sale" Facebook group to compensate for financial aid that had not yet been approved or disbursed to her. "I send Ashlyn on playdates with friends who I know will feed her" she shared. And as for herself, she "can handle skipping meals every once in a while before the money comes in."

The budget appeal delay is not an isolated example. At the time that I conducted these interviews (mid November), at least two student parents had not even had their standard financial aid package disbursed yet, let alone the budget appeal. Many were waiting to get approvals on a separate supplemental forms called the "Satisfactory Academic Progress" appeal that student parents commonly need to submit. According to the UC Berkeley Financial Aid Website, students must be meeting "Satisfactory Academic Progress" or SAP, in order to qualify for any form of financial aid. The UC Berkeley Financial Aid website lists the following criteria for SAP:

- Making progress toward your degree by completing a minimum percentage of attempted units
- Maintaining a minimum cumulative grade point average
- Completing your degree within a maximum specified amount of attempted units

For student parents, this means that those who struggle academically beyond this criteria, or intend to take longer than their expected time to graduate, are at risk for becoming ineligible for financial aid as a whole. These scenarios are very common for student parents seeing as they tend to take advantage of the reduced course load option which allows them to lighten their course load but also delays graduation. As such, four out of eight interviewed reported their need to file a SAP appeal, which, according to the website, is a vehicle through which students may report their "extenuating circumstances [that] sometimes prevent students from making satisfactory academic progress toward their degree" and allow them to have their financial aid eligibility reconsidered.

Pamela, a 20-year-old student and mother of a 3-year-old daughter shared that since she has taken a very reduced course load in order to balance academic demands and single parenthood, she is required to submit a SAP appeal every semester before she can even be considered for the standard budget (before the optional budget appeal). She submitted her SAP appeal two weeks before the semester started, and still has not received her approval, which means she has not had any financial aid disbursed at all. Maryanne, a 30-year old re-entry student and single mother of a 4-year-old son with special needs, shared that back in 2013, her SAP appeal also faced a multiple week delay in processing even after the semester had begun. It was then denied. Since the semester was already underway, she was charged for the cost of attending as a full time student for the semester, without any way to pay it. "I was told that other students in my situation are encouraged to take out private loans to pay for this, but I could not qualify for any private loans because my family is all in Mexico and you need a family member to cosign on those loans." Maryanne laments that she never would have registered for classes if she thought she could be denied financial aid eligibility. Her financial situation demanded that she go back to working in retail for the next year and a half to pay for the single semester that she was denied aid for registered classes. She returned in 2015 after her debt was paid and the block on her account could be removed. Though Maryanne faced by far the most severe consequence for delays in processed paperwork, six out of eight students reported one or more instances of not receiving funds past the beginning of the semester due to delays in paperwork processing.

A Weberian lens advocates for paperwork on the basis that documentation facilitates rational, calculated, decision-making processes based on facts and not emotions. However, these student parent experiences suggest that paperwork not processed correctly or in a timely manner creates only more red tape, and serious negative financial and educational consequences for student parents. When asked how financial aid advisors could better serve student parents, Pamela answered "process our paperwork faster! We have dependents and we have different financial responsibilities that not a lot of students on this campus have, so consider us a priority on this campus." Pamela calls directly for the opposite of formal equality, as did at least four other participants.

Financial aid advisors operate street level bureaucrats with discretionary power.

Amy, a 20-year old single mother of a 5-year old daughter chooses to go to the Student Parent Center to get her financial aid questions answered over the Financial Aid office in Sproul Hall because "they're so impersonal… certain things become essential for this lifestyle because you have a kid. And they [Financial Aid officers] make you feel like you have to beg them for those things." Pamela echoed Amy's sentiment, and also expressed that she wished that those advisors with the final discretion over their budgets "could live in the budget we are given, so they can know what that struggle is like and really consider if they would survive in this state and still pull off being a parent and being a scholar."

To echo Crozier's (1964) argument on under-informed bureaucrats, Pamela also shared that on more than one occasion she has found herself *teaching* Financial Aid advisors what kind of aid that she is supposed to be eligible for, because they do not know. "Like, I'm the one teaching *them* like 'um, hello? I'm a student parent, do you even know that there is a student parent grant?'"

Not every financial aid advisor was reported as impersonal or uninformed—only the ones with decision making power. Maryanne expressed that she felt "lucky" to have Luis Mencillas help her with her case because he was "on my side." Even though she felt supported, he ultimately could not get her most recent budget appeal approved to include the cost of alternative medicine for her autistic son, or organic food that the doctor has recommended for his diet. To echo Michel Crozier's critique of Weber's bureaucracy, this example illustrates the ways in which those in power are far too disconnected to make informed decisions on relevant matters, while those who work more closely to the clients have no authority due to the hierarchical order. "They're sympathetic. Some have dependents themselves." They will appear understanding but then still be like 'okay but I still need you to fill this out' and for what? For your stuff to be denied"—Amy.

The relationship of multiple, interconnected bureaucracies creates more red tape.

For Maryanne, receiving two sets of contradictory advice from two different bureaucracies cost her nearly $5000, and a year and a half of her life spent working full time to pay it off before returning back to school. After accepting her transfer admission to Cal and applying initially for financial aid, she was asked to submit a SAP appeal, which took more than 4 months to process and had to be resubmitted after it was misplaced on their end. Maryanne was advised by the housing office to look for alternative housing plans in case her financial aid didn't come in.

> "I knew that if I didn't get SAP approved, I would still be billed for my classes! So I enrolled in online courses instead and made a 'plan B' to live with a friend for a semester. Then they denied me [my SAP appeal] because they said I had 'unstable plans!' I was still billed for the semester of online classes that I didn't take, and a block was put on my account until I paid it. When I asked the Office of the Registrar if they could help correct it, they said 'we are two different buildings' and like, they knew it was wrong but they didn't have the power to make it go away."

Pamela faced a similar issue with daycare and financial aid. She took on summer work to boost her income while she didn't receive summer aid, but then quit for the fall when classes would return. She also needed to submit a SAP appeal, which had delays in processing. Meanwhile, the daycare center required a financial aid statement to qualify her daughter for a subsidy.

> "At the beginning of the fall when my financial aid was backed up, they were still using my summer income to say 'well look you still have this income' but at the same time it's like 'I've already quit my job! I'm back in school…I'm now getting financial aid but my financial aid has not come in yet so I don't have any documentation to prove to you that I'm getting financial aid…so the fee was still there. So because of that I had to pay $106 in August and September. I went in and then asked financial aid if I could get even just an estimate and they said 'I'm sorry, your stuff hasn't been approved, so we can't really make any promises.' So up until this point, childcare still thinks I'm making my income from my summer job, and financial aid can't give me a statement to show them that that is not true. I finally had time to talk to the family advocate at daycare and they are going to take me on word of mouth until the proof comes in. But now I'm thinking, do I even

> have time before the semester ends to submit a budget appeal because my financial aid isn't even in yet?"

Pamela will receive no reimbursement for the fees she should not have been paying. She feels that she has lost time that she could have been spending dedicated to her studies, her parenting responsibilities, and or her mental wellness. The decentralization and loose interconnectedness of multiple bureaucracies exemplified here was a key finding in this study.

The relationship of multiple, intertwined bureaucracies also creates opportunities for loopholes.

Although student parents certainly face financial setbacks arguably at the hands of the dysfunctional Financial Aid bureaucracy, my findings also show that student parents utilize ways to take advantage of the dysfunction and poor communication between multiple bureaucracies. For example, Pamela revealed that she has been in violation of her lease agreement at the UC Village for years by having an unauthorized roommate who pays her an extra $700 a month. This income has been extremely advantageous to her, as she was able to make ends meet when her SAP appeal was delayed and financial aid money did not come in until halfway through the semester. Candy is a veteran, who receives a federal G.I. Bill grant.

> This is probably gonna mess up your research, but I haven't really needed financial aid… because the assistance that I get, they're all federal… GI Bill, Chapter 33…they didn't talk to each other. Get what I'm saying? I had a Pell grant and I maximized that Pell grant, and I was like cashing in…get what I'm saying? So I haven't really dealt too much.—Candy, 36

She has omitted entering this as income, and it has never been followed up on by anyone "by mistake I assume, but hey you gotta be resourceful to make it all work," Candy says.

Katrina, a 27-year old single mother shared that in recent years, the finances have not been enough for her to afford rent, groceries, expenses for her daughter, but since her daughter's father lives in Texas and pays for her expenses when she sends their daughter to visit, Katrina has sent her daughter to Texas for nearly the entire semester. "This is the only way I can afford to live here. When she was here, my grades were dropping and the money wasn't enough and it was seriously so stressful" says Katrina. Katrina reports that sending her daughter to live with her father, but claiming that her daughter still lives with her in Berkeley is the only way that she can afford her rent, groceries, and other needs without her grades needing to suffer. She also reported that she has the time and energy to prioritize her mental health by doing yoga regularly.

The incentive to use bureaucratic dysfunction to find loopholes is best described by Jeremy:

> "Look, there is no disclaimer anywhere that says your financial aid won't be enough, but if you look at what they give you monthly, and look at the cost of rent in the UC Village, you'll see that you're gonna be $800 short, minimum…This budget appeal process is a phony baloney process… the incentive is to put as little info as possible to not incriminate yourself…and it pushes you to be sneaky."

With the exception of Katrina, very few students expressed sentiments that implied they felt as though they were taking advantage of the system in an unfair way. Instead, many justified it in Candy's terms, as a "hustle" or rather, a situation in which taking advantages anywhere possible—even if it is against the rules—is the only way to make ends meet financially at this institution for student parents. For Pamela, breaking the rules by violating her lease agreement and taking in an extra roommate was the only way to maintain her "access" to her education when the shortcomings of the bureaucratic Financial Aid system failed her even when she played by their rules. To this, I argue that the bureaucratic machine has failed to adequately address pressures from below that in this case, are arguably rational—namely the belief that students with families should not need to go hungry or go to such great lengths to secure finances for basic needs when they are eligible for full financial aid.

Affected student parents call for more "formal equality", despite existing bureaucratic dysfunction.

The time and energy needed to fill out, submit, and await a response for a Budget Appeal has negatively impacted every single student interviewed financially, academically, or mentally. As Pamela tells:

> "Do you know how time consuming that is? To just like,

> organize a budget appeal with even twenty receipts? Food, childcare, medical expenses, traveling receipts, you have to print out a doc with how much gas you spend, print out a Google map with what your daily commute looks like, and if you're traveling out of California you have to also express that in a letter explaining why…so it's just time consuming…it takes a toll on you which eventually takes a toll on your academics…if only I could study as much as I worry about money, I'd have a 4.0"

When asked how they felt that the financial aid system could be improved upon to make financial aid at UC Berkeley more accessible for student parents, I expected to hear students call for more channels through which they could advocate for their own unique needs. Rather than the detailed, case by case, budget appeal process that currently exists as a supplemental option, many students surprisingly called for a more standardized process—but specifically for student parents. This both refutes and affirms Weber's argument in favor of formal equality given that the standardization would be done within the confines of an already unique and distinct population. Maryanne explains:

> "…everything is so subjective right now so it makes everything more complicated and makes the process longer because they have to review more things. Maybe if they just made it like ok you have one kid, you get 3,000 more, and if people have two kids a different number… other students are given a straight budget, and if you want to spend $300 at Nordstrom then that's your problem. But for us, if we need to buy clothes for our kids then they start asking questions like 'why can't you buy your clothes at Target or somewhere cheaper?' So if there was a standard student parent budget, an initial one, then this subjectivity wouldn't have to be there unless student parents ask for more things—like my son's speech therapy—which would be on a case by case basis"

This is essentially a call for a hybrid of formal equality with the opportunity for self-advocacy and case management. This was surprising because it suggests that the financial aid bureaucracy could be more functional for student parents if it required them to advocate on their own behalves less. The reason Jeremy referred to the budget appeal process as "phony baloney" is because Financial Aid allows student parents to turn in as many invoices, receipts, and other forms of financial verification that they feel are necessary. This does not mean that each item will be approved, but it presumably affords student parents a fair amount of financial flexibility. When asked the question "if managing your financial aid case was another class, how many units would it be worth?" five student parents answered with three units (which equates to more than 100 hours in a semester). I argue that time is just as necessary as money as a resource in the pursuit of access and the possibility of achieving excellence at UC Berkeley. To require so much of their time before they can receive their money still does not guarantee access and is arguably discriminatory. This university claims that it is financially accessible for students of all socioeconomic backgrounds because of financial aid, but then demands that financially needy students dedicate so much of their time to actually working to receive these resources that their opportunities to pursue "excellence" take a drastic toll. As Eliza, a 26-year-old single mother and Sociology major explains:

> "You've got to work harder as a student parent from the beginning—to access those internships, get the classes that fit your kid's schedule, and research opportunities that will help your resume…and finding places to be that are child-friendly. You got to work so hard. And when I'm concerned about food for me and Janie, my paper can wait."

CONCLUSION

Student parents at UC Berkeley largely face negative consequences at the hand of the bureaucratic organization, as I hypothesized. However, my findings largely indicated that financial aid is one of multiple bureaucracies in an interconnected system of bureaucracies whose level of dysfunction is compounded exponentially, often by many of the traits that Weber argues make bureaucracy so technically efficient (i.e. paperwork and expert training). While conducting this research, I expected time and again to find a greater level of uniformity among my responses. This, perhaps is because I internally applied a degree of formal equality to my subjects given my knowledge that they were all student parents. I was surprised to learn that even the students with the exact same income and household size could still have endless external factors positively or negatively impacting their financial circumstances, as well as their academic and mental health circumstances.

Learning the experiences of those who are directly impacted by these dysfunctions proved that dysfunction can at times lead to workable outcomes and advantages. Such a conundrum leads me to conclude that perhaps these mixed responses illustrate exactly Weber's point—that no one system can satisfy all individuals, and no matter what there will be those who are impacted worse. The student parents at UC Berkeley perhaps represent the "propertyless masses" that are "especially not served by formal equality" (Weber 234). I do not disagree that the system of financial aid as a bureaucracy is stable and efficient to a degree. The simple fact that every student parent I interviewed has not yet dropped out or failed out of this University because of finances shows that to one degree or another, they are indisputably granted "access" to this University, similar to the way that bureaucracy is presumed to grant equal access to bureaucratic jobs and services to all. In the case of the university, I will conclude by affirming that access alone for non-traditional students that already come in with a disadvantage should not be the sole metric for which the bureaucratically organized system of Financial Aid at UC Berkeley can call itself efficient or accessible to the vulnerable population of student parents.

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

In reflection of this process, I acknowledge my unique insight that has indisputably affected my entire hypothesis. This insight comes from my personal experiences as a student parent who has dealt with the Financial Aid bureaucracy on many occasions, as well as my service to the student parent community at UC Berkeley as the Student Parent Food Donations Program Director. In my role as program director, I am required to constantly assess the demand for donated food within the student parent community. I am well aware that more than 100 undergraduate students rely heavily on our program to ensure that they have food for their families. Since I have grown personal friendships with many of my fellow student parents whom the program serves, I also have some insight on their time scarcity given their academic workload and their parental responsibilities. Nonetheless, I have watched now for two years how dedicated parents stay waiting in long lines despite even cold and rainy weather to receive free food. Some parents go as far as to wake their sleeping children in the early mornings so that they can stand in line to receive free food donations because the urgency of their financial situation demands it. Throughout the entirety of these interviews, this insight contributed to the formulation of my hypotheses, questions, findings, and conclusions.

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Campus Shared Services: Bureaucratic Inefficiency and the Corporate Restructuring of UC Berkeley

Aaron Palmer
University of California, Berkeley

Abstract
The project of Operational Excellence and the subsequent Campus Shared Services was a solution to fix the financial troubles of UC Berkeley through the promise of creating greater organizational efficiency and cost-saving measures. But instead of fulfilling its promise, it has done the exact opposite. Services have become less efficient and its operations have become more costly. Using strategies for the corporate world, this organizational restructuring has also come at the cost of how this university operates. Faculty, students, and staff have become excluded from the part of shared governance, and top level administrators have gained more power in its core functions. Within Weber's theory of bureaucracy, the ideal type of hierarchy of office comes into play. This hierarchy of office has created a system ignoring feedback from below, and these inefficiencies have arrived because of a lack of cooperation from above.

Keywords
Weber, bureaucracy, hierarchy of office, organizational efficiency

INTRODUCTION

At the time of the economic crisis in 2008, UC Berkeley was struck with a structural problem. Funding from the state had been reduced and the university was faced with a massive budget deficit. In response, Chancellor Birgeneau, at the recommendation of the private firm, Bain & Co., started on a massive restricting project, which focused on the administrative organizational structure on campus, with the goal of fixing the university's financial problems. From this, the multi-year, multi-project program Operational Excellence (OE) and its subproject Campus Shared Services (CSS) was created, which sought to bring greater efficiency and cost savings in its operations. But, at its current state, this program did not meet its intended goal.

Operational Excellence and CSS can be seen as a move that brought organizational and operational principles from the corporate world into this public institution. In Henry A. Giroux's book, "Neoliberalism's War on Higher Education," he describes how the neoliberalist ideology of free-market fundamentalism and privatization has changed the public university (2014). He examines how neoliberalism has caused the defunding of the public university and how the public university has now become commodified. Giroux places a lot of emphases on how there has been a restructuring of the university towards corporatization and how governance within the institution has changed. There is greater power towards the top, which is occupied by an executive class of administrators, and their discourse with faculty and students have become stifled. Giroux's discourse/discussion may serve as a helpful starting point to think of the question concerning the administrative practice of UC Berkeley More specifically in the case of CSS: why did this bureaucratic restructuring—which was intended to create greater efficiencies—fail?

According to Giroux, the ideology of neoliberalism has shaped the institutional structure of public universities over time. From the principles of the corporate world, the structure of the public university has taken what Max Weber would consider a rational hierarchical organizational form. Experts who claim rational-legal authority have used a top-down approach in the restructuring of the university. One of the issues that emerges within the bureaucratic feature of the hierarchy of office is the lack of feedback from below. Top level administrators within the bureaucracy claim an expert knowledge over their subordinates, disseminating authority from the top-down while preventing participation and information sharing from the bottom-up. This goes against the principle of shared governance,

which in its ideal form, allows for the participation in governance and feedback from faculty and other stakeholders at the university. Without the allowance of input from below, tension has arisen between the chief of the bureaucracy (the Chancellor) and the divisions below. Also, instead of tailoring administrative services for the individual needs of the diverse campus departments by centralizing and reorganizing the administrative services outside of the campus, CSS also created greater rigidity in how these services were conducted, consequently reducing the efficiency and simultaneously increasing the cost of administrative tasks.

OUTLINE

The following paper will present the argument for why OE and CSS created greater inefficiencies and compromised the tradition of shared governance. I will first present background information on the OE and CSS project. Then I will show data on the outcome and the current status of CSS. Finally, I will present the argument that the failures of CSS can be seen as a poor decision of top administration and private consulting firms to rationalize the deficit problems in financial terms, while ignoring the reality that only shared governance by faculty and ground level staff guarantees/promises/consolidates the soundness of the public educational institution.

METHODOLOGY

Data for this project has been collected through online sources, including: online news articles from sources like the Daily Californian, published research, and 'internal documents' produced by faculty and administration at UC Berkeley which relate to OE and CSS. I have uncovered vast amounts of data in relation to how OE and CSS have been implemented, the current status, as well as staff's, faculty's and administration's perspective on OE and CSS. For news articles and internal documents, I have used the method of coding and analyzed the data. I have also integrated data from previous research conducted on OE and CSS as part of my findings.

ARGUMENT & DATA

Implementation of OE & CSS:

The logic for creating CSS was a response to the financial deficits UC Berkeley was facing during a time of an economic recession and decreased funding. With the decrease of public funding, the university shifted its focus towards procurement and to organize itself in a way to meet the demands of

the market economy. CSS was backed by a greater project called Operational Excellence, which attempted to reorganize the university through various cost saving measures and to create greater administrative efficiency. The cost cutting through OE focused on four areas: procurement, organizational simplification, information technology, and student services. This meant a big organizational shift, about which Chancellor Birgeneau said, "Each of us will have to change the way we work, and the way we work with each other, in order to streamline our operations and produce meaningful savings," (Taylor 2012). From the onset, OE was riddled with controversy throughout the campus and the greater UC system community. One area of controversy was the hiring of the private consulting firm, Bain & Co., which the UC paid $7.5 million to evaluate and propose policies for cost saving measures. Bain & Co. provides management consulting for governments, nonprofit organizations, and businesses with a focus on finding inefficiencies within the firm and organizations, and finding solutions to increase efficiencies and reduce expenses. The total projected cost at the time was between $70-75 million to fund the various projects and an additional annual cost of $5 million (Alisha 2011). It is interesting to note the amount of total expenses the UC went through in order to save money.

The general purpose for the creation of CSS was to combine administrative staffing in a central location to streamline processes in order to save money. This placed more than 600 people in a single location on 4th street in Berkeley, which is approximately three miles from campus and this new building came at the cost of $24 million (Davis 2015). A PowerPoint slide provided by CSS states the operational challenges UC Berkeley has and the rationale for why the creation for this center was necessary. This includes: highly distributed administrative functions, varying types of quality of technology used across campus, inefficient or redundant processes, fragmented quality control, and multiple interpretations of policy. The objective was to simplify and standardize administrative tasks, direct more resources towards teaching and research by generating savings, and to meet the needs for departments and other units on campus. CSS provides four key administrative functions: business and financial services, human resource and academic personal support, information technology, and research administration. Prior to this administrative centralization, these functions were scattered around campus in the various departments and units.

During the period of implementation, issues arose about the lack of involvement of faculty, staff and students. In a letter provided by the Berkeley Faculty Association (BFA) and Save the University to the administration, there was sentiment detailing the need for the "willingness

by top administrators to abandon reform proposals … if feedback proves that they are poorly designed and flawed," and that feedback from faculty, staff and students should not be treated as hostile and should not be silenced (2010). With UC Berkeley's long history of shared governance as the crux of the public model of higher education, OE had created a fear within these units that the lack of feedback and cooperation would further deteriorate this public model. This could be seen as a move by top level administrators—who hold specialized knowledge on organizational strategy and financial competency—to give them greater authority on how the university should be operated. This hierarchal approach allowed for the further centralization of the administration, while ignoring the actual individual needs at the ground level.

The financial consulting firm Bain & Co, and at the lead of Chancellor Birgeneau had used their preconceived notions of modern organizations in the framework of a private corporate structure. In the PowerPoint slide on the initial findings, they present a solution which states that a high-performance operating culture should "define clear organizational goals and cascade goals to units and individuals, with corresponding metrics" and to "Enhance performance management and incentive systems to ensure accountability for high performance," (Bain & Co. & UC Berkeley 2010) The same slide also suggests the use of a financial management model which should "foster highly skilled finance organization," and "maintain ongoing financial discipline and accountability, using financial performance metrics to guide decision making." What can be taken from this is the restructuring which models a corporate structure with greater top-down authority and the use of financial metrics, including a costly auditing culture, as a way to create operational and financial efficiencies.

Outcomes of CSS:

Prior to the implementation of CSS, there had been concern about the lack of consideration of the specialized needs required for different departments. The BFA reported that "there is a danger of a 'one size fits all' proposal without adequate consideration of differences in size, function, and needs of departments and other subunits," (2010). They continued by saying that "some need more specialists, other more generalists; some can share services with other units, some cannot." By creating this 'one size fits all' approach, CSS had run into the problem of not being able to meet the specific needs of many of the departments on campus and had created greater inefficiencies since these departments had to expend more of their

resources in order to meet their personal needs, which CSS was not fully able to supply.

In reflection of how CSS has come to restructure the university, writer James Cersonsky states that the centralized control of the university erodes the allegiances between academic and non-academic employees and that the strategy of division and containerization is an academic disaster with a dubious fiscal promise (2012). CSS created a lot of concern about its implementation, ranging from the $24 million dollar purchase for the property on 4th street, environmental impacts, as well as an opportunity that was lost to use that space to economically support the community (Davis 2015). What was most notable in this animosity was the fact that units and departments on campus were no longer employing and supervising the support staff; instead, staffing became centralized and shared among several units. By taking these key staff members outside of their departments, CSS separated them from the culture within their units/departments and the understanding of the diverse and various ways in which each unit was able to do their work. Before, each unit required different tactics to solve their own problems, and required a highly collaborative process. As Professor Davis from the Architecture department notes, "Decision-making in the sciences is often different than in the humanities," (2015). With an intent to make administrative operations more efficient, the centralization of administrative services dissolved one of the key aspects of how this university had operated. These services lost a key personal aspect,—which involved the constant collaboration and communication with staff, faculty and students—and became autonomized. In Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy, this separation from the campus community into a centralized office could be seen as a situation in which bureaucratic administrators are placed to work at full working capacity. Full working capacity means that there is a separation from the home (in this case, the campus community) and work. The issue arises where there is greater routinization of work. Workers lose their personal attachment to the campus community and cases are no longer treated on a case-to-case basis, but instead operations become standardized through rules and regular procedures. Professor Davis puts it this way: "Separating the management and administration from its academic and intellectual enterprise undermines a main motivation for employees, creates a caste system, and limits collaborative problem solving. We are not making widget," (2015).

Ultimately, OE and CSS was not able to meet its goal of bringing greater operational efficiency and cost savings. In fact, it had the opposite effect. Staff members who were not integrated into the CSS campus were

burdened with additional work, and faculty were put into the position to do the work that was once done by the departmental staff members. Oversight has become disconnected over staff members who now have to report to the centralized office. And even with severe financial problems, departments and units were put into the necessary position of hiring additional staff members to deal with the outcome of CSS, since CSS was not being responsive to their needs. In fact, payroll costs have increased dramatically due to the increase in management and management support staff; direct payroll cost of management support employees has grown from $75.6 million in 2009 to $114.5 million in 2014, an increase of $38.9 million in payroll ("Restructuring at UC Berkeley Fails..." 2016).

More restructuring and layoffs:

The future for CSS is currently unknown. As recent as May, 2016, the current Chancellor, Nicholas Dirks, had announced that in the face of a $150 million financial deficit, there will be major (unknown) changes to the CSS model as a way to cut further costs (Srivastava 2016). Campus spokesperson, Dan Mogulof, has also acknowledged that CSS has not been able to deliver on all its promises in terms of administrative service efficiencies and cost savings and will eventually be replaced with a new model (Srivastava 2016). The failure of CSS can also be seen in the layoffs in December of 2015 of 28 CSS system employees, due to a lack of funds and lack of work. This has led to Union members rallying against this layoff. In an interview in the Daily Californian, a CSS human resource employee states that he attributes these layoffs to bureaucratic inefficiencies and that there has been an increase of managers to manage staff members, but that they did not come up with any working solutions and they do not communicate with lower level staff members (Goldberg 2016).

This story of OE & CSS has gone full circle and the issue of bureaucratic feedback has come back into the picture. The problems of inefficiency of the CSS model can be attributed to the increased hierarchal structure, which has seen an increase in managerial positions as a solution to fix a financial problem. The project has caused an increase in payroll expenditures with the payment to the consultant company and the new building on 4th street, but has also institutionalized a power structure in the name of holding expert knowledge, which has prevented participation, collaboration, and input from below.

CONCLUSION

> "In the field of scientific research and instruction, the bureaucratization of the always existing research institutes of the universities is the function of the increasing demand for material means of management… Through the concentration of such means in the hands of the privileged head of the institute, the mass of researchers and docents are separated from their 'means of production,' in the same way as capitalist enterprise has separated the workers from theirs." ~ Max Weber

Weber saw the increase of the bureaucracy at the university as an issue in which tension is created within the heart of the university—the faculty and staff whose functions are to support the education of students and produce knowledge. They now become detached from the main administrative functions, and are replaced by a bureaucratic class. While this hierarchical administrative structure seeks efficiency in its operations, it ignores the main principles in which this public institution was founded on. OE and CSS was seen as a solution to fix UC Berkeley's financial difficulties by creating a corporatized structure built on efficiency and rationality, but the top bureaucrats within this institution have created a project, which ultimately has become inefficient because of its neglect of feedback from faculty, students, and staff, which have made this public institution great.

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

This project helped me in bringing greater insight into the inner workings of UC Berkeley and to an area which is not visible from a student's perspective. Prior to starting this research project, the existence of Campus Shared Services and the Operational Project was unknown to me, and to my surprise when talking to other faculty members, the functions of CSS was also not clearly understood by them.

Although I was able to collect a lot of data through online sources, I do acknowledge that there are many limitations to this method of data collection. One of the limitations I had faced was that there high concentration of qualitative data on very specific aspects of CSS and OE, including faculty and staff perspectives, and general information published through online news articles, but other aspects, including quantitative data and information on the administrative functions of CSS have been difficult to find.

I believe that if I was able to conduct interviews with faculty, staff, and administrators who have relations to CSS, the quality of my data would have been enhanced, and I would have greater insight in the details of this administrative structure. But, due to time and resource constraints, this would have been difficult to accomplish.

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Thea Matthews is a graduating senior at the University of California, Berkeley majoring in sociology. She recently won The Danesha McCoy Award for outstanding scholarship. Currently, she is part of Cal-Advancing Diversity in Aging Research (Cal-ADAR) program. As an evocative Black feminist scholar, her research interests include how interpersonal and institutional responses to varying degrees of trauma experienced individually and/or collectively impact the ways in which society functions. She is also interested in the social implications of historical/ inter-/ multi-generational trauma as well as cultural trauma; and exploring effective solutions to mend old social problems. Her senior thesis explores these issues in relation to child sexual violence in the U.S.

Aaron Palmer is a current undergraduate student at the University of California, Berkeley. He is majoring in sociology with a minor in public policy and plans on graduating in the Spring of 2017. His academic interests are in social theory, political theory, sociology of organizations, and education and labor policy. Prior to coming to U.C. Berkley, he studied photography at Brooks Institute in Santa Barbara.

Natalie Ruiz is a senior at the University of California, Berkeley majoring in Sociology and Social Welfare. Her areas of interest include social policy, poverty, and social inequalities, with a focus on poor families and their relationship to social safety nets. Natalie is intrigued by socially constructed stigmas surrounding poverty and their influence on creation and implementation of social policies. She has assisted in graduate level research to study the ways in which inequality shapes patterns of food consumption across varying income level neighborhoods in Oakland, California. Natalie has a strong commitment to community service, especially advocating for the needs of students on campus who are also parents as the Program Director for the Student Parent Food Assistance Program. These efforts won her the 2016 Chancellor's Award for Civic Engagement. Her recent Senior Honors Thesis has given Natalie the unique opportunity to marry her passion for advocacy with her intrigue for Sociological research on families in poverty.

John Towey received a BA in sociology with a minor in demography from the University of California, Berkeley, graduating with Highest Honors.

Prior to transferring, John received an AA in General Studies: Social and Behavioral Science from Los Angeles Pierce College, and was a recipient of the 2013 Betty Odello Perpetual Scholarship awarded by the department of Philosophy and Sociology there. While a student at Berkeley, John was actively engaged in research, assisting faculty projects as both a research apprentice and a research assistant. John also pursued his own research interests, participating in the 2015 Summer Undergraduate Research Fellowship program, completing an honor's thesis, and presenting this research at the 2016 Pacific Sociological Association conference. John's research interests include economic sociology, political sociology, collective action and social movements, social stratification and inequalities, and social demography. In addition to research, John has been involved in Berkeley's Student Learning Center as a study group leader for both research methods and classical sociological theory. He has also worked as a math and English tutor for Kumon Math and Reading Centers. John is a member of Alpha Kappa Delta, the international sociology honor society; Phi Beta Kappa, the national arts and sciences honor society; the American Sociological Association; and the Pacific Sociological Association.

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In general, we recommend submissions not to have too complex a hierarchy of sections and subsections. In the case of a heading, the title should be separated from the preceding paragraph by two (2) lines and one (1) line from the proceeding paragraph. The heading should appear in 10-point boldface type, left justified. In the case of a sub-heading, the title should be separated from both preceding and proceeding paragraphs by a single (1) line. The sub-heading should appear in 12-point italicized type.

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Submissions should follow the American Sociological Association (ASA) *Style Guide* (Third Edition). All citations in the text should be identified by the author's last name, year of publication, and pagination (if necessary). Identify later citations in the same way as the first. If there are more than three authors of a single work, use "et al." Citations should follow the following format: (Author Year:Pagenumber). If there are multiple citations, separate each citation with a semicolon (";") and a space: (Author Year:Pagenumber; Author Year:Pagenumber).

References should come at the end of the paper and should be prefaced with the heading "References" in 12-point boldface type, left justified. The reference entries themselves should be formatted according to the American Sociological Association (ASA) *Style Guide*.

"The function of sociology, as of every science, is to reveal that which is hidden."

- Pierre Bourdieu