Eleven

The Undergraduate Journal of Sociology

Volume 2

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University of California, Berkeley

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"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it."
—Karl Marx, "XI" from "Theses on Feuerbach"

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University of California, Berkeley

EDITOR'S NOTE

We are exceedingly proud and pleased to publish this second volume of *Eleven: The Undergraduate Journal of Sociology*. With the unyielding support from the University of California, Berkeley Department of Sociology, *Eleven* continues its reputation for publishing exceptional undergraduate papers in the social sciences. This volume shines a bright light on the unique and spectacular intellectual talent among the university's undergraduate community, and the *Eleven* editors and staff were more than honored to offer an uncommon but much needed forum for junior scholars.

In this volume, *Eleven* paved new roads to translate Marx's "Eleventh Thesis" into a thoughtful realization on paper. For the first time, the journal organized a thematic section that encouraged undergraduate scholars to respond to a single topic concerning the discipline. With the kind cooperation of Laleh Behbehanian and Michael Burawoy, *Eleven* invited students from the unparalleled, exploratory course—"Global Sociology, Live!"—to critically engage the spirit and strength of an emerging subdiscipline. To inspire dialogue, Behbehanian and Burawoy wrote a compelling paper for the journal that offered a sharp definition for the subfield as well as a panoramic vista that detailed the course's trajectory. Four students from the class, all featured in this volume, responded to the introductory article. Indeed, these four young scholars answered Behbehanian and Burawoy with comments characterized by a respectfully appreciation for their contributions and, yet, a bold critique of the definition of a subfield that seemed all the more pressing given an alarming multitude of global crises—which the global sociology course refused to silence. By providing undergraduates an arena to meaningfully discuss the terms of a global sociology, the journal encouraged the type and tenor of analyses capable of social transformation at the heart of *Eleven*'s namesake.

In addition to our novel thematic section, this volume showcases two exemplary papers that explicitly and implicitly engage global themes. Jassmin Antolin Poyaoan unearths the historical record to chronicle a three-part process of Filipino racial formation in the United State. Her findings—which implicate the United States colonization of the Philippines—reveal how and why Filipino-Americans cannot be easily categorized within and often resist an Asian pan-ethnic category. In our other featured paper, Sarah Fleishman marries Goffman's theory of everyday life to an empirical study of the use of Twitter, an online social platform. She finds that her nine cases manufacture a hyper-stylized and yet accessible Twitterself in the service of self-promotion and marketing goals. While Fleishman does not explicitly

discuss the global implications of a Twitterself, one can arguably recognize that online self-presentations recognize few nation-state boundaries.

Once again, we hope that you will read *Eleven* from cover to cover. We are thrilled to feature such polished and provocative undergraduate papers, and we hope this volume will continue to provide the community with a source of inspiration and praise for promising young scholars. So join us in our excitement for this auspicious celebration of our publication, a journal that continues its commitment to exemplary undergraduate scholarship.

Aaron Benavidez,
Eleven Editor-in-Chief

Global Sociology: Reflections on an Experimental Course

Laleh Behbehanian and Michael Burawoy
University of California, Berkeley

When sociology began as a positivist enterprise in the 19th Century, the goal was to develop laws of society that were universal in character, that applied everywhere and through all time. Such were Durkheim's theories of the division of labor, of suicide, and of religion; such were Weber's categories, classification, and ideal types; and such was Marx's theory of capitalism. A global sociology, on the other hand, is the culminating phase of a reaction against universal sociology, introducing geographical space as central to the formation of knowledge. Global sociology directs attention to the particularity of many universal claims, but without dissolving everything into particularity, without abandoning the search for the universal.

We might say that global sociology is the third stage in the scaling up of sociological practice. In the first phase, sociology began as very much concerned with communities. In the United States, the Chicago School was really about one city, Chicago, even if it claimed to be about the world. The second phase—and the chronology is not linear—was about the nation state. Here we get the classic studies of Weber and Durkheim, but also the research programs that drew on national data sets, focusing on national political systems and civil society of national dimensions. Again this unit of analysis was often not thematized, but rather presented as universal. The third phase is a global sociology, which while not discounting the local or the national, reaches for global forces, global connections, and global imaginations. The danger here is that global sociology once again becomes a universalization or extension of the experience of the North, in particular of the United States. Global sociology, like community sociology and national sociology, must be continually on its guard against the particular masquerading as the universal.

While global sociology may be a novel enterprise in the global North, it might be said that sociologists in the South have always had to take a global perspective, insofar as they have long been acutely aware of how their societies are shaped by forces emanating from the North, whether through forms of violent subjugation or the more subtle forms of hegemony.

Paradoxically, Northern approaches—with their universalizing mission—have nonetheless often dominated Southern sociology, if only for the reason that leading sociologists in the South have largely been trained in the North. There is a profound imbalance, therefore, between, on the one hand, the sociologies of the North backed by enormous academic capital and, on the other hand, emergent, indigenous sociologies of the South, bereft of material and intellectual resources. For the most part, this imbalance has led to a struggle on the terrain of Northern sociology rather than a frontal assault against its universalizing tendencies.

These are some of the dilemmas with which any global sociology must grapple and which we sought to address in our experimental "Global Sociology, Live!" course at the University of California, Berkeley. Most crucially, we aimed to include an internationally diverse array of scholars who contributed their varied perspectives to our discussions. Using video-conferencing and Skype, we invited sociologists from different parts of the world—the Philippines, India, China, Colombia, South Africa, and Lebanon—as well as sociologists in the United States studying different countries, to partake in a discussion of global capitalism and the counter-movements to which it has given rise. They each gave short 15-minute lectures, after which they engaged in a 45-minute discussion with our students, who themselves also came from a variety of different nations and backgrounds. Having studied and discussed the lecturer's work prior to each lecture, the students were well prepared to ask informed questions and participate in lively discussion. All of these sessions were recorded and posted online at isa-sociology.org/global-sociology-live, making them available to global audiences with Internet access. The lecturers are well-known sociologists who, while based in the South, were all trained in the North and speak fluent English. In this sense, we recognize that this project—rather than being counter-hegemonic—indeed took place on the contested terrain of global hegemony, seeking to develop a sociological understanding of global capitalism by exploring its instantiations in different parts of the world.

SOCIOLOGY AS THE STANDPOINT OF CIVIL SOCIETY?

What does it mean to develop a sociological understanding of global capitalism? In other words, what should we mean by global sociology? This requires answering the prior but difficult question: *what is sociology*? Here, too, there is the danger of false universalization, but we will have to take that risk. We have to start somewhere. We approach sociology as the study of the world from the standpoint of society, understood as civil society—

the institutions, organizations, and movements that are neither part of the state nor the market. This does not mean that sociology only studies civil society and its components—family, parties, trade unions, churches, etc.—but rather, that it studies the world from the standpoint of civil society. This immediately differentiates sociology from economics, which studies the world from the standpoint of markets, and from political science, which studies the world from the standpoint of the state and political order. In a world where states and markets conspire to destroy society, sociology finds itself in a challenging position. It takes the *standpoint of a civil society* in which human survival is endangered by the destructiveness of unregulated markets and predatory states.

Now, we should not think that civil society is a holistic, romantic entity, defending all that is good. Civil society is a divided entity, traversed by all manner of exploitations, oppressions, and divisions that are likewise reflected in sociology. Just as civil society is Janus-faced—supporting the state but also potentially challenging it—so the same can be said of sociology. Just as civil society overlaps with the economy and state, their borders often blurred, so too are the borders between sociology, economics and political science. And where civil society is primordial and gelatinous, so too is sociology. In countries where civil society does not exist, sociology cannot emerge except as an underground network, and where civil society is weak and fragmented, as in Russia today, so is sociology. Where civil society is bifurcated, as it was for example in Apartheid South Africa, sociology, too, is bifurcated. Moreover, in places where civil society is colonized by external forces rather than an indigenous civil society, there is instead only a "mass society" of "bare life" comprised of individuals without formal organizational presence.

This vision of sociology as rooted in civil society derives from two theorists—Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi, who observed the transition to advanced capitalism at the critical time of the1930s—and from the critical location of the semi-periphery. From this standpoint, they developed grand vistas of the global order, acutely sensitive to its different parts. Gramsci saw civil society as providing new means for the dominant class of advanced capitalism to secure consent to its domination. However, he did not examine where this civil society came from—it just happened to emerge toward the end of 19th Century in Europe or what he called "the West." Karl Polanyi, on the other hand, was more interested in its origins, arguing that civil society (he simply called it society) emerged as a reaction to the over-extension of the market, particularly the unregulated labor market. He largely focused on England, where industrial capitalism first took root and where reactions

to the market took the form of cooperatives, trade unions, political parties, self-help organizations such as burial societies, as well as the factory and Chartist movements. Those reactions were built on the local organizing of society aspiring to the national level and seeking state regulation of the market. The next round of marketization, after World War I, was spurred on by open trade and exchange rates fixed by the gold standard. It led to the Great Depression and a subsequent counter-movement by states, impelled by the mobilization of civil society, to regulate their economies so as to insulate them from the ravages of international markets. State-society relations, as varied as the dictatorial regimes of Stalinism and Naziism, and various forms of social democracy in Northern Europe or the New Deal in the United States, set limits on the free play of markets. While Gramsci and Polanyi provide us with a conceptual framework for a sociology that studies the world from the standpoint of civil society, neither of them conceived of the possibility of a *global* civil society that could become the basis of a global sociology.

GLOBAL CAPITALISM AS NEOLIBERALISM

Polanyi did not expect another round of marketization, but this is just what happened in the 1970s with the rise of what we call neoliberalism. In this era, state and economy collude in the promotion of a capitalism that involves, on the one hand, the deregulation of markets, privatization, and a broad offensive against labor, and, on the other hand, the expansion of markets to entities that were hitherto protected, in particular natural resources or the environment (water, air, land), associated with what David Harvey calls "accumulation through dispossession."

This third wave of marketization, characterized in particular by the development of finance capital, has a new global character in that it operates outside the control of nation states. This surely is the lesson of the denouement of the 2008 financial crisis when, in contrast to the 1930s, the United States government did little to regulate finance capital. The power of finance capital makes its presence felt across nation states, but in different ways as Harvey explains in his book, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. In Latin America and Africa, it manifests as the consequence of defaulting on loans, which results in the imposition of harsh structural adjustment programs by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Markets play a very different role in post-Soviet Russia, where they were introduced in an unregulated manner, as compared to China, where they are incubated under the direction of the party state. Despite these variations, third wave marketization assumes a

global character. Thus, our project is to explore its global dynamics, as well as its various manifestations in specific local and national contexts in order to identify the possibilities of a global civil society.

We began our course with Harvey, who provided a framework for approaching neoliberalism as a global class project aimed at capital accumulation through forms of dispossession. We then examined how neoliberalism implants itself differently in different places. Michael Watts discussed the consequences of the Niger Delta oil boom, which has devastated the surrounding communities and given rise to insurgent groups. The oil industry in Nigeria results in national political structures that are fragile and unstable, as they are dependent on oil revenues, rather than being based on the social ties of robust social institutions. Ananya Roy then talked about microfinance loans, designed as development from below. In the case of Bangladesh, we see an example of the success of these loans administered by the Grameen Bank, especially when considered in combination with other organizations that have provided social protection. But precisely because the "beneficiaries" are poor women who can be relied on to pay back their loans, finance capital reaps enormous profit. In other places, such as Egypt, microfinance has been underwritten by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and shaped by geopolitical goals of stabilization, making it less effective as a strategy of economic development.

Whether it be the oil economy or microfinance, global capitalism needs institutions that perform the regulatory function of the state at the international level. Walden Bello outlined the history and role of the IMF, which orchestrates the world's financial order, the World Bank, which promotes specific development projects, and the World Trade Organizations, which regulates international trade. These global institutions seek to prevent crises or contain them when they appear, but, in doing so, they impose austerity measures and harsh conditions on nations. In an apparent shift away from strict neoliberal policies, the World Bank has sought to develop strategies to reduce poverty and to support projects that are less environmentally destructive—yet in reality, market fundamentalism still holds sway. Arguing that these multilateral agencies cannot be reformed, Bello proposed that regions should develop their own regulatory instruments and follow the lead of China, for example, which makes loans that seem to impose fewer conditions upon borrowing nations.

Of course, no attempt to understand global capitalism today can omit China. Ching Kwan Lee talked to us about the ways that China does not conform so easily to the model of neoliberalism, if only because the Chinese

state has been such a central actor. Yet in the final analysis she argued that cheap migrant labor and the *hukou* system that patrols it, has underpinned the staggering economic growth of China. Insofar as neoliberalism refers to an economy entirely dominated by the market, China is not neoliberal even if it has moved in that direction. But if, as Harvey argues, neoliberalism refers to an underlying project of strengthening and enriching a dominant class with the aid of the market, China indeed fits the neoliberal model.

THE GLOBAL LOGIC OF NATION STATES

Lee's description of marketization in China brought the state to the forefront of our discussion. When it had become increasingly clear that states have, in fact, played a crucial role in imposing and managing the third wave of marketization, we then raised the question of whether states also sometimes operate according to their own logics of governance which cannot always be fully understood through the lens of neoliberalism or by reference to the economy. What are the logics of governance that characterize states, and particularly those seeking to extend power beyond national territorial boundaries?

Sari Hanafi described the manner by which the Israeli state attempts to govern the Palestinian population through what he calls "spacio-cide," a strategy of rendering Palestinian spaces unlivable and reducing Palestinians to "bare life." He argued that Israeli state practices are characterized by the imposition of a "state of exception" that enables it to manipulate legal frameworks in a manner that ultimately denies Palestinians any rights. Furthermore, he argued that the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions could be similarly understood as responses to being governed under "states of exception," which also reduced these populations to "bare life." In these contexts, the NGOs that compose civil society, largely funded and directed from abroad, often operate in line with state agendas. Hanafi, therefore, maintains that any effective forms of resistance—as in the cases of Egypt and Tunisia—must come from outside civil society through informal connections and alliances among the subaltern.

Laleh Behbehanian shifted our focus from the Middle East to the counter-terrorism practices of the United States government, which she argued invokes a "state of exception" that enables it to bypass the rule of law in its pursuit of "terrorists." The United States' "War on Terror" is a global project that involves extensive cooperation and collusion with the intelligence and security agencies of many other states throughout the world. She suggested that we are witnessing the emergence of a global security apparatus, one in which other nations act as proxies for the United States, enabling it to expand the power of its global reach. In contrast to Hanafi, Behbehanian emphasized that the only significant challenge launched against the United States' "War on Terror" has emerged from the institutions of civil society through an international effort by journalists and NGOs concerned with human rights and civil liberty violations.

COUNTER-MOVEMENTS: LOCAL, NATIONAL, GLOBAL

Through these discussions, it became evident that insofar as sociology seeks to adopt the standpoint of civil society, it must be attentive to both the consequences of marketization in the age of global capital, as well as the increasingly global logics that shape the governance strategies of states. We then turned to the possibilities for counter-movements in the contemporary period, particularly those that might have global dimensions. Peter Evans began our discussion by presenting an optimistic panorama of what he calls "counter-hegemonic globalization." He argued that neoliberalism inevitably fuels opposition by virtue of its destructive social and economic effects, and that generic globalization (the development of new means of communication and mobility) creates opportunities for globalizing this opposition by generating ties among subordinate classes in different nations. He posited that this would require a "braiding" together of broad social movements across national boundaries that would include labor, environmental, women's and human rights organizations, and that these movements would have to operate at the multi-levels of the local, national, and global scales. Evans characterized this approach as a form of Neo-Polanyian optimism. But has it any basis in reality? So we then turned to a number of scholars whose research focus on existing forms of social movements.

Edward Webster, for example, discussed the responses to downsizing and new offensives against labor in the white goods industries in South Korea, South Africa, and Australia. In the cases of South Korea and South Africa, rather than organized counter-movements, we find workers taking up defensive survival strategies and seeking new ways of sustaining themselves in the informal economy. Only in Orange, Australia were there signs of local organizing, involving collaboration with farmers to put pressure on the state to regulate capital and provide security for workers. While this is the sort of local national counter-movement found in reaction to the first and second waves of marketization, there were also some attempts to build alliances with workers from other white goods factories in the United States and Sweden, but they came to naught. It turned out that different nodes in this potential labor chain had incompatible interests, based on their different

relations to capital. When talking about the defense of global labor standards, Webster stressed the importance of nationally based labor struggles, which he viewed as the crucial foundation of horizontal transnational linkages that could become the basis for a global movement.

We then turned to Amita Baviskar, who spoke about environmental movements in rural and urban India. She suggested that environmental struggles over deforestation, the construction of dams, and land appropriations for special economic zones, have witnessed more success among the rural poor. In contrast, urban "bourgeois environmentalism" seeks to clean up the city by dispossessing migrant populations living in slums and closing down enterprises that pollute the air, while at the same time pouring resources into road and bridge constructions to facilitate the movement of the greatest polluter of all—the automobile. In focusing on the class dynamics of these struggles, Baviskar shows how apparent counter-movements, such as environmentalism, may actually be the soft side of neoliberalism.

Cesar Rodriguez-Garavito then shared with us examples of struggles by indigenous communities in Latin America against the encroachment of global capital, and, particularly, extractive industries. He showed how these struggles are absorbed in a global socio-legal field that stretches from the communities themselves to include NGOs, the state, and global actors like transnational corporations, the United Nations, and the International Labor Organization. While the terms of this global socio-legal field generally disadvantage indigenous communities, he argued that it nonetheless provided the best opportunity for these movements to contain, or at least delay the devastation of their lands by attempting to hold the state and capital accountable to international legal conventions. Rather than searching for horizontal connections of a transnational "counter-hegemonic" character, Rodriguez pointed us to the absorption of actors in a vertical field, where their struggles necessarily occur on the terms of a global hegemony.

Finally, Erik Olin Wright proposed a different approach—one that looks for alternatives not in vertical global fields or horizontally linked transnational movements, but in emergent institutions that expand the power of civil society vis-à-vis the state and the economy. Here the goal is to search for "real utopias"—actually existing institutions with a potential socialist or democratic character. He identified four such institutions: participatory budgeting, which advances the social vis-à-vis the local state; worker cooperatives, which advance the social vis-à-vis the economy; Wikipedia, which represents a direct collective self-organization of the economy; and unconditional basic income, which enables all manner of new forms of

social empowerment. The project of "real utopias" is to take each case and examine its internal contradictions and conditions of possibility, and, thus, the possibilities for its dissemination. So, for example, participatory budgeting, which initially emerges in Brazil, spreads throughout Latin America, and then comes to be discussed at the United States World Social Forum from where it is taken up by an Alderman in Chicago and becomes a model for other districts. The project of "real utopias" seeks to generalize locally based efforts, with the hope of making them globally accessible, thereby nourishing a global imagination of alternative possibilities to the neoliberal order.

GLOBAL SOCIOLOGY WITHOUT A GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY?

In our search for a global civil society that might launch an effective counter-movement against the collusion of global capital and nation states, we found only fragments and failed attempts. At best, we can say that there may be an embryonic form of a global civil society that has yet to fully develop. But if sociology studies the world from the standpoint of civil society and if there is in fact no real global civil society to speak of—then what does this mean for the possibility of a global sociology?

We concluded this course by identifying three possible approaches to developing a global sociology given the embryonic nature of global civil society. The first involves focusing on the forces, like global capital or states, that seek to fragment and contain civil society. Global sociology must identify those forces, which obstruct the possibilities for developing a global civil society. A second approach would involve working with existing embryos, whether they be "real utopias" or ephemeral cross-national alliances, and examining their conditions of existence, perpetuation, dissemination, or destruction. Global sociology must work with the realities of a fragile civil society, seeking ways to develop and expand it. A final approach would involve sociology actively partaking in the construction of a global civil society. Rather than passively studying the world from the standpoint of civil society, the realities of the contemporary period necessitate a global sociology that actually contributes to building a global civil society. No longer standing outside of the world it studies, sociology develops a reflexivity about its role in constituting and shaping that world. Global sociology becomes a project of public sociology.

Reflections on Contemporary Capitalism and a Global Sociology

Pil Christensen
University of Copenhagen, Denmark

As a student of the "Global Sociology, Live!" course, I feel a strong inclination to continue the discussion that we began on the first day of the course. Along with the different topics, theorists, and cases that we discussed to locate and shape a global sociology, we had to consider the most basic elements of our analysis: what sociology is, what society is, how we should conceptualize both, and what does it mean to understand them in a global perspective. Even though Behbehanian and Burawoy offered a clear framework, the same one that they presented in the article under discussion, we all remained open toward questioning this framework. A fundamental openness characterized our discussions, and I felt I was a part of the common project to investigate and develop new ways of understanding sociology and our global world.

Science—and especially social science—is always a common project, and the development of new ideas, models, and theories never happens in a vacuum. The idea of a single theoretical genius is one we need to dispel, and, instead, we need to focus on the collective process of creating new knowledge. Therefore, I am delighted to continue to participate in the collective process of developing a framework for global sociology—especially since I write this response, from the other side of the world, in Denmark.

First, I want to question the basic model upon which Behbehanian and Burawoy built their analysis. Is it possible and desirable today to analyze our society by compartmentalizing it into three main spheres—the economy, the state, and civil society? And what problems do we create for the rest of our analysis by using this model?

Secondly, I will reflect upon the question of whether contemporary capitalism can be understood solely as neoliberalism or whether we forget some important aspects of capitalism by understanding it within this frame. Lastly, I will discuss the perspectives of counter-movements, using my own analysis, as well as the context provided by Behbehanian and Burawoy, as a framework. Furthermore, I will criticize the role of the state in the basic framework presented by Behbehanian and Burawoy.

SOCIOLOGY AS THE STANDPOINT OF CIVIL SOCIETY?

Behbehanian and Burawoy base their sociological analysis of the contemporary world on a tripartition of society into the economy, the state, and civil society. They "approach sociology as the study of the world from the standpoint of society, understood as civil society" (Behbehanian and Burawoy 2012:4). This model is mainly based on the ideas of two sociological theorists—Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi. As Behbehanian and Burawoy acknowledge, the theorists developed their analyses of civil society and capitalism in the first half of the 20th Century. The theorists both focus on the "transition to advanced capitalism" (2012:5) in the 1930s and, therefore, industrial capitalism and the concomitant industrial society. It is under the hegemony of industrial capitalism that the analysis of society as comprised of three main spheres makes sense, and, therefore, it also makes sense to understand sociology as the study of society from the perspective of civil society. In my view, the form of capitalism as industrial and Fordist was the foundation for dividing society into an economic, a political, and a civil society sphere. My argument is that capitalism has changed radically, and can no longer be characterized as an industrial capitalism. Instead, the human interactions and activities that Behbehanian and Burawoy associate with civil society must, in the contemporary capitalist society, be understood as productive and political and, therefore, also a part of the economic and political sphere.

So what form does capitalism take today? And why does it break down the boundaries between the different spheres? With inspiration from a different theoretical standpoint than the one adopted by Behbehanian and Burawoy—broadly represented in the autonomist Marxist tradition and especially in the work of Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt (2000; 2004; 2009)—it is possible to identify a transition from Fordism to Post-Fordism that began in the 1970s and continues today. This transition can be characterized as a paradigm shift. A paradigm establishes a model according to which society is structured in a certain historical period, and history can, in this way, be said to consist of a range of different paradigms. According to Hardt and Negri, the structures in a certain paradigm are generally seen as determined by hegemonic forms of production, and different paradigms are structured by different hegemonic tendencies. Fordism and Post-Fordism represent two different paradigms. Industrial production constituted the dominating and hegemonic form of production in the Fordist era

and, therefore, pervaded all other forms of work, production, and social organization in general. Concretely, this meant that all social institutions—for example, the school, the hospital, and the military base—had the factory as their model (2004:140-142). Society under industrial capitalism was organized by the sharp divisions between work life and other forms of life *and* between the directly productive work conducted in the factory and the reproductive work in other spheres of society. This helps us to understand why civil society by Gramsci and Polanyi was sharply separated from both the economic and the political sphere and why it made sense to base an initial analysis of society on this foundation.

Because the paradigm shift in capitalist production has radically changed society, approaching civil society as separate from the economy and the state becomes problematic. The important point is that we live today in a fundamentally new form of society, and we abide by a new form of capitalism. The Post-Fordist paradigm is characterized by what we could call bio-political production or immaterial labor—that is, the things we as humans produce in common—knowledge, communication, emotions, communality, and relations. Now, it is important to stress that we should see this new form of production as hegemonic in a qualitative rather than a quantitative sense. This means that immaterial labor or bio-political production is not the form of labor that, in terms of numbers, necessarily dominates our society (after all, most people still work in traditional forms of production, or in the agricultural sector). What it instead means is that the characteristics of immaterial and *bio-political labor* permeate all other forms of production and the structuring of society more generally. Thus, all forms of labor tend to become informationalized, intellectualized, and characterized by the pressure to make personal connections with clients and co-workers (Hardt and Negri 2004:109). This applies to the American service worker who must smile and be polite, the Northern European caretaker or nurse who must exude a warm bedside manner, and the Eastern European factory worker who must communicate with her team. Thus, the changes in capitalism must be seen as global, and although people around the world still live very different lives and experience diverse working conditions, we are all subsumed by the new form capitalism has taken.

The essential change from industrial capitalism to Post-Fordist production is that human life itself has become the main productive element. Because of this new productive paradigm, the boundaries between the spheres of economy, state, and civil society dissolve. When production is based on and structured by communication, knowledge, personal connections, and communality, the common human life and interactions

between humans come to structure and organize production—and this is what mainly creates value (Hardt and Negri 2004:107-115). Capitalism as an economic system is no longer the main creator of value by structuring and organizing the production; it is, instead, human interaction.

Just as our social lives cannot be separated from the economy, they also cannot be separated from the political. Politics understood as praxis, which concerns the change, organization, and management of society, has become immanent in social life since Post-Fordist production is characterized by the human ability to organize, manage, and change society. The production process is no longer structured by the assembly line but by human cooperation (Hardt and Negri 2009:174-175). Politics is ubiquitous in our romantic life, the construction of identities, culture, work place, and social relations more generally. Through our social and common life, we produce both value and politics.

When our social and cultural lives are productive and, at the same time, always characterized by the political, it makes little sense to understand society as divided into three different spheres. We must, as sociologists, investigate society from the perspective of the new conditions created by Post-Fordist capitalism. If we keep studying society as if it has not changed since Gramsci or Polanyi wrote their theoretical canons, then we miss the possibility of understanding our world and creating possibilities for resistance. Human interactions associated with civil society must be understood as productive and political and, therefore, as a part of the economic and political sphere.

Unpaid reproductive work must be seen as productive, together with different forms of human activity located outside the sphere of traditional and paid forms of work. On an abstract level, the distinctions between productive and reproductive or between paid and unpaid work, disappear since our social relations, community, and communication is what produces value in society. The sharp line between work and leisure that were dominant during the era of industrial capitalism has withered, and, under Post-Fordism, we are always working and producing. The domestic sphere and the work sphere are no longer so distinct because people increasingly work from home, and can be contacted by e-mail at any time on, for example, their smart phones. Social production does not happen in a delineated room, such as the factory or within a certain time frame associated with the traditional nine-to-five job. This must be understood as a theoretical and abstract model since we experience multiple boundaries between our work life and other areas of our lives. But it is still important that the basic frames of society must be reconsidered or discarded in the Post-Fordist era.

Crucial to state though is that my analysis is not structurally

determinist—the paradigm shift in capitalist production occurred due to many different factors, among them, technological development and various struggles against capitalism. Changes must, therefore, be seen as an interaction between many different forces and actors and not as determined by internal mechanisms in capitalist production. At the same time, I want to stress that the capitalist relations of production, in general, do not determine the structures of all other social phenomena. The power relations between sex, race, and gender, for example, are related to but not subordinated by capitalism.

As Behbehanian and Burawoy note, Polanyi was "arguing that civil society (he simply called it society) emerged as a reaction to the over-extension of the market, particularly the unregulated labor market," and "[h]e largely focused on England, where industrial capitalism first took root and where reactions to the market took the form of cooperatives, trade unions, political parties, self-help organizations such as burial societies, as well as the factory and Chartist movements" (2012:5-6). It is not that these reactions to the capitalist market economy do not exist anymore—capitalism still destroys the human being, nature, and society, and, therefore, still meets resistance. Instead, resistance takes and can take other forms, and resistance must not be analyzed as separate from productive and economic aspects of society.

GLOBAL CAPITALISM AS NEOLIBERALISM?

The first theorist we discussed in the course was David Harvey, who presented his conceptualization of contemporary capitalism as neoliberalism. Harvey gave us a range of different tools and useful insights to understand neoliberalism and the conditions it exacerbates. But when we understand global capitalism solely as neoliberalism—as Behbehanian and Burawoy do—it creates at least one important problem: we forget the progress within capitalism of the last 40 years. When contemporary capitalism is understood as neoliberalism, it is often cast as a negative state or a regression. The idea is that conditions for humans, nature, and society have only worsened during the neoliberalization of capitalism. A nostalgic longing for a past that never existed often follows from this idea.

Without discarding the theory of neoliberalism, we need to understand capitalism as Janus-faced. Contemporary capitalism needs to be seen both as progress and regression, something that is reflected in new possibilities for emancipation and alienation. If one of the main productive forces in society is social life and human interaction, then the means of production

must exactly become humans and human life (Hardt and Negri 2000:46). In this sense, the human being "owns" the most important means of production in the form of the body and mind, and, therefore, the ability to create communality, emotions, relations, and communication. This, at least in some ways, moves us closer to a self-determined society controlled by human needs. Working conditions, mostly in Western societies and in more immaterial sectors are also characterized by greater flexibility in terms of working time, place, and content. More autonomy, creativity, cooperation, and chances for mobility between jobs are often incorporated. There should be no doubt that these characteristics can have significant negative, alienating implications and consequences, but they also contain the potential for emancipation in the form of self-determined production.

Again, however, contemporary capitalism must be perceived as double-sided, and besides what we could call the neoliberalization of capitalism, the drawback is also represented in a deeper form of alienation (Hardt and Negri 2000:406; 2004:66; 2009:137-140). The new forms of production induce, to a much greater extent than under Fordist production, control and absolute subjection under the domain of capital. Because social life becomes central to production, production seeks to commodify human capability, and our social and emotional relations become objects for and on the market. When our communities, passions, communication, and cogitation become central parts of the way we work and produce, making them subsequently products for sale, the possibility of alienation from exactly these abilities and activities becomes more likely, and we risk becoming fundamentally alien to ourselves.

Neoliberalism is in many ways a good way to diagnose capitalism; but it needs the second perspective, the progressive face, to be aligned with the conditions created by contemporary capitalism since our current form of capitalism also contains improvement and new possibilities.

COUNTER-MOVEMENTS IN A NEW WORLD

The perception of contemporary capitalism and its global forms is important for our analysis of resistance, the possibilities of resistance, and all forms of counter-movements. Peter Evans was the first scholar in the course to confront the question of counter-movements in his optimistic analysis. Evans (2008) writes about the possibilities of a transnational union movement and the ways that globalization reinforce the necessities of a global labor movement. Evans offers good points, but a complete transformation of the union movement as well as our basic understanding of value production are necessary to deliver on Evans' optimism. It is not

enough to transcend national borders; conceptual boundaries also need to be analytically dissolved. As I have argued, work is being transformed all over the globe and social production, cooperation, and immaterial products have become more important. Furthermore, a substantial production of wealth occurs outside a traditional labor market. Women's unpaid domestic labor and people's traditional knowledge about nature are just two examples. This general transformation of production needs new and different forms of organization that correspond to contemporary forms of production. Therefore, it becomes important that the traditional labor movement includes not only workers but also people without work, students, undocumented workers, and people who perform precarious and unpaid labor. A similar critique can be made of other scholars featured in the course. Eddie Webster, Rob Lambert, and Andries Bezuidenhout (2008) give us an analysis of the strategic changes that the labor movements will have to undergo to be able to fight the neoliberal restructuring process. Webster and his co-authors provide strong ideas in terms of strategies for the unions, suggesting cooperation between unions and the community and arguing for a dissolution of the distinction between productive and reproductive work (2008:188-211). But we must ask the question: Why do Webster et al. not take a fuller step and suggest organizing around social production in general, by letting the unions not only cooperate with other civil society and community organizations, but actually organize with them, and, thus, recognize the value produced in the reproductive and unpaid labor spheres?

We can criticize some of the course presenters for their lack of suggestions for resistance corresponding with the conditions created by contemporary capitalism. But this critique can be directed at our class as well, since we, in some ways, had a hard time suggesting opportunities and alternatives for resistance. As Behbehanian and Burawoy argue (and what furthermore became evident during the course), new forms of sovereignty characterize the global world today. Power is, to a greater extent, located on a global level, and the traditional sovereignty of the nation-state can be questioned. For example, Behbehanian "suggested that we are witnessing the emergence of a global security apparatus, one in which other nations act as proxies for the United States, enabling it to expand the power of its global reach" (Behbehanian and Burawoy 2012:8). Other examples of global power include the great influence many international corporations and international institutions have compared to nation-states—for example, the Nigerian oil industry that Michael Watts (2006, 2007) investigated. In spite of these lessons and our collective discussion, we often did not apply the

insights regarding power to the question of resistance. Most of our solutions to neoliberalism and destructive capitalism ended up being an appeal to the state for more regulation and control of a raging capitalism. Sometimes the appeal was directed toward an imaginary global state apparatus, and many times the focus was on the nation-state.

I think our inability to bypass the state is connected to the general framework of the course, which I have already discussed. If we understand economy, civil society, and the state as three different spheres, we cannot move beyond a demand for state regulation. We are not able to develop ideas that extend beyond the boundaries made by the three spheres if they become our fundamental way of conceptualizing society. To create and contribute to resistance and counter-movements that aim to take back power in our lives, nature, and society, we need to see the possibilities of using our basic productivity and political power immanent in social life. Framing resistance as something that comes from a civil society—which is separate from both economy and politics—produces a passive appeal to the state since we do not see ourselves as capable of wielding significant power.

Furthermore, the separation of the economy from what we call civil society reproduces a capitalist discourse and a way of generating value because it implies that value in our society is created by the capitalist economy and not by human activity. The idea of civil society as detached from the economy does not recognize the fundamental productive value of human activity in the Post-Fordist era, and, therefore, the possibility of a transformation of the productive relations in society. Thus, the division of society into three spheres thwarts the basis for transcending a society organized around capitalist production.

A Polanyian vision—one that both Evans and Webster, to some extent, adopt—by which civil society controls the market and the state seems to ultimately be a variation of the regulated market. This is a social democratic, Keynesian idea, which does not decisively break with the commodification and marketization of labor. Even more, although social democracies have created more equal societies within their borders, they are often built upon protectionism and foreign resource extraction, which is based on an unequal distribution of wealth on a global scale.

Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to find permanent alternatives to capitalism, which Behbehanian and Burawoy underscore when they assert that "human survival is endangered by the destructiveness of unregulated markets and predatory states" (2012:5).

A GLOBAL SOCIOLOGY?

There is no doubt in my mind that a global sociology is necessary and that we should continue our discussion about this emerging field. The global conditions of capitalism require that we, as sociologists, find ways to investigate the contemporary world. Further, we should constantly discuss the perspectives and theoretical lenses we use in our investigation.

A global sociology should, in my opinion, not necessarily be the study of society from the perspective of a global civil society, as Behbehanian and Burawoy argue. Still, I find the conclusions from our course to be prudent. It is possible to use all three approaches without having to accept the Gramscian tripartition of society since it makes sense to look at different parts of society while simultaneously not understanding them as separate spheres (Behbehanian and Burawoy 2012:5). Furthermore, it is necessary to use all approaches in order to achieve a diverse conception of our global society.

Finally, Behbehanian and Burawoy's suggestion that global sociology should become "a project of public sociology" is important. Instead of framing the project as one that "contributes to building a global civil society," a public sociology today should contribute to the shaping of resistance and counter-movements against a neoliberal capitalism while developing alternatives to a society dominated by capitalism. We must formulate a vision of a non-capitalist society. A society built upon a form of economy that does not commodify or marketize labor is absolutely necessary if we want to care for both people and nature *and* if we want to create equality, freedom, and democracy on a global level. We must make these goals universal modes of thought. We must use our sociological imagination to shape ideas of a society beyond capitalism.

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Taking Global Sociology Global: What is Global Sociology and Do Norwegian Sociologists Really Need It?

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Take the ideas of this course to the furthest corners of the planet.
—Laleh Behbehanian and Michael Burawoy

Globalization is without doubt the most overused concept of the 21st Century. Without properly defining the term, everyone seems to be adding the prefix "global" to their work, and based on the number of textbooks on "Global Sociology" produced in the last decades,[1] it is safe to say that the trend has inevitably also reached the sociological community. In cooperation with the International Sociological Association (ISA), Laleh Behbehanian and Michael Burawoy launched their contribution through the undergraduate course and online lecture series "Global Sociology, Live!" at the University of California, Berkeley.[2] In contrast to other prefix-seekers, however, they developed a thorough framework by which "global sociology" can be understood and studied. This paper looks at their approach, and asks whether it is the one that sociologists in Norway should strive to adopt.

In this paper, by discussing a small sample of research on what could be called global sociology in Norway, I join those who have concluded that Norwegian sociology lacks a global perspective, and I add that this clearly limits Norwegian sociologists in most terrains of study. I continue by identifying a set of critiques to the approach[3] taken by Behbehanian and Burawoy and considering the challenges that this approach might meet when adopted outside its Anglo-American context.[4] I conclude by presenting what I believe are the most valuable parts of global sociology and what aspects of the course Norwegian sociologists and others should embrace.

WHAT IS GLOBAL SOCIOLOGY?[5]

In their final lecture in "Global Sociology, Live!" and in the article to which this paper is a response, Behbehanian and Burawoy state that there are several possible ways to define global sociology and that it is still an experiment, an ongoing process. However, they did provide a definition, one that has served as the starting point for the course. Based on the notion that sociology is the study of the world from the standpoint of what Gramsci termed *civil society*, global sociology must ultimately be pursued from the standpoint of *global civil society*. Yet, a problem emerges when we are not able to identify such a constellation. Without a civil society, there is no sociology (Behbehanian and Burawoy 2012).

Still, Burawoy concludes that there are three ways in which global sociology can be approached. The first is by studying the very institutions that prevent or undermine global civil society from forming. This is the approach taken by Walden Bello, who claims that global sociology, "among other things, [is] the study of international power structures […] of hegemony" (2011). A second approach is to work with the embryonic forms of a global civil society that do exist, for example, by taking the perspective of the emerging global labor movement. The third, and perhaps most interesting approach, is for sociologists to work to *produce* a global civil society, constituting their very own object of study through engaging in conversations of transnational character. This last approach presupposes that sociologists strive to be reflexive and also that the sociology they pursue has a public dimension, in the Burawoyian sense of the term (Behbehanian and Burawoy 2012).

Global sociology, as pursued in this lecture series, does not strive to be a universal sociology nor another projection of American or Western views, but rather a sociology rooted in a number of national contexts, conducted from different points on the planet. This course, Behbehanian and Burawoy say, qualifies as global sociology because they foregrounded a variety of voices and sought diversity in lecturers and the classroom. In total, they contend that this course is globally accessible, with a global perspective, and with case studies from different parts of the world.

GLOBAL APPROACHES FROM A FAR CORNER OF THE PLANET

Burawoy wants a global sociology to come from different points of the planet, but one must question whether such global approaches are already emerging. Research (pursued primarily by master's students on the degree

to which Norwegian sociologists engage in global questions) shows that the discourse prevalent in this far northern corner of the planet overlooks most aspects of what Behbehanian and Burawoy call "global sociology."

Through her analysis of ethnocentrism in course material assigned to students at the University of Oslo, Ida Hjelde (2006) started a still on-going debate in Norwegian sociology about the discipline's tendencies to, while speaking increasingly about globalization, continuously reproduce narrow Western views of society without taking into consideration how the world is shaped by transnational institutions and global processes (Khazaleh 2006). Her thesis galvanized a discussion among students and faculty more than 30 years after Said published *Orientalism*, a clear indication that such a voice had not previously been heard in the discipline. Hans Erik Næss (2007, 2008) continued the discussion by studying the syllabi given to sociology students throughout Norway. He concludes that Norwegian sociology is suffering from a "transnational deficit" since only five of 155 available bachelor's and master's courses in sociology successfully incorporated transnational approaches.

Even more, based on a preliminary study of the work conducted by the country's leading sociologists,[6] Neumann concludes that Norwegian sociology is blind to the internationalization and globalization of sociology occurring elsewhere in the world. He points out that although some Norwegian sociologists do study globalization (Mjøset), global processes (Brockmann), and social life outside of Norway (Prieur), it is the study of isolated Norway—treated as a separate unit rather than a part of a global network—that dominates. This is a clear paradox according to Neumann since neoliberalism increasingly permeates all aspects of Norwegian society (Neumann 2007:277).[7] Norwegian sociology has experienced a sharp decline in funding, the number of students applying for positions, and overall standing relative to other social sciences. The reluctance to admit that a global focus must permeate Norwegian sociological studies has led to the weakening of the entire discipline, according to Neumann, especially as other fields are successfully adopting such an approach. For example, "International Studies" is currently the most popular bachelor's program in social sciences at the University of Oslo. Even more, the social anthropologist Thomas Hylland-Eriksen has had great success with his transnational research network, Culcom, which reframed the question of migration from one of immigration to one of transnational migration. Until the university withheld funding in 2011, Culcom served as an arena for public social science with research projects funded by the university rather than by state or outside donors. Sociologists were absent from the program, with the exception of a small group of master's students (among them the above-mentioned Næss). Based on the little available research, one is preliminarily led to conclude that some kind of global sociology is, indeed, needed in Norway. There are arenas in Norway where a global sociology is being debated, but they seem to be dominated by non-sociologists, a trend which can arguably be seen as a threat to the entire discipline of Norwegian sociology.

(WHY) DO WE NEED GLOBAL SOCIOLOGY AT ALL?

As demonstrated in the previous section, Norwegian sociology is in need of a global perspective and one could say that the framework presented by Behbehanian and Burawoy would be a fruitful approach. Still, there are some reasons why one could argue that global sociology as it has currently been presented is not an approach that should be adopted by sociologists worldwide—at least not without slight modification.

First, as it stands now, Behbehanian and Burawoy's global sociology is strongly biased towards northern perspectives. Although they claim that their approach should not be yet another attempt at exporting a Western or American framework to scholars in the rest of the world, the effort to present this course as more global (than it really is) is striking and does not live up to the goal of the reflexive sociologist. To say that Gramsci and Polanyi are not Western thinkers because they are from the European periphery is not a valid claim—especially since Polanyi wrote *The Great Transformation* in English from London. These frameworks are built predominantly from the standpoints of European men from the West, and, with the exception of Webster,[8] all the lecturers who presented in this course have completed their graduate studies at Western elite educational institutions.[9] One could even go so far as to argue that calling a sociology developed in elite universities in the West "global" is an attempt by scholars to strengthen and legitimize their own positions in the field of sociology (certainly, in addition to and not instead of, contributing to a better understanding of global processes). To add the "global sociology" label to a scholar's work is certainly legitimizing, but may be seen as an attempt to divert attention away from the clear discrepancy between the attention given to sociology produced in the Global South and sociology produced in the Global North. If global sociology cannot be part of removing the divide, it should not attempt to legitimize it. For Norwegian scholars and others who aim to adopt a more global perspective, increased caution and openness about existing biases cannot be emphasized enough. If we do not succeed in overcoming the tendency to legitimize sociology from the North, global sociology may leave us stuck in the corner where

we invented the term rather than taking us, indeed, to the far corners of the planet.

Second, as is made very clear by the Norwegian case, global sociology intersects with existing academic fields, and one argument against a global sociological subfield may be that such an approach already exists in the vast number of emerging scholarly disciplines: International Studies, International Relations, Development Studies, and, *inter alia*, Global Studies. One could, for example, argue that certain International Relations scholars pursue the goals of this course's "global sociologist." Having historically been a discipline that studies global processes through the lens of the state, International Relations scholars are increasingly also studying global processes from the perspective of civil society. This is not necessarily an argument against the emergence of global sociology, but it is one that scholars approaching this field should be aware of and responsive to. Rather than limiting the potential for the framework developed here, the participation of non-sociologists in the field of global sociology can be said to increase its possibilities since non-sociologists will also, presumably, be interested in a strong global sociology.

WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

Within the framework presented by Behbehanian and Burawoy, there lies immense potential, despite the weaknesses pointed out in the above section. Most specifically, this potential lies in what Burawoy names the "pluralization of conversation," a call which is not new to the discipline of sociology. Bourdieu asks scholars to form an "international of intellectuals," and Ulrich Beck calls for global cosmopolitanism. However, as Burawoy (2010:4) points out, it is unclear how all of our divisions evaporate when, together, we meet global challenges—be they of neoliberalism, world system crisis, or deepening global inequality. In the spirit of this class, I believe we must start not within each national context, but rather or in addition, within each global sociologist. As a generation of students increasingly confronts a globalized world, it is through greater diversity in educational institutions all over the world that the real possibility for a global sociology can be found. It is through education in sociology that our sociological habitus is formed.

When Burawoy (2010), Bourdieu (1997), and others argue that we must situate a thinker in his national context in order to gain full understanding of his work, they are overlooking the important factor that national sociologies, such as in the Norwegian case, are taking the standpoint of a national(istic) civil society. Burawoy stresses that global sociology must be grounded in the national context, *ergo*, Norway should also seek to ground

a sociology of its own. I would argue the contrary. The house of global sociology can have national walls, but the foundation must ultimately be of a transnational character, by which scholars see themselves as belonging to more than one national discipline. Having worked, lived and conducted research in and around the world, and, in the process, learned a variety of languages and about other cultures permitted the lecturers in this class to think in global terms. It is precisely this sense of having a foot in each camp that makes scholars global sociologists. Increasingly providing opportunities for sociology students to travel, learn foreign language, and work outside their national arenas would fulfill the promise of global sociology. Graduate students should be encouraged to do part of their research abroad; we should work towards increasing the number of international students and faculty in our universities; and, most importantly, coordinate our efforts in ensuring that universities stay or become public. These recommendations are perhaps the best way sociologists can contribute to the creation and expansion of a global civil society. At least, these suggestions are how we produce global sociologists of the future.

CONCLUSION

This paper has shown that Norwegian sociology is in strong need of a framework that may allow for a shift towards a more global approach to sociology. Further, I have shown that the approach taken by Behbehanian and Burawoy (2011; 2012) holds great promise for Norwegian sociologists, but that it also has some significant weaknesses. Most importantly, global sociology is not as reflexive and internationally based as it claims to be, and, thus, scholars adopting a similar model may find themselves legitimizing their own work to the exclusion of scholars not educated in Anglo-American elite universities.

One solution to this problem is to increasingly adopt global networks of scholars, which the International Sociology Association (ISA) is currently and notably achieving. Global sociology should also increasingly cooperate with existing scholarly fields, such as that of International Relations. But more importantly, scholars should move away from the rigid view that a global sociology must be grounded in national sociologies. Rather, it may be grounded in the many emerging global sociologists. Producing students with such a habitus, not only through dialogue but also through international experience, is needed, and the only way to do so is by providing possibilities and opportunities for sociology students to experience the world outside their national settings. Sociologists can contribute to this training by engaging

in the fight for free public universities all around the world. We might end up, indeed, catalyzing the birth of a global civil society in the process.

To conclude on a curious note, a search in Norwegian Google for "global sociology"[10] proves what this paper has attempted to show: that global sociology is not alive and striving in this cold corner of northern Europe. However, it also shows that small attempts at global sociology in one part of the world can have impact elsewhere, and although I encourage caution in attempting to spread the framework discussed here, it does hold some promise for the future. After all, the first hit on Norwegian Google is the blog for Behbehanian and Burawoy's class, "Global Sociology, Live!"[11]

NOTES

1. See, for example, Cohen and Kennedy (2007); Ferrante (2008); Lie (1994); Macionis and Plummer (2008); Sklair (1995); and Sneider and Silverman (2009).

2. It should be noted that the idea of the course rested on Behbehanian and Burawoy having a long-term engagement with the topic.

3. Norwegian sociology is heavily dominated by American trends. One could argue that if this approach were challenged in Norwegian academe, it would certainly be more heavily challenged elsewhere. In that sense, exporting a framework of global sociology to Norway may seem as a simple "first step" if one wants global outreach.

4. As will be discussed in this paper, I believe that the Anglo-American context is important for how this framework has developed, despite Behbehanian and Burawoy's (2011; 2012) attempts to avoid this.

5. This paper by limited to discussing the definitions and approaches to global sociology that are offered by Behbehanian and Burawoy (2011; 2012).

6. None of which produced a single article for publication in any of the top three sociology journals of the world (*American Review of Sociology, American Sociological Review* or *British Journal of Sociology*) between 2000 and 2004 (Neumann 2007:276).

7. I would add a couple of names to this list, among them Katrine Fangen. However, I largely agree with the tendency Neumann underscores.

8. Webster earned his doctorate from Witwatersrand, South Africa, but also holds degrees from the University of Oxford and the University of York.

9. Amita Baviskar (University of Dehli, Cornell University), Walden Bello (Princeton University), Laleh Behbehanian (American University in Cairo**,** University of California, Berkeley), Michael Burawoy (University of Zambia, University of Chicago), Peter Evans (Harvard University, Oxford University), Ching Kwan Lee (University of California, Berkeley), Sari Hanafi (University of Strasbourg, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris), David Harvey (Cambridge University), César Rodriguez-Garavito (New York University, University of Wisconsin, Madison), Ananya Roy (University of California, Berkeley), Michael Watts (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor), Erik Olin Wright (University of California, Berkeley).

10. The Norwegian terms, "globalsosiologi" and "global sosiologi" searched June 5, 2011 and December 5, 2011.

11. The blog can be found on globalsociologylive.blogspot.com.

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The Wound and the Knife: Five Theses on Crisis, *Demos*, and Counter-Terror

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The most original feature of this terror formation is its concatenation of biopower, the state of exception and the state of siege. Crucial to this concatenation is, once again, race.
—Achille Mbembe, *Necropolitics*

I am both the wound and knife, both the blow and the cheek, limbs and the rack, victim and the torturer. / ... I am my heart's own vampire ...
—Charles Baudelaire, "L'Héautontimorouménos"

This short paper will examine preliminary materials for five theses on three conceptual categories: crisis, *demos*, and terror and counter-terror—categories visited with Michael Burawoy and Laleh Behbehanian throughout their seminar course, "Global Sociology, Live!" While the structure of this paper builds from a somewhat unconventional scaffolding, it is bound by larger claim: insofar that the "Janus-faced"[1] characterization of civil society is useful to differentiate civil society's potential challenge (against the state and/or the economy) from its active collusion (with the state and/or the economy), the reverse is also true: the "Janus-faced" characterization (Behbehanian and Burawoy 2012) is reciprocally weak in its ability to conceptualize the potential challenge civil society *qua* civil society mounts as an already active collusion. That is to say, the terrain of potentially dynamic social, cultural, and political conflict provided by civil society is fundamental for the state and economy's reproduction—such potential conflict is ceremonial, not a "blurring at [the] edges" of the modern state and economy, but instead a relationship of co-animating interdependence.[1,2]

As Burawoy and Behbehanian acknowledge in "Global Sociology: Reflections on an Experimental Course": "In our search for a global civil society that might launch an effective counter-movement against the

collusion of global capital and nation states, we found only fragments and failed attempts" (2012:11). Perhaps, then, we do not situate—that is to say, we do not invest our optimism in or attempt to build as sociologists[3]—ourselves in a fugitive global civil society. Rather, we look toward those spaces that appear to reproduce and proliferate as quickly as neoliberal capital: fragmented spaces of bare life—precisely those bits of space and territory "comprised of individuals without formal organizational presence" (2012:5)—as our trench and vantage point. Perhaps using the easy visual logic of our computer operating systems, our seminar's analysis reflexively "maximized" the model of national civil societies into a global one. We looked for institutions of global governance that could match a global economy. But what the global economy produces is not a global governance, but slums (Denning 2010).

This paper essentially attempts to spatialize and expand this claim through the above mentioned conceptual categories. The challenges to this claim are immediate. Looking at "bare life," for instance, from the point of view of civil society as we have in our seminar, it appears "inchoate, disorderly, arbitrary."[4] Indeed, these are words we have used in Burawoy and Behbehanian's seminar to define "bare life" itself. And so—taking a cue from sociologist Saskia Sassen's short article "The World's Third Spaces"—this paper attempts to draw out a view from a space that is neither global nor national, but partial, fragmented, and bare.

1.1 CRISIS: SURPLUS POPULATIONS—DISPOSSESSION AND WAR

Our first and most basic thesis is one that we have referenced time and again throughout the seminar course, restated here: (1.1) that capital rallies the production and regulation of surplus populations—the result of what Karl Marx called "primitive accumulation" and what David Harvey coined "accumulation by dispossession." In short, this thesis highlights the main event of a globalizing and expanding capitalism or, in general, "the economy."

For instance, we might begin by remembering that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994[5] was a collaboration between actors within the economy and the territorialized violence of the nation state. Perhaps in contrast to Marx, we have not developed a position where the state is purely superstructural.[6] Instead, we have assumed a tricky presupposition throughout the semester: we do not say that the state is an empty vessel in which either capital or civil society imposes itself.

The opposite position would appear to turn a blind eye to the question of the historical failure of national campaigns—anti-colonial, socialist, or otherwise—and the reality of transnational capital. We have said, instead, that the state operates through its own logic and by its own desire for reproduction and relevance in governance.

How then to understand NAFTA? On the one hand, for the economy, it is the smoothing of the space in which capital flows: the aligning of legitimated violence across territories to ensure the right of finance capital and commodities to move with ease; an alignment of violence to ensure the right to purchase that most "peculiar commodity," the particular form of life that is labor power, and to turn that labor power into further capital and further objects. On the other hand, NAFTA is a "War on the Border" against surplus populations. This war, like any war, is both a war of position and a war of maneuver. It uses many tactics: the state's prison system[7] bolstered by new Federal Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) facilities; federal ICE forces posted along the United States-Mexican borderlands; Norteño-Sureño regulation throughout California; the camp bio-politics of body regulation through documentation and non-documentation; docile service labor in the cities and docile farm labor in the countryside; the reemergence of Bracero-era narratives about misogynistic, irreparably violent, disease-carrying hordes; the regulation of remittances; the banning and defunding of Spanish language courses and Ethnic Studies in schools and universities; the emergence of white militias or "Minute Men" whose sporadic, fragmented, extra-state, racialized violences serve to make the state's apparatus of racialized violence appear legalistic and procedural—that is to say, neutral. And so, while capital produces surplus populations, it is (in the main) the state's war that produces racialized surplus populations. This, of course, is not to imply that civil society could somehow end racialization through encounters with state and legal challenges. Civil society and the state, in fact, participate in governance together, a claim that will be explored in the next section. Capital's production of surplus populations is immediately racialized, with the regulation of race war being the primary mechanism of the state's "War on the Border."

2.1 *DEMOS*: THE SPACE OF GOVERNANCE AND DIFFERENCE

Democracy designates both the form through which power is legitimated and the manner in which it is exercised.
—Giorgio Agamben, *Democracy in What State?*

That a population is first dispossessed and then barred from a means of flourishing is the real "double movement" of capital and governance. We have lamented this condition throughout our course. The metaphor we might allow ourselves is one of distance, that is, a spatialized governance. Our second thesis claims: (2.1) that dispossession creates territory, and that territory is then claimed by "politics" or "governance"—a managing force that has in modern history been dominated by a collaborative assemblage of the "nation state" and "civil society." Further, this assemblage is situated within the distance between the surplus population and its means of flourishing; governance is an assemblage that functions as a moving barricade, a blockage, "politics," and, in our case, democracy.

2.2 *DEMOS*: CONCEALMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Hence the turn to a universalistic rhetoric of human rights, dignity, sustainable ecological practices, environmental rights, and the like, as the basis for a unified oppositional politics.
—David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*

The distances between a surplus population and its means of flourishing differ in scale from population to population. This distance is then made by both the state and civil society into a redistributive economy of identities ("redistribution" in that labor is first taken or "alienated," then returned in part as subjectivity given that identity can be understood as a reproductive force), the apparatus of difference-making, the broad and coarse fragmentation of race, and the fine fragmentation of individuation. These are the identities through which post-colonial civil society has mobilized (the citizen, the consumer, the person of color, the woman, etc.) and to which the state imbues rights (that the individuated subject is a rights bearing individual, and, in rarer moments, a member of a class which bears rights). Our third thesis claims: (2.2) that these disparities of distance are produced as externalities (to capital's initial and main event of dispossession), and are then cycled through subjects. It is at this moment that

the apparatus of governance becomes more than a barricade; it penetrates the *demos*, and it vitalizes and constitutes the population. While capital produces dispossession—that is to say, the initial distance (the dispossession of humans from a means to produce others and reproduce themselves)—governance produces various disparities of dispossession through a "micro-physics" of power, discipline, and control.[8] What democratic governance produces and subsequently conceals are these disparities of distance. To manage this, a rights discourse and democracy (a discipline control deployed by the state certainly but also by civil society within its social movements[9]) appear to level differences between individuals—the difference, for instance, between racialized subjects. While we may all be dispossessed of the means of production vis-à-vis capital, some are re-enfranchised as consumptive (and productive) subjects vis-à-vis governance. Just as extra-state militias or violence make the state appear reasonable and neutral, real concrete race disparities are both *deployed* by the state and civil society and *remedied* by the state and civil society.

This capacity to conceal partially succeeds. It is no longer, say, France 1848, when the symbol of nascent bourgeois democracy is the swift, painless leveling of the guillotine—indeed, partially because we do not know which class to guillotine. "Dispossession," Harvey writes, "is fragmented and particular" (2005:178). Rights, on the other hand, are levelers and total. When Harvey says a "unified oppositional politics," he is looking for a unified oppositional subjectivity—and our lamentation for this fugitive "countermovement" is still for this antagonistic subjectivity. This heretofore unsatisfied yearning or lamentation should inspire us to consider that if difference is produced as an externality to the "double movement" of capital and the state and if dispossession is then concealed by the state and civil society, then perhaps thinking through the abolition of the state and civil society is just as tenable and meaningful as is thinking through the abolition of capital—especially in those spaces where the productive factory floor is largely removed.[10]

3.1 TERROR AND COUNTER TERROR: BARE LIFE AND STATE DETERRITORIALIZATION

"Terrorism" retains part of the original double meaning of "territory," in that it refers not only to violence, but to space too.
—Mark Neocleous, "Off the Map: On Violence and Cartography"

If our third thesis argues that governance is a collusion between civil society and the state to produce disparity and fragmented identity and to conceal dispossession, then our fourth thesis regards a liberatory counter-movement's strategy and tactic[11]: (3.1) that the tactics and strategies of counter-movements are determined by the extent to which a population (believes it) is included in or excluded from the negotiation of governance or politics. For instance, Sari Hanafi writes:

> "The uprooted body (bare life) it [spaciocide] creates is a body 'ready to blow.' The deracinated body is a subject without relationship to territory; it is a body in orbit, a satellite, the body becomes an uncontrollable and unsupervised object bound to exercise its revenge. Satellites are the objects 'in need' of control, but are difficult to control, and the result is 'ground zero(s),' be it the work of individual terrorists (World Trade Center), or state terrorism (Falujah or Jenin Refugee Camp); and ... we know Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine are interconnected in American and the Muslim cognitive geography" (2009:118-119).

Of particular interest is Hanafi's parenthetical mention of two sites: the Jenin Refugee Camp and Falujah. First, the Jenin Refugee Camp is under the administration of the Palestine Authority—not a sovereign state but an administrative entity similar to a county government. Its borders, airspace, and trade are controlled, in fact, by the Israeli state. Second, when referencing Falujah, Hanafi cites the 2005 Falujah Massacre during which the United States and United Kingdom indiscriminately deployed white phosphorous bombs into civilian areas. So what interests us here is that while Hanafi makes the claim that the deterritorialized body is a "body in orbit," a body "ready to blow," he also—without being explicit—makes the claim that a deterritorialized state is a state in orbit, a state ready to blow. It is an argument worth bearing out: Hanafi is clear in that the Israeli state manages its population through bio-politics[12] (that of admitting into "political life" only one fragment of the population and reducing other fragments of the population to various states of "bare life")[13]—through this political act the state produces terror in those reduced to bare life.

> "Bio-politics renders possible the spaciocide and spaciocide creates deterritorialized bodies, for example, Palestinians without a place in this territory or refugees literally without land. Spaciocide leaves a body without space. This body, then, regains its subjectivity by blowing him or herself up together with an enemy who is also biologically and ethnically classified" (Hanafi 2009:118).

Again, this is true: where exclusion from politics is total, the biological body is the only means by which one can struggle. The examples of body-based struggles or struggles of and through the body are numerous: "suicide bombing" in Israel, self immolation in Tunisia, collective suicide by the U'wa in Colombia and Apple (Foxconn) factory workers in China. But here Hanafi also implies that a deterritorialized state is a state without space, and must reassume its agency through self-abolition. This is to say that two figures occur: first, the political figure—the proceduralist, legal, ostensibly leveling, but actually differentiating, act of politics that produces terror in those reduced to bare life; and, second, the figure of state-terror itself, originating from the deterritorialized state—which itself produces more bare life and, thus, more bodies without space. And so there is a man from Leeds named Shezad Tanweer—who in 2005 weaponizes and detonates himself (killing seven others) on a London Underground train leaving Liverpool Street Station—and in the video communiqué, which he releases postmortem, he directly cites the Falujah Massacre earlier in the year.[14] This example re-proposes the possibility that Behbehanian opens for us when she offered that "terrorism" is:

> "A new statist 'regime of truth,' one that produces the 'truth' of 'terror' by naming it as such. The emergence of terror as a new regime of truth involves two simultaneous developments: the carving out of a new field of state intervention referred to as 'counter terrorism' and the constitution of a new disciplinary subject known as the 'terrorist'" (Behbehanian N.d.).

For Behbehanian, the state makes itself relevant to a population (i.e., manages and regulates bodies and the relationships between bodies) by deploying "counter terrorism"—a "regime of truth" which itself produces the terrorist subject (and, thus, eventually, subjectivity). The state through counter-terrorism produces a subject it (and conveniently, only it) can "solve." Like Hanafi, Behbehanian references Foucault to allow us to do something Harvey (for instance) could not: by thinking precisely through the practice of domination and fragmentation as a mechanism of state reconsolidation in the-face-of or in-collaboration-with (either works here, so well that the difference ceases to matter) capitalist globalization, we see a deterritorializing of state power and the rise of the "War on Terror," a

global "legitimate violence" without a given territory. This maneuver to deterrorialize is the mechanism by which the state makes itself relevant once again. If civil society's response to capitalist globalization is (was) a barely visible "movement of movements," an "anti-globalization" movement in the 1990s and early 2000s, then the state's response is deterritorialization. Thirty years of an attempted "exit" from the United States' 1970s crisis in governance generates a hyper "counter-terrorism" in 2001.

3.2 TERROR AND COUNTER TERROR: IN DEMOCRACY, GUILLOTINES FOR EVERYONE

This is modern democracy's strength and, at the same time, its inner contradiction: modern democracy does not abolish sacred life but rather shatters it and disseminates it into every individual body, making it into what is at stake in political conflict.
—Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer*

Just as the production of bare life has two figures, one of which is state deterritorialization, state deterritorialization itself consists of two figures. First, deterritorialization implies that the state transcends its physical borders as capitalist firms expand past national borders. Secondly, the state also escalates its production and management of subjectivities. It transcends the border of the physical human body, and heavily focuses on the relationships, connections, and networking between bodies (a claim that parallels Foucault's reading of the history of discipline). We can perhaps see a response to this second figure—the state's management of connections and networks—in civil society via horizontal, rhizomatic network-based social movement organizing. Our fifth thesis, then, argues: (3.2) that the individuated, biological body is the material border of governance/capital's primitive accumulation (value through identity production, governance through legal subjectivity, bio-politics, etc.). The biological body is a border that once transcended, power finds (as its object) relationships between bodies. Given this thesis, counter-terror is the management and production of these relationships on behalf of a state in its attempt to "make itself relevant" to a globalizing capital, but also to remain on its own plane of coherence. As Behbehanian makes clear,[15] the "War on Terror" is a tactical extension and expansion of the "War on the Border," the "War on Drugs," and the "War on Gangs." And in so far as these prior wars produce and manage race, the "War on Terror" is an act of race-production and management—that is, race war. In an ostensibly politically post-racial

United States, counter-terror appears precisely because of the first thesis (1.1). To expand the point, in the past three decades of producing surplus populations, race anxiety is high. Behbehanian charts for instance, the National Entry-Exit Registration Scheme program whereby nearly 300,000 United States residents were coercively registered, 13,000 of whom were deported. To a degree, we are tongue tied—not into silence, but over our own proscriptions. We stutter and fumble and are dissatisfied when looking for and attempting to describe a "global civil society" precisely because democracy as it turns out is not the raising of human life to the divine. It is not the secularizing force that reminds us of the basic point made by the Young Hegelian, Ludwig Feuerbach: the sacred is an alienated projection of our own power. Global sociology's divine, global force—even while clutching a list of "real utopias" and models of democratic and "ethical" capitalism—is still missing. Agamben writes:

> "And the root of modern democracy's secret bio-political calling lies here: he who will appear later as the bearer of rights and, according to a curious oxymoron, as the new sovereign subject (*subiectus superaneus*, in other words, what is below and, at the same time, most elevated) can only be constituted as such through the repetition of the sovereign exception and the isolation of corpus, bare life, in himself. If it is true that law needs a body in order to be in force, and if one can speak, in this sense, of 'law's desire to have a body,' democracy responds to this desire by compelling law to assume the care of this body" (1998:73).

We do not solve this problem: that the production and management of race relations is a coarse fragmentation—the atomizing oblivion of individual bodies. Democracy, in fact, tells us that the sacred is political life itself, the remaining populations are congealed, dead objects, some of which are deterritorialized[16] (as are capital and the state) and animated in various stages of bare life—a death necessary for governance. In democracy, the political subject is ostensibly sacred, yet earnestly prostrates, submits, and consents to the sovereign power of the state. The political subject is distant, fragmented, and removed from wielding sovereign power precisely by being animated by that power. There is a move (that both Sari Hanafi and Michel Foucault highlight) by sovereign power away from the territory (deterritorializing) and to the population and to the body. The social war of the 21st Century is democratic in this way—producing and reproducing fragmentary life

horizontally—each body a partial wound, each body a partial knife.

4.1 THESES

1.1 That capital rallies (the production and regulation of) surplus populations—that is to say, the result of (in Harvey's words) "accumulation by dispossession" or (in Marx's words) "primitive accumulation"—in short, the main event of an expanding capitalism or, in general, "the economy";

2.1 that dispossession creates territory, and that territory is then claimed by "politics" or "governance"—a managing force that has in modern history been dominated by a collaborative assemblage of the "nation state" and "civil society";

2.2 That these disparities of distance are produced as externalities (to capital's initial and main event of dispossession) that are then cycled through subjects;

3.1 That the tactics and strategies of "countermovements" are determined by to what extent the population (believes it) is included in or excluded from the negotiation of governance or "politics";

3.2 That the individuated, biological body is the material border of capital's primitive accumulation and governance (value through identity production, governance through legal subjectivity, bio-politics, etc.)—a border that once transcended, power finds as its object relationships between bodies.

NOTES

1. The cautious optimism we might invest into the liberatory potential of civil society is an optimism invested into democracy itself—which then is a claim about citizenship and the nation-state, or for Negri-ists among us (who also claim the nation-state is obsolete) it is a claim about the liberatory (regulatory) potential of larger statist formations like the European Union or perhaps the United Nations. This optimism describes a reproductive mechanism like civil society as an innocuous "blurring" with the forces of the state and the economy.

2. This is not to claim that social movements self-consciously embedded in civil society have not ever increased a "human flourishing" taken in the very general. Indeed, the flourishing of individual rights vis-à-vis the state and protected by the state has certainly occurred in the history of the modern nation state. The state has in the past responded, in part, to civil society and, in part, to its own threatened reproduction and growth by mounting incursions into and regulations of the economy. But it is instead to ask if—given the increasing weightlessness

of present-day capital (Dezeuze 2011)—the nature of governance, the nation-state and of civil society have not been deeply scarred and altered by this 1970s "unexpected round of marketization."

3. These are among Behbehanian and Burawoy's three concluding prescriptions in "Global Sociology: Reflections on an Experimental Course."

4. These are the words with which sociologist Saskia Sassen uses to describe what she calls the "new realities" of "proliferation of partial, often highly specialized, global assemblages of bits of territory, authority and rights" seen from the point of view of the nation state (Sassen 2011).

5. Being children of the U.S. "counter globalization" movement, NAFTA holds a special place in our hearts.

6. Conceivably, the state as pure superstructure may be the case in its initial emergence (and the state is always scarred deeply by this initial emergence). This is different than saying that the modern state is the result of capitalism. It may have been analogous to the emergence of capitalism. However, our seminar historicizes the "modern state," the state's logic, techniques, and history, and self-image are shaped and scarred by its initial formation. We did not say, for instance, that the state is determined by the forces and relations of production. But neither did we say that it ever was autonomous from economic production. It matters here only in that if we categorize civil society as "Janus-faced" we suggest that there is something to win through civil society. We imply that we can significantly transform the character of the state and the economy through transforming the character of civil society precisely by asserting ourselves *as* civil society—the "perspective of sociology is the perspective from civil society" as Burawoy explained during our first meeting. It would seem that not a few of our speakers in "Global Sociology, Live!" would assert, as well, that the state and the economy are similarly Janus-faced. But if so, what is the significance of distinguishing between these three arenas?

7. By "governance," as we explore in thesis 2.1, we mean a collaborative assemblage of the state and civil society.

8. This "micro-physics" of power may likely be, for Foucault and for us, an extended euphemism for the "micro-physics" of race—especially as race is wrought and codified on a global scale, from the 16th Century wave of European colonialism, to 18th Century European Enlightment/racialization, to the anti-colonial process, and into the present "War on Terror."

9. This is to say that whatever categorical identity is mobilized by a social movement to achieve state recognition within a rights discourse (that is to say, state-recognized victimhood) seeks to conceal differences (of distance from "power") between its membership.

10. Bernes (2010) writes on the "hidden abode of production": "The project of the 'seizure of the means of production' finds itself blocked or faced with the absurd prospect of collectivizing Wal-Mart or Apple, workplaces so penetrated to their very core by the commodity-form that they solicit nothing less than total destruction or total transformation." Walter Benjamin (1986) also may be of some help here; he creates a latent potential for liberatory violence within his language of sovereignty. Through the breaking of the state's laws in daily practice, one at least begins to even approach imagining the abolition of state or sovereign power—a power that by essence is within the unapproachable scale of "society" or "history." In "Critique of Violence" in *Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings*, Benjamin writes: "The critique of violence is the philosophy of its history—the ' philosophy' of this history, because

only the idea of its development makes possible a critical, discriminating, and decisive approach to its temporal data. A gaze directed only at what is close at hand can at most perceive a dialectical rising and falling in the lawmaking and law-preserving formations of violence. The law governing their oscillation rests on the circumstance that all law-preserving violence, in its duration, indirectly weakens the lawmaking violence represented by it, through the suppression of hostile counterviolence. This lasts until either new forces or those earlier suppressed triumph over the hitherto lawmaking violence and thus found a new law, destined in its turn to decay. On the breaking of this cycle maintained by mythical forms of law, on the suspension of law with all the forces on which it depends as they depend on it, finally therefore on the abolition of state power, a new historical epoch is founded. If the rule of myth is broken occasionally in the present age, the coming age is not so unimaginably remote that an attack on law is altogether futile" (1986:299).

11. This is in part a response to Erik Olin Wright's ambivalence towards the "ruptural" and deference to the "symbiotic."

12. For instance, Hanafi writes "The sovereign power according to Agamben routinely distinguishes between those who are to be admitted to 'political life' and those who are to be excluded as the mute bearers of 'bare life.' It is a process of categorizing people and bodies in order to manage, control and keep them under surveillance and reducing them to a 'bare life,' life which refers to the body's mere 'vegetative' being, separated from the particular qualities, the social, political and historical attributes that constitute individual subjectivity. This is a new form of power which enables the colonial power to manage bodies according to colonial and humanitarian categories" (2009:114).

13. Agamben writes in *Homo Sacer*: "This is modern democracy's strength and, at the same time, its inner contradiction: modern democracy does not abolish sacred life but rather shatters it and disseminates it into every individual body, making it into what is at stake in political conflict" (1998:73).

14. For excerpts from a transcript of the communiqué, see BBC News 2006.

15. Behbehanian draws tactical links across these wars.

16. For instance, Behbehanian offers: "Haggerty and Ericson argue that contemporary surveillance operates by 'abstracting human bodies from their territorial settings and separating them into a series of discrete flows" (Behbehanian N.d.:27).

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Going Global: A New Global Sociology and Methodology for Transnational Inquiry

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For Behbehanian and Burawoy, the inauguration of a new-fangled global sociology first requires a definition of sociology. To begin, they define sociology—in contrast to economics (which studies the market) and political science (which studies the state)—as the study from "the standpoint of civil society" (Behbehanian and Burawoy 2012; Burawoy 2010:25). Global sociology would ultimately study transnational economies and political bodies to determine their effects on the possibility and vitality of a civil society with world-wide influence. Global sociology, then, would prod and probe "a global civil society, knitting together communities, organizations and movements across national boundaries" (2010:25). In short, Behbehanian and Burawoy propose a scheme for a global sociology that catapults Gramsci's conceptual framework from a national Italian stage to a global theatre.

WHO'S AFRAID OF CIVIL SOCIETY?

As productive as a Gramscian framework may be for inspiring contestation from, within, and between institutions—where resistance to and transformation of political economic hegemonic forces can be articulated and negotiated—Bebehanian and Burawoy's confident faith in Gramsci to address contemporary transnational processes and global social inequalities harbors a few problems that deserve some comment here.

First, Behbehanian and Burawoy's definition of global sociology, relying on a Gramscian framework, is not formulated from an on-the-ground empirical imperative but through a theoretical, rhetorical, and reductionist gesture. Behbehanian and Burawoy reduce global sociology into two parts: sociology and global. Sociology is treated as the key linguistic foundation—a fundamental noun that takes as its constitution a definition of sociology fashioned from the discipline's traditional inclination to halt a "sociological imagination" at state borders. This sociology that sees civil society as the supreme object of analysis, to be clear, issues from a methodological nationalism—which "assumes that the nation, state and society are the 'natural' social and political forms of the modern world"—that characterized Gramsci's work (Beck 2010:10-11). What is more, the global in Bebehanian and Burawoy's formulation only denotes something beyond the nation-state. As a pure and stand-alone adjective, the global does not transform sociology—a rhetorically stalwart and defensible noun. The global is simply a blown-up view from the standpoint of a civil society.

Second, the formulation of global sociology as requiring a world-scale civil society presupposes that a healthy society needs a set of global institutions and congealed social movements. This advancement of a global civil society—including, particularly, various NGOs from regions with more material means—necessitates a more critical discussion of the faults and failures of existing global civil society organizations in alleviating social inequalities and delivering various resources and community needs. Given the critique (from anthropologists) of transnational civil society organizations that blindly deliver "manna from heaven," we cannot assert that global organizations always, only benevolently respond to globalized market and coercive state forces without being deeply and muscularly critical of global institutions. Even more, the preference for a civil society as the object of analysis *par excellence* for the entire field of global sociology is alarmingly dissatisfying given that some communities do not have vibrant or even extant global or local civil societies. How does one study the Thabo Mbeki settlement outside central Johannesburg, where global civil society is thin, while still studying how transnational economic forces have determined a precarious community? Do we simply study the absence or impossibility of a global civil society and, thereby, assume that a world-scale civil society (likely funded by Western transnational organizations) is the panacea for global-turned-local troubles?

Third, the formulation of a global sociology from the standpoint of a global civil society potentially undercuts many feminist projects. Since sociologists rarely view the domestic sphere as part of the public sphere (despite the blurring of the public and private distinction by feminist scholars and sociologists of the family), the Gramsci-inspired definition of sociology harbors the potential exclusion of the sociology of everyday life proposed by scholars like Dorothy Smith (1987; 1990). Furthermore, since "girls and women around the world, especially in the Third World/South … bear the brunt of globalization," a global sociology that turns its analytical gaze away from production and reproduction in the home (or with effects found most starkly in the home) effaces the communities most vulnerable

to the onslaught of global economic restructuring (Mohanty 2002:514). Constructing a global sociology that does not explicitly extend feminist lessons dangerously brings us close to reproducing the assumption that the most significant global transformations and their egregious impacts occur outside the domestic sphere. To avoid this problematic and empirically inaccurate assumption, which so sharply excludes labor and life in the home, we must continue the search for a more flexible global sociology that either expands the meaning of "public" or explicitly incorporates the domestic sphere in an analysis of civil society.

A GLOBAL SOCIOLOGY REVISITED

A global sociology must respond to contemporary—not early 20th Century—global social problems in order to examine deleterious global forces. Ulrich Beck provides a robust account of our world-wide current crises:

> "Consider the following: global free trade and financializaton, corporate deterritorialization and transnationalized production, globalized labor use, competition and class conflicts, globalized policy consulting and formulation (coerced by the IMF, etc.), internet communication and cyberspace, globally orchestrated bioscientific manipulation of life forms (gradually including human bodies), global risks of all kinds (financial crisis, terrorism, AIDS, swine flu, SARS), transnational demographic realignments (the migration of labor, spouses, and children), [cosmopolitized] arts and entertainments, and, last but not least, globally financed and managed regional wars" (2010:11).

While Beck offers a extensive list, he leaves out climate change—another global transformation with significant transnational effects. Nevertheless, his sundry and significant enumeration offers an important cornucopia of empirically based transformations and crises. These are the conditions and the accompanying effects about which a global sociology can formulate its object of analysis and its definition.

Given Beck's tableau of contemporary global social problems, a newly minted global sociology should invert the reductionist relationship in Behbehanian and Burawoy's definition. Rather than understand the noun "sociology" as fundamental while viewing the global as an adjective that relates to the noun by simply enlarging its scope, a new definition of global sociology would privilege the global. In other words, the global determines sociology rather than the sociology determining the global (the preferred relationship that corresponds with the empirically derived list of contemporary transnational problems).

We would be well served, then, to refashion Behbehanian and Burawoy's definition and privilege the following definition of global sociology: a subfield of the discipline that examines global flows and new global meta-spatial networks. This alternative conceptualization of global sociology can embrace the analysis of a global civil society since transnational actors working with and within global institutions are not outside various global flows—be they financial, discursive, material, symbolic, socio-biological, or corporeal. Yet, this definition of global sociology differs from the one provided by Behbehanian and Burawoy since it opens analytical space for and intellectual legitimacy to other forms of global analysis that resist or cannot be cartographically represented—what I call meta-spatial networks. An analysis that seeks to unearth global meta-spatial networks invites and opens new possibilities for conceptualizing global processes that cannot be easily represented by traditional global maps (for instance, the virtual world of digital communications or the abstract and slippery world of financialization). These global meta-spatial connectivities will require new representations that can only be delineated by reference to more complex spatial depictions of worldwide processes and flows. Above all, global flows and meta-spatial networks become the basic units of analysis—a clear departure from a consortium of states or civil society providing the unit of global analysis *par excellence*.

IN SEARCH OF A GLOBAL METHODOLOGY

Therefore, global flows and networks that may or may not be represented on a map would be the object of analysis for global sociology. Global sociology would study contemporary crises and their effects—be they in civil society or in other social fields or spaces. Given that global sociology would pursue transnational social currents and other global connectivities, the subdiscipline would require a new methodology for complimenting and realizing these global inquiries. Already, contemporary scholars—who have studied social problems with worldwide significance—have offered promising alternatives. They have inspired the following two methodological tools for conducting and realizing a global sociology, particularly a transnational or metanational global sociology that searches for global flows and, thereby, moves beyond the clunky, 1950s international approach that simply compares nations or clusters of nations as a way of examining the global.

Since globalized political economy involves social actors "from above"

who are often linked to powerful institutions like the International Monetary Foundation (IMF) and World Bank, a global sociology that studies political economy would need to have a rigorous and unambiguous approach to "studying up." Second, an empirically rich global sociology that can promptly produce knowledge to address social inequalities will need to relinquish the tacit cult of individuality that characterizes sociology and academia more generally. A global sociology will necessitate a methodological practice involving collaborative networks of multiple scholars—from different regions of the world—who study the same object of analysis with the same set of research questions and in multiple geographical sites. I will now further elaborate these two methodological strategies for a flourishing global sociology.

First, sociologists have various methodological tools for "studying down" or researching marginalized and vulnerable populations. However, sociology as a discipline has not comprehensively considered the position of the researcher when "studying up" or researching extraordinarily powerful individuals, organization, and institutions that have Goliathian influence in mobilizing or hindering global flows. While some researchers speak of "going stealth" to "capture data," a global sociology will need many more techniques and positions for studying the über-powerful. Ananya Roy and Walden Bello present two possibilities. A self-professed "double agent," Roy interviewed "those professionals who research and manage poverty—people like [herself]" in *Poverty Capital* (2010:38). Aiming "to uncover the dynamics of poverty capital and to chart the historical moment that is millennial development," Roy's approach demonstrates a way to "study across" or "study laterally" (2010:40, 34). In describing her position in the field, Roy offers that she researched from: "the impossible space between the hubris of benevolence and the paralysis of cynicism … a space marked by doubleness: by both complicities and subversions, by the familiar and the strange" (2010:40). While some critics might argue that Roy's position in the field means that she played both sides of the fence and, thereby, compromised her analysis, Roy offers one option for studying groups with extraordinary decision-making influence.

Bello similarly provides an orientation for studying powerful groups and institutions. Rather than working as a double agent, he conducts research as a strident critic. Bello's articles take the IMF and World Bank to task, ardently sounding the death knell of their demise (Bello and Guttal 2005:11). He avers that the IMF caused the Asian Crisis of 1997 as well as financial failures in Russia in 1998 and Argentina in 2002 (Bello 2006:2; Bello 2009:2). Bello also reveals that the World Bank's poverty alleviation and environmentally sensitive aims are empty fictions, an exposure that

now places the Bank in crisis. Bello's research and the route he has taken to procure data—including uninvited entry into the World Bank headquarters in Washington D.C. and the extralegal borrowing of 3,000 pages of top-secret documents—present a provocative alternative for a global sociologist without access to data monopolized by dominant multinational and transnational institutions.

Second, a global sociology will need to break free from the cult of individuality that assumes research should be an individualized project. If global sociology hopes to examine global flows and other global dynamics from multiple sites and in a timely manner (to more quickly address social inequality), then the subfield should work in teams of scholars who seek to answer the same set of research questions. The collaboration among Webster, Lambert, and Bezuidenhout provides a viable and encouraging example. They conducted research among workers in the white goods industry in Ezakheni (in South Africa), Orange (in Australia), and Changwon (in South Korea), and found that neoliberalism "consciously manufactures insecurity" to extinguish collective contestation among civil society actors and movements (Webster, Lambert, and Bezuidenhout 2008:17-18, vii). While Webster et al. do not extensively describe the research relationship and dynamics required to produce *Grounding Globalization*, their book exemplifies and inaugurates an approach for global sociology that generates knowledge and assessment from group work. Even more, a global sociology project involving multiple sociologists from many parts of the world—that is, from the periphery as well as from the metropole—would increase the likelihood that social theory from the "South" would enter and/or gain authority within the global sociological academy. In this way, a team model for crafting and conducting global sociology would soften the critique that "Northern" sociology enables a project of Western intellectual domination (Connell 2007; Connell 2010).

CONCLUSION: PROMISES AND POSSIBILITIES

Burawoy and Behbehanian's invitation to formulate a new subfield called global sociology comes with overwhelming excitement but also a serious demand to critically reflect upon a best formulation for this "embryonic" field. This response expands the definition of global sociology beyond the limitations and problems that issue from a civil-society-centric definition. To avoid inadvertently limiting the global dimension, toying with the danger of assuming a global civil society offers global manna, and linking into a possible exclusion of feminist projects, this paper inaugurates a more

empirically driven alternative to the subdiscipline's search for a productive definition. In the spirit of recapitulation, I offer that global sociology is a subfield of sociology that maps global flows and global meta-spatial networks. To promote this novel definition, global sociology would benefit from considering new methodological tools for studying complex and transnational global flows and meta-spatial networks. Comprehensive, clear, and studied strategies to "studying up" and collaborative research teams are just two methodological tools for emerging and encouraging global projects.

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The Effects of the U.S. Colonization of the Philippines on the Filipino-Asian Split in America

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Abstract: The Filipino-Asian split has long implied a social, political, and economic division between Filipinos and the greater Asian panethnicity. Scholars have addressed two factors contributing to the split: the cultural differences between Filipinos and other Asians and the class inequality between them. Yet, these theories fail to fully explain the different social positioning of Filipinos in American society by ignoring the effects of history. This study chronicles and analyzes the racial formation of Filipinos through primary and secondary text-based data focused on the period between 1898 and 1946. Findings are categorized into three themes closely following the three-phase chronological process of Filipino racialization: (1) "Little Brown Brother"; (2) "The Filipino Problem" and; (3) "The Invisible Filipino." This study concludes that one reason why Filipinos remain starkly differentiated from the greater Asian panethnicity is due to these three periods of differential racialization. This more nuanced understanding of the Filipino-Asian split adds insight into the effects of U.S. imperialism on the social positioning on minority groups in America.

Keywords: race, colonialism, Filipinos, identity formation, the state

INTRODUCTION

Despite constituting the second largest Asian-American group in the United States (Barnes and Bennett 2002:8), Filipino Americans have vigorously resisted inclusion in the pan-Asian framework (Espiritu 1992:104). History offers numerous examples. In the late 1960s, Filipinos rejected the Yellow Power Movement, claiming to be brown not yellow (Espiritu and Omi 2000:61),[1] and in 1988, Filipinos successfully lobbied for the passage of the California Senate Bill 1813, requiring "state personnel surveys or tabulations to classify persons of Filipino ancestry as Filipino rather than as Asian or Hispanic" (Espiritu 1992:106). Yet, this Asian-Filipino divergence is not without its residual effects. For example, adjusted for population, in 2000, Chinese Americans were almost seven times more likely to attend the University of California, Berkeley than Filipino Americans were (Teranishi 2002:144). Moreover, in 1979, the average salary of a college-educated Filipino was just over $16,000, whereas a similarly educated Chinese American earned an average of $21,000 (Espiritu 1992:107).

Many scholars treat the socio-economic Filipino-Asian split as a contemporary phenomenon, but the division has been present since the early 1900s, when Filipinos first immigrated to the United States in large numbers. During this time, the Philippines was an American colony, and Filipinos were distinguished as colonial subjects. As such, researchers in the social sciences suggest that Filipinos were often categorized differently from other Asians at the time (Almaguer and Jung 1998). For instance, scholars have argued that during the early 20th Century in Hawaii, Filipino laborers were considered inferior to Japanese laborers as a result of perceptions regarding Japan's sovereignty and the Philippines' lack thereof (Jung 2006:416). Additionally, due to their status as American nationals, Filipinos were able to enter the United States in large numbers whereas other Asians faced restrictive immigration quotas (Ngai 2004:94). The racial categorization of Filipinos in America is one of the most self-evident instances of differential racialization. Differential racialization occurs when a dominant society distinctly categorizes minority groups at different times and in response to changing needs (Delgado and Stefancic 2001:8). Utilizing this perspective, scholars have pinpointed American colonization of the Philippines as providing the United States with a unique need to racialize Filipinos in a manner that diverged from the racial formation of other Asians in America. However, few sociological sources analyze the effects of colonization on the Filipino-Asian division (Almaguer and Jung 1998). Therefore, I propose to correlate the distinct categorization of Filipinos during the United States' colonization of the Philippines with the greater Filipino-Asian split. To do so, I pose the following question: How did the United States' colonization of the Philippines influence the racial categorization of Filipinos? This study organizes racial categorization according to a three-phase chronological process: "Little Brown Brother," the "Filipino Problem," and the "Invisible Filipino." I research the process of Filipino inclusion and exclusion to explain the distinct mechanisms by which Filipinos were racially categorized. By framing my research in this manner, I focus solely on the perspective of the dominant society at the time: white Americans and the state. In my

research, I elaborate this argument using qualitative data garnered from both primary and secondary sources. Finally, I form a historical narrative of the Filipino-Asian split that suggests broader patterns concerning the role of imperialism on the racial formation of minority groups.

Operationalizing the Term "Asian"

Although Asian panethnicity implies a plethora of different nationalities and cultures, I am operationalizing "Asian" as referring to Chinese and Japanese subgroups. I do this to avoid complications when making general statements about Filipinos and Asians, as the term Asian is laden by debate and contestation not only within the Filipino community, but also within the communities of other underrepresented subgroups such as Asian Indians. Additionally, Chinese and Japanese communities have historically been at the national forefront of American society's conception of Asian despite the heterogeneous nature of Asian immigration (San Juan 2000). The dominance of Chinese and Japanese ethnicity in the mind of the American racial imagination can be attributed to the fact that Chinese and Japanese laborers were the first to migrate to the United States from Asia in large numbers with Filipino migrants following closely on their heels (Volpp 1999).

LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review is divided into three sections: race and ethnicity; Michel Foucault's concept of the subject and power; and theories on what caused the Filipino-Asian split. The literature on race and ethnicity explains the Filipino-Asian split by contextualizing Filipino and Asians as racial and ethnic categories with particular historical and political trajectories. Synthesizing the work of previous scholars, I create a conceptual framework of racial formation and categorization to clarify Filipino inclusion and exclusion, which enables the analysis in the following sections. Next, Foucault's work on the subject and power presents a theoretical framework for understanding the power relations that crafted racial categorization and how these relations influenced the construction of Filipino subjects. Finally, the last section will offer theories about the causes of the Filipino-Asian split, which serves as a gateway and entry for my empirical contribution to the field.

Race and Ethnicity

It is an imperative to fully understand the concepts of race and ethnicity before fully discussing the implications of Filipino racial classification. This section outlines key works not only on the sociological meaning of race and ethnicity, but also on the process of creating these constructs in society.

Ethnicity Paradigm

The concept of ethnicity arose in the 1920s and 1930s as a critique of race as a biological notion. Ethnicity is understood "as the result of a group formation process based on culture and descent" (Omi and Winant 1994:15). As opposed to race implying distinct hereditary features, progressive sociologists such as Horace Kallen and Robert E. Park argued that race is a social category of ethnicity. That is to say, race is one of the many factors attributing to ethnic group identity (1994:15). For example, two individuals who have the same distinct physical characteristics may identify with different ethnicities based on their distinct cultures and origins (i.e., "Jewish" versus "Irish").

Although Michael Omi and Howard Winant agree that race is not solely a biological concept, they underline key criticisms of the ethnicity paradigm in *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s*. First, the ethnicity paradigm focuses on European (white) ethnicity, thereby downplaying the extent of racial inequality between whites and non-whites (Omi and Winant 1994:16). Ethnicity-based treatment of racially defined minorities fails to recognize the unique circumstances these groups encounter in the United States, and ignores the disparities between their experiences and the experiences of European immigrants (1994:22). This framework could lead to conflict between a group's racial identity and ethnic identity as apparent in the Filipino-Asian split.

Furthermore, the treatment of racially defined minorities as ethnically defined minorities has denied the prevalence of race and its role in American history, which is problematic for this study (Omi and Winant 1994:20). Historical events closely associated with idea of race such as slavery, colonization, and racially based exclusion lose their racial meaning under the paradigm of ethnicity. The goal of this study is to outline the racial meaning of Filipinos in America from the early 20th Century—a time when "ethnic" groups today were considered either races or nations (Marger 2006:10). As a result, I only refer to ethnicity when discussing Yen Le Espiritu's work on Asian American panethnicity. For all other purposes, I refer to ethnic groups as races just as they had been in the early 1900s.

Espiritu's *Asian American Panethnicity: Bridging Institutions and Identities* not only supports the idea of ethnicity as all encompassing, but also outlines the creation of the Asian American panethnicity. After narrating the history of oppression experienced by Asian Americans at the hands of the dominant whites, Espiritu (1992) suggests that politically dominant groups are the ones who define ethnic categories in the service of counting and classifying them for the benefit of the economic and political order. Espiritu's theory on ethnic categorization not only resonates well with the following sections on race and racial formation, but also provides context for Asian American panethnicity when discussing the Filipino-Asian split.

Defining Race

Omi and Winant define race as a "concept which signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies" (1994:55). This particular definition rejects the belief of race as biological and definite. Rather, Omi and Winant recognize that race is a complex of social meanings constantly shifting behind socio-political struggles. Even discrete physical characteristics are given racial signification as a result of social and historical processes (1994:55).

This study draws its conceptions of race not only from Omi and Winant, but also from critical race theory. Theorists Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic argue that critical race theory provides a framework for studying race based on the civil rights of racial minorities (2006:7). In *Critical Race Theory: An Introduction*, Delgado and Stefancic note six tenets of critical racy theory: (1) because racism is human nature, a completely colorblind society is not possible; (2) there is little incentive to eradicate racism; (3) race is a product of social relations; (4) differential racialization implies that different minority groups are categorized differently depending on shifting needs of the dominant society; (5) each race has its own history; and (6) people of color have unique voices in narrating their experiences (2006:7-9). In my research, I utilize tenets three, four, and five to create a theoretical framework for understanding Filipino racialization. Through these tenets, I scrutinize the methods by which Filipinos were categorized as a racial group.

Racial Formation

Any understanding of race would be incomplete absent the notion of racial formation. A term coined by Omi and Winant, racial formation is "the sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed" (1994:55). As such, race is conceived through hegemony (i.e., "the way in which society is organized and ruled") as well as

the representation and organization of human bodies in society (1994:56). That is to say, race is a product of both the "social structure and cultural representation" of groups within that structure (1994:56).

Racial formation occurs when a link is made between structure and representation of a certain group (Omi and Winant 1994:56). In other words, a connection must be made between the meaning of race and the way society is racially organized in relation to that meaning (1994:56). This link emerges out of a racial project, which Omi and Winant define as "simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial dynamics, and an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources along particular racial lines" (1994:56). Therefore, similar to ethnicity, racial categories are defined by groups that hold the social and political power to organize and distribute resources within society. In my research, those groups consist of white Americans and the state. Thus, I utilize the notion of racial formation to draw racial meaning from the cultural representation of Filipinos in America during the 1920s and 1930s by looking specifically at the Filipino racial project run by the state and white majority.

The Subject and Power

In addition to being racially categorized, Filipinos were also classified based on their status as colonial subjects. Foucault's work on the subject and power provides a fruitful theoretical framework for understanding the process behind subject creation. Combined with the literature on racial formation, Foucault's concepts shed light on how Filipinos' distinct classification has led to the Filipino-Asian split by highlighting their subordinate role in United States-Philippine relations.

The Subject

The process of objectification transforms humans into subjects (Foucault 2001:326). That is, subjects are a result of an exercise of power that "categorizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, [and] imposes a law of truth on him that he must recognize and others have to recognize in him" (2001:331). Foucault suggests two types of subjects: subjects under the control of a dominant group and subjects bound by their self-conscience (2001:331). Moreover, the objectification of subjects requires a process of either dividing the subjects from inside or dividing them from others (2001:326). In this study, I focus on the macro level to demonstrate how Filipinos were subjects under the control of the United States government, and, through objectification, were racially differentiated from other Asians.

The Exercise of Power

The creation of subjects implies a social relationship between groups based on relational power dynamics. Power allows a group not only to individualize another, but to also take actions that dictate the further actions of others (Foucault 2001:337). In fact, power only exists through the circumstances that enable its exercise (2001:340). Foucault's understanding sufficiently frames my documentation of how the United States exercised its power to classify Filipinos, which, in turn, governed the actions of Filipinos within American socio-political and economic space.

Analyzing Power Relations

Power relations should not be analyzed through the observation of institutions (i.e., government) alone since institutions do not establish power relations in isolation. Rather, a combination of institutional and external factors mold and define the relationships between groups in society (Foucault 2001:343). Once established, power relations are deeply rooted from within rather than imposed from without (Foucault 2001:343).

Critical to my research, Foucault provides a framework for examining power relations. Foucault's contribution can be distilled into five key elements one should enumerate before analyzing power relations: (1) the system of differentiations; (2) the types of objectives; (3) instrumental modes; (4) forms of institutionalization; and (5) the degrees of rationalization (2001:344). First, the system of differentiations refers to the methods a society takes in distinguishing certain groups. Examples include the use of the judicial system to differentiate status and privilege and the use of economy to differentially distribute wealth and goods. Next, types of objectives make clear the motivations of an acting group in its exercise of power, whether it is the maintenance of social privileges or the accumulation of wealth. Additionally, the instrumental modes of power indicate the types of methods used to utilize power (e.g., the threat of arms or the influence of rhetoric). Next, the forms of institutionalization include the ways power relations are formally authorized within society, which include legitimization through the law and the creation of social norms. Finally, the degrees of rationalization refer to the certainty of results given a certain set of power relations. That is to say, power relations are constantly fine-tuned on the basis of effectiveness in promoting and ensuring desired outcomes (2001:344). Throughout this study, I argue that the United States government took clear steps to produce the desired outcome of Filipino subjugation, and, in turn, Filipino racialization.

The Causes of the Filipino-Asian Split: Cultural Differences and Class Inequality

Espiritu's (1992) work on Asian American panethnicity examines the causes of the Filipino-Asian split. Espiritu addresses two factors: the cultural differences between Filipinos and other Asians and the class inequality between them. Culturally, Filipinos differ from other Asians due to their colonial history, matriarchal societies, and predominantly Catholic faith (Espiritu and Omi 2000). Additionally, Filipinos do not fare as well in the labor market compared to Asian Americans (i.e., Chinese and Japanese) and are less likely to attend postsecondary school (Espiritu 1992). Both theories are reasonable explanations for the Filipino-Asian split. However, Espiritu does not address the Philippines' colonial history and its effects on the racial categorization of Filipinos in America. Given an omission of colonial history, Espiritu overlooks a significant factor in explaining the Filipino-Asian division.

Classification During U.S. Colonization

A few scholars have added to Espiritu's analysis by purporting colonization as a third factor. Tomas Almaguer and Moon-Kie Jung (1998) suggest that the impact of American colonization of the Philippines be addressed as a third component in explaining the Filipino-Asian split. However, Almaguer and Jung fail to provide concrete empirical evidence for their claim. Leti Volpp (1999), on the other hand, discusses the first legal manifestation of the Filipino-Asian split in her essay "American Mestizo: Filipinos and Anti-miscegenation Laws in California," providing the empirical evidence that Almaguer and Jung lacked. In her essay, Volpp reveals the legal separation of Filipinos from Asians by chronicling the effects of California anti-miscegenation laws on the racial categorization of Filipinos in the 1930s. At the time, Asians were classified as "Mongolians," and, thus, were prohibited from marrying whites. On the other hand, Filipinos argued that due to physical and cultural differences, they were not "Mongolian" but rather "Malay," a racial designation which was not legally prohibited from marrying whites in California. Although California eventually amended its law to include "Malays," Volpp suggests that colonial status was a reason Filipinos were not categorized as "Mongolians." Like Almaguer and Jung, Volpp lays the groundwork for investigating United States colonization as key to the distinct racialization of Filipinos, thereby unveiling a third cause to the Filipino-Asian split. Finally, Mae Ngai presents historical evidence of Filipino immigration to the United States as a result of American colonization of the

Philippines. Ngai (2004) argues that the notion of white superiority justified 19th Century colonialism and that American domination had roots in the belief of their subjects' racial inferiority. Unlike most scholars, Ngai places the treatment of Filipinos who migrated to the United States in the context of their colonial status. For instance, the United States defended the colonial possession of the Philippines as a "benevolent project that would civilize the backward Filipinos, but that mythology turned into a social crisis when real Filipinos showed up in California in the late 1920s" (2004:94). Suddenly, white Americans could not tolerate Filipinos who demanded better working conditions and/or social equality. Most importantly, this intoleration led to the denial of Filipinos' ability to acculturate as well as to the classification of Filipinos "into an identity that combined racial representations of Negroes and Orientals" (2004:115). Ngai offers valuable research on the effects of colonization for colonial subjects who migrate to the metropolis.

METHODOLOGY

My research provides concrete, empirical evidence supporting the claim that American colonization of the Philippines should be a third factor in explaining the Filipino-Asian split. This research not only complements the existing literature but also expands Ngai's analysis of the effects of colonization on classification. By documenting the unique racialization of Filipinos as a result of American colonization, I illustrate how state-imposed classification contributed to the separation between Filipinos and Asians. This research sought to create a historical narrative underlining the process of Filipino racialization in America during the United States colonization of the Philippines. I gathered evidence mainly through content analysis of historical artifacts and text-based analysis of prior scholarly work on this subject. By utilizing both primary and secondary data, I tapped into a wide array of evidence to overcome limitations inherent in historical research (i.e., the inability to conduct interviews or field research).

Historical artifacts in this research included scholarly work on Filipino immigration in the 1930s. For example, the state-instituted study of Filipino immigration by Bruno Lasker in 1930 titled *Filipino Immigration*[2] offers an excellent secondary source. My paper relied heavily on Lasker's work since the study was the most comprehensive of its time. To be sure, Lasker's methodology included in-depth interviews and statistical analysis of Filipino demographics and public sentiment toward Filipinos. This study also analyzed photographs compiled in *Confrontations, Crossings and Convergence: Photographs of the Philippines and the United States 1898-1998*, which offer visual

insight into the conditions and representation of Filipinos at the time of colonization. Given that Omi and Winant claim that race is a product of both the "social structure and cultural representation" of groups (1994:56), these photographs provided a portrait of representations as a component of racial formation for Filipinos in America.

Secondary data not only validated and supplemented my primary data findings, but also shed light on historical data and perspectives outside the scope of my study. For instance, I drew heavily from Luis H. Francia's *A History of the Philippines: From Indios Bravos to Filipinos* to place the Filipino experience in America in the context of Philippine history so as to offer the reader a holistic perspective on Filipino classification. I also used secondary data to formulate a cursory conception of Chinese and Japanese racial formation to guide the comparison between the general Asian and Filipino experience in the United States.

To narrow the scope of the data, I placed a specific timeframe for my study. Excluding the historical background preceding American colonization of the Philippines, I periodized my findings mainly between 1898 until 1946 (the period of United States colonization) to generate a brief glimpse of the post-war period. However, I specifically focused on the 1920s and 1930s for two reasons. First, Filipinos did not start migrating to the United States in large numbers until the 1920s (Ngai 2004:100), and, second, official studies on Filipino immigration did not start until the 1930s (Lasker 1969:3). These decades offered rich insight on how white Americans and the state perceived Filipinos during a time of racial formation.

After collecting and analyzing my data, I organized my findings into three distinct themes closely following the three-phase chronological process of Filipino racialization. The themes are centered around well defined time periods characterizing the shifts in the treatment of Filipinos in America. The three themes include: "Little Brown Brother," "The Filipino Problem," and "The Invisible Filipino." Each stage is supported by empirical evidence and analyzed based on the theories of race and subject offered by Omi, Winant, and Foucault.

FINDINGS

Spanish Colonial Period: 1565-1898

Filipino classification as both subjects and a race did not begin until the Spanish arrived. Following the general pattern of colonization, the Spanish sought to transform the native Filipinos into ideal colonial subjects, claiming that the locals' "subjugation was really their liberation" (Francia

2010:70). For the Spanish, Filipino liberation began with religious education and the adoption of Catholicism. The Spanish also forced the majority of locals to leave their land and resettle in areas unknown to them. Most locals—with the exception of leaders and their direct family—were coerced into adopting Spanish surnames to facilitate tax collection (Francia 2010:70). The combination of religious indoctrination, resettlement, and exploitation under the pretense of liberation not only marked the beginning of the Philippines' colonial history, but also unified Filipinos under one identity—an identity of oppression.

Eventually, the abuse and oppression suffered at the hands of the Spanish rallied Filipinos and led them to pursue a common desire for independence. For nearly 400 years, Spain managed to quell local resistance to colonial rule. However, in the latter half of the 19th Century, increasingly widespread education, Spain's deteriorating domestic situation, and the influence of revolutions around the world (i.e., the American, French, and Latin American Revolutions) led to a renewed push for independence. Spain's international conflicts ultimately determined the fate of the Philippine Revolution. The United States, a burgeoning global power, declared war on Spain in April 1898. Spain, lacking the military power to seriously contest the United States, called for a formal peace treaty. The United States ratified the Treaty of Paris on February 6, 1898 under the stipulation that it would gain territorial rights in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam after compensating Spain $20 million.

The Philippine-American War

The United States had won the hearts and minds of the Filipino people under the guise that they would drive off the Spanish and usher in Filipino independence. Instead, the United States declared that Filipinos were not fit for self-government in spite of Filipino efforts to create a governing body and constitution modeled after the democratic ideals of the French and American Revolutions. In fact, less than two weeks before the United States Congress ratified the Treaty of Paris, Filipino revolutionaries officially celebrated the inauguration of the Philippine Republic only to be ignored by the international community.

On February 4, 1898, the Philippine-American War commenced after two Filipino soldiers were killed by American troops for almost trespassing American territory against United States military orders. For Filipinos, this moment defined the start of a new war for independence; however, for the United States and the rest of the world, this moment marked the beginning of the Philippine Insurrection, which would last until 1902. Despite the

resistance, many Filipino elites defected to the United States after being promised positions in the new colonial government. In the face of defection and overwhelming American military power, the new Philippine Republic could not be sustained. Finally on July 4, 1902, United States President Theodore Roosevelt announced the end of the war with the capture and surrender of all prominent resistance leaders.

Phase One: "Little Brown Brother"

Internationally, the Philippines had become an undisputed American colony, and, as such, Filipino identity abroad developed accordingly. The United States mobilized a Filipino racial project, which served to rationalize and justify its colonization and subjugation of the Philippines. The following section outlines the racial formation of Filipinos as "little brown brothers" and how this image diverged from the United States' representation of Asians as the "yellow peril." To justify its continued occupation of the Philippines, the United States needed to demonstrate that Filipinos were unfit for self-governance. During Spanish colonization, Spain had justified its presence in the Philippines by claiming to bring religious salvation to the natives, but, by the time the United States colonized the Philippines, Filipinos were already predominantly Catholic. During the Spanish-American War, the United States had condemned Spain for its possession and abuse of its colonies. Usurping the role of Spain, the American government needed to create a narrative that differentiated its involvement in the Philippines from Spanish colonialism.

The Schurman Commission

The United States used multiple instrumental modes of power to objectify and reduce Filipinos to subjects (in the Foucauldian sense), including political propaganda. Political rhetoric accused Filipinos of being tribal and unfit for self-governance. President William McKinley himself declared:

> When I next realized that the Philippines had dropped into our laps, I confess I did not know what to do with them…. that we could not leave them to themselves, they were unfit for self-government and, they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was; and that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died (as cited in Rusling [1903] 1987:17).

The concept of Filipinos' inability to self govern was institutionally reinforced by the Schurman Commission. Dr. Jacob Schurman, president of Cornell University, led a group of five individuals, hand-picked by President McKinley, to investigate the conditions of the Philippines. The commission was appointed on January 20, 1899 with the task to make recommendations for United States foreign policy in the Philippines. The commission recommended the following:

> 1. Establishment of a civil government with finances kept separated from United States finances and the Philippine treasury bearing the cost of the administration of civil government
> 2. Establishment of a bicameral legislature of two-house lawmaking body
> 3. Establishment of a system of public education (Sagmit and Sagmit-Mendosa 2007:197)

Most importantly, the Schurman Commission found that granting the Philippines its independence was not feasible, which not only provided the justification for American involvement in the islands but also contributed to the racial representation of Filipinos within the American social structure. As Omi and Winant argue, the link between structure and representation—in this case, the role of Filipinos as colonial subjects and the representation of them as unfit to self-govern—is a racial project that forms the race of those it seeks to represent.

In the four decades following the Schurman Commission, the United States rationalized its colonial occupation of the Philippines by the watchwords of civilization and democracy. The Schurman Commission solidified the racial project of Filipinos by marrying the representation of Filipinos as a primitive and tribal people with the social structure of American colonialism.

The 1904 World's Fair

The U.S. racial project intensified with the 1904 World's Fair in St. Louis, Missouri. Although the majority of Filipinos had been both Westernized and Christianized for centuries since the beginning of Spanish colonization, the United States chose to render Filipinos spectacles of primitivism. The government hired anthropologists to ship Filipinos from the most isolated tribes in order to depict Filipinos as "backward" and "in need of civilization." These Filipino natives were exhibited on a 45-acre reservation, where they were daily instructed to perform rare rituals,

including the consumption of dog meat. The United States also included a replica of an American schoolhouse in the Philippines to show American efforts in civilizing Filipino tribes (Figure 1). Such representations at the World Fair typified America's racial project to render Filipinos "little brown brothers."



Figure 1. 1904 World's Fair visitors attend a mockup of an American schoolhouse in the Philippines. Courtesy of National Archives, Washington, D.C.

Ultimately, the 1904 World's Fair not only shaped initial international perceptions of Filipino identity, but also established a clear identity for Filipinos in America. Before 1904, Filipino migration to the United States was minimal. However, the concept of Filipinos as tribal and primitive resonated with the American public particularly after encountering various tribes at the St. Louis exposition. Although the exhibit did not accurately depict the cultural status of the Filipino majority, its displays reinforced the myth of American racial superiority. This assurance of racial superiority would foster American resentment toward Filipino Americans for decades to come.



Figure 2. Young Igorot boy pictured in 1904 (left). Same person pictured in 1913 (right). Courtesy of Dean Worcester, *The Philippines Past and Present. Vol. 2* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1914).

The United States professed its duty to assist and civilize its "little brown brothers" who were deemed primitive and uncivilized in the wake of the 1904 World's Fair. Figure 2 offers the supposed metamorphosis of a young boy from a tribal Bontoc Igorot to a Western groomed and clothed young man nine years later. The photographs are a perfect example of the American ideology in regards to uplifting Filipinos by recreating them in the image of Americans. "The idea was to encourage … Filipinos … to emulate and identify with their bigger white brothers, thus transforming hostility into acceptance and, it was hoped, admiration" (Francia 2010:165).

Whereas Filipinos were viewed as needing American assistance, Chinese and Japanese were viewed as a threat that needed to be quelled with discriminatory policies. The Schurman Commission's findings and the presentation of Filipinos at the 1904 World's Fair directly contrasted with the perceived threat of Asians as the "yellow peril" at the time. The "yellow peril" was a metaphor popularized by William Randolph Hearst—an American newspaper publisher—that portrayed immigrants from China and Japan as threats to the American way of life (Mugridge 1995:47). However, unlike Filipinos who were considered inferior and in need of American guidance, the Chinese and Japanese were considered quite the opposite. Indeed, Hearst believed that, if united, the Chinese and Japanese were capable of dominating the world—an idea he feared so much that he continually pressed the United States government to ban immigration

from China and Japan but not the Philippines (Mugridge 1995:47). This dichotomy of "little brown brother" and "the yellow peril" lay at the genesis of the Filipino-Asian racial divergence in the American context. At this time, the Chinese and Japanese had never been United States subjects and were thus granted with a sense of autonomy and protection from their homeland, which Filipinos lacked. This differentiation of power relations among the United States, China, and Japan as opposed to between the United States and the Philippines resulted in the differential racialization of Filipinos—the distance between Filipinos and other Asians in the American racial imagination.

The Contradiction of U.S. Benevolence

Although the United States professed benevolence toward the Philippines, the reality showed that relations between Americans and Filipinos were based on racial prejudice and discrimination. Due in large part to the political rhetoric surrounding American altruism, the majority of Americans viewed Filipinos as inferior and incapable of changing their undesirable traits. The following is an excerpt of a book written about the Philippine-American War by Charles Ballantine of the Associated Press:

> Our 'little brown brother,' the Filipino pure and simple, whom we are so anxious to uplift to his proper plane upon earth and relieve from the burden cast upon him by heredity and a few hundred years of Spanish dominion, is without doubt unreliable, untrustworthy, ignorant, vicious, immoral, and lazy ... tricky, and, as a race more dishonest than any known race on the face of the earth (as cited in Miller 1982:210).

The supposed mission to educate, civilize, and treat Filipinos "through kindness and gentle understanding" did not challenge the negative traits assigned to Filipinos based solely on the color of their skin (as cited in Miller 1982:167).

The notion of white superiority not only justified America's role as the Philippines' benevolent savior. It also served as a catalyst to racial prejudice and discrimination against Filipinos who challenged American assumptions about Filipino primitiveness. In the following sections, we will discuss how the growing presence of Filipinos in America during the 1920s and 1930s helped to reinforce Filipino identity as tribal and backward and yet challenged and contradicted that notion as well. We will see how the contradiction of a "civilized" Filipino, well versed in Western ideals, led to a political shift from "benevolent assimilation" to the "Filipino Problem" *as well as* to new challenges in the United States racial order, which produced a more defined Filipino-Asian split.

Phase Two: "The Filipino Problem"

The transition from "little brown brother" to the "the Filipino problem" was one fraught with confusion and political debate about Filipino racial identity and its relation to the greater Asian identity. In the following section, I discuss two instances when the American struggled to maintain its racial order, which required the state to reinterpret Filipino racial formation in ways that clearly demarcated Filipinos from other Asian groups. First, I observe the arrival of *pensionados* and unskilled Filipino laborers, who destroyed the myth of Filipinos as "little brown brothers" and challenged white Americans' assumptions about people from "the Far East." Then, I analyze anti-miscegenation laws and the resulting debate regarding whether or not Filipinos should be classified under the same umbrella as Chinese and Japanese immigrants.

Oriental or Latin American?

Throughout the late 19th Century and early 20th Century, nativist anxiety had led to an onslaught of discriminatory treatment and policies toward immigrants from China and Japan. In addition to being perceived as threats, Chinese and Japanese immigrants were largely seen as perpetual foreigners with distasteful traits, including their "physical appearance, language, and manner of dress, food, religion, and social customs" (Almaguer 2009:157). Initially recruited for cheap labor, Asian immigrants were banned from entering the United States under both the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 and the Immigration Act of 1924 (Espiritu 1992:54).

While the United States continued to restrict further immigration from Asia, it sought to fill its labor void by encouraging more Filipinos to immigrate through one loophole: the Philippines was an American territory. As such, Filipinos—America's "little brown brothers"—were able to travel freely to and from the United States despite anti-immigration laws (Ngai 2004:100). This special status clearly differentiated Filipinos from Asians and created the first instance of a Filipino-Asian split institutionally enshrined in United States domestic policy.

The United States encouraged Filipino immigration by promoting the program of Filipinization. The goal of Filipinization was to ensure that Filipinos would be trained and eventually phased into positions in the Philippine government. As a result, Filipinos from the middle and upper-middle classes were sent to the United States to receive a Western education with the intent of returning and applying newfound knowledge to their government positions.

Figure 3. Filipino pensionados in Seattle, Washington circa 1924. Courtesy of Fred Cordova, *Filipinos: Forgotten Asian Americans: A Pictorial Essay, 1763-circa 1963* (Dubuqe: Kendall/Hunt Publishing, 1983).

These individuals were called *pensionados* and were among the first major wave of migrants to the United States. Pictured in Figure 3, *pensionados* ran counter to the idea of the tribal Filipino since they were Christians, English speaking, dressed in Western attire, and familiar with American affairs. In 1912, more than 200 male and female *pensionados* received degrees in the United States (mostly in the West), and, throughout the next decade, the United States government sponsored several hundred more students (Francia 2010:165; Ngai 2004:101). Following World War I, the majority of *pensionados* returned to the Philippines and filled many government positions, but not without challenging Americans' perception of Filipinos as primitive.

In addition to *pensionados*, unskilled laborers participated in the first great wave of Filipino migration to America. Filipinos thrived in an American agricultural sector in need of a new labor supply. In 1910, they first arrived in Hawaii, where the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1908 had created a dire labor shortage. The agreement mandated restrictions on Japanese immigration, and, therefore, sugar plantation owners no longer had access to a steady supply of laborers from Japan. As a result, Filipinos began filling the labor void, and, by the end of the 1920s, an estimated 72,000 Filipinos immigrated to Hawaii alone (Ngai 2004:101). Filipinos were attracted to the United States due to weak political and economic conditions in the Philippines, the

promise of opportunity and wealth in America, and a desire for education (Mariano 1933:7-13). Although they were not as educated and affluent as the *pensionados,* Filipino laborers were still keen on Western ways and far from primitive as shown in Figure 4. However, unlike *pensionados*, most Filipino laborers never returned to the Philippines. Some married and established families in America, thereby creating the first group of Filipino Americans.

Figure 4. A photo of unidentified Filipino farm laborers in Reedley, CA circa 1930. Courtesy of Fred Cordova, *Filipinos: Forgotten Asian Americans: A Pictorial Essay, 1763-circa 1963* (Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt Publishing, 1983).

Although Filipinos migrated to the United States in larger numbers during the 1920s, they were considerably overlooked as an ethnic group in America. Lasker notes, "Until about 1927 or 1928, only a small minority of [Americans] had become aware of the fact that tens of thousands of Filipinos were living in [the United States]" (1969:3). Lasker argues that the lack of awareness was concentrated on the East Coast, where Filipino migration was less prominent (1969:4). Additionally, Americans found Filipino classification difficult: Filipinos were "Orientals" due to their physical characteristics and the geographic location of the Philippines, but, on the other hand, they could qualify as Latin American due to their Western ways and ability to speak Spanish (1969:4). This confusion exacerbated the Filipino-Asian split, as the American racial zeitgeist could not readily lump Filipinos under the Asian classification. Despite limited awareness of the Filipino presence in America during the 1920s, the great immigration set the stage for future confusion and contestation.

No Longer Brothers

Filipino racial classification evolved in response to the new social and political struggles posed by their increased migration to America. The demographic landscape of Filipinos in America unfolded in the 1920s and was closely studied in the 1930s. Between 1920 and 1929, approximately 14,000 Filipinos migrated from Hawaii to the West Coast and another 37,600 migrated straight from the Philippines. The United States, particularly the West Coast, experienced a spike in Filipino migration. In fact, by 1930, about 56,000 Filipinos resided on the West Coast in comparison to the 5,603 Filipinos recorded in the 1920 Census (Lasker 1969:21).

In terms of sex and age distribution, Filipino immigrants in the 1920s were quite homogenous. Due to the steady decline of female immigrants starting in 1922, more than 90 percent of the Filipino population in America was male by the end of the decade (Lasker 1969:23). Lasker argues that due to Spanish-Catholic traditions, very few women were able to travel alone and seek higher educational opportunities (1969:94). In terms of age distribution, the vast majority of immigrants in the 1920s were under 30 years of age with the mid-20s characterizing the average age (1969:23). As a result of immigrant youth and the uneven ratio between men and women, most Filipinos who migrated during the 1920s were also single (1969:25). Due to their homogeneity, the majority of Filipinos formed communities and even founded self-help organizations to help overcome racial and cultural isolation (De la Cruz and Baluyut 1998:38). The emergence of a vibrant Filipino community made them seem more populous than they were, thus fueling white animosity:

> Where Filipinos are few and inconspicuous, we [Americans] usually find them well liked; and favorable descriptions of their qualities find ready credence among those not directly acquainted with them. Where Filipinos arrive in droves and seem suddenly to be inundating the streets and public places, unfavorable reports concerning them are more apt to be believed (Lasker 1969:7).

During this time, racial conflicts were concentrated on the West Coast. These conflicts included: white American riots; physical and judicial brutality against Filipinos; exclusion of Filipinos from public places; and even complete expulsion of Filipinos from small towns. Lasker indicates that conflict between Filipinos and Americans first became apparent in 1929 (Lasker 1969:7). However, studies report an earlier incident on September 19, 1928 in Yakima Valley, Washington, where a group of 150 American

men successfully harassed and drove out two busloads of Filipino laborers hired to pick apples in Seattle (Mariano 1933:62).

From the late 1920s onward, racial relations between Filipinos and Americans continued to deteriorate. In October 1929, for instance, a mob of approximately 300 Americans visited every farm employing Filipinos in Exeter, California, demanding that all employers dismiss their Filipino farm laborers or risk property damaged (Lasker 1969:14). These threats were so successful that some employers convinced Filipino employees to stay in jail, where they could be protected from vigilante violence (1969:14). In the following year, two young Filipino men were found escorting two white women home, and, as a result, the Filipino men were assaulted by a group of Americans. In this case, the Americans were able to flee from the authorities, while the assaulted Filipinos were arrested for disturbing the peace (1969:15).

Numerous cases between the late 1920s and early 1930s reveal the racial anxiety surrounding Filipinos and the reinterpretation of their collective racial identity. Figure 5 displays the overt racism in a letter written to a small town sheriff demanding the expulsion of Filipinos. Violence against Filipinos—sparked by concerns over interracial mixing between Filipino men and white women *as well as* by public rhetoric that Filipinos were driving down wages—revealed that Filipinos were no longer America's "little brown brothers" but rather the source of "a new problem of mass immigration" (Lasker 1969:v).

Public disdain, previously targeted at Chinese and Japanese immigrants, now turned its focus to Filipinos. As Ngai points out: "Filipinos were greeted by a tradition of anti-Oriental racism that was eighty years in the making. … When nativists called Filipinos the 'third invasion' from the Orient, they placed the problem within a discourse that held maximum political purchase" (Ngai 2004:109). Although the tensions between whites and Filipinos bore similarity to those between whites and Asians, the rationalization of Asian exclusion during the early 1900s did not readily apply to Filipinos. Most discriminatory policies at the time targeted "Mongolians" and not "Malays." More specifically, Mongolians were considered the "yellow" races from the Far East (e.g., the Chinese and Japanese), whereas Malays were considered the "brown" races. Given racial assumptions about Filipinos, they were considered Malay due to a darker complexion (Simon 2012:39).



Figure 5. A copy of a letter threatening Filipinos. Courtesy of The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

Not only did physical appearance play a role in differential racialization among Filipinos and Asians, but the Westernization of Filipinos (under Spanish rule and through specific American projects, as discussed earlier) set them apart from other Asians, particularly in the realms of labor disputes and relations with white women. For example, Filipino laborers often refused to work for lower wages and were apt to fight for democracy and equality—both American ideals that had been emphasized during the American take-over of the Philippines (Ngai 2004:107). Moreover, the Americanization of Filipinos worried Nativists, given their fear of the potential for interracial mixing between Americanized Filipino men and American women (2004:110).

This system of racial differentiation was a method to maintain the racial order of white dominance by restricting non-whites' rights and access to resources. To achieve this goal in the Filipino case, the state needed to alter the racial order by melding Filipinos with an already excluded racial

group. An examination of anti-miscegenation laws in the early 20th Century reveals a racial re-categorization—another facet of the Filipino-Asian split.

Anti-miscegenation Laws: Evidence of a Racial Re-Ordering

Although marriages between American women and Filipino men were quite rare, when it did occur, Filipinos were apt to claim their rights within the American legal framework (Lasker 1969:94). Anti-miscegenation laws in the United States prohibited marriages between whites and blacks, whites and "Indians" (Native Americans), whites and "Hindus" (South Asians), and whites and "Mongolians" (Chinese and Japanese) (Volpp 1999:799). However, only nine states banned whites from marrying "Malays" (Filipinos),[3] and, even so, these restrictions did not develop until the mid-1920s (1999:799-813).As a result, Filipinos often argued that they were not Mongolian but Malay, in order to legally justify marriage to whites. In 1921, amid great debate and controversy, the County Counsel of Los Angeles declared that Filipinos were not Mongolians due to their brown skin, and this opinion letter was key in granting numerous marriage licenses until 1930 (1999:813-814).

Predictably, anti-Filipino hostility intensified as Filipinos continued to settle in the United States, mingle with, and occasionally marry white women. The following quotation demonstrates the magnitude of resentment intimate relations between Filipinos and whites inspired:

> Racial aliens may undercut us, take away our jobs, surpass us in business competition, or commit crimes against our laws, and we will be only a little harder on them than we would be on aliens from Europe of our own race. But let them start to associate with our women and we see red (as cited in Lasker 1969:92).

In terms of their sexuality, Filipino men were often differentiated from Asian men, and, in the American racial imagination, a link emerged between the Filipino race and their sexuality. Due to their homogeneity, Filipino men were negatively represented as a "womanless group"—dangerous to white women and distinguished from other Asians in articles and editorials. To place Filipinos in an existing racial framework, Filipinos were often rhetoricallyfigured as sexually aggressive and consumed in their sexual passion, and the dominant white American popular culture compared them to hyper-racialized and sexualized caricatures of African Americans (Ngai 2004:110). For proof of lasciviousness, Nativists would point to the establishment of Filipino taxi dance halls, wherein a Filipino man could pay ten cents for a ten-minute dance with a white taxi dancer (Ngai 2004:110). By linking Filipino racial identity to an already excluded group, African Americans, the Filipino identity in the American racial imagination underwent a racial re-categorization. Utilizing the new racial construction as justification amid great debate and controversy in the face of rising anti-Filipino sentiment, state legislatures throughout the country amended anti-miscegenation laws to include the Malay race so as to prevent Filipino-white unions (2004:115).

Although Filipinos were eventually excluded from marrying whites, the legal and political debate surrounding their racial classification not only revealed the fluidity of race, but also exposed the increasing gulf between Filipinos and Asians. That is, in the resolution to exclude Filipinos, lawmakers could not categorize Filipinos with Asians, but rather chose to address Filipinos as a separate category. Only after the United States granted the Philippines its independence would this differential racialization diminish (which, to be clear, underscores the importance of American colonization in the construction of the Filipino race).

Filipinos had not only confronted Americans with a reality that contradicted the American fantasy of a tribal Filipino. They also posed the United States with the new challenge of excluding immigrants who were also United States nationals. Americans attempted to resort to old tactics of immigrant exclusion, but faced difficulties produced by colonization of the Philippines and consequent Filipino Americanization. Given such factors, Americans were compelled to slightly alter their approach in excluding Filipinos by differentiating them from Asians in public discourse and anti-miscegenation laws.

Phase Three: "The Invisible Filipino"

The power relations between the United States and Filipinos shifted as a result of the social and political struggles between whites and Filipinos in America. The rationalization of excluding racial minorities required immigration restrictions and limitations. Accordingly, the majority of American anti-imperialists advocated for Philippine independence at least, in part, due to a desire to quell Filipino immigration. By granting the Philippines its independence, Filipinos would be subjected to the immigration quotas ruled by the U.S. Immigration Act of 1924. Consequently, Philippine independence was largely supported by the American public, and became an issue of great political debate in the 1930s.

In 1935, the United States finally granted the Philippines sovereignty

designating July 4, 1946 as the day the islands would be officially independent. The Tydings-McDuffie Act established a ten-year transition period after which the Philippines would achieve commonwealth status. The Act's passing bore severe implications for Filipino migrants: Filipinos were no longer able to freely travel to and from the United States, and the total of Filipino immigrants was immediately capped at 50 people per year.

In an effort to completely rid America of the "Filipino Problem," the United States issued a repatriation program for Filipinos not long after the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act in 1935. Due to the Great Depression and anti-Filipino hostility, a growing number of Filipinos found themselves unemployed and homeless. Consequently, Congressman Samuel Dickstein declared Filipino repatriation a "national emergency" (Ngai 2004:120). Despite the urgency among American politicians, Filipinos did not sign up for repatriation in large numbers. In fact, in the first year of the program only 157 Filipinos were repatriated (2004:122). Studies show that "from the first sailing in April 1936 to the last in July 1941, a total of 2,064 Filipino nationals returned to the Philippines" (2004:122).

Due to the Tydings-McDuffie Act and the following repatriation program, the "Filipino Problem" that had endured in the American psyche in the late 1920s and early 1930s faded away by the late 1930s. The United States economy was improving, and World War II had just begun. As a result, more Americans moved to urban areas and acquired industrial jobs, avoiding conflict with Filipinos in the agricultural sector (Ngai 2004:125). Moreover, due to the new restrictions on immigration, the age distribution of Filipinos in America grew older; consequently, fewer Filipinos frequented controversial taxi dance halls (2004:125). As quickly as Filipino immigration became a national dilemma, Americans just as quickly forgot about the domestic presence of their colonial subjects. As Filipinos as a racial group receded from the limelight, so too did the American construction of Filipino identity. In effect, to Americans, Filipinos as a race became invisible—a fading memory in the American racial imagination.

History Retold

Indeed the United States has also attempted to erase its past construction of the Filipino identity in the American context. John DeRose, a high school history teacher, outlines a class activity wherein he presents two competing accounts of the Philippine-American War to his students: a Filipino version of the war gathered from sources such as video clips of the 1904 World Fair, and the American version found in a government-approved classroom textbook. Students acknowledged the lack of specific

details about the war in the class textbook, the omission of the Philippines' fight for independence, and the exclusion of the depiction of Filipinos in the 1904 World's Fair (DeRose 2009:4). History is constructed through a process of selection and emphasis. The conscious choice to exclude crucial elements of Filipino history in America represents a particular construction designed to bury evidence of prior American creation of a Filipino racial identity.

American Power Relations and the Filipino-Asian Split

Despite American denial of its past, United States-Filipino power relations heavily influenced the Filipino-Asian division by creating a completely distinct racial experience for Filipinos, which led to difficulties in Filipinos and Asians sharing a collective identity and unifying behind the same socio-political causes. This lack of solidarity between Filipinos and Asians coupled with the United States Census placing Filipinos into the Asian American pan-ethnic category renders Filipinos a collective group invisible from state and society.

Indeed, modern-day Filipino scholars and activists have drawn connections between the American construction of Filipinos as subjects to the Filipino marginalization and relative invisibility within the Asian American pan-ethnic framework. Evidence of internal divisions date back to as early as 1930, when a dispute between Japanese businessmen and Filipino laborers arose from a contested marriage between a Japanese woman and a Filipino man in Stockton, California (Liu, Geron, and Lai 2008:19). Filipino laborers were often considered inferior due to their status as colonial subjects (Jung 2006:416). The stigma of colonization coupled with the representation of Filipinos as primitive and indolent during the "little brown brother" period, in part, distinguishes Filipino experience and image from other Asians. This moment in history is but one example that demonstrates the impact of American racial construction on race relations between Filipinos and Asians.

Filipinos' history of seeking to legally differentiate themselves from Asians for socio-political motivations continued to create a wedge between Filipinos and other Asians. Filipinos eagerly argued their separation from the Mongolian race in order to marry whites. In the modern era, Filipinos have felt inadequately represented by the pan-Asian coalition and have advocated for separation to ensure a stronger political voice (as cited in Espiritu and Ong 1994:313). Even more, resistance to the imposition of the "invisible Filipino"—the key figure in the third phase of Filipino racial formation—drove Filipinos to seek and construct their own distinct ethno-racial identity.

CONCLUSION

The three-phase process by which Filipinos were racially categorized is both chronological and interconnected—characterized by a combination of racial formation and subject creation. Omi and Winant's theory of race and racial formation holds that racial categories are conceived through hegemony as well as the representation and organization of human bodies in society (1994:56). Moreover, Delgado and Stefancic argue that differential racialization implies that groups are categorized differently in response to shifting needs of the dominant society (2006:7-9). At first, United States colonization of the Philippines was an act of American hegemony aimed to represent Filipino bodies as inferior and unfit to self-govern. American organizational needs shifted twice, which resulted in the next two phases of Filipino racialization.

The United States could no longer sustain the representation of primitive Filipinos after *pensionados* and Filipino laborers began to immigrate to America in large numbers. A rapid influx of Filipino immigrants over the span of a decade fueled anti-immigrant sentiment, which required the United States to rethink Filipino racial formation. Thus, the representation of Filipinos transitioned from "little brown brother" to the "Filipino problem" as the government condoned anti-Filipino sentiment by supporting allegations that Filipino men were driving down wages and wantonly mingling with white women. Ultimately, when the United States no longer maintained colonial dominance in the Philippines, Filipinos in America experienced another shift in racial formation. Not only did the Tydings-McDuffie Act seek to undo Filipino identity as previous colonial subjects, but it also rendered them an invisible group for decades to come.

The process by which Filipinos were racially categorized in America was as much a racial project as it was the creation and maintenance of Filipinos *qua* United States subjects. Foucault argues that the creation and maintenance of subjects is an exercise of power that "categorizes the individual … [and] imposes a law of truth on him that he must recognize and others have to recognize in him" (2001:331). Filipinos were coerced into accepting their role as colonial subjects after the United States colonized the Philippines. Likewise, Filipinos were, at different points in time, subject to the labels of immigrant and Asian American as a consequence of changing power relations between Filipinos and the United States. Ultimately, the evidence of Filipino racial formation and subject creation differentiates them from other Asian groups due to the unique relationship between Filipinos and the United States. A historical status as colonial subjects relegated Filipinos to a

racial identity historically mired by domination, exclusion, and, later, relative invisibility in the American racial imagination. An examination of the process of Filipino racialization in America reveals a unique construction of Filipino racial history and collective identity distinct from other Asians. Moreover, the historical examination of Filipino racial formation provides insight regarding the historical processes of the inclusion and exclusion of minority groups. In other words, through subject creation and differential racialization, the United States was able to create and adjust the socio-political space of Filipinos in America through its foreign and domestic policy. It is reasonable to think that this phenomenon is not unique to Filipinos, but rather is apparent in other instances of American foreign affairs. For example, the campaign in the Philippines bears striking similarities to the war in Iraq, where the United States purported its benevolence both in saving the Iraqi people from a harsh dictator and preparing the local government to govern with the ideals of American governance and democracy. To be sure, Iraq is not an American colony, and this parallel requires more analysis. Yet, it would be a worthy scholarly endeavour to study the effects of the United States occupation in Iraq on the racialization of Iraqis in America. Foucault contends that the goal of understanding power relations is not to "liberate the individual from the state, and from the state's institutions, but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualization linked to state" (2001:336). That is to say, the outcome of my research is not to inspire the reader toward the question: "How do we liberate Filipinos from their objectification?" Rather, the question must be: "How do we eliminate this type of objectification from occurring altogether?"

NOTES

1. The Yellow Power Movement was an Asian American initiative during the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s.

2. Bruno Lasker was commissioned by the Research Committee of the American Council to make a preliminary study "to secure a general picture of the [Filipino] situation, clarification of the problems involved in it, and the indication of the major trends of current proposals for their solution" (Lasker 1969:vi).

3. The nine states were: Arizona, California, Georgia, Maryland, Nevada, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming.

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Crafting the Twitterself: The Social and Promotional Utility of Microblogging in 2010

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Abstract: Nine case studies that use Twitter, a popular microblogging website, reveal three main tweeting trends: to share information, to interact with others, and to self-promote. This paper demonstrates that by using Twitter, individuals and organizations carefully craft hyper-stylized self-presentations. Reviewing these tweeting trends through a Goffmanian lens can help us to understand the presentation of self created by Twitter users. The Twitterself can be crafted in a way that helps to build feeling of closeness and connection in the service of marketing and self-promotion. This paper combines Goffman's theory on everyday life with original data to analyze the method of crafting the Twitterself. Finally, this article asserts that Twitter has become an unparalleled marketing strategy for many users.

Keywords: digital social media, Twitter, Goffman, the self

INTRODUCTION[1]

We very firmly believe the open exchange of information can have a positive impact on the world. Every day we see evidence supporting this belief. Most Twitter accounts are public for a good reason—people find value in openness. An open approach means value for users, value for partners, and value for Twitter.
—Twitter Blog 2009

Twitter is a popular microblogging[2] website that asks users "What's Happening?" and allows people to share information through status updates of 140-characters or less. Microblogging caters to the fast paced and information-saturated character of contemporary times. Innovations such as Twitter excite information sharing and receiving, and affect daily communication. In the spirit of understanding these new interactions, this research aims to discover the role of Twitter and determine its social function by following the Twitter accounts of nine case studies (celebrities, politicians, large companies, and news sources). In what ways do individuals and organizations use Twitter to share and receive information and to what end?

This paper demonstrates that by using Twitter, individuals and organizations carefully craft their self-presentations through the utilization of various methods of status updating. Because of its unmediated nature—namely that each user has jurisdiction over what is posted and when—Twitter users are able to impress upon their followers an illusion of authenticity. This helps users create connections with their followers that seem to increase fan loyalty, making Twitter not only an incredible forum for social communication, but also an unparalleled tool for self-promotion.

THE FIRST CHIRP

Jack Dorsey, Evan Williams, and Biz Stone founded Twitter in 2006. As blogging and social networking websites exploded in popularity, Dorsey realized the opportunity for a website built solely around status updates that would offer a glimpse into people's lives. The idea was inspired by a combination of blogs (online journals), instant message services, and short message service (SMS) text messages that gained recent popularity because they allowed people to share short bursts of real time information. Inspired by these ideas, Dorsey imagined a medium that combined features permitting information sharing in real time with multiple people at once. The founders wanted Twitter to become an "information network" as opposed to a social network, placing emphasis on Twitter as an open source of information.

The website began with the working name "status" to represent its main feature—short updates of what a person was doing at any given moment. But this name quickly changed, as Dorsey explains:

> We liked the SMS aspect, and how you could update from anywhere and receive from anywhere … we wanted to capture that in the name … we came across the word "twitter," and it was just perfect. The definition was "a short burst of inconsequential information," and "chirps from birds." And that's exactly what the product was (Sarno 2009).

As the website gained popularity, Twitter began to change along with its users. One example of Twitter's adaptability occurred in November 2009, when Twitter changed the question it asked its users from "What are you doing?" to "What's Happening?" On their blog, the founders explained

that "the fundamentally open model of Twitter created a new kind of information network and it has long outgrown the concept of personal status updates" (Twitter Blog 2009).

Since its inauguration onto the social media stage, Twitter has seen a rise in popularity. Throughout 2009 and 2010, Twitter remained in the No. 12 spot on www.alexa.com, a website that tracks Internet traffic around the world. These statistics show an extremely large increase in visits to the Twitter website between 2008 and 2010, moving Twitter out of its spot in the top 2,000 most visited websites into the top 20 most visited sites starting in the middle of 2009 (See Appendix A). A study released by Twitter in 2010 mirrors Alexa's data, showing that the number of daily tweets increased dramatically since its inception—up to almost 50 million tweets per day as of January 2010 (See Appendix B).

Users and Followers

Twitter functions through a constant stream of updates or "tweets."[3] A tweet, or status update, is a way for a user to post a message that automatically appears to any other user who wants to view it. The status update is similar to leaving a voicemail message on a phone, except a status update is typically available to many more people at one time. On Twitter, status updates can include anything from one's thoughts, feelings, questions, or frustrations to news items, links to other websites, pictures, videos, or any other information a person wants to share.

To post an update on Twitter, one must sign up by creating a username (up to 20 characters) and a profile page. A person's profile page can display as much information as he or she wishes, including a full name, e-mail address, location, links to websites, and a small "bio" with other personal information. A user can also edit his or her profile picture and page design—all of which will be displayed on the personal profile page.

LITERATURE REVIEW

This paper examines the social function of Twitter, one of the most popular microblogging platforms that enables users to "[s]hare and discover what's happening right now, anywhere in the world" (Twitter 2010). I specifically study how Twitter facilitates communication through various tweeting methods, and how different tweet methods enable users to manufacture a respective Twitterself. Since research on Twitter is extremely thin due to its novelty, I will examine three main areas of study. The first body of literature will focus on the sociological and theoretical framework of my project. The third will focus specifically on the properties and functions of Twitter. The final section will note relevant work that has been published since this research was conducted in 2010.

Sociological and Theoretical Framework

In "Social Implications of the Internet," DiMaggio et al. (2001) examine several functions of the Internet through a sociological lens and highlight its importance in facilitating social communication. These various functions compliment and sometimes complicate existing forms of inequality, social capital, and cultural participation in society. His work draws significantly on Manuel Castells' *The Rise of the Network Society: Volume 1* ([1996] 2010), which provides a sociological framework for the escalation of technology in the "information age." His recent "Preface to the 2010 edition" addresses the "shift from traditional mass media to a system of horizontal communication networks organized around the Internet and wireless communication networks" ([1996] 2010:xviii) that characterize the "network society." His examination of popular websites that permit anyone to distribute content via the Internet inaugurates a shift from mass communication to "mass self communication." According to Castells, mass self-communication is harder to control hierarchically, fostering more communication and more open, unfiltered opinion. It is easily accessible, ubiquitous, and, most importantly, autonomous. He cites blogging, e-mails, and popular social networking sites such as YouTube as examples of this new type of communication. Castell's concept of mass self communication can be directly applied to Twitter, a platform that combines social networking and content distribution with blogging and self-representation.

In his seminal work on self-presentation, Erving Goffman (1959) analyzes the ways that an individual, upon knowing his audience, will work to portray a particular image to that audience. Goffman argues that a person's life is similar to a performance—with a front and back stage. The front stage is the finalized presentation of self that we portray to others, complete with idealized actions and props to aid in our performance. While interacting with others on the front stage, the individual will engage in "impression management" or "will act with expressive responsibility … to convey impressions inappropriate at the time" (1959:208). The "art of impression management" is a useful tool in ensuring that the audience sees the individual in a favorable manner. The back stage, conversely, is a space for private thoughts and actions. It is a place where the individual can plan an impression of self to ensure a faultless public performance. While Goffman's work is written in a pre-Internet era and is intended to analyze

face-to-face interactions, his ideas of performance creation and front-stage self-presentation can be applied to presentations of self on Twitter. That is, the content posted by different users and the reactions they intend to draw from their followers can certainly be seen as a calculated performance intended to evoke an intimate connection between tweet producers and recipients.

The presentation of self on the Internet has been examined by Laura Robinson (2007), who relies heavily on Goffman to provide a theoretical framework for her argument that the creation of an online "cyberself" involves the same kind of performance as offline self-presentation. She asserts that one's self is defined by symbolic interactions or what a person believes to be society's perception of oneself. She uses Goffmanian terms in stating that "[o]nline expressions are still 'given' and 'given off' through text; 'front stages' and 'back stages' are critical to framing cyberinteractions" (2007:107). Although this paper will draw the majority of its theory from Goffman, the combined works of Goffman and Robinson provide a productive framework for examining the presentation of the cyberself on Twitter.

Microblogging/Twitter

In "Twitter Power: Tweets as Electronic Word of Mouth," Jansen et al. (2009) evaluate Twitter as a marketing tool. They conclude that microblogging plays a significant role in brand marketing since the microblogging platform enables brands to set up different accounts and then to follow and engage in conversations. Even more, Twitter's function as a marketing tool extends to celebrities and politicians who market themselves via status updates.

Much of the literature on Twitter examines the website to define and understand microblogging, a communication phenomenon less than a decade old. Martin Ebner and Mandy Schiefner in "Microblogging–More Than Fun?" (2008) discuss the trend of "mobile learning" or the growing connection between the Internet and our ability to attain information. Their research suggests that the new trend of posting short "status updates" is an expansion of the trend of e-mails, blogs, and SMS text messages—a quick and easy way to share information in an increasingly mobile world. Dejin Zhao and Mary Beth Rosson (2009) write that the mobility of microblogging sites such as Twitter help to increase their popularity and usability. Since Twitter messages can be received both on mobile phones and computers, updating statuses and following others user's updates are simple tasks.

According to "Why We Twitter: Understanding Microblogging Usage and Communities," scholars have identified Twitter as an outlet for information sharing in various forms (Java et al. 2007). The most common posts on Twitter fall under the category of daily chatter, which answers the only question asked by Twitter: "What's Happening?" Zhao and Rossen argue that reading small bits of information about others' lives help to develop "more accurate perceptions of others" (2009:44), build common ground, and engender a sense of connectedness with people in one's social network. Courtenay Honeycutt and Susan C. Herring (2009) in "Beyond Microblogging: Conversation and Collaboration via Twitter" similarly offer that Twitter facilitates direct conversation between different users in ways that mirror communication by instant messages, SMS text messages, and e-mail.

Java et al (2007) report that about 13 percent of all posts on Twitter contain links or URLs to other websites, blogs, or videos, and that many users tweet to report news or comment regarding current events. As discussed by journalists reporting in publications like *The Economist* and *The New York Times*, Twitter's ability to report news as it happens is a groundbreaking feature of today's new media. While many of these articles are fairly nuanced, they provide a strong base for understanding different types of tweets, which guided the formation of tweet categories used in this paper.

Initially, while the media explored the impact of Twitter, scholars remained relatively tacit on the new phenomenon. In the year that I spent researching for this project, few scholarly sources were available. The few published articles were extremely specific, many of them focusing only on a very small aspect of Twitter that was mostly irrelevant to this research. While some scholars focused on the theory behind the general idea of online self-promotion, there is little (if any) research that used sociological theory to unpack Twitter's social function. This research aims, then, to address this gap in theory by using Goffman as a theoretical foundation for Twitter self-presentation. In addition, this paper supplement's Goffman's theory with contemporary theories on marketing to explain how Twitter can be used for social interaction *and* building connections between users. In many cases, Twitter birthed a new kind of marketing strategy—a forum for hyper-stylized self-promotion. This research supplements extant Twitter research while illuminating the relationship between social media, social connections, and branding.

New Literature

Since conducting this research in 2010, the available literature written about Twitter has grown significantly. Many authors have studied Twitter as a marketing strategy for businesses, and a search on Google for books on Twitter and marketing yields numerous results. To put this in perspective, a search for "Twitter and marketing" on the popular online bookstore www.amazon.com in January 2010 yielded no more than five results while a search in July 2012 generated more than 1,300 results.

Scholarly research on Twitter has also blossomed. Goncalves et al. (N.d.) applied Dunbar's Number—a suggested cognitive limit to the number of stable social relationships one can maintain—to study the number of social connections one can make using Twitter. While their analysis is quite different than the one in this study, they have fruitfully applied social theory to the social platform. Recent studies also demonstrate the type of Twitter-related research published at the the conclusion of this study. Most notably, in "Tweet, Tweet: A Content Analysis of Nonprofit Organizations' Twitter Updates," Waters and Jamal (2011) examine nonprofit businesses to determine whether they truly engage and communicate with their followers. Their findings conclude that despite the potential for information sharing in the form of two-way communication, the organizations they studied were more likely to posted using one-way models when users post many updates, but true interactions and conversations were limited. Unlike Waters and Jamal, I found that many of my case studies regularly engaged with their followers. But I also conclude that self-promotion is the predominant form of tweeting for most of users I followed. Given my findings, I can imagine that in the years since this study was conducted, self-promotion has only increased due to Twitter's rise in popularity as a marketing platform. Thus, Waters and Jamal's analysis adds an updated dimension to my findings from 2010.

METHODS

My research examines Twitter's impact on social communication by observing the tweeting methods in nine case studies composed of three celebrities (Ellen DeGeneres, Lady Gaga, and Lance Armstrong); two companies (Whole Foods and Starbucks); two politicians (Steve Poizner and Jerry Brown); and two news sources (*Los Angeles Times* and *CNN*).

Although my paper looked at Twitter from its inception in 2006 to 2010, most of my research involved observing tweets during the month of January 2010, when I closely tracked nine users, recording each of their

tweets on an Excel spreadsheet to form a specific tweet typology. While I had many users from which to choose when selecting my case studies, I attempted to create a diverse and objective group of case studies. All of my studies are individuals or organizations; they all have a large number of followers; and many of them have appeared in Twitter-related news articles or blogs. For a fuller description of each user, please see Appendix C.

Furthermore, I chose to focus specifically on these nine cases for several reasons. First, as stated above, each of these individuals and organizations were studied, mentioned, and/or recognized for their Twitter use during a time when many people were still grappling with the social platform. Similarly, all of my case studies were fairly knowledgeable about how to use and navigate Twitter. They were familiar with the different conventions of Twitter—@-replies, retweets, etc.—and possessed the know-how to leverage the platform to communicate with others. As such, they often posted varied and interesting content. Finally, I wanted to focus my study on the Twitter-usage habits of public businesses and personalities to understand how the platform is used as a marketing tool in addition to a way for sharing information. If I had studied a random sample of individuals from the general public, I would not have gained insight into how Twitter is used in general, but I would have been able to determine how it is used by those in the public eye as a tool for crafting self-presentation, and, thus, for effective self-promotion. With that said, the analysis that focuses on crafting a Twitterself can also be applied to the general public concerned with self-presentation in everyday virtual life.

I used the data from these nine case studies to determine Twitter's primary functions, which I have divided into three main categories: information sharing, promotion, and communication. Finally, I analyze these functions to shed light on the role of Twitter for both tweet producers and receivers. To effectively categorize these tweets, I invented a very specific tweet typology—influenced in part by the categories that made themselves apparent in my observations, and, in part, by the writings of Java et al. (2009). My tweet typology identifies ten categories of tweets, among them general tweets, news tweets, tweets with hyperlinks to videos and pictures, promotional tweets, and @-reply tweets. For a comprehensive list of Twitter technical terms, please see Appendix D.

To answer this study's question I followed nine cases on a daily basis between January 1, 2010 and January 31, 2010, recording all tweets and developing a tweet typology based on my observations. By recording and charting tweets and then coding similarities and differences between tweeting methods, I was able to see specific patterns in tweeting styles and compare

how these styles differed for each user. These observations, in conjunction with Goffman's analysis of self-presentation, enabled me to determine how each of the case studies craft their Twitterselves, in what ways, and for what purposes.

A comprehensive and empirically based typology will guide the data presented in this paper. It is important to note that this data is often more complicated than it appears. I had to make executive decisions about how a tweet should be classified to understand the tweet's main function (at least, what I understood its main function to be). This is to say that what is classified as one type of tweet may also encompass other conventions (i.e., an @-reply tweet may also have some promotional value, but is still classified as an @-reply on the chart). Once I gathered my data, I saw three very clear thematic trends in user tweets, which I will call information-sharing tweets (tweets made with the intention of sharing general information), interaction tweets (tweets that facilitate communication and/or conversation), and promotional tweets (tweets made with the sole intention of marketing).

The following sections of this paper will examine how these themes explain the majority of tweets made by the organizations and institutions as well as the purposes that these tweets serve for the users in this study.

TWEET PRODUCERS: CRAFTING THE TWITTERSELF

Goffman (1959) asserted that since society is not homogeneous, the average person must arrange her presentation of self to correspond to different settings. As such, the self is multi-faceted. This research expands this notion of a mutli-faceted self by exploring the Twitterself as just one of those selves in everyday life. For instance, in Twitter's case, one's front stage of a performance is portrayed through status updates. Through these updates, my nine case studies—which can be likened to actors on a stage—have worked carefully to craft a self that will convey a specific impression to their followers. Goffman helps to elaborate the point: "Sometimes the individual will act in a thoroughly calculating manner, expressing himself in a given way solely in order to give the kind of impression to others that is likely to evoke from them a specific response he is concerned to obtain" (1959:6).

Like an actor on the stage, this self-impression would not be complete without a setting—the profile page—and numerous props. Each Twitter user's profile page, or homepage, can be viewed as the setting of our actor's performance. Goffman's discussion of the significance of setting is pertinent here:

> A setting tends to stay put, geographically speaking, so that those who would use a particular setting as a part of their performance cannot begin their act until they have brought themselves to the appropriate place and must terminate their performance when they leave it (1959:22).

The homepage, which includes an individually chosen background and a profile picture, immediately communicates a stylized presentation. It also likely (especially on the pages of celebrities and politicians) includes numerous pictures of the user to identify the page's owner. A visually distinct homepage is more inviting than a homepage that has not been customized, attracting Twitter followers through its authentic-look and eye-catching charm. Customized features—like adjusting the presentation of the homepage—provide the backdrop to one's Twitter-customized self or what I will call the Twitterself. In most cases, the Twitterself is presented apart from face-to-face daily life. It is a supplement to one's career or business identity since it exists in a separate, virtual realm—a digital space that presupposes a more candid glimpse of a user's life and personality. This supposedly honest glimpse enables the fiction of personal connection with followers that cannot be manufactured elsewhere. The Twitter setting facilitates an interaction that is not possible outside the Twitterverse[3] since followers cannot gain this kind of access to public figures without viewing their Twitter. Yet, the profile page also represents one of the most crafted elements of the Twitterself, as users "… are able to carefully choose what information to put forward, thereby eliminating visceral reactions that might have seeped out in everyday communication" (Boyd 2007:12).

Twitter users can engage in performance each time they post a status update. These status updates reveal a carefully calculated self-presentation. It is important to note, however, that the Twitterself differs from Goffman's analysis on one important point. Goffman makes clear the distinction between "expressions given" and expressions "given off." The former refers to the "verbal symbols or their substitutes" (1959:2) that permits a person to manage his impression so that the audience perceives it in a particular way, while the latter refers to those expressions that are not consciously but rather come across in a person's facial expressions or other forms of non-verbal communication. The possibility of "expressions given off" is inherent in face-to-face communication since "expressions given off" cannot be controlled, and, thus, can be used to expose a false or contrived personality. Yet "expressions given off" play a far lesser role in the presentation of online actors since the self they may portray is one that has been carefully calculated in the form of a status update. Therefore, the Twitterself is a

more controlled and contrived self than Goffman's everyday self.

Twitter users enter the Twitterverse with the sole intention of putting on a performance. For instance, public figures on Twitter want to present their "real selves"—the selves one cannot find in tabloids, on movie theatre screens, nor on television. This self is portrayed as an authentic, unmediated self, and, therefore, more accessible. Yet this "real" self—regardless of its aim for authenticity—is in many ways part of a role that users play to their own social advantage. The following pages will examine what I observed to be the three main categories of Twitter usage for my case studies, noting the different types of self-presentation that appear within each category. These observations suggest that Twitter has become an incredible venue for users to construct a favorable self-presentation, and, consequently, Twitter can be used as an unparalleled marketing tool.

TWEETING AS A TOOL FOR SHARING INFORMATION

Sometimes the individual will be calculating in his activity but be relatively unaware that this is the case.
—Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959:6)

In crafting the Twitterself, the users I followed dedicated a considerable number of tweets for sharing general information. For the *CNN* and the *L.A. Times,* information-sharing is a necessary part of the media's aim; however, for public figures and companies, sharing general information provides a break from persistent advertising that usually accompanies public users. In addition, information sharing offers followers a glimpse into the "candid" self of otherwise untouchable figures. With Goffman in mind, we can assume that these tweets are not truly candid; they are "expressions given" since the information would not be available to followers if the users did not want it to be. Yet, for the average follower without a Goffmanian lens (and who, therefore, likely takes tweets at face-value), these information-sharing tweets provide a glimpse into the "everyday life" of a politician, celebrity, or company—thereby arguably creating a feeling of familiarity and even intimacy with public users.

While public figures spent time on Twitter marketing themselves, some of their tweets focused solely on sharing information about one's life, daily activities, or current events. For both Poizner and Brown, these tweets represented less than one percent of their total January posts. For celebrities, however, there was a more concentrated attempt to divulge information about one's daily life, perhaps to allow followers to relate to them on a more personal level.

General tweets made by Lance Armstrong, Ellen DeGeneres, and Lady Gaga accounted for 29 percent, 13 percent, and 67 percent, respectively, of total January tweets. These celebrities discussed a range of topics:

> Big. Football. Game. Tomorrow. Can't. Wait (Armstrong January 6, 2010).

> The Saints are going to the Superbowl, and now, thanks to the Saints' QB Drew Brees, my mama is going too! Thank you SO MUCH! (DeGeneres January 28, 2010).

> Back in New York, leopard tights and sparkles, like a new woman. Can't wait 4 Monster Ball, ready to tear the face off my hometown 2nite xx (Lady Gaga January 20, 2010).

Some general tweets even posted links to personal pictures and videos, often providing a contrasting image that differed from the typical images posted by major media outlets. In general, information sharing tweets by public figures resembled posts that would be made by any Twitter user, and reminded followers that even celebrities are "real people" who enjoy the same activities as the "average person." The ability for these users to present a seemingly authentic and unmediated self is a key element for building connections between users and fans—a topic to be discussed in the following pages.

For news sources with little personal information to share, the most common method for information sharing was unsurprisingly through posting news. This was most often achieved by posting a general statement or headline of an article, followed by the link to the article (what I have called a basic news + hyperlink tweet). For example:

> Sarah Palin: Fox gig doesn't close the door to 2012. http://bit.ly/63KpLW (*CNN* January 15, 2010).

This was the single most popular type of tweet for both *CNN* and the *L.A. Times*. In fact, in January, basic news tweets occurred a total of 389 times for *CNN* and 403 times for the *L.A. Times*, averaging approximately 66 percent and 61 percent of their total tweets, respectively. A similar style of tweet, which I have classified as a basic news tweet without a hyperlink, was noted less often (18 tweets for *CNN* and only three tweets the *L.A. Times*). This tweet type can be collapsed into with basic news + hyperlink tweets to create a new category, simply, "basic news tweets." The total number of basic news tweets was almost identical: 407 for *CNN* and 406 for the *L.A. Times*—totaling 68 percent and 62 percent of their total tweets, respectively.

While general information sharing for news sources does not help form a *personal* connection with *CNN* or the *L.A. Times* in the way that it may for a public figure, information sharing facilitates a connection between users and followers nonetheless. While *CNN* and *L.A. Times* post news, they rarely post the same stories, and the tone with which they post stories is often quite different. For instance, the *L.A. Times,* which caters mostly to an audience based in Southern California, tends to tweet with a touch of humor:

> Lamar Odom on the Lakers' attitude: "We're cocky. We're cocky. We're cocky. So what?" http://bit.ly/6WBxcV (*L.A. Times* January 24, 2010).

CNN, on the other hand, tends to send more sober tweets as shown above in the tweet about Sarah Palin. The difference in presentation is probably due to the fact that *CNN* appeals to a larger and more diverse audience while the *L.A. Times* bends to more local, quotidian interests. Regardless, these differences are likely the product of specific strategies for information-sharing tweets that cater to the needs of audiences. If followers enjoy a particular news source's tweeting style, they will most likely continue to follow the Twitter user. If they do not, they can easily go elsewhere. In light of the possibility that individuals can choose to no longer follow tweets, each of these sources can assume its followers are satisfied, and will continue to loyally follow their respective Twitterself.

TWEETING TO FACILITATE INTERACTION

Sometimes the individual will act in a thoroughly calculating manner, expressing himself in a given way solely in order to give the kind of impression to others that is likely to evoke a specific response he is concerned to obtain.
—Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959:6)

Many users tweeted with the intention of interacting with followers. Sometimes this interaction came in the form of direct conversation between two users, and, other times, it was seen in the re-tweeting of another user's post. Users sometimes asked for feedback and responded to it, and users often thanked followers directly for continued "love" and "support." Regardless of the form, every user I followed leveragd Twitter conventions to show that they acknowledged followers. These twitter interactions encouraged feedback and communication from followers, thereby manufacturing an

illusion of closeness and intimacy (given that Twitter interactions appear to validate the opinions and input of followers). The development of a relationship between public entities and their followers is an extremely useful tool for keeping followers engaged and entertained. Twitter, as a forum for "open communication," helps portray celebrities as concerned about fans and responsive to their daily lives. This manufactured intimacy is not an accident, but, rather, a well-crafted presentation-of self that strengthens followers' view of the user as authentic and unmediated—which functions as an effective marketing strategy.

The convention of the @-reply was used by many of the public figures I followed as powerful tool for opening lines of communication between Twitter users and their fans. For example, Lance Armstrong used @-replies more frequently than any other public figure that I studied, closely resembling Starbucks and Whole Foods. In fact, Armstrong posted a total of 86 tweets that included @-replies—almost half (46 percent) of his total tweets in January. He appeared to communicate with friends, fellow cyclists, fans, sponsors, and Twitter pages that promoted upcoming races. Sometimes he used the @-reply to engage in direct conversation:

> @K1dney_Punch They'll be very strong. Will they still be wearing those temporary jerseys though? (January 5, 2010).

Other times, he simply tagged others in his posts:

> Exciting st 5 here @tourdownunder. Crowds were massive all day. Thx to all for showing up and supporting all the riders (January 22, 2010).

> Last dinner in Kona w/ @annahansen, @maxarmstrong1, @trainright, @knollio, and Ryzcard. Going to miss this place a lot. Be back soon tho (January 11, 2010).

Ellen and Poizner were also avid users of the @-reply with a 21 percent and 18 percent, respectively, of their tweets utilizing this type of tweet. Moreover, Ellen[4] and Poizner used the @-reply in similar ways, often to mention another user in a post, as opposed to engaging a follower in direct conversation:

> It was a pleasure to debate @TalktoTom many times on our plans for CA. I wish him the best of luck in the future. http://bit.ly/7fmdl1 (Poizner January 14, 2010).

> @EricStonestreet was in my audience in Season 1; today he's on my show (& on Modern Family – one of my fave new shows)

http://su.pr/4AL9 (DeGeneres January 12, 2010).

Ellen also communicated with other users using the re-tweet, which, like the @-reply, provided an outlet for user to follow her interactions. Ellen's use of the re-tweet is significant since she re-tweeted differently than most other users. Although Ellen's re-tweets totaled 18 percent of her tweets in January, they were uniquely in the form of @-replys. In other words, if a Twitter user spoke directly to Ellen, she would reply by first posting her own response first and then by adding an "RT @ 'twitteruser'" to show what "twitteruser" had originally said:

> Thanks! Maybe we'll chat. Ask for me. RT @ashleighjoelle Ill def call to donate! Great for so many celebs to come 2gether for a gr8 cause! (January 20, 2010).

> Happy Early Birthday! RT @MellowMegz Very excited that I share my birthday with such a cool person Ellen. Almost happy birthday Ellen!! (January 12, 2010).

This is a different approach from the one taken by most Twitter users, who would simply reply to another user by using the @-reply without showing the previous tweet posted by a previous follower or user.

Re-tweets from other public figures most often looked something like this post on Brown's page:

> RT@KQED_CapNotes Congrats new Governor Jerry Brown! The AG becomes acting Guv tonite as every higher official goes 2 DC & no LtGuv. Who needed a campaign? (January 19, 2010).

These posts read more like advertisements, as did many other re-tweets posted by users I followed. That is, retweets can be viewed as commercially motived since they often reposted something another user had said, which was usually complementary. Regardless, the use of the re-tweet is another way to show acknowledgement of another Twitter user, and, therefore, still represents a form of interaction that colors the Twitter presentation of self.

Yet, Lady Gaga used none of these conventions to interact with her followers. Instead, she used many of her general updates (29 of 43 total tweets in January) to speak to her fans at once:

> The monsterball was moved so we could still perform, not to sell more tickets. I promise to make it up to you, you are everything to mexgaga (January 6, 2010).

> We won two grammy's already little monsters + I dedicate them to u! I ruined my makeup crying! Look for little monster suprise on the piano (January 31, 2010).

Other tweets by public figures resembled Gaga's tweeting style, addressing all of their followers at once:

> Very, very close to hitting today's goal of 6k Facebook supporters. Could you be number 6,000? Join us there today at http://bit.ly/8CE9XC (Brown January 11, 2010).

> Attention Followers! We're looking for fun new talent so send me a YouTube link with the tag #GetOnEllen. Can't wait to see what you post (DeGeneres January 26, 2010).

Given that they opened lines of communication between Twitter users, these posts serve a similar function as the @-reply. However, the tweets speak to a larger group, as opposed to just one or two specific individuals. Even more, they also serve a dual purpose: to inspire interaction and promote a Twitterself.

For Whole Foods and Starbucks, interaction was most often seen in the form of customer feedback. These companies urge followers to provide questions and comments, and, by answering these questions, companies forged relationships with their followers while also gaining considerable promotional leverage. For example, Starbucks' "Brad the Twitterer" tweeted 234 times in January with approximately 85 percent of tweets in the form of an @-reply. Similarly, the Whole Foods "ghost tweeter" dedicated 161 of 196 tweets in January to @-replies, totaling 82 percent of posts that month. These companies' @-replies covered a vast range of topics: from gift cards to customer service to products and locations. Many posts appeared to benefit not only the customer offering feedback, but also the company's followers:

> @PriNcEsS_mUrDoC We have these flavors in sugar free: vanilla, caramel, hazelnut and cinnamon dolce. (Starbucks January 5, 2010).

> @erinmkelly We've got tons of eggplant recipes. Check it out: http://bit.ly/4rJZEN (Whole Foods January 18, 2010).

> @lickasha We changed our Tea lineup on Tuesday. Here's the details: http://j.mp/6TQtKb (January 14, 2010).

In either form, the @-reply accounted for a large majority each company's posts per day.

Whole Foods and Starbucks also interacted with their followers using re-tweets. The companies would occasionally re-tweet a good-natured

compliment or witty observation:

> RT@Mjlamp I strongly believe that @wholefoods should be-named Yum-town, USA. If for no other reason than their bangin' Chicken Tikka Masala (Whole Foods January 13, 2010).

> RT@pollensoft New term coined: #twitterbrate: to tweet so much that you suddenly celebrate and get cupcakes all over the place. Thanks @Starbucks! (Starbucks January 12, 2010).

In fact, re-tweets were 16 of Starbucks' and 12 of Whole Foods January tweets. These re-tweets were a crafted marketing strategy with dual purposes. They provide store-to-customer communication while also giving companies feedback in the form of positive advertising.

Even news sources engaged Twitter users. Despite the seemingly straightforward task of posting news, the news sources I followed managed to interact with other Twitter users, including both the average follower as well as their staff writers and *L.A. Times* or *CNN* Twitter accounts. Sometimes news sources, for example, addressed followers by asking for opinions or feedback:

> What's your take on the Apple Tablet? Will it be a game changer? Will you buy one? Submit an iReport. http://bit.ly/5JmAp0 (*CNN* January 26, 2010).

In addition, the media cases in this study most often facilitated interaction by the use of the @-reply. Appearing just four times on *CNN's* Twitter page but amounting to a total of 104 tweets for the *L.A. Times,* the @-reply separates the tweeting methods of these two news sources. In the latter case, *the L.A. Times* also used the @-reply to tag other affiliated Twitter accounts:

> In Ohio, Obama stops in 'where friends meet' http://j.mp/6Q29bc | See @latimesmuskal for live coverage of the president's Elyria town hall (*L.A. Times* January 19, 2010).

The *L.A. Times* also used the @-reply to acknowledge staff writers:

> Tiger Woods' story veers to sex addiction http://j.mp/4IUReo by @LATimesWharton | Full coverage http://latimes.com/golf (*L.A. Times* January 21, 2010).

Finally, the *L.A. Times* used the @-reply to create connections with other individuals or organizations that their tweets referred to or received information from:

> Coachella 2010: Jay-Z, Muse, Thom Yorke lead lineup http://j.mp/8SfKPA > Full lineup via @pophiss (*L.A. Times* January 19, 2010).

CNN and the *L.A. Times* also used the re-tweet to interact with other users on Twitter while also posting news:

> RT @CNNtech: @cnnireport community reacts to Apple's "oversized iPhone." Check out the story: http://bit.ly/bS189W (*CNN* January 28, 2010).

It is important to distinguish between the two @ symbols in this tweet since they show two forms of interaction with two different Twitter accounts. The first @ symbol, appearing after the "RT," means that *CNN* has re-tweeted the post made by "@CNNtech," the Twitter account. The second @ symbol signifies an @-reply to the Twitter account "@CNNireport" to direct followers to that Twitter page should they want more information discussed in the tweet. Re-tweets were the second most popular tweeting method for both of the news sources I followed. *CNN* posted a total of 176 re-tweets in January, while the *L.A. Times* posted only 144, accounting for approximately 30 percent and 22 percent, respectively, of the total number of tweets that month.

TWEETING AS A FORM OF SELF-PROMOTION

Sometimes [the individual] will intentionally and consciously express himself in a particular way ….
—Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959:6)

The majority of tweets made by the users I followed can be considered promotional—even if promotion does not appear to be the tweet's main intention. Promotional tweets read much like advertisements, overtly marketed and branded by the Twitter user. It is in these tweets that Goffman's idea of actors on a stage applies to Twitter since each user works to present her product (music, coffee, television show, etc.) in the most favorable light in order to provide incentive for followers to "buy" particular products. This section will focus on those tweets that appeared to function like personal, self-fashioned commercials constructed by various users although overt advertising was not a primary function of Twitter use.

Positive marketing is an important part of any public figure's image. In the Twitterverse, celebrities and politicians maintain total control over published materials, and, therefore, can ensure that their tweets project a positive and compelling self-image. For the politician, promotional tweets accounted for 53 percent of Poizner's tweets, and 70 percent of Brown's

total January tweets. These figures show that for the two politicians, Twitter functions as an online campaigning tool. In fact, promotional tweets were often used to promote political interests:

> Join my team to help rebuild CA and fix our broken economy http://bit.ly/8gDz9G #jobsnow #tcot (Poizner January 26, 2010).

Tweets were also used to promote recent success or campaign accomplishments:

> Politico Magazine names Jerry Brown one of the top 25 to watch in 2010. (Brown January 4, 2010).

> Honored to receive the endorsement of former CA Gov George Deukmejian today. VIDEO:http://bit.ly/82cKc6 #tcot #cagov (Poizner January 19, 2010).

Like Poizner and Brown, Lady Gaga used Twitter for promotional purposes, dedicating more than 40 percent of her tweets to marketing new songs, music videos, and merchandise:

> #GAGAFORHAITI www.ladygaga.com BUY GAGA MERCH TODAY 100% OF PROFIT GOES TO EARTHQUAKE RELIEF. LITTLE MONSTERS SAVE THE WORLD TODAY (January 24, 2010).

Similar to other public figures, Ellen DeGeneres posted 85 promotional tweets in January, accounting for more than half (56 percent) of her total tweets that month. Ellen typically advertised her shows, and almost always tweeted both text and hyperlink to her website, which displayed video clips from *The Ellen Show* and other extra information and footage that can be found only on her website. Many of Ellen's tweets aimed to promote upcoming actors and performers on her show:

> Ricky Gervais showed me his elmo. You heard me. http://su.pr/26VcVX (January 15, 2010).

An entirely different type of promotional tweet on Ellen's page was dedicated to special giveaways and sweepstakes that were either announced on her show or only available on the Internet via Twitter and her website:

> I'm giving away some iPod touches to my Twitter and Facebook followers. You gotta follow me to win! (January 26, 2010).

Another type of promotion informed fans of her work on *American Idol* and encouraged fans of *The Ellen Show* to support her by watching *Idol*:

> West Coast, turn on your TVs. Idol starts in 15. #EllenOnIdol (January 12, 2010).

In contrast, Armstrong breaks from this practice, tweeting only 12 updates with the intention to promotion his work. For Armstrong, promotions are often imbedded within posts aimed to communicate with other users and Twitter accounts rather than to sell a talent or project. Most of his promotional tweets resembled the following post:

> We're looking for health, nutrition & fitness experts to write for LIVESTRONG.COM. More info here: http://tinyurl.com/yl5m6ej (January 29, 2010).

While many of his other tweets resembled the above type of tweet, other types combined conversational tweets with promotional tweets:

> RT @LIVESTRONG: New @LIVESTRONG Blog "State of the Union" by @livestrongceo http://bit.ly/dwbjHA #sotu #LIVESTRONG (January 28, 2010).

Similarly, eight of *CNN's* January tweets explicitly advertised programs on their television station:

> AFL-CIO Pres. Richard Trumka gets the last word on health care and Pres. Obama's jobs push. Watch CNN's State of The Union with John King (January 31, 2010).

But like Armstrong, the news sources in this study buried most of their promotions within their tweets. Since one must view the source's website to read the full news article or view pictures or videos, promotion in every tweet was nearly inevitable. For example:

> #FollowFriday @psteinhauserCNN whose CNN poll was mentioned by Obama today! http://bit.ly/cP8ZBU (*CNN* January 29, 2010).

> Ahem. @latimesmovies asks: What's the point of 10 best picture Oscar nominations? http://j.mp/8FhVMI (*L.A. Times* January 25, 2010).

Starbucks and Whole Foods occasionally strayed from their @-reply tweets to engage in no-nonsense marketing. Tweeting about a new store, product, recipe, or news article, these posts demonstrated the use of Twitter as a marketing tool. More specifically, promotional tweets were just less than 0.7 percent of Starbucks' tweets in January and 0.8 percent of Whole Food's January tweets. For Starbucks, these tweets look like advertisements:

> Just had one of our tasty new Panini Sandwiches, the Roasted Tomato and Mozzarella. I recommend! (January 19, 2010).

Promotional Tweets by Whole Foods, on the other hand, were slightly more diverse. While some announced new store locations or products, others promoted the Whole Foods blog and announced new recipes and health tips that match the store's persona of natural, wholesome health consciousness.

CONCLUSION: THE ULTIMATE MARKETING STRATEGY

With the help of Goffman, I have established that Twitter provides an unparalleled outlet for well-calculated self-presentation that comes to users in the form of information-sharing, interaction, and self-promotion. We have seen that coupled with well-calculated self-presentation is a pattern of carefully placed marketing tactics, often times quite explicit but sometimes slightly harder to identify. The Twitterverse has become a place where "the road to success is found … in explicit self-packaging … success is not determined by individuals' internal sets of skills, motivations, and interests but, rather, by how effectively they are arranged, crystallized, and labeled" (Lair et al. 2005:308). The Twitterverse offers a new kind of marketing that transforms these nine case studies into brands and followers into customers.

Despite my separation of three of Twitter's main functions, information-sharing tweets and tweets meant to facilitate interaction are still intertwined with marketing priorities and goals. In fact, every tweet posted by the users I followed served marketing purposes. In an attempt to connect with followers in a candid manner through an unmediated public forum, these users harnessed Twitter to build connections with their followers, based on a portrayal of authenticity and open communication. General updates, feedback, fan appreciation, videos, pictures, and anything else posted in a tweet allow followers to learn something about the user, creating a fictive relationship between users and followers—which is the ultimate marketing strategy.

In the new age of marketing, celebrities have become brands, and brands have become more like people in the sense that consumers now judge an item based on its meaning instead of its use (Goodman and Rushkoff 2003). Starbucks Coffee and Peets' Coffee both serve excellent drinks but capture a sector of the market based on the characteristics attributed to each coffeemaker. And if Lady Gaga sings just as well as Taylor Swift, how do consumers decide whom to love, and whom to ignore? According to Kevin Roberts (2004; 2006), consumers make purchasing decisions because certain brands instill within them a "loyalty beyond reason" that causes consumers

to feel the brand is a part of them. Consumers will follow and defend their brands since brands offer an unmatched meaning and belonging (Goodman and Rushkoff 2003).

Through the utility of Twitter, the nine cases I followed appeared to instill brand loyalty among their followers. Though the limitations of this study did not permit me to interview followers about their perceptions of various Twitter cases, Twitter interactions in this study suggested connection, engagement, and, therefore, a certain degree of loyalty. I am not suggesting that the politicians I followed cater to their users in the same way that Starbucks does, but loyalty was likely achieved in both cases. The creation of brand loyalty is reminiscent of Goffman. After all, Goffman writes that it is in a person's interest to "control the conduct of others, especially their responsive treatment of him … by expressing himself in such a way as to give them the kind of impression that will lead them to act voluntarily in accordance with his own plan" (1959: 3-4). Thus, a person or brand must not only attempt to control their respective image; they must also heed to the responses that such an image evokes and make adjustments in order to influence an audience. As such, to extend Goffman's analysis on self-presentation, the Twitterself is a presentation meant to persuade others to consume an image, purchase its products, or act in the interest of a Twitter user.

TWEET RECIPIENTS: WHY WE FOLLOW

The users that I followed leveraged Twitter as a tool for making connections with their followers, often by crafting their Twitterself to engage followers. This paper examined Twitter through a Goffmanian lens to provide readers with a new way to think about the social function of Twitteras a novel form of communication *and* as a space that provides individuals and organizations with a unique forum for self presentation. By utilizing various tweeting methods, users craft a Twitterself in a way that is seemingly authentic and unmediated, yet simultaneously attuned to marketing strategies and expectations. This Twitterself is the contemporary and virtual version of Goffman's front stage. In my research, I found that the Twitterselves crafted by the nine case studies I followed position Twitter as a tool for sharing information, facilitating interaction, and, above all, for unique and carefully crafted self-promotion.

Despite the apparent success of these techniques, however; it seems appropriate to assess the strength of the connections that users make with followers. Is this connection real, and how strong is it? While I was unable to survey the followers of the individuals and organizations I followed for this

paper, the large and growing number of people following my case studies suggests that followers are gaining something from the experience of reading tweets. Furthermore, the data I collected revealed a significant degree of interaction between users and followers. As such, the cases in this research succeeded in crafting Twitterselves that continue to attract followers and keep them following their brand. Because Twitter can be updated in real time at any point, followers never know which users will share information or when they will receive it, and this alone likely keeps the average Twitter user engaged, hoping always to create new bonds with the users they follow.

Even more, Twitter provides tweet recipients with a sense of control that is unmatched in other venues. That is, participating in Twitter as a user or a follower is voluntary. Not only does an individual choose to join Twitter, she chooses whom she follows, and she chooses the users she wishes to communicate with directly. This unparalleled sense of control benefits both tweet recipients and producers. The recipients feel they are gaining something—namely, communication with public figures and companies—and because of this, the tweet producers are met with acceptance, and their marketing tactics are welcomed and even prompted. This is especially true when recipients feel their feedback and readership is important to users. It is, therefore, in the tweet producer's best interest to present himself in such a way that keeps his followers engaged.

Future research should focus on understanding the function of Twitter for the average user. This research would involve tracking public figures to more fully understand their connections with users (and the strength of brand loyalty that Twitter may foster) and to examine how the average person uses Twitter and for what purposes. While my research sought to understand only a small portion of Twitter's population and explain one of its functions, it is merely suggestive and in no way indicative of the use of Twitter for all users. Even in its infant stages, we have seen Twitter and other social networking sites foster social movements, break news and spread rumors, and provide marketing strategies for companies and brands. Given Twitter's rapidly growing popularity as well as the myriad of ways it can be applied to online media, this novel form of communication should continue to be an important site of analysis for future scholarship—both for the public and the academy.

NOTES

1. Since this paper was written and completed in 2010, Twitter has undergone many significant changes and has seen a huge increase in popularity. The case studies in this paper can now be seen as pioneers in their own right—using Twitter for communication, engagement, and promotion in a way that had never been done before. While this paper suggests that Twitter functions as a marketing strategy for these case studies in 2010, the reality of 2012 is that Twitter (and other forms of social media) are now widely used as marketing tools for brands and businesses. Had I been researching today, my research question might look at *how* businesses use Twitter as a marketing strategy, *why* Twitter fosters communication between celebrities and the average person, or *how* authentic the self-presentation of brands on Twitter really is. This is to say that my paper serves as an analysis of how Twitter was used in its relative infancy, and, therefore, should be read as a portrait of the time when it was written.

2. Microblogging is a term for posting short bursts of information on a website or social networking platform. Twitter is a microblogging website due to its 140-character post limit.

3. Twitterverse is defined as the cyberspace of and for twitter. This naturally extends beyond twitter.com to anywhere you can twitter, including cell phones and laptop computers (Urban Dictionary 2010).

4. Throughout the paper, I will refer to Ellen DeGeneres by her first name since this is how the media most commonly addresses her.

APPENDIX A: ALEXA DAILY TRAFFIC

Source: www.alexa.com 2010

APPENDIX B: TWEET BOOM



From the Twitter Blog entry, "Managing Tweets" (2010): "Folks were tweeting 5,000 times a day in 2007. By 2008, that number was 300,000, and by 2009 it had grown to 2.5 million per day. Tweets grew 1,400% last year to 35 million per day. Today, we are seeing 50 million tweets per day—that's an average of 600 tweets per second."

APPENDIX C: CASE STUDIES

Celebrities

@ladygaga: 3.5 Million Followers; 43 Tweets in January 2010
Singer and songwriter Lady Gaga's rising popularity helped her gain a substantial following on Twitter—up from 2.8 million in the February of 2010 (Hampp 2010). Her tweeting is in many ways a contrast to her career trajectory: straightforward and to the point. She projects an adoration for her fans (whom she addresses as "little monsters," named after her Album *The Fame Monster*), and uses Twitter to engage fans directly as well offer a glimpse into her everyday life. Lady Gaga appears to personally posts her own status updates.

@TheEllenShow: 4.3 Million Followers; 151 Tweets in January 2010
Ellen DeGeneres is well-known comedian, actress, and television personality. She hosts *The Ellen Show,* and also judged on the popular reality television show *American Idol.* She primarily uses her Twitter account to market herself and interact with fans and followers. Ellen's tweets are often self posted, but sometimes one of her personal assistants posts under her direction.

@lancearmstrong: 2.5 Followers; 187 Tweets in January 2010
Armstrong is a well-known cyclist, cancer survivor, and founder of the Livestrong foundation. In 2009, Lance Armstrong topped many lists for most popular celebrity tweeters. His tweets cover a range of topics, and often communicate directly with other Twitter users. He appears to personally update his Twitter account.

Businesses

@WholeFoods: 1.7 Million Followers; 196 Tweets in January 2010
Whole Foods Market is an organic grocery store that seems to consider Twitter a valuable asset for gaining customer feedback. The company has more than 100 specialized Twitter accounts, ranging from pages dedicated to sharing recipes ("@Wholerecipes") to accounts for each individual store location (i.e., Berkeley, CA Whole Foods location on Twitter, "@Wfmberkeley"). Its Twitter account offers store information and promotions as well as direct conversation between the company and their customers that focuses mostly on customer feedback and satisfaction. The Whole Foods Twitter account is updated from its global headquarters in Austin, Texas.

@Starbucks: 797, 215 Followers; 234 Tweets in January 2010
It seemed relevant to assess Starbucks' Twitter use since the coffee company has become a popular and integrated company in United States culture. The Starbucks website urges customers to: "See what people are saying about us and share your own thoughts. Coffee and conversation go together" (Starbucks 2010). Despite its small number of followers compared to Whole Foods, Starbucks seems to receive an immense amount of feedback, answered by "Brad at Starbucks in Seattle"—the "official tweeter" for Starbucks whose personal Twitter page concisely reveal his work: "In my real job, I tweet for @Starbucks" (www.twitter.com/bradnelson).

Politicians

@StevePoizner: 215,044 Followers; 38 Tweets in January 2010
Poizner hoped to be the Republican candidate in the California Gubernatorial election in November 2010. I followed him because I wanted to examine the role of Twitter in the campaigning process. It is unclear who updates his

Twitter account, but it appears to be a combination of both personal tweets and tweets made by others under his direction.

@JerryBrown: 1.2 Million Followers; 33 Tweets in January 2010
Democrat Jerry Brown competed against Poizner in the 2010 California gubernatorial election. I chose Brown for the same reasons as Poizner, and also because I hoped I would observe some friendly competition between the two. Like Poizner, it is unclear who updates Brown's Twitter account, but it is likely a combination of personal updates and updates made by others under his direction.

News Sources

@CNN: 1 Million Followers; 595 Tweets in January 2010
CNN is both a news website and broadcast news television station, ranked the most popular news website by www.alexa.com in 2010. On Twitter, *CNN* breaks news to followers, providing hyperlinks to its website. It also promotes various programs on its television station. It is unclear who tweets for *CNN*.

@latimes: 58,821 Followers; 654 Tweets in January 2010
The *Los Angeles Times* is a popular print newspaper and website, and generally caters to a much smaller and more concentrated audience than *CNN*. The *L.A. Times* boasts more than 70 separate Twitter accounts—from their most general account (which I observed for this paper) to accounts focused solely on the weather, entertainment, business, sports teams, and staff writers. The *L.A. Times* general Twitter account is updated by its editors.

APPENDIX D: TWEET GLOSSARY

@-reply: This term designates a tweet that engages two users in conversation, replies to another Twitter user, or tags another Twitter user in a post to show followers exactly who is being talked about or referred to in a given tweet. Even though they are typically directed toward a particular person, @-replies appear on the homepage. For example:

> @PerezHilton I just woke up and read your tweet. Made my morning!! (Swift November 15, 2009).

General Tweet: A general tweet is a text-only message that does not fit into one of the categories listed below. It does not use a Twitter-specific convention such as an @-reply or a re-tweet, and it does not provide a hyperlink to an outside source. General tweets most often convey one's thoughts or feelings, and occasionally address the Twitter world at large. For example:

> Figure skating is on, oh wait, I mean the Olympics (Armstrong February 19, 2010).

Hashtag: A hashtag refers the pound symbol or "#"and the key word that follows the hashtag is placed somewhere within a person's tweet.

> Did you know: Yukon Blend was created for the captain of a fishing fleet who wanted to keep his crew happy in chilly sub-arctic seas. #Bold (Starbucks March 9, 2010).

News/fact with URL: This term designates a URL tweet accompanied by text, which explains or refers to the content of the hyperlink. For example,

> What We're Reading: Conan's Twitter Buddy and New York in Pixels http://nyti.ms/bHW2nr (Nytimesbits March 9, 2010).

News/fact without URL: This term designates a text-based tweet that states a fact or presents news without a hyperlink to another website. For example:

> "The Hurt Locker" won the best picture Oscar Sunday night (*CNN* March 7, 2010).

Other: Tweets classified as "Other" would include anything that did not fit into the above categories

Picture: A picture tweet includes text and a hyperlink to a picture. For example:

> http://twitpic.com/112xya - look what i did last night. little

> monsters forever, on the arm that holds my mic. Xx (Lady Gaga February 2, 2010).

Promotion: A promotional post markets or promotes a person, product, television show, live appearance, event, or sale related to the Twitter user. For example:

> Deal: Get a FREE Targus® Mode Messanger Bag with the purchase of any Dell Outlet Home Laptop! http://bit.ly/77fUFG (Dell Outlet December 9, 2009).

RT: A re-tweet (RT) is a tweet that re-posts another user's tweet with the phrase "RT@" in front of the tweet to tag. An RT may or may not include extra text added by the re-tweeter. For example:

> RT @SheriSalata if you need some perspective today about life watch film critic roger ebert on @TheOprahShow today. it is an uplifting WOW (Winfrey March 2, 2010).

URL: This term refers to a text only post in the form of a URL or hyperlink to another website. For example:

> http://twitpic.com/12qwsl (Lady Gaga February 12, 2010).

YouTube Video: A YouTube video tweet that usually includes text followed by a hyperlink to a video posted on YouTube. For example:

> This is incredibly cool. Please watch. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=53xa5DHwvG4 (Armstrong February 4, 2010).

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

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Michael Burawoy teaches Sociology at the University of California, Berkeley.

With bachelor's degrees in Working Life Studies and Social Sciences from the University of Roskilde, **Pil Christensen** is in the final stages of completing her master's degree in Sociology at the University of Copenhagen. Her thesis focuses on private debt and how this debt became an important part of the economy. In addition, her work highlights how power is exercised through debt during economic crises. As part of her master's program, Christensen spent one year as a visiting student at the University of California, Berkeley in the 2010-11 academic year. With a strong interest in converting her academic knowledge into practice, Christensen has continuously participated in numerous community-level projects. She has given numerous lectures and taught workshops to various trade unions, students, and grassroots organizations. Christensen has also participated in debates in connection with Danish and European social forums and student-political conferences. As part of her work to bring academic perspectives into the public sphere, she maintains a political blog and regularly participates in television and radio debates and interviews. In 2009, in addition to writing several articles and contributing to numerous research reports, Christensen wrote a chapter in the book *Værdikampe – Økonomi og Samfund* [*Value Battles*]. Most recently, in 2011, she co-authored an introduction to the collected works of the political philosophers Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri.

Sarah Fleishman received her BA in Sociology from the University of California, Berkeley in 2010. She was awarded highest honors for her undergraduate thesis entitled "Crafting the Twitterself: The Social and Promotional Utility of Microblogging," which explored the marketing powers of Twitter through a sociological lens. After graduation, Fleishman began work as a social media consultant for various businesses in Los Angeles, California. As an intern for Access Networks, a tech company in Los Angeles, she created and maintained a social media and digital marketing strategy for the business. She is currently the marketing manager at Access Networks, working with the executive team to manage the brand and execute all marketing collateral—both digital and print.

Ida Johanne Warnes Kjeøy is a Norwegian sociology student at the University of Oslo, where she is currently pursuing her MA degree. Academically, Kjeøy has a perennial and particular interest in transnational approaches, having studied International Relations before delving into sociology. She has extensive training in theoretical issues, particularly with an emphasis in Bourdieusian theory, and has previously written on the fruitfulness of bringing Bourdieu into the transnational field. Kjeøy has been an advocate of a public sociology in Norway, and she recently coordinated the course "Public Sociology, Live!" at the University of Oslo. In line with her transnational agenda, Kjeøy has not only pursued degrees in her own country, but also studied at the American University of Cairo and the University of California, Berkeley. She is currently affiliated with the EUMAGINE project, led by scholars at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRiO) and the University of Oxford.

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All manuscripts must be typed and double-spaced with 1-inch margins on all sides. The submission must included numbered pages. All text (including titles, headings, and footnotes) should be in Times New Roman, 12-point font.

In general, we recommend submissions not to have too complex a hierarchy of sections and subsections. In the case of a heading, the title should be separated from the preceding paragraph by two (2) lines and one (1) line from the proceeding paragraph. The heading should appear in 12-point boldface type, left justified. In the case of a sub-heading, the title should be separated from both preceding and proceeding paragraphs by a single (1) line. The sub-heading should appear in 12-point italicized type, left justified. Block quotes, used for long quotes, should be 12-point, full justified, and not indented. The block quote should be set off from the rest of the article by a single line both before and after. The margins should be set in another half (1/2) inch on both the left and right sides.

Endnotes should be used for concise supplementary comments. Please consider only using endnotes for significant additions to the article. Any long or especially complicated supplementary material should be included in the appendices rather than endnotes or made available from the author on request. Table and figure titles should be normal text. Tables should also be numbered consecutively throughout the article and may be included on separate sheets. In the latter case, insert a note at the appropriate place in the text. Each table must include a descriptive title and heading for each column.

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Submissions should follow the American Sociological Association (ASA) *Style Guide* (Fourth Edition). All citations in the text should be identified by the author's last name, year of publication, and pagination (if necessary). Identify later citations in the same way as the first. If there are more than three authors of a single work, use "et al." Citations should follow the following format: (Author Year:Pagenumber). If there are multiple citations, separate each citation with a semicolon (";") and a space: (Author Year:Pagenumber; Author Year:Pagenumber).

References should come at the end of the paper and should be prefaced with the heading "References" in 12-point boldface type, left justified. The reference entries themselves should be formatted according to the American Sociological Association (ASA) *Style Guide* (Fourth Edition).

"The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to *change* it."

–Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach"